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ABSTRACT
The Inner Experience of Older Individuals
by
Todd Michael Seibert
Dr. Russell T. Hurlburt, Examination Committee Chair
Professor of Psychology
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
Older individuals are susceptible to the development of numerous age-related
neurodegenerative disorders including Alzheimer’s Disease and Vascular Dementia.
This is continuing to become a more serious social, financial, medical, and psychological
problem as the average life span continues to increase across the world. Nevertheless,
very little is known about the inner experience of older individuals. This study used
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) to investigate the inner experience of twelve
older individuals with and without cognitive impairment. Five of six unimpaired
individuals were able to engage successfully in DES compared to only one individual
with cognitive impairment. The findings suggest that DES is extremely sensitive to
cognitive impairment and older individuals may lack certain aspects of inner experience.
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION
Approximately 4.5 million people in the United States had Alzheimer’s Disease (AD)
in the year 2000 (Hebert, Scherr, Bienias, Bennett, & Evans, 2003). Because human
lifespan is increasing at a substantial rate and the risk of developing AD increases greatly
with age, AD is quickly becoming a public health disaster (Lopez et al., 2000). Average
life expectancy in industrialized nations is increasing at a historic rate (National Institute
on Aging, 2000). In 2003, the average life expectancy for individuals living in the United
States was 77.6 years (National Center for Health Statistics, 2005). This number is
expected to climb quickly as medical science continues to make important advances in
health care (National Institute on Aging, 2000). It is predicted that life expectancy in
industrialized nations will reach 82.9 years by the year 2050 (National Institute on Aging,
2000).
Approximately 0.7 percent of people who are 65 years of age have AD, 12 to 13
percent of people at age 85 have the disease, approximately 23 percent at age 90, and 38
to 39 percent at age 95 (APA, 2000). If there is no discovery of a cure for AD or a way
to prevent AD, the number of individuals in the United States with AD in 2050 is
expected to triple relative to 2000 to 13.2 million people (Hebert et al., 2003). Currently,
caring for individuals with AD costs an estimated $100 billion a year in the United States
(National Institute on Aging, 2006). This number is likely to increase substantially as the
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baby-boomers move into advanced stages of aging (Graff-Radford, 2003; National
Institute on Aging, 2006). When one combines the rapidly increasing life span of
humans and the prevalence of AD in relation to age, there is clearly a potentially
disastrous situation in front of us. In fact, AD is already being called “the disease of the
century” (Whitehouse, Maurer, & Ballenger, 2000).
The need for effective treatment and management of the disorder is urgent
(Parasuraman, 2004). Fortunately, the scientific community has recognized the urgency
of the situation and significant research has focused on the risk factors of the disease
(Ballard, 2002). Unfortunately, the scientific community’s understanding of the disease,
specifically its ability to detect, prevent, and treat the disease, although recently much
improved, has not increased in harmony with the number of those the disease affects.
Cures for the disease have not been found and do not appear to be on the horizon.
Small developments in the diagnosis and treatment of AD can have a substantial
impact on the mental and physical health of individuals with AD, their families, as well
as a major financial impact (Leifer, 2006). Even a small slowing of decline could save
billions of dollars. Ernst, Hay, Fenn, Tinklenberg, and Yesavage (1997) estimated that if
treatment could improve the scores of individuals with AD on the Mini-Mental State
Exam (MMSE) (Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) by 2 points, a modest increment,
$7,000 per year could be saved per AD patient. This translates to saving approximately
31.5 million dollars currently and a projected 92.4 million dollars in 2050 in the United
States alone. Therefore, although a cure or prevention for AD is ideal, even small steps
in improving diagnosis and treatment can have a tremendous benefit to the community as
a whole.
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Research has clearly shown that AD is a degenerative disease that develops far before
it is readily apparent or diagnosable (Kawas et al., 2003). Some studies suggest that both
cognitive and neurological signs (i.e.,, neurofibrillary tangles and amyloid plaques,
sometimes called senile plaques) of AD can be present up to 50 years before it is
diagnosed (Snowden et al., 1996). Snowden et al. (1996) studied autobiographies written
by nuns upon entering a convent at an average age of 22 years. The researchers analyzed
the last ten sentences of each autobiography and calculated the idea density (i.e., the
average number of ideas expressed in every ten words) in these sentences. The study
showed that idea density in the nuns’ writing correlated highly negatively with the later
development of AD. In fact, low idea density was present in childhood in 90 percent of
those who developed AD while low idea density was present in only 13 percent of those
who did not develop AD. Furthermore, individuals who eventually develop AD make
significantly more errors on a test of non-verbal memory (the Benton Visual Retention
Test) up to 15 years before a diagnosis of AD (Kawas et al., 2003). LaRue and Jarvick
(1980) found that certain subtests of the WAIS predicted dementia two decades before
symptomatology arose. Sixty-seven percent of individuals who scored in the bottom
fourth of Coding eventually experienced dementia, 75 percent who scored in the bottom
fourth of Vocabulary developed dementia, and 85 percent of those scoring in the bottom
fourth of Similarities eventually experienced dementia (LaRue & Jarvick, 1980).
Although these studies suggest that there are cognitive differences among individuals
who eventually develop AD and those who do not, effective early diagnosis remains
elusive.
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Neurobiological evidence also suggests that the process of AD may be in place well
before it can be clinically diagnosed. The hippocampus and brain regions associated with
the hippocampus are especially altered well before clinical diagnosis can be made (Braak
& Braak, 1995), and multiple cortical and subcortical areas appear to exhibit dysfunction
before AD can be diagnosed (Backman, Jones, Berger, Laukka, & Small, 2005).
Furthermore, amyloid plaques may be present and continue to accumulate before the
symptomatology of AD can be detected (Zamrini, De Santi, & Tolar, 2004). Finally,
evidence of inflammation associated with neuronal death is often observed before the
development of neurofibrillary tangles and amyloid plaques and well before clinical
symptoms appear (Rosenberg, 2005). Because the disease process begins before clinical
symptoms appear, preclinical diagnosis is crucial so that treatments can be used to change
the course of the disease’s progression (Desai & Grossberg, 2005).
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CHAPTER 2

REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE
Alzheimer’s Disease – History, Presentation, and Course
AD was first identified by Alois Alzheimer in 1907 when he published the case of
Auguste D., a 51 year old woman Alzheimer treated in Frankfurt, Germany (Maurer,
Volk, & Gerbaldo, 2000). Alzheimer noted symptoms in the woman that included
cognitive deficiencies that became progressively worse over time, disorientation to time
and place, hallucinations, delusions, and a general inability to function in a socially
appropriate manner (Maurer et al., 2000). After 4 ½ years of being in Alzheimer’s care,
Auguste D. died (Maurer et al., 2000). At this time Alzheimer performed an autopsy and
discovered that Auguste D.’s brain contained neurofibrillary tangles and amyloid plaques
(Maurer et al., 2000). It was this key finding of neurofibrillary tangles and amyloid
plaques that allowed for an enhanced understanding of this disease (Morris & Becker,
2004a). Emil Kraeplin first coined the term “Alzheimer’s Disease” in 1910 (Maurer et al.,
2000).
The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) classifies dementia of the Alzheimer’s type, or AD, as
a memory impairment that must be accompanied by aphasia (language disturbance),
apraxia (motor disturbance), agnosia (inability to identify objects), or deficiencies in
executive functions. Furthermore, cognitive difficulties must progress in a gradual and
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continuous manner (APA, 2000). The DSM-IV-TR also differentiates between early
onset (appearing under 65 years of age, also called familial AD due to apparent
hereditary nature) and late onset (appearing after 65 years of age, also called sporadic AD
due to apparent non-hereditary nature) as well as with and without behavioral
disturbances (APA, 2000). AD is the most common form of dementia (APA, 2000;
Misciagna, Masullo, Giordano, & Silveri, 2005; The Dementia Study Group of the Italian
Neurological Society, 2000; Morris & Becker, 2004b; Leifer, 2003).
The most used diagnostic criteria for AD are those developed by the National
Institute of Neurological and Communicative Disorders and Stroke-Alzheimer’s Disease
and Related Disorders Association (NINCDS-ADRDA; Lopez et al., 2000; The Dementia
Study Group of the Italian Neurological Society, 2000). The NINCDS-ADRDA criteria
are used to diagnose either probable or possible AD (Morris & Becker, 2004b; Lopez &
Becker, 2004). Probable AD is diagnosed when AD seems to be the only likely cause of
the dementia (Morris & Becker, 2004b; Lopez & Becker, 2004). Possible AD is
diagnosed when it appears that AD may be present but the onset and/or course of the
disease is atypical (Lopez et al., 2000) or the dementia could be due at least in part to
another neurodegenerative disorder (Morris & Becker, 2004b). The reliability and
validity of these standards have proven to be excellent in a variety of studies (Mayeux et
al., 1998).
As mentioned above, there are many cognitive deficits associated with AD. Some
theorize that this is due to a general factor that is compromised in AD that affects
cognitive functioning globally. Many researchers identify slowing of processing speed as
a likely candidate for this general factor, although there is substantial disagreement about
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this issue in the literature (see Baddeley, Baddeley, Bucks, & Wilcock, 2001 for a
review). Auditory memory problems can often be accounted for by a decrease in the
speed of processing of auditory information (Just & Carpenter, 1992). Specifically, there
appears to be a deficiency in processing the semantic component of words (Just &
Carpenter, 1992).
Still, the most identifiable deficiency in AD is memory impairment, not slow
processing speed, although processing speed could be a mediating factor in memory
impairment. The one cognitive symptom that is required for a diagnosis of AD is
substantial memory impairment (APA, 2000). Accordingly, the most common initial
clinical presentation of AD is subjective report of forgetfulness (Petersen, 2003). The
ability to form new memories is usually depleted first, but later in the course of AD
retrieval of already formed memories typically deteriorates greatly (Kopelman, 1985).
As AD progresses, virtually all areas of memory are impaired (Greene, Hodges, &
Baddeley, 1995). Nevertheless, in spite of the tremendous amount of research done on
this topic, the exact cognitive nature of the memory impairment in AD is not entirely
clear (Overman & Becker, 2004).
The course and presentation of AD is highly variable among individuals and there is
much debate regarding what deficiencies most typically manifest first in AD.
Historically, episodic memory has been identified as the symptom that presents first and
is the most readily noticed in early AD. Nevertheless, many other symptoms appear to be
present very early in the course of the disease, including problems with semantic
memory, working memory, attention, inhibition, learning, and language. Deficiencies in
episodic memory are often the most pervasive problem in people with AD (Overman &
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Becker, 2004; Collette & Van Der Linden, 2004; Rusted & Clare, 2004) and are typically
the most severe cognitive deficits in the early stages of the disease (Overman & Becker,
2004). Tests of delayed episodic recall can often effectively distinguish between AD
and normal aging early in the progress of AD (Germano & Kinsella, 2005). Although
individuals with AD often seem to remember the fact that a particular event occurred,
they often do not remember it directly or ascribe any personal relevance to the memory
(Overman & Becker, 2004). Individuals with AD often exhibit difficulty remembering
when they had initially viewed a picture or group of pictures, a key part of successful
episodic memory (Rickert, Duke, Putzke, Marson, & Graham, 1998).
It was once believed that difficulties in episodic memory were primarily due to
retrieval, but research over the past decade has suggested that deficient encoding is the
primary difficulty in episodic memory for individuals with AD (for a review, see
Germano & Kinsella, 2005). Still, the deficiency in episodic memory appears to be due
to both encoding and retrieval problems (Overman & Becker, 2004). There is evidence
that forgetting is not increased in episodic memory, but rather information either does not
enter memory or is not encoded properly in the acquisition phase (Perry, Watson, &
Hodges, 2000).
Semantic memory is also impaired throughout the course of AD (Garrard, Patterson,
& Hodges, 2004; Overman & Becker, 2004) and is often present in the early stages of
AD (Ramsden, Kinsella, Ong, & Storey, 2008). Semantic fluency deficits can be a
sensitive measure of early AD (Ramsden et al., 2008). The reason for this difficulty is
still debated among researchers. Some argue that it is due to a break down of meaningful
links between semantically-related information while others argue that access to the
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memories themselves are compromised (for a review, see Findler, 2000). Inhibition
problems may be part of the reason for semantic memory deficits as well. Individuals
with AD exhibit increased difficulty in learning word-lists (for a review, see Overman &
Becker, 2004) with high rates of intrusion errors (i.e., reporting words that were not
present on the word list) when recalling lists of words as well as low rates of recognition
(Overman & Becker, 2004). High rates of intrusion also occur when freely recalling
stories (Overman & Becker, 2004).
Semantic memory problems associated with AD often occur in an ordered manner.
Typically more specific information in semantic memory is lost or impaired first with
more general semantic information following (Margolin, Pate, & Friedrich, 1996). For
example, studies have shown that individuals in the early stages of AD have significant
impairment in object-naming tasks that require the retrieval of a specific referent (Martin
& Fedio, 1983) and have difficulty making distinctions between words that are similar
semantically (Warrington, 1975). However, tasks requiring the use of knowledge of a
more general nature, such as tests of vocabulary, remain relatively unimpaired in early
AD (Martin & Fedio, 1983), although individuals with AD eventually exhibit dysfunction
in this area as the disease progresses (Margolin et al., 1996).
There is conflicting evidence regarding the existence, extent, and nature of implicit
memory impairment in individuals with AD (Meirin & Jelicic, 1995). A meta-analysis of
research on implicit memory in AD suggests that there is a small decrease in implicit
memory in individuals with AD (Meirin & Jelicic, 1995). This meta-analysis also found
that the level of impairment fluctuated as a function of the type of test. Individuals with
AD did not show impairment on word-based implicit memory tests that were perceptual
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in nature (such as word-stem priming tasks) that did not exceed a ten minute gap between
the initial presentation and the later retrieval phase (Meirin & Jelicic, 1995). However,
implicit memory was impaired when it involved conceptual tasks, free association,
category generation, and tasks that were non-verbal in nature (Meirin & Jelici, 1995).
Implicit memory seems to be relatively unaffected in Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI),
even in those who later converted to AD (Perri, Serra, Carlesimo, & Caltagirone, 2007).
Memory difficulties in AD can also be viewed through the three stages of memory,
sensory memory, short-term or working memory, and long-term memory. There is very
little research on sensory memory in AD. However, there has been some research that
has shown that electrical activity that is related to auditory sensory memory is impaired in
individuals with AD. Specifically, the amplitude of the event related potential elicited by
tones that are related to auditory sensory memory are decreased in individuals with AD,
suggesting a possible increase in the rate of sensory memory decay (Pekkonen, Jousmaki,
Kononen, & Reinikainen, 1994).
There is still debate regarding the nature of a decrease in working memory capacity
and efficiency in normal aging (for a review, see Lund, 1997). However, there is strong
evidence that supports the existence of working memory dysfunction throughout the
course of AD as well as very early in the progress of the disease (see Belleville,
Chertkow, & Gauthier, 2007). Manipulation of information, divided attention, and
inhibition, all key components of effective working memory, are impaired even in mild
AD (Belleville et al., 2007). Deficiencies in passive short-term storage of information is
also found in individuals with mild AD (Belleville et al., 2007) although there is some
conflicting evidence about this deficit (see Germano & Kinsella, 2005). There is strong
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evidence to suggest that the central executive portion of working memory is impaired in
AD and is among the first cognitive functions to decline in AD, although the reason for
this decline is not entirely clear (Germano & Kinsella, 2005).
Manipulation of information in working memory via elaboration and rehearsal seems
to be especially impaired in individuals with AD. People with AD do not seem to benefit
from contextual cues at the time of encoding, including elaboration, rehearsal, and other
encoding strategies (Findler, 2000; Sadasivan, 1989). Furthermore, verbal memory
deficiencies in AD have been hypothesized to be partially due to slower rates of subvocal
rehearsal (Hulme, Lee, & Brown, 1993). Vocal rehearsal was found to require more
frontal lobe activation in individuals with AD compared to unimpaired older individuals,
suggesting a decrease in efficiency and use of resources in AD when rehearsal is required
(Woodard et al., 1998).
One key component of forming successful memories is converting information stored
temporarily in working memory to long-term memory. There is evidence that this
conversion is problematic in AD. For example, the primacy effect is often reduced in
individuals with AD, indicating that information can be stored for a short period of time
but is often not successfully transferred from working memory into long-term storage (for
a review, see Overman & Becker, 2004; Findler, 2000). It appears that problems in
episodic memory may be at least partially due to the inability to transfer information
effectively from working memory to long-term memory (Overman & Becker, 2004). It is
possible that individuals with AD do not use techniques of elaboration properly, thus not
allowing information to be effectively encoded and moved to long-term memory
(Overman & Becker, 2004).
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Deficits in immediate memory are more noticeably compromised than problems with
long-term memory in individuals with AD at the early stages of the disease. However, as
the disease progresses, long-term memories become substantially affected. Still,
problems with long-term memory can be seen early in the disease via neuropsychological
testing (Ramsden et al., 2008). Individuals with AD perform worse on tests of delayed
memory than elderly individuals with no cognitive impairment as well as older
individuals with other types of dementia, such as Vascular Dementia (VaD) and frontotemporal dementia (Braaten, Parsons, McCue, Sellers, & Burns, 2006). Individuals with
AD often make source monitoring errors when recalling information as well (Benjamin &
Craik, 2001). As mentioned above, problems with long-term memory seem to be at least
partially due to difficulties transferring information from working memory to long-term
storage (Findler, 2000).
Another way to think of memory dysfunction in AD is to view it in terms of the three
processes necessary to form successful memories; encoding, storage, and retrieval.
Although the memory deficits observed in AD were once thought to be primarily due to
retrieval, it appears that encoding problems play an even larger role (for a review, see
Germano & Kinsella, 2005). It appears that problems with memory that are presented in
an auditory manner are largely due to encoding (Lund, 1997). There is also some
evidence that encoding of semantic information can be highly compromised, even more
so than in some other types of dementia (Granholm & Butters, 1988). Individuals with
AD also seem to require deeper encoding to make full use of cues in cued retrieval
conditions (Lipinska & Backman, 1997). Nevertheless, the literature is highly

12

contradictory regarding the extent and nature of encoding deficits in individuals with AD
at various stages of the disease (see Lund, 1997).
There is also highly conflicting evidence regarding the existence of a reduced
capacity to passively store information in AD (for a review, see Germano & Kinsella,
2005). Most research suggests that the primary deficits in memory in AD are due to
problems with encoding and retrieval where storage is not a primary issue (for a review,
see Germano & Kinsella, 2005).
There is evidence that individuals with AD have difficulty with the retrieval stage of
the memory process. Some researchers have suggested that a primary difficulty in
memory for individuals with AD is an inability to organize information in memory via
effective retrieval strategies (Findler, 2000). However, there is conflicting evidence
regarding the extent and nature of retrieval deficiencies in AD. Deficiencies in free recall
are highly prevalent throughout AD while the evidence is mixed regarding the presence
of a decline in recognition although some researchers suggest that cued recognition offers
virtually no benefit to individuals with AD (Massman, Delis, Butters, Dupont, & Gillan,
1992). Retrieval deficits have been exhibited in both immediate and delayed word recall
tasks (Overman & Becker, 2004). Still, other authors suggest that individuals with AD
experience difficulties with both recognition tasks and retrieval tasks supposedly due to
an inability to successfully consolidate information (Lezak, 1995) and utilize effective
retrieval strategies (Ramsden et al., 2008).
Perhaps one of the best representations of the retrieval process in individuals with AD
is the word-stem completion priming effect in older individuals and individuals with AD.
The word-stem completion priming effect occurs when individuals study a list of words
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and are then given word-stems from the list. People are more likely to respond with a
word from the previously studied list than another word. For example, if individuals are
given the word stem “tru” and the word “trust” was presented in the studied list, it is most
likely that individuals will complete the word as “trust” instead of other possibilities,
such as “truck” or “trumpet.” Deficiencies in word-priming are thought to represent an
underlying deficiency in retrieval (Fleischman et al., 1999).
Individuals can either be given direct instructions to use the word stem to remember a
word from the list (explicit instructions) or are simply asked to complete the word stem
with the first word the comes to mind (implicit instructions). When explicit instructions
are used, older individuals typically remember fewer words from the list than younger
individuals but under implicit instructions there is typically no difference (see Fleischman
et al., 1999). Priming in individuals with AD appears to be similar to normal elderly
when AD is mild, but there is less of a priming effect as dementia severity increases
(Fleischman et al., 1999). This is thought to be evidence for a progressive retrieval
deficit in AD that continues as the disease progresses (Fleischman et al., 1999).
As mentioned above, memory is not the only impairment that occurs very early in the
course of AD. Executive functioning is well established as an early symptom of AD
(Collette & Van Der Linden, 2004; Salthouse & Becker, 1998) and includes deficiencies
in inhibition (Overman & Becker, 2004) and attention (Parasuraman, 2004). Executive
functioning difficulties have been demonstrated in pre-clinical AD and have been shown
on a wide variety of measures in early AD, including dual-task paradigms and the Stroop
test (for a review, see Collette & Van Der Linden, 2004). Neuropsychological batteries
have shown deficits in executive functioning in non-diagnosed individuals who
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eventually develop AD relative to those who do not develop AD (Fabrigoule et al., 1998).
Deficiencies in executive functioning specifically are suggested to be a factor that
contributes to the existence of a number of other cognitive deficiencies (Salthouse &
Becker, 1998).
Two important cognitive functions that fall under the umbrella of executive
functioning are attention and inhibition. Deficits in attention have been established in
normal aging as well as in AD (Pignatti et al., 2005). However, normal older individuals
show no more decrease in comprehension when there is distracting background noise
than younger individuals (Van Gerven, Meijer, Vermeeren, Vuurman, & Jolles, 2007)
and often do not exhibit deficiencies in dual-task paradigms compared to younger
individuals (Baddeley, Bressi, Della Sala, Logie, & Spinnler, 1991). In individuals with
AD, attention is affected broadly and is often the first non-memory related cognitive
function to noticeably decline, even before language deficits (Perry & Hodges, 1999;
Parasuraman, 2004). Many researchers feel that the deficiencies in working memory that
are experienced in individuals with AD are due to problems with attention, making AD
primarily a disorder of attention (Parasuraman, 2004).
Attention deficiencies may progress in an ordered manner in AD with attentional
switching abilities being decreased first and the ability to sustain attention being affected
last (Norman & Shallice, 1987). Compared to unimpaired individuals, those with AD
show a steeper decline in the ability to switch attention in dual-task paradigms when there
is especially high cognitive demand (Baddeley et al., 1991; Ramsden et al., 2008). In
fact, attentional switching seems to be differentially impaired to a greater extent than
other forms of attention in AD (Ramsden et al., 2008). This specific difficulty with
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cognitive functioning and attention in conditions of high cognitive demand is interpreted
by some as evidence for a decline in general cognitive resources in individuals with AD
(for a review, see Ramsden et al., 2008). This suggests that cognitive dysfunction that is
related to attention will increase as the amount of information that needs to be processed
and ignored increases.
Visual-spatial switching is also compromised in AD (for a review, see Findler, 2000).
Visual-spatial problems with attention in AD have been documented in a variety of ways,
including visual-spatial attentional shifting, finding objects among similar objects in
visual search tasks, abnormal eye movements in visual scanning tasks, focusing on small
parts of the visual field, decreased examination of novel aspects of complex visual
scenes, and decreased examination of facial expressions that show emotion (for a review,
see Parasuraman, 2004). Individuals with AD have difficulty focusing on visual
information in the periphery of the visual field as well as switching attention to this area,
especially under conditions that require a high amount of cognitive processing (Norman
& Shallice, 1987). Other problems with attention include a reduction in the speed and
accuracy in letter search tasks that could represent problems with sustained attention in
individuals with AD (Baddeley et al., 2001) and a relatively difficult time resisting
distraction in general (see Germano & Kinsella, 2005).
Inhibition is also compromised in individuals with AD, and is even commonly
deficient in normal aging (Pignatti et al., 2005). Deficiencies in the ability to
successfully perform in dual-task situations in people with AD can be viewed as evidence
for inhibitory dysfunction (Morris, 1996). Furthermore, individuals with AD tend to
make errors of intrusion in memory tasks, suggesting a deficiency in the ability to inhibit
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incorrect responses (Overman & Becker, 2004; Finlder, 2000). This suggests that at
least part of the memory deficit experienced by those with AD is due to deficits in
inhibition (Overman & Becker, 2004). Also, although individuals with AD do not seem
to be distracted by irrelevant background speech at a greater level than normal elderly or
even younger individuals, when individuals with AD are tested on higher-order cognitive
processes with the presence of significant irrelevant background speech, they show more
slowing relative to unimpaired older and younger adults (Van Gerven et al., 2007). Still,
the exact nature of inhibition difficulties is unclear as conflicting evidence has been
produced, although problems with interference and semantic inhibition appear to be
present in most individuals with AD (for a review, see Collette & Van Der Linden, 2004).
Clearly, because memory is compromised in AD universally, so is the ability to learn.
The inability to learn new information is a hallmark sign of early AD (for a review, see
Germano & Kinsella, 2005). Learning impairments are present in the very early stages of
AD and continue to decline until they are entirely lost as the disease progresses (Martin,
Brouwers, Cox, & Fedio, 1985). These impairments are broad and occur across a wide
range of modalities (Greene, Baddeley, & Hodges, 1996). For example, Greene et al.
(1996) found that individuals with AD exhibited a much flatter learning curve in both
verbal and visual-spatial information requiring both recognition and recall at delayed and
immediate intervals compared to older individuals without AD. This deficit in learning
appears to be primarily due to encoding deficits at the time of acquisition rather than
problems with forgetting (for a review, see Germano & Kinsella, 2005).
Some researchers view the hallmark symptom of episodic memory decline as an
inability to learn from contextual information at the time of encoding (Germano &
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Kinsella, 2005). Impaired learning at acquisition appears to be deficient in the early
stages of AD (Grober & Kawas, 1997) suggesting substantial encoding deficiencies in
AD, although the reason for this acquisition deficit is not well understood (Germano &
Kisella, 2005). Individuals with AD often do not benefit from repeated learning trials as
much as younger individuals or normal elderly (Findler, 2000) and repeated trials do not
benefit normal elderly as much as younger individuals (Lund, 1997). Deficits in learning
seem to be largely due to both deficiencies in encoding and an inability to transfer
information from working memory to long-term memory (Findler, 2000). Verbal
learning in general seems to decrease with age (Van der Elst, Van Boxtel, Van
Breukelen, & Jolles, 2005).
Deficiencies in language are also a common component of AD throughout the disease
and is also present to a lesser extent in normal aging. Although many people associate
AD primarily with difficulties with memory, linguistic problems are perhaps just as
pervasive while declines in language functioning in the normal elderly population often
appear insignificant and uncommon (Meguro et al., 2001). Still, older individuals
process both written and spoken language more slowly than the general population (Just
& Carpenter, 1992). The most common linguistic problem in AD is nominal aphasia, the
inability to think of a person’s name (Kertesz, 2004; for a review, see Sabat, 1994a), and
problems writing meaningful letters (Bayles & Tomoeda, 1991). These three problems
are typically the first linguistic problems to appear in AD (Bayles & Tomoeda, 1991).
Nominal aphasia specifically has a clearly progressive pattern that begins early in the
disease and declines steadily (Cummings & Benson, 1989).
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There are often four phases of language disturbance in AD: anomic (or nominal)
aphasia (difficulty naming objects in spite of intact speech fluency), transcortical sensory
aphasia (poor comprehension despite largely intact speech production), Wernicke’s
aphasia (difficulty understanding speech and producing meaningful speech), and global
aphasia (aphasia in most or all domains; Mathews, Obler, & Alber, 1994). Other
common linguistic problems include the inability to complete sentences, difficulty with
reading comprehension, a tendency to produce meaningless sentences (part of
Wernicke’s aphasia), the inability to spell words correctly (Bayles & Tomoeda, 1991),
and problems generating word lists that are lexically and categorically related (Barr &
Brandt, 1996). Some research shows that spelling problems develop in three ordered
phases; lexical, then phonological, then peripheral (Lambert, Eustache, & Viader, 1996).
This is important not only to the initial detection of AD but also may indicate how far
along the individual may be in the progress of the disease. Phonological and syntactic
language functions are often relatively well preserved over the course of AD (for a
review, see Sabat, 1994a).
Difficulty with the expression and processing of emotion and anosognosia also occurs
in AD. Individuals with AD often have difficulty interpreting non-verbal signals of
emotion in others, although this is likely due to cognitive declines that are not within the
affective realm and not a direct compromise of affective processing (Zaitchik & Albert,
2004). Anosognosia, or the lack of awareness that one has a neurological disease, is
common in individuals with AD and varies in degree among individuals (Morris &
Hannesdottir, 2004). Anosognosia is especially problematic in AD because individuals
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cannot alter their potentially dangerous behavior in response to knowledge of the disease
(Morris & Hannesdottier, 2004).
Non-cognitive symptoms also appear in AD. A number of disturbances in motor
function are possible in AD, although the presentation of these disturbances often differs
greatly among individuals (Kidron & Freedman, 2004). Common motor disturbances
include rigidity, tremors, seizures, motor retardation, disturbances in gait, apraxia,
agnosia, and difficulties grasping and sucking (Kidron & Freedman, 2004). Other noncognitive symptoms include changes in personality and behavior as well as deficits in the
ability to perform activities of daily living (Desai & Grossberg, 2005). The development
of maladaptive behavior patterns can be especially dangerous for individuals with AD
and problematic for caregivers (The Dementia Study Group of the Italian Neurological
Society, 2000). Psychotic symptoms are also present in a subset of individuals. Sixteen
percent of individuals with AD have delusions whereas 10 to 13 percent experience
hallucinations (Allen & Burns, 1995). Depression is also present in a majority of
individuals with AD (Allen & Burns, 1995).
The overall course of AD is highly variable among individuals. Typically,
individuals with AD will lose about 3 to 4 points from their scores on the MMSE for
every year they have the disease (APA, 2000; Lopez et al., 2002; Hogan & Patterson,
2002). However, many researchers have suggested that in between the slow progression
of AD there are periods of plateau where there is little noticeable cognitive decline. After
an initial plateau phase that often occurs after a subtle decline in memory, many
individuals decrease at a steady rate, although this rate often varies among individuals
(Haxby, Raffaele, Gillette, Shapiro, & Rapoport, 1992). Rates of decline can be up to
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four times different among individuals (Haxby et al., 1992). There can be a number of
plateau phases during the course of AD and typically plateaus occur before the decline of
non-memory cognitive functioning (Haxby et al., 1992). Although AD progresses
somewhat idiosyncratically, it typically lasts from 7 to 15 years ending in death
(Bouchard & Rosser, 1999).
Symptoms that occur in the later stages of AD often involve a further decrease of
cognitive abilities on a global scale as well as the presence of emotional difficulties such
as depression and anxiety (Allen & Burns, 1995). Psychotic symptoms including
hallucinations and delusions often occur in the later stages of AD as well (Allen & Burns,
1995).

The Neurology of Alzheimer’s Disease
Neurologically, AD is characterized by the presence of neurofibrillary tangles (made
of phosphorylated tau protein; Desai & Grossberg, 2005), amyloid plaques (consisting of
amyloid protein; The Dementia Study Group of the Italian Neurological Society, 2000),
neuronal degeneration, loss of synapses (Desai & Grossberg, 2005; Gomez-Isla &
Hyman, 2003; Lopez & Bell, 2004), and abnormalties in amyloid metabolism (Lopez &
Bell, 2004). A number of neurotransmitters are also depleted in AD. These
neurotransmitters include acetylcholine (AChE), glutamate, noradrenaline, and serotonin
(Curran, Kopelman, & Rusted, 2004), although the AChE system typically exhibits the
greatest dysfunction (Desai & Grossberg, 2005). Depletion in AChE is the most
consistently depleted neurotransmitter in AD and could be responsible for associated
amnesia in the disease (Curran et al., 2004).
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Neurofibrillary tangles and amyloid plaques are considered the neurological
hallmarks of AD (Citron, 2002) and must be sufficiently present upon autopsy in order to
verify a diagnosis of AD. Amyloid plaques are abnormal masses of tissue partially
composed of amyloid that are present throughout AD as it progresses (Morris, 2004).
Neurofibrillary tangles are dispersed throughout the brain in AD and are present in
myriad cortical and subcortical structures that are responsible for cognition and memory
function (Morris, 2004). These neurological hallmarks of AD do not appear to exert a
one-to-one effect on AD symptomatology and can affect the severity of AD differently
for different people. Individuals can have these neurological abnormalities without
exhibiting cognitive or behavioral symptoms of AD (The Dementia Study Group of the
Italian Neurological Society, 2000). Fifty to sixty percent of individuals who meet the
neurological criteria for a diagnosis of AD (i.e., exhibit sufficient neurofibrillary tangles
and amyloid plaques) show no signs of significant cognitive decline (Desai & Grossberg,
2005). It is suggested that the amount of neurofibrillary tangles is correlated to dementia
severity but that the presence of amyloid plaques does not correlate with severity of AD
symptoms (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003). Also, neurofibrillary tangles may be correlated
with neuronal loss while plaques do not seem to exhibit this correlation (Gomez-Isla &
Hyman, 2003).
Inflammatory processes in the brain also occur over the course of AD (Rosenberg,
2005). Some researchers believe that inflammation is the key physical process involved
in the development of AD and its related symptoms. The neuro-inflammatory hypothesis
of AD states that declines in functioning and dysfunction of the central nervous system
are due to inflammatory processes in the central nervous system (Rosenberg, 2005).
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Inflammatory processes have been shown to be related to cognitive and functional
difficulties in AD (Rosenberg, 2005). Inflammation appears to be related to the presence
of amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles and causes neuronal death (Rosenberg,
2005).
It appears that the earliest neurological abnormalities associated with AD occur in the
medial temporal lobe, especially in the hippocampal formation and entorhinal cortex
(Kato, Knopman, & Liu, 2001; Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003; Overman & Becker, 2004;
Rosenberg, 2005). These deficits are thought to be at least partially responsible for
memory difficulties in AD (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003). Eventually, the entorhinal
cortex can exhibit a loss of 70 percent of its neurons (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003). The
amygdala also typically becomes highly compromised in AD (Morris, 2004). As AD
progresses, degeneration spreads to cortical areas (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003;
Rosenberg, 2005). Affected cortical areas include the superior temporal sulcus, although
this region is typically is not compromised until the moderate stages of AD (Gomez-Isla
& Hyman, 2003). As AD enters its later stages neuronal atrophy becomes spread
throughout the brain (Morris, 2004).

Risk Factors in Alzheimer’s Disease
A number of risk factors exist for the development of AD, including increasing age,
a family history of AD, genetic mutations in presenilin-1 and presenilin-2 (which are
related to abnormalities on the metabolic precursor of amyloid), and the existence of the
apolipoprotein E-4 (APOE) allele (Graff-Radford, 2003). Further risks include female
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gender, history of head injury, low education, low intelligence, and small head size
(Cummings, Vinters, Cole, & Khachaturian, 1998).
Recently, substantial research has focused on the APOE allele as a risk factor for the
development of AD. Risk for the development of AD is increased by the APOE allele
(Saunders et al., 1993; Bondi et al., 1995), perhaps by increasing the quantity of deposits
of amyloid in the brain (Cummings et al., 1998). The APOE allele appears to be the
biggest risk factor for the development of AD (Leifer, 2003). Individuals who are
carriers of the APOE allele develop AD at a 29 percent rate compared to 9 percent for
individuals who are not carriers of the allele (Cummings & Cole, 2002).
Cognitive abnormalities can sometimes be observed in non-demented individuals
with the APOE allele. Individuals with the APOE allele have shown varied scores on
tests of verbal and visual-spatial ability with some individuals exhibiting deficiencies in
verbal processing while others exhibit deficiencies in visual-spatial processing (Jacobson,
Delis, Bondi, & Salmon, 2005). This suggests that individuals with the APOE allele may
constitute two subgroups that have different deficits in verbal and non-verbal attention
(Jacobson, et al, 2005) as well as in verbal and non-verbal learning and memory
(Jacobson et al., 2005). This finding is consistent with neurological studies that have
suggested asymmetrical hemispheric degradation in individuals with the APOE allele and
inconsistent findings regarding the presence of memory deficits in individuals with the
APOE allele (Jacobson et al., 2005). Further neurological abnormalities can be observed
in non-demented individuals with the APOE allele. An increase in hippocampal activity
during memory tasks has been observed in non-demented carriers of the APOE allele
(Dickerson et al., 2005). Non-demented carriers of the APOE allele also perform worse
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on tests of episodic memory than do individuals who do not have the APOE allele (Bondi
et al., 1995). This difficulty in episodic memory appears to reflect ineffective cognitive
organization when trying to learn new information (Bondi et al., 1995). Difficulties in
executive functioning are also exhibited in non-demented APOE carriers, such as
difficulties with divided attention (Rosen, Bergeson, Putnam, Hawell, & Sunderland,
2002), inhibition, and switching attention (Wetter et al., 2005). Also, individuals with the
APOE allele exhibit deficiencies in working memory before dementia has developed
(Parasuraman, Greenwood, & Sunderland, 2002).

Pre-Clinical Alzheimer’s Disease
AD progresses gradually; recently research has focused on potential transitional
stages between normal aging and AD (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003). Substantial
research has focused on individuals in the preclinical stages of AD (i.e., individuals with
subtle cognitive and/or behavioral abnormalities who do not yet exhibit AD
symptomatology but who will eventually develop AD; Small, Herlitz, & Backman,
2004). Deficits are seen consistently 2 to 3 years before the development of clinically
diagnosable AD (Small et al., 2004) and up to 50 years before diagnosis (Snowden et al.,
1996) and exist in multiple cognitive and linguistic domains (Backman et al., 2005). A
meta-analysis of studies assessing preclinical cognitive changes in those who would
eventually go on to develop AD indicated that there is a global decline in cognitive
functioning (Backman et al., 2005). Large deficiencies in individuals with preclinical
AD appeared in the realms of episodic memory, executive functioning and perceptual
speed whereas moderate deficiencies were found in visual-spatial skill and attention
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(Backman et al., 2005). Likewise, factor analysis of the Personnes Ages Quid study
suggested that deficits in a general cognitive factor were associated with the development
of dementia 2 years later (Fabriogoule et al., 1998).
Although there are a number of cognitive deficits associated with preclinical AD, the
most apparent deficit is a dysfunction in both verbal and non-verbal episodic memory
(Small et al., 2004; Backman, Small, & Fratiglioni, 2001). Specifically, individuals with
AD or those who are in the preclinical stages of AD appear to have difficulty transferring
episodic information from short-term storage to long-term storage (Backman & Small,
1998), although the increased ability of individuals with AD to recognize information
relative to freely recalling information suggests a retrieval deficit as well (Jacoby, Toth,
& Yonelinas, 1993). The Bronx Aging Study also showed that individuals who went on
to develop AD exhibited difficulties in both episodic memory and verbal fluency 2 years
before development of the disease (Masur, Sliwinski, Lipton, Blau, & Crystal, 1994).
Tests that assess episodic memory function, such as the Wechsler Memory Scale
(associative learning;Wechsler, 1945), the Benton Visual Retention Test (Benton, 1963),
the Auditory Verbal Learning Test (Vakil & Blachstein, 1993), as well as a number of
word-list and picture recall tests may be especially effective in identifying individuals
who are at risk for AD as episodic memory problems are often the earliest identifiable
symptoms of AD (Small, Herlitz, Fratiglioni, Almkvist, & Backman, 2000).
Other deficiencies are apparent in preclinical AD. In one study low scores on global
cognitive performance, short-term visual memory, and abstract reasoning were predictive
of the eventual development of dementia up to 3 years before clinical symptoms emerged
(Fabriogoule, Lafont, Letenneur, Rouch, & Dartigues, 1996). Dysfunction in attentional
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processes may also be present in early and preclinical AD (Parasuraman, 2004). This
attentional dysfunction may be due in part to problems with executive functioning, as
difficulties with this area are common in preclinical AD (Fabrigoule et al., 1998). Also,
as is the case with individuals at risk for AD via the presence of the APOE allele, a
number of studies have shown that preclinical AD may be characterized by discrepancies
between measures of verbal and non-verbal cognitive function. Individuals in the
preclinical stage of AD have shown substantially different scores on tests of verbal and
visual-spatial ability (Jacobson, Delis, Bondi, & Salmon, 2002).
Behavioral abnormalities can also be seen in individuals with preclinical AD.
Individuals who eventually develop AD and related dementias appear to exhibit changes
in their daily living activities such as shopping, taking care of finances, and using the
telephone well before a diagnosis of dementia can be reached and before standardized
tests could detect any cognitive or behavioral changes (Nygard, 2003). Emotional and
personality abnormalities may also act as an indicator of the eventual development of
AD. Individuals in the preclinical stages of AD appear to exhibit more depressive
symptoms than others up to 3 years before diagnosis, especially symptoms that are
related to motivational disturbances, such as anhedonia, and decreases in energy and
concentration (Berger, Fratiglioni, Forsell, Winblad, & Backman, 1999). Furthermore,
individuals with preclinical AD may also exhibit anxiety, social withdrawal, introversion,
self-centeredness, agitation, and apathy in very mild forms of AD when cognitive decline
is difficult to detect (for a review, see Cummings, 2003).
Scores on the MMSE seem to be slightly decreased in individuals with preclinical AD
as compared to those who do not go on to develop AD (Berger et al., 1999). One study
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has shown that differences in the MMSE can be observed up to 6 years before the
diagnosis of AD (Small, Fratiglioni, Viitanen, Winblad, & Backman, 2000).
Furthermore, if individuals in the preclinical stages of AD report memory loss, perform
poorly on tests of cognitive functioning (such as the MMSE), and perform poorly on
neuropsychological tests there is an 85 percent change that these individuals will develop
AD within 3 years (Palmer, Backman, Winblad, & Fratiglioni, 2003). However, there
does appear to be a great deal of variability among individuals with preclinical AD
regarding both rate and pattern of decline (Backman et al., 2005).

Mild Cognitive Impairment
Recent research has also focused on Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI). MCI has
been thought of as a possible precursor to the development of AD and a possible
beginning point for the treatment of AD (Desai & Grossberg, 2005). MCI has been
conceptualized and called many different things, including incipient dementia, prodromal
AD, and isolated memory impairment (Petersen & Morris, 2003). MCI differs from
preclinical AD in that preclinical AD does not necessarily encompass a noticeable
cognitive impairment whereas MCI does involve a noticeable cognitive impairment.
MCI is diagnosed if individuals have no loss in function, do not meet the criteria for
dementia, but have scores on tests of memory that are more than one standard deviation
lower than the norm (Desai & Grossberg, 2005).
There appear to be three types of MCI: amnestic MCI, which includes a subjective
memory problem and typically progresses to AD; multiple-domain MCI, which involves
slight deficiencies in memory as well as non-memory domains (e.g. language, executive
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function, activities of daily living, etc.); and single non-memory domain MCI, that
manifests as a single non-memory related cognitive dysfunction (Petersen, 2003). The
DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) refers to “age-related cognitive decline” (780.9), a condition
similar to MCI that is a cognitive impairment not due to another condition that is
objectively tested and typically includes subjective memory complaints. An objective,
universal definition of MCI has not yet been established, although it often includes
subjective memory complaints, normal global cognitive functioning relative to age,
maintenance of ability to perform tasks of daily living, and absence of dementia
(Petersen, 2003; Petersen & Morris, 2003).
AD is sometimes conceptualized as representing the end point on a continuum of
aging, whereas other times it is thought of as being a separate disease that is not related to
normal aging (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003). MCI is often conceptualized on this
continuum as a transitional phase between normal aging and AD (Gomez-Isla & Hyman,
2003; Petersen & Morris, 2003; Petersen, 2003). A large proportion of individuals with
MCI eventually are diagnosed with AD. Approximately ten percent of individuals with
MCI are diagnosed with AD every year compared to one to two percent of non-MCI
individuals (Petersen et al., 1999). Within 6 years, approximately 80 percent of
individuals with MCI meet the clinical criteria for a diagnosis of dementia (Petersen et
al., 2001).
Neurological abnormalities can be observed in individuals with MCI.

Individuals

with MCI exhibit a substantial (32 percent) loss of neurons in the entorhinal cortex, a
structure that is very often compromised early in AD and throughout the progression of
the disease (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003). Individuals with MCI also have a tendency to
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exhibit neurofibrillary tangles and amyloid plaques (Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003).
Individuals with MCI show increased hippocampal activation during memory tests,
whereas individuals with AD show decreased activation (Dickerson et al., 2005). This
increased activation may represent the need to employ more coping strategies in order to
execute successful memory (Dickerson et al., 2005).
Still, it is often very difficult to distinguish between individuals in the very early
stages of AD (i.e., preclinical AD and MCI) and normal adults (Morris & Becker,
2004b). Aside from obvious diagnostic and treatment issues that this raises, another
implication is that it hinders effective research of AD. Many studies of AD involve
comparing a group of AD patients to a control group of “normal” adults on some
objective measure and comparing the differences between the two groups. However, it is
estimated that up to 20 percent of older individuals in the “normal” adult control groups
may be in the early stages of AD (Fleischman & Gabrieli, 1998). This obviously has
major implications for the effective study of AD.

Diagnosis of Alzheimer’s Disease
As treatments are being developed, interest in diagnosing AD in its earliest stages has
increased (Frodl et al., 2002). Recognizing AD in its earliest possible stages has become
more important in recent years due to the development of interventions, especially
pharmacological interventions, that are best utilized in the earliest stages of the disease
(Wetter et al., 2005; Desai & Grossberg, 2005; Gomez-Isla & Hyman, 2003; Petersen &
Morris, 2003; Cummings, 2003; Mohr, Dastoor, & Claus, 1999; Frodl et al., 2002; Morris
& Becker, 2004b; Parasuraman, 2004; Leifer, 2003). Effective early diagnosis and
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discovery of the cause of AD may allow for reversal of the disease and limit emotional
distress of individuals with AD and their loved ones (Cohen & Eisdorfer, 1986; Leifer,
2003). For example, loved ones of individuals with AD often sense that something is
wrong but are not aware why their spouses, parents, and siblings with AD are prone to
emotional outbursts, intellectual confusion, and dangerous behavior (Cohen & Eisdorfer,
1986).

Also, early and accurate detection allows for a more accurate prognosis, more

timely education of patients and their loved ones and care givers, and appropriate
planning for future care (Ikeda, 2004; Leifer, 2003).
Although the ability to make a successful diagnosis has improved in recent decades,
effective early diagnosis is still difficult (Lopez et al., 2000; Cummings & Khachaturian,
1999; Miller, 2004). AD cannot be officially diagnosed until autopsy because the
presence of neurofibrillary tangles and amyloid plaques must be confirmed before the
nature of the individual’s dementia can be known for certain (The Dementia Study Group
of the Italian Neurological Society, 2000), but preliminary diagnoses can be made. Still,
there are no objectively defined cut-off scores for AD in contemporary diagnostic
systems (Petersen & Morris, 2003), there is no assessment tool that can provide a
definitive diagnosis of AD (Sabat, 2001; Hannesdottir & Snaedel, 2002; Miller, 2004),
and the criteria for an inclusion diagnosis of AD have never been operationalized (Lopez
et al., 2000). Furthermore, there are no biological markers that allow for a definitive
diagnosis of AD (The Dementia Study Group of the Italian Neurological Society, 2000).
This is the biggest hurdle to accurate diagnosis (Gray & Della Sala, 2004). The subtle
early symptoms and insidious onset that characterizes the early progress of AD also
makes early diagnosis difficult (Leifer, 2003).
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Another issue in the early detection of AD is that the course and presentation of AD is
highly variable both within and among individuals and is often unpredictable (Haxby et
al., 1992). In general, the presentation and course of AD is highly heterogeneous
(Bouchard & Rosser, 1999; Lopez et al., 2000). For example, different people will
exhibit different symptomatology in the early stages of the disease and this
symptomatology will progress and change in different ways and at different rates
(Bouchard & Rosser, 1999). Furthermore, the neurological abnormalities associated with
individuals with AD can be highly variable (Lopez, 2000). Functioning can change
noticeably even on an hourly basis (Sabat, 2001).
People in the early stages of AD often show little or no decline after an initial small
decline, making AD hard to detect well after a slight decline is in place. Often the disease
may have to progress to the intermediate stages before deterioration is obvious (Bouchard
& Rosser, 1999). Individuals in these early stages of AD often perform relatively
normally on tests of general cognitive function for up to 35 months after disease
symptomatology has begun (Haxby et al., 1992). This plateau stage includes scores on
the WAIS, which suggests that in the early stages of AD non-memory cognitive function
associated with IQ remains constant during an initial decrease in memory ability (Haxby
et al., 1992). This makes AD especially difficult to detect in its early stages.
It is also possible that individuals can hide this initial decline by utilizing coping
skills that have the potential to mask the effects of AD for some time after the initial
cognitive symptoms appear (Cohen & Eisdorfer, 1986). Hence, although an individual
with AD may experience many of the initial cognitive declines associated with the
disease, the use of coping mechanisms makes it difficult for others, whether family
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members, loved ones, or clinicians, to detect. Many individuals with AD report that they
were effectively able to disguise their cognitive decline well after they knew there was a
decline (Cohen & Eisdorfer, 1986). Individuals with AD report using strategies such as
talking less, writing reminders, and limiting activities to those that were easily performed
(Cohen & Eisdorfer, 1986). External cues such as notes and reminders appear to be the
most effective compensatory techniques used by individuals with AD (Wilson & Hughes,
2001). As AD progresses, individuals often rely increasingly on others as coping
mechanisms to provide memory cues (Dixon, Hopp, Cohen, de Frias, & Backman, 2003).
A number of other factors can make diagnosis difficult and inaccurate. For example,
symptoms of psychosis, aphasia, mental retardation, low education level, and language
differences between the assessor and the individual with AD can all lead to a false
positive diagnosis of AD (Canadian Consensus Conference, 1991). AD affects elderly
individuals almost exclusively and because older individuals are at high risk for a number
of other physical, psychological, and sensory problems and also often experience side
effects of medication, it is frequently difficult to gain an accurate psychological
assessment of elderly individuals, especially if pre-morbid functioning cannot be
accurately assessed (Miller, 2004). Assessment instruments also present a problem in
diagnosing AD as many standard cognitive assessments are not satisfactorily normed on
extremely old populations (Miller, 2004). Unfortunately, cognitive assessment tools have
not been developed that are specifically designed for use in an elderly population (Miller,
2004). Due to all of these difficulties, the diagnosis of AD must rely heavily on clinical
judgment (Petersen & Morris, 2003).
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Recent studies have suggested clinical diagnostic accuracy rates of up to
approximately 90 percent (Salmon et al., 2002; Graff-Radford, 2003; Cummings &
Khachaturian, 1999). Nevertheless, AD still often goes undetected until the moderate or
late stages of the disease. Between 24 and 72 percent of primary care physicians fail to
diagnose AD when it is present (Leifer, 2003). Many times mild or moderate cases will
not be recognized upon admission to general medical hospitals (Cairns, Evans, & Prince,
2004). Still, a wave of recent research in AD has led to a substantial increase in the
reliability of diagnostic criteria of AD as well as increased diagnostic accuracy (Desai &
Grossberg, 2005).
Accurate diagnosis of AD typically involves many steps. First, it is important that the
individual’s pre-dementia intellectual functioning is established before assessment takes
place (Morris, 2004). The best tool to achieve this is the New Adult Reading Test
(NART) (Morris, 2004) developed by Nelson and O’Connell (1978). This test requires
individuals to read familiar words, a task that is considered to be unaffected in
individuals with AD (Nelson & O’Connell, 1978) and therefore useful for establishing
some level of pre-dementia intellectual functioning. A clinical interview and a thorough
history are typically the next steps in the diagnosis of AD (Weiner, 1991; Leifer, 2003).
Assessing onset of symptomatology, duration of symptoms, progress of symptoms,
current medications during the clinical interview as well as performing a neurological
evaluation are very important in accurately diagnosing AD as well (Duncan & Siegal,
1998). After the interview, the assessment process typically includes tests of at least
memory, language, and one other area of cognitive function (Miller, 2004). If an
assessment battery tests memory, language, and another area of cognitive function and no
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signs of dementia are revealed, then further testing typically does not add any useful
information (Miller, 2004). Because AD affects cognitive functioning in such a global
way, a test of almost any domain of cognitive function can add to the diagnosis of AD
(Miller, 2004). Tests of memory are often the most useful in diagnosing AD, especially
in the early stages of the disease, although accurate diagnosis of AD requires a
comprehensive assessment (Miller, 2004). Because language difficulties are also
common in AD in early stages of the disease, tests of language function can be used to
aid in the diagnosis of AD (Weiner, 1991; Miller, 2004). A number of other areas may
be assessed, including reading, writing, abstract thinking, judgment, and motor
coordination (Weiner, 1991). Office-based assessments ideally have been normed on
extremely elderly populations (although many have not been) and typically consist of 20
to 30 questions that focus on basic cognitive functioning (Miller, 2004). Finally, basic
cognitive functioning is explored using the most basic questions about one’s self,
common knowledge, and simple tests of memory (Miller, 2004).
A number of tests exist that attempt to quantify dementia. The most commonly used
include the MMSE, Global Deterioration Scale, Blessed Dementia Scale, Washington
University Clinical Dementia Rating, Brief Psychiatric Rating Scale, Sandoz Clinical
Assessment-Geriatric Scale, and Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale (Weiner, 1991).
The Wechsler Memory Scale is the most commonly used assessment for evaluating
memory function in AD (Miller, 2004).
The most used screening test (and “gold standard” for other screening tests) for AD is
the MMSE (Miller, 2004; Leifer, 2003), developed by Folstein, Folstein, and McHugh
(1975). Although the MMSE is the most widely used instrument for screening for early
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AD, it is not very sensitive when used by itself in diagnosing mild cases of AD (Leifer,
2003) and it has a tendency to produce false positives and cannot be used alone to
diagnose AD reliably (Miller, 2004). False-positive diagnoses are the most common
error made in assessing dementia in general (Miller, 2004). Scores below 23 out of 30 for
individuals with a high school education on the MMSE are often indicative of the
presence of dementia, while the same is true of individuals with a score of 18 or below
who have an eighth grade education (Weiner, 1991).
The Global Deterioration Scale (GDS) may also be used to diagnose AD and track its
severity (Reisberg, Ferris, De Leon, & Crook, 1982). The GDS rates individuals on
seven levels of cognitive decline: none, very mild, mild, moderate, moderately severe,
severe, and very severe (Reisberg et al., 1982). Therefore, the GDS is not only useful for
the diagnosis of AD, but also useful for tracking its progress (Reisberg et al., 1982). This
scale utilizes a clinical interview, the WAIS, and the MMSE in order to give patients the
appropriate rating of cognitive decline (Reisberg et al., 1982). A score of 3 (mild) often
indicates preclinical AD or the presence of MCI (Petersen, 2003). The Blessed Dementia
Scale (BDS; Blessed, Tomlinson, & Roth, 1968) assesses general knowledge,
concentration, and memory. The BDS also contains questions relating to activities of
daily living, changes in affect and habits, and personality. The items consist of various
difficulties that individuals with dementia might have, such as inability to remember a
short list of items. Patients or their caregivers either rate if this difficulty occurs never,
occasionally, or daily or mark if the difficulty is present or absent. The Washington
University Clinical Dementia Rating Scale (CDR) quantifies AD severity via interview
(Hughes, Berg, Danziger, Coben, & Martin, 1982). This instrument measures
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functioning in six domains: memory, orientation, judgment and problem solving, home
and hobbies, community affairs, and personal care (Hughes et al., 1982). Each domain
receives a rating of either none, questionable, mild, moderate, and severe regarding the
presence of dementia (Hughes et al., 1982). The CDR also yields a general score to
reflect overall dementia (Hughes et al., 1982). Scores of questionable dementia may
reflect the presence of a preclinical form of dementia (Petersen, 2003). The Brief
Psychiatric Rating Scale (Overall & Gorham, 1962) is one of the most widely used
instruments in psychiatric research. It was originally 16 items, but was expanded to 18
shortly after its development (Burger et al., 1997). This scale assesses five major areas:
thinking disorder, withdrawal, anxiety-depression, hostility-suspicion, and activity
(Burger et al., 1997). The Sandoz Clinical Assessment-Geriatric Scale is a rating scale
that consists of 18 items (Patin, Hamot, & Singer, 1984). Each item falls into one of four
categories: cognitive impairment, behavioral impairment, somatic complaints, and
negative mood (Patin et al., 1984). The items are rated on a 7-point Likert scale with one
representing no dysfunction and seven representing severe dysfunction (Patin et al.,
1984). The Alzheimer’s Disease Assessment Scale (Rosen, Mohs, & Davis, 1984)
evaluates dementia severity in both cognitive and non-cognitive realms. The cognitive
portion of the test is assessed using traditional testing procedures while the non-cognitive
items are assessed via behavioral observation (Rosen et al., 1984). It consists of 21 items
that are rated on a 0 to 5 scale, 0 indicating absence of dysfunction and 5 indicating
severe dysfunction (Rosen et al., 1984). Some researchers support the use of the WAIS as
a complementary tool to the diagnosis of AD (Larue & Jarvick, 1980; Reisberg et al.,
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1982), although some feel that it lacks sensitivity in detecting AD (Miller, 2004; Haxby
et al., 1992).
It is important that not only cognitive tests of AD are used and investigated;
biological, neurophysiological, and neuroimaging techniques are investigated and should
be used in the diagnosis of AD as well (Frodl et al., 2002). New techniques include MRIvolumetric measurement, biological correlates to AD found in cerebrospinal fluid,
genetic testing for the APOE allele, and a variety of cognitive measurements (Frodl et al.,
2002). Furthermore, the finding that certain characteristics of specific event-related
potentials are different in those with AD and those who eventually develop AD compared
to others (i.e., controls and those with MCI) has opened this area as a potential diagnostic
avenue (Frodl et al., 2002). Positron emission tomography (PET) is a relatively
noninvasive procedure that could potentially aid in the diagnosis of AD. PET measures
the metabolic rate of cerebral glucose. Individuals with AD sometimes have reduced
metabolism of cerebral glucose in parts of the parietal and temporal and this pattern is
sometimes observable well before AD can be diagnosed (Leifer, 2003).
Differential diagnosis between AD and other dementias is often problematic as well.
Vascular Dementia (VaD) is the second leading cause of dementia and is difficult to
distinguish from AD due to general cognitive similarities between the two diseases
(Misciagna et al., 2005). While there may be some differences in the presentation of
different types of dementia, differential diagnosis among these dementias remains very
unreliable due to the overall similarity in dementia presentation and the heterogeneity of
presentation among individuals with all forms of dementia (Miller, 2004).
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Psychopharmacological Interventions
As the incidence of AD increases, so too does the effort to develop effective
pharmacological treatments for AD (Lopez & Bell, 2004). Although there are no cures
for AD, there are a number of psychopharmacological treatments for the disorder. These
treatments have a number of potential benefits, including delaying the onset of AD,
reducing the symptoms of AD, and aiding in helping in the biological difficulties
associated with AD (Allen & Burns, 1995). Specifically, acetylcholinesterase inhibitors
(AChEIs) appear not only to have beneficial effects in the cognitive realm for people
with AD, but also can elicit improvements and/or stabilization in activities of daily living,
behavioral disturbances, and delay in placement in nursing homes (Standridge, 2004).
For example, Lopez et al. (2002) found that AChEIs may delay the deterioration of the
ability to live independently. In their study, 40 percent of people with AD who were
untreated had been admitted to a nursing home after their study had begun whereas only
six percent of patients treated with AChEIs had entered a nursing home during the same
three year period (Lopez et al., 2002).
Deficits and abnormalities in AChE neurons is a hallmark of AD and continue to
worsen throughout the progress of the disease (Geula, 1998). Individuals with AD can
experience a 50 percent reduction of AChE (Carlsson, 1983). These deficits are expected
in AD as AChE is linked to memory function and memory function is severely impaired
in individuals with AD. AChE deficits are especially dramatic in the hippocampus and
neocortex, key areas that influence memory, executive functioning, and various
behavioral and emotional responses. (Ballard, 2002). Abnormalities in AChE are
associated with both the formation of amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles, the
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neurological hallmarks of AD (Hogan & Patterson, 2002; Wright, Geula, & Mesulam,
1993). Hence, medications that increase the presence of the AChE in the brains of
individuals with AD can help aid in many of the cognitive deficits associated with the
disease (Hogan & Patterson, 2002).
Currently, AChEIs are the most effective pharmacological treatment for AD and work
by increasing the presence of AChE in the individuals with AD (Hogan & Patterson,
2002; Ballard, 2002; Whitehouse, 1997; Allen & Burns, 1995). AChEIs effectively
increase the amount of AChE in the synapses of those with AD (Hogan & Patterson,
2002; Leifer, 2003) by decreasing the rate that AChE is broken down in the synapse
(Johanssen, 2004) by acetylcholinesterase (Hogan & Patterson, 2002). AChEIs were the
first medications approved for the psychopharmacological treatment of AD by the United
States Food and Drug Administration (Lopez et al., 2002; Leifer, 2003). These
medications are typically used as the first line of treatment for AD (Lopez et al., 2002).
Currently there are three different types of AChEIs that are used for treatment of AD,
rivastigmine, donepezil, and galantamine (Johannsen, 2004; Rosenberg, 2005). These
medications have similar global effectiveness and side effect profiles (Hogan &
Patterson, 2002; Ballard, 2002).

These drugs have been shown to slow the degradation

of global functioning, cognitive functioning, activities of daily living, and behavioral
problems associated with AD (Johannsen, 2004). The side effects include nausea,
vomiting, diarrhea, muscle cramps, abdominal pain, dizziness, insomnia, and weight loss
(Hogan & Patterson, 2002). While these drugs do not reverse the progress of AD they
can elicit some improvement in the early stages of treatment (Johannsen, 2004; Desai &
Grossberg, 2005). Unfortunately, not everyone with AD experiences benefits from these
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medications, and those who do not respond cannot be reliably identified (Hogan &
Patterson, 2002).
Typically, these medications are most effective for individuals with mild to moderate
AD and are typically prescribed for individuals only in these stages (Johannsen, 2004;
Ballard, 2002) although they may have longer lasting effects that could benefit
individuals in the more severe stages of AD (Lopez et al., 2002; Johannsen, 2004). The
beneficial effects of these drugs appear to sustain themselves for more than 5 years
(Johannsen, 2004). It is recommended that AChEIs be continued in patients with AD for
at least 1 to 2 years before there is consideration of discontinuing the medications in
order to ensure that the medications are not having a beneficial effect (Johannsen, 2004).
Although monitoring the effectiveness of AChEIs is important to decisions regarding
the continuation of pharmacotherapy it is difficult to track these drugs’ effects.

The

MMSE is typically used to assess the effectiveness of pharmacotherapy slowing these
declines (Johannesen, 2004). However, the MMSE does not assess a number of areas
that may receive benefits from medication, such as affect and activities of daily living
(Johannsen, 2004). Because AChEIs seem to produce benefits in a number of realms, a
cognitive assessment such as the MMSE should not be used alone in the assessment of
these drugs’ effectiveness. Measures of everyday function and behavior should be used
in conjunction with cognitive tests to monitor drug effectiveness in AD as AChEIs aid in
slowing decline in these areas as well (Hogan & Patterson, 2002). Also, the MMSE may
not be able to detect subtle improvements that may be occurring due to the therapy
(Hogan & Patterson, 2002). However, because there is typically a 3.3 point decline
annually on the MMSE, although this rate of decline is variable both within and among
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individuals with AD that are untreated (Haxby et al., 1992), a lesser decline or no decline
at all in individuals receiving pharmacotherapy would suggest effectiveness of the
medication (APA, 2000; Lopez et al., 2002; Hogan & Patterson, 2002). AChEIs have
been shown to decrease the rate of decline on the MMSE. Lopez et al. (2002) found an
average decline of 2.5 points per year in those who were taking AChEIs as compared to
the typical 3.3 point decline. Therefore, although the subtle effects of these drugs on the
course of AD may be difficult to track, the global effectiveness of these drugs can be
consistently monitored.
AChEIs are not the only form of pharmacotherapy available to individuals with AD.
AChEIs may also be used in combination with drugs such as memantine, an N-methyl-daspartate stimulator. Memantine by itself has been shown to slow the deterioration of
both cognitive and behavioral functions (Desai & Grossberg, 2005) and when used in
combination with AChEIs may be more beneficial than AChEIs alone (Standridge,
2004). Another line of pharmacotherapy is the non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs
(NSAIDs). These drugs are anti-inflammatory drugs (such as aspirin) that appear to
provide some protection against the development of AD (McGeer & McGeer, 2001;
Rosenberg, 2005) as inflammatory processes in the central nervous system are associated
with AD and neuronal death (Rosenberg, 2005). However, the effectiveness of these
drugs has not been confirmed by prospective studies (Desai & Grossberg, 2005). It has
also been suggested that inhibiting the production of butyrylcholinesterase (BuChE) as it
is a substrate for AChE and increases over the course of AD may be worthwhile as a
focus of pharmacotherapy (Ballard, 2002). Medications that inhibit BuChE include
cymserine, bisnorcymserine, and phenethylcymserine (Ballard, 2002). Rivastigmine
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inhibits both acetylcholinesterase and BuChE and may therefore be more effective than
medications that inhibit either acetylcholinesterase or BuChE alone, although this claim
has not yet been substantiated (Ballard, 2002).
Other medications used to treat AD include neuroleptic and non-neuroleptic drugs for
abnormal behavior associated with AD, antipsychotic medication for cognitive
deficiencies, and benzodiazepines (Lopez & Becker, 2004). MAOI’s and SSRI’s also
have been used in the treatment of AD (Allen & Burns, 1995). Vitamin E has been
investigated as a possible treatment for AD due to its antioxidant properties. Results on
the efficacy of this treatment have been mixed, although vitamin E does have the
advantage of being a safe and low cost treatment (see Leifer, 2003 for a review). The
American Psychiatric Association recommends pharmacological treatment for AD that is
both individualized and multimodal (American Psychiatric Association, 2002).

Non-pharmacological Interventions
Although psychopharmacological treatments for AD are the first line of treatment for
the disease, psychological and behavioral interventions are important as well (Desai &
Grossberg, 2005). Psychotherapy of individuals with AD is a relatively recent
phenomenon as researchers and clinicians have been very pessimistic regarding the
ability of individuals with AD to retain information needed to benefit from psychotherapy
(Davis, 2005). In 1989, Riley noted that caregivers were typically the identified patient
in cases of AD rather than the individuals with AD. By focusing only on behavioral
management, as psychosocial interventions for individuals with AD typically do, there is
the danger of ignoring phenomenological aspects of the disease (Riley, 1989).
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Psychotherapy itself is controversial in the context of dementia due largely to clients’
inability to remember information from session to session (Frazer, 2000), although it may
be dangerous to presume that gains cannot be made in psychotherapy for this reason
(Riley, 1989).
One difficulty with using non-pharmacological interventions is that, due to
difficulties in executive functioning, individuals with AD have difficulty implementing
strategies that are designed to help them (Rusted & Clare, 2004). Furthermore, the
existence of anosognosia can greatly hinder the effectiveness of non-pharmacological
treatments in AD (Cotrell, 1997). Still, because there is often a “disability gap”
(individuals with AD often exhibit greater dysfunction than is warranted by their
neurobiological abnormalities), environmental factors are important to the functioning of
individuals with AD (Bowlby Sifton, 2000). A major goal of non-pharmacological
interventions in AD is to reduce this gap (Bowlby Sifton, 2000).
Unfortunately, few non-pharmacological treatments for AD have undergone
randomized clinical trials to establish the efficacy of these treatments (Rabins, 2000).
The efficacy of non-pharmacological treatments is based on case studies, naturalistic
observation, and single-blind studies rather than randomized clinical trials (Rabins,
2000). A review by the American Psychiatric Association found no evidence for
improvement in cognitive functioning via non-pharmacological therapies (Rabins, 2000).
The same review suggested that some non-pharmacological therapies may be somewhat
efficacious in treating non-cognitive, behavioral symptoms. These therapies include
music therapy, pet therapy, activity therapy, and regularly scheduled activity (Rabins,
2000). This review also suggested that a supportive, structured environment that engages
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individuals with dementia in frequent physical and mental activities is more helpful than
classic talk therapy.
Everyday intervention with AD is largely environmental in nature. Focus on
activities of daily living, safety, caregiver issues, access to appropriate community
resources, and psychoeducation are all key components of any intervention strategy
designed to treat AD (Whitehouse, Mayeux, & Growden, 1989). Simple reminders are a
key component of memory loss intervention (Frazer, 2000). Also, removing potentially
dangerous objects and replacing them with safer things is also important. For example,
instead of having a stove, the individual with AD may have a microwave or a toaster
oven (Frazer, 2000). Environments of individuals with AD should match the severity of
the dementia and provide relatively easy functioning within that environment (Chafetz,
1991). A number of principles of environmental construction can be used to aid
individuals with AD and dementia (for a review, see Chafetz, 1991). These are
simplification of the environment (e.g. removing things that are unnecessary, making
simple floor plans that are preferably only one level, etc.) while maintaining an
appropriately stimulating environment, easy access to things needed for everyday living,
protection from potentially dangerous objects and situations, providing access to safe
outdoor environments, safe and easy to use furniture, limiting excess noise and light, and
making locations within the environment as easy to identify as possible. Pynoos and
Regnier (1991) presented 12 guidelines for setting up the physical environments of
individuals with AD to aid in their functioning including having written schedules,
providing specific steps for everyday activities, using pictures to remind of the functions
of different everyday objects, controlling the individual’s level of stimulation, adhering to
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a routine schedule, limiting challenging activities to appropriate levels with regard to the
individuals abilities and frustration tolerance, limiting novel experiences, and using
medication reminders.
Treatment of AD often focuses on treating memory problems rather than emotional
problems surrounding the disease. There are many simple things that caregivers can do to
aid memory of individuals with AD. These include maintaining a consistent schedule for
the individual with AD, providing visual reminders of activities for the day, using notes,
labeling objects either with words or pictures depending on the individual’s abilities, and
using short sentences when communicating (Mace & Rabins, 1991). Camp, Foss,
O’Hanlon, and Stevens (1996) utilized spaced retrieval to aid individuals with AD reduce
difficulties with memory and time orientation by involving implicit memory functions
that are relatively maintained in AD. Spaced-retrieval involves teaching an individual a
piece of information, then repeatedly questioning them about that information. Each time
the individual is successful remembering the information upon inquiry, the time between
inquiries increases (Camp et al., 1996).
Arkin (2001) helped individuals with AD improve biographical memory by having
them repeatedly listen to audiotapes the stated facts about their life history. Other
treatments may involve memory exercises such as practicing digit span and reviewing
biographical and geographical information (Fernandez, Manoiloff, & Monti, 2006).
Because difficulties in encoding seem to be at the heart of the memory difficulties
associated with AD, interventions that help individuals with AD encode information
should be especially useful (Rusted & Clare, 2004). Recently, interventions have focused
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on multi-modal encoding that can be used in the individual’s everyday life (Rusted &
Clare, 2004).
Camp and colleagues (Camp et al., 1993) have developed a model of memory
intervention that utilizes principles of classical conditioning.

This model is based on the

assumption that individuals with AD are not significantly impaired in the use of external
aids for memory and are not significantly impaired in their implicit memory. The model
uses classical conditioning to change problematic behaviors of individuals with AD. For
example, a stimulus that typically elicits a negative or inappropriate response from an
individual with AD is repeatedly paired with a stimulus that elicits a positive or
appropriate response. In theory this works because individuals with AD can rely on
external aids to learn and because they can learn the association via the relatively
preserved implicit memory system as opposed to the severely compromised explicit
memory system. Individuals can also be conditioned to utilize external aids such as
calendars and reminder notes early in the course of AD so that they will continue to use
these external aids throughout the disease.
Often psychosocial interventions are maintenance interventions rather than methods
to improve or reverse the disease due to difficulty learning new information. It is
difficult for individuals with AD to improve if they have difficulty learning new skills
and behaviors (Weiner, 1991). However, some evidence suggests that individuals with
AD can improve. For example, studies have suggested that simple environmental
interventions could provide great assistance to those with AD. For example, Dawson,
Kline, and Wiancko (1986) showed that simply engaging individuals with AD in planned
weekly interactions can elicit improvement on cognitive tests. Furthermore, studies have
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suggested that individuals with AD who were given small amounts of control over their
environment helped increase health and mood. Langer and Rodin (1976) performed a
study in which one group of individuals with AD were able to choose how they arranged
furniture in their rooms, what kind of plant they had in their rooms, and which of two
nights they would see a movie. The other group had no control over any of these
decisions. Those in the first group were not only happier, healthier, and more active, but
experienced half as many deaths in the 18-month span of the study. Unfortunately, the
effectiveness of current environmental interventions is largely under question and have
not surpassed the effectiveness of pharmacological interventions (Rusted & Clare, 2004;
American Psychiatric Association, 2002; Weiner, 1991).
An important aspect of AD treatment to some researchers is simply that the person
with AD is not forgotten or ignored. Kitwood (1990; 1997) stressed the importance of
avoiding placing people with AD in an inferior position, a common occurrence in the
treatment of AD that is part of what he refers to as “malignant social psychology.”
According to Kitwood, this causes individuals to exhibit more cognitive and behavioral
disability than can be accounted for by neurological dysfunction alone (the “disability
gap” mentioned above). Malignant social psychology occurs largely because caregivers
often unintentionally focus on the shortcomings of the individual with AD and thus
“position” them socially in a manner that is depersonalizing, unsupportive, and counter
therapeutic (Kitwood, 1990). Sabat (1994b) provided evidence for this phenomenon in a
case study that showed a woman whose symptoms were reduced in the therapeutic
environment of a day care center but greatly worsened in the less therapeutic
environment of her home.
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Kitwood (1997) espoused a person-centered approach to the treatment of AD and
focused on facilitating positive interactions with individuals with AD as a primary means
of treatment. These positive interactions include validating the individual, their reality,
their feelings, recognizing the individual as a sentient being with real needs and desires
and communicating this to them, consulting with the individual regarding their needs and
preferences, working collaboratively on treatment and tasks, and helping individuals with
AD in areas they need assistance by filling in the function that they can no longer
perform.
Another important intervention is helping individuals with AD function in meaningful
ways, such as helping individuals with AD find ways to continue to engage in hobbies,
activities of daily living, social activities, and household chores that are enjoyable
(Bowlby Sifton, 2000). Supporting positive behaviors that are maintained in individuals
with AD in general can be an effective intervention (Bowlby Sifton, 2000). Bowlby
Sifton (2000) identified a number of functions that are commonly maintained in
individuals with AD and identified ways to support these functions. For example,
procedural memory is often somewhat maintained in AD and can be especially aided by
familiar, typically non-verbal cues as recognition is typically not as damaged as recall.
Because humor is often maintained throughout AD and can aid in emotional well-being,
it is important to support and encourage the use of humor by individuals with AD. It is
important to encourage the experience of positive emotions and the experience of positive
emotional memories as these abilities are typically maintained in AD. Because many
social skills are over-learned, such as hand shaking, encouraging the use of these skills
can facilitate social involvement, self-esteem, and dignity. Providing appropriate sensory
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stimulation is important to maintain contact with the external environment, promote brain
activity, and provide sensory pleasure through things such as pleasant odors and textures.
Exercise and movement are beneficial to many with AD as substantial motor functioning
abilities are typically maintained in AD. The ability to process and enjoy music is
typically maintained in AD and can help support an individual’s connection with the
external environment and provide a positive emotional experience. Because long-term
memory is largely preserved, positive memories can be aroused by encouraging
individuals with AD to reminisce about positive things from their past (Bowlby Sifton,
2000).
Some interventions used with AD focus on the interaction between the individual
with AD and their caregiver. The manner in which caregivers interact with individuals
with AD can either exacerbate or ameliorate some of the symptoms associated with AD
and is thus a very important area of AD management (Weiner, 1991). It is important that
caregivers create a physical and interpersonal environment that allows individuals with
AD to function at the highest level possible (Weiner, 1991). It is also useful for the
caregiver to accept an individual’s level of functioning rather than attempting to
challenge or improve them (Weiner, 1991). It is also suggested that caregivers aid
individuals with AD by performing some of the day-to-day functions that the individual
can no longer perform (Weiner, 1991; Kitwood, 1997).
Weiner (1991) outlined a number of principles that are important in the management
of AD, including correcting sensory impairment when needed, not confronting the
individual with AD, simplifying communications and activities, structuring activities,
using multiple cues when communicating, repetition of communication, demonstrating
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appropriate behaviors, using both positive and negative reinforcement, reducing the
individual’s choices, providing an appropriate amount of stimulation, avoiding behaviors
that require learning new things, identifying and encouraging the use of skills that are still
intact, expressing emotion clearly, minimizing anxiety, and using methods of distraction
when problematic situations arise. Bowlby Sifton (2000) also outlined a number of
important things caregivers can do, such as helping individuals with AD begin an
activity, provide appropriate cues, break jobs down into smaller steps, allow for choice
that is not overwhelming, set up the individual to succeed, limit distraction, allow
privacy, allow extra time to complete tasks, and provide a consistent routine.
A number of classic “talk” therapies have been utilized with individuals with AD and
dementia (Watkins, Cheston, Jones, & Gilliard, 2006; Riley, 1989; Frazer, 2000).
Although many of these are individual therapies, group and family therapy may also be
effective (Riley, 1989). Different forms of psychodynamic therapy and different
psychodynamic conceptualizations of AD have been used to treat AD ranging from
focusing on providing attachment to a parental figure, facilitating emotional catharsis,
facilitating psychological growth by utilizing weakened defenses caused by AD, and
utilizing interpersonally focused therapy (for a review, see Frazer, 2000). Rationale for
psychodynamic therapy includes the maintained affect in individuals with dementia and
the rapid development of transference (Frazer, 2000). Furthermore, because defenses are
weakened due to cognitive impairment, progress can be made quickly as unconscious
material can be brought into awareness quickly (Frazer, 2000). Psychodynamic therapies
have been used with individuals with mild to moderate cognitive impairment due to
dementia but not severe dementia (for a review, see Frazer, 2000).
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Validation therapy, developed by Feil (2002), is also a therapy for AD that focuses on
interacting and communicating with individuals with AD. It uses a psychodynamic
perspective to attempt to make sense of the seemingly random verbalizations and
behaviors of individuals with AD (Frazer, 2000). Although validation therapy has not
been empirically validated, it is used by many therapists (Frazer, 2000). It can be used by
a number of people, and although it requires training, it does not require a college degree.
The central tenet of validation therapy is to provide empathic listening and to maintain a
respectful attitude toward individuals with AD (Feil, 2002). Specific techniques of
validation therapy are used for individuals at different stages of AD (Feil, 2002).
Unfortunately, validation therapy has little scientific support (American Psychiatric
Association, 2002).
Although cognitive-behavioral therapy is often used to treat comorbid depression in
individuals in the early stages of AD and dementia, it may be used to treat individuals
with MCI independent of depression (for a review, see Frazer, 2000). Cognitivebehavioral therapy with individuals with cognitive impairment is similar to any other
population where the focus is on psychoeducation regarding the relationship between
behavior, cognition, and affect, recognizing and changing cognitive distortions and the
settings in which they occur, recording behaviors and cognitions, analyzing the
relationship between cognition and mood, and encouraging more adaptive behaviors and
cognitions. Sometimes additional structure is required both within and between sessions
for individuals with cognitive impairment in order to make change more salient.
Caregivers may also be involved in implementing behavioral interventions.
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Person-centered therapy for AD has been increasing in recent years as researchers and
clinicians are more thoroughly recognizing and attending to the emotional needs of
individuals with AD (Kitwood, 1997). Person-centered therapy attempts to focus on the
person with AD rather than their short-comings and attempts to utilize their strengths
(Innes & Hatfield, 2001). Person-centered therapy is sometimes used to conjunction with
visual art therapy, dance/movement therapy, and music therapy (Innes & Hatfield, 2001).
Many other therapies are specifically designed for individuals with AD.
Reminiscence, life-review therapy, and sensory stimulation therapy have shown some
benefit to individuals with AD (Bowlby Sifton, 2000). Reminiscence therapy encourages
individuals with dementia to retrieve autobiographical memories in order to gain a better
understanding of self, gain personal meaning, and aid in accepting the final stage of life
(Kasl-Godley & Gatz, 2000). This intervention is usually conducted in groups with
individuals with dementia and is often used to aid socialization (Kasl-Godley & Gatz,
2000). Life-review therapy has similar goals but uses a number of techniques such as
writing autobiographies, taking trips to important places from one’s past, creating
scrapbooks, and visiting or writing important people from one’s past (Butler, 1974).
Stimulation therapy involves increasing the social and physical activity of individuals
with AD (American Psychiatric Association, 2002; Rusted & Clare, 2004). Reality
orientation, where individuals with AD are routinely oriented to place, time, and other
important aspects of their environment, is sometimes used to aid memory problems, but
its effectiveness is questionable (Rusted & Clare, 2004; Zarit, Orr, & Zarit, 1985).
Activity therapies involve focusing individuals with AD on external activities that are
pleasurable and taking the focus away from themselves and their decreased cognitive,
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behavioral, and emotional abilities (Weiner, 1997). Activity therapies can demonstrate
short-term benefit by distracting individuals with AD from their predicament (Weiner,
1997). Group therapies are also sometimes used with individuals with AD and are often
successful (for a review, see Frazer, 2000). Group therapy is the most common form of
non-pharmacological therapy used to treat AD (Watkins et al., 2006).
Although many individual “talk” therapies are available for individuals with
dementia, some themes provide common foci across therapies with this population.
These issues are loss, adaptation, and interpersonal conflict (Frazer, 2000). Elderly
individuals frequently experience the loss of close friends and family members through
death and may also experience the loss of their own cognitive abilities. In situations in
which individuals are concerned about loss, it is important for the therapist to
communicate to the individual that they are not alone (Frazer, 2000). Furthermore, not
only must individuals with AD adapt to the limitations of their own cognitive
impairment, but they also commonly have to adapt to changes in residency and caregivers
and their own role within the family (Frazer, 2000). Therapists and caregivers may deal
with the problem of adaptation by substituting their own cognitive abilities for those of
the individual (Kitwood, 1997; Frazer, 2000) with AD and by identifying care giving
staff that the individual is most comfortable with and allowing them to maximize the time
they work together (Frazer, 2000). Finally, due to cognitive impairment and lack of
behavioral and affective inhibition, among numerous other difficulties, individuals with
AD commonly experience a variety of interpersonal difficulties (Frazer, 2000).
Successful interventions within the realm of interpersonal difficulties typically involve
behavioral interventions that prevent situations in which problematic interpersonal
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interactions occur, whether this be avoiding certain people or certain environmental
settings (Frazer, 2000).

Tracking Alzheimer’s Disease
Monitoring the progress and course of AD is important to determine individuals’
cognitive and behavioral abilities and to understand the course of AD. Also, treatment
effectiveness is important to monitor so adjustments can be made in treatment and the
effectiveness of various treatments can be documented. However, monitoring the
effectiveness of treatment in AD is especially difficult due to its highly variable and
unpredictable presentation and progress (Haxby et al., 1992; Bouchard & Rosser, 1999;
Lopez et al., 2000). Progress of AD is typically monitored using either screening
instruments that are used in the diagnosis of AD, those that provide a broad picture of
cognitive functioning (such as the MMSE), or extensive test batteries that allow for a
more nuanced look at how AD is progressing (Gray & Della Sala, 2004). It has been
suggested that the progression of language deficiencies could be used to track the
progress of AD as different language disturbances develop through the course of AD
(Kertesz, 2004). The tracking of motor disturbance has also been suggested as a possible
method of tracking the development of AD (Kidron & Freedman, 2004).
Some researchers pay close attention to the discourse of individuals with AD in order
to determine the effectiveness of treatment. For example, Watkins et al. (2006) observed
signs in individuals’ narratives that signaled the assimilation of and acceptance of their
disease and the accompanying symptoms of the disease. These researchers suggested
that a key part in treatment is promoting the conscious acceptance of the disease and its
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consequences, and therefore statements that reflect this, such as commenting on the
disease and its symptoms and communicating fear that one is losing one’s mind are seen
as markers of improvement over the course of therapy. Their findings have suggested
that different therapeutic foci are most beneficial at different stages of the disease. For
example, if individuals have assimilated their memory difficulties, it may be most
beneficial to aid them in gaining some control over their situation through planning. If an
individual has not assimilated their disease, a less directive focus on affect may be more
beneficial.

Inner Experience in Alzheimer’s Disease
There is very little understanding of the subjective experience of individuals with AD
(Lawton, Van Haitsma, & Perkinson, 2000). Although it is difficult for individuals with
dementia to communicate what is occurring in their inner experience, it can still be
understood to a limited degree (Lawton et al., 2000). Understanding of this experience is
important for a number of reasons, one of which is to help caregivers can respond more
effectively to their emotional needs and desires (Lawton et al., 2000).
Good care for people with dementia requires a continuing search for means by which
caregivers may comprehend the needs of such people and build this understanding
into the way they give care. The emotional states of dementia patients are a neglected
source of such cues. (Lawton et al., 2000, p.117).
Although there has been substantial interest in the study of the inner experience of
individuals with AD in recent years, many researchers, caregivers, and individuals with
AD are left to speculate on the nature of the inner experience of individuals with AD.
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For example, support groups for caregivers of those with AD are often populated with
questions such as “what’s going on in that head of his?” (Gubrium, 2000, p. 185).
There were caregivers who anxiously sought answers and seemingly grasped at any
understanding that became available. Other caregivers came to support group with
ready-made answers of their own, contributing to the local culture of knowledge
about the inner world of the demented. Some support groups touted rather definitive
views of the demented and participants were continuously held accountable to these
views. (Gubrium, 2000, p. 186).
Furthermore, support groups often seem to develop and maintain group myths about
what the experience of AD is like. Sometimes caregivers develop romanticized views of
the inner experience of AD. For example, some group myths have included views that
individuals with AD experience more with feelings than with words, that as the disease
progresses individuals with AD are more sensitive to touch, that they respond more to the
tone of a loved one’s voice, that the individual just needs physical affection to “wake up,”
and that they can communicate with their eyes and expressions (Gubrium, 2000). Not all
views are necessarily romanticized however. Other speculations that individuals who care
for individuals with AD sometimes make are that AD is basically “brain failure”
(Gubrium, 2000, p. 185), that there is no mind left in AD, and the individual with AD is
“just a piece of meat”, that there may be no thoughts left, that the person still “has it up
there” (Gurbrium, 2000, p. 187) but is simply more prone to confusion, that feelings are
present but processing is decreased, that the person is an “empty-shell” bereft of thought,
that the person is not really there anymore, and that their inner experience is confused but
not meaningless (Gubrium, 2000).
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Unfortunately, individuals with AD are also left to speculate the nature of their own
condition. For example, one individual with AD lamented,
No theory of medicine can explain what is happening to me. Every few months I
sense that another piece of me is missing. My life…my self…are falling apart. I can
only think half thoughts now. Someday I may wake up and not think at all…not
know who I am. Most people expect to die someday, but who ever expected to lose
their self first? (Cohen & Eiserdorfer, 1986, p. 22).
Unfortunately, not only must individuals endure the unspeakable hardships of AD but
they must do so without a thorough explanation of what to expect experientially as the
disease progresses.
Even researchers often seem in the dark and left to speculations regarding the inner
experience of AD and dementia. Sabat (2001) asked,
How, then, can we come to a more detailed, richer understanding of the experience of
persons afflicted with AD as they go about the task of living with and among others?
That is, how can we see the afflicted as persons who have their own desires, hopes,
fears, loves, identify the nature of those aspects of their lives, and thereby see them as
being defined and understandable in terms of characteristics beyond their ‘presenting
symptoms’? (p. 13).
The reason that caregivers, loved ones, researchers, and even those with AD and
dementia must resort to unfounded speculations about the inner experience of AD is that
very little is known about the inner experience of AD and dementia.
What is the experience of AD like?…But what does it mean to lose one’s mind (as
opposed to a brain)? How can one tell when the mind is gone? How is one to
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conceptualize its subjectivity? These are urgent questions because their answers
organize thoughts, sentiments, and courses of action in relation to the individual
question. (Gubrium, 2000, p. 185).
Although there is very little known definitively about the inner experience of
individuals with AD and other dementias (as evidenced by the need for the speculations
above), the inner experience of dementia has been a topic of interest for well over 100
years. Esquirol (1838/1845, cited by Sabat, 2001, p. 313) hypothesized about the inner
experience of dementia, stating that individuals with dementia have “few or no ideas.”
Contemporary researchers continue to form hypotheses and make speculations regarding
the inner experience of AD and dementia. The notion that individuals with AD
experience a general loss of self is perhaps the most pervasive speculation regarding the
inner experience of individuals with AD (Ballenger, 2006). However, this spectulation
has been changing recently as many researchers believe that selfhood is maintained well
into the progression of the disease and perhaps throughout the disease (Shenk, 2005;
Ryan, Byrne, Spykerman, & Orange, 2005). Although there are clearly a number of
losses of important aspects of the self associated with AD, there is also potential for
growth in major aspects of the self, including the use of coping skills, creativity, and
spirituality (Ryan et al., 2005; Kitwood, 1997).
Nevertheless, the extent to which individuals with AD maintain their sense of self
remains a topic of debate in contemporary Alzheimer’s research and is often the focus of
questions surrounding the inner experience of individuals with AD. Dementia has come
to be thought of by many researchers as a loss of selfhood, although there is very little
understood about self-awareness in dementia and there is likely to be high variability
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among individuals with dementia regarding perceptions of selfhood and self-awareness
(Lawton et al., 2000). Because Western culture often equates selfhood with memory and
language while ignoring non-cognitive aspects of expression, AD is often viewed as a
loss of selfhood in this culture (Ballenger, 2006). This notion may also be partially
present due to campaigns that used the idea to win support for AD (Ballenger, 2006).
Cohen and Eisdorfer (1986) used the reports of individuals with AD and dementia to
hypothesize that a key component of AD and dementia is the progressive “loss of self.”
Some researchers, however, have rejected the idea that dementia leads to a loss of
self-hood (Ballenger, 2006). Some caregivers reject the notion that their loved ones have
lost their selfhood, believing that the self is still there, simply hidden behind the mask of
dementia, and that sometimes dementia helps to reveal an individual’s true self
(Ballenger, 2006). The extent to which individuals with AD maintain a sense of self
depends largely on the observer’s definition of self. Although individuals with AD may
lose key components of their selfhood, such as memory and communication, they may
maintain other important parts of their selfhood, including their social selves (Sabat &
Harre’, 1992; Kitwood, 1990). Harris and Sterin (1999) stated that the nature of the self
in AD is difficult to pinpoint as it is in a constant state of change due to ever changing
needs and shifting roles that are part of the progression of AD.
The primary method of drawing inferences about the nature of self in individuals with
AD is closely examining the communication of these individuals in their natural
environment, especially communication that seems to indicate the existence of a sense of
self such as using personal pronouns and the communication of values, memories,
experiences, and topics that are otherwise important to them (see Sabat, 2002; Sabat &
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Harre’, 1992; Shenk, 2005). The idea that an individual is still a person or has a self has
been suggested as the central tenet of AD care (Ryan et al., 2005).
Perhaps the leading researcher in the area of the inner experience of AD is Kitwood,
who developed the Dementia Care Mapping (DCM) technique to evaluate the care given
to individuals with dementia (Kitwood & Bredin, 1994). DCM requires researchers to
shadow an individual with dementia who lives in a residential care facility for at least 6
hours in order to understand the quality of care the individual is receiving and to gain an
understanding of their daily experience. This technique has led Kitwood to hypothesize
that a key component of the experience of dementia is the loss of personhood, and a key
component of care is aiding individuals with dementia to maintain their personhood
(Kitwood, 1993; Kitwood & Bredin, 1992). Kitwood and Bredin (1992) have identified
three phenomena in dementia that are evidence for the maintenance of personhood. First,
there is sometimes a reversal of symptoms, even in the severely demented. Individuals
who have experienced a progressive deterioration of cognitive and behavioral functioning
sometimes recover some of their lost skills. Second, after progressive cognitive and
behavioral deterioration, there is sometimes stabilization and a lack of further cognitive
and behavioral deterioration. And finally, research with geriatric rats show that, at times,
changing the rats’ environmental conditions can reverse their neurological deterioration.
Although the authors admitted that these observations are not adequate for a sound
scientific theory regarding the maintenance of personhood in dementia, they did maintain
that they are sufficient to show hope for the maintenance of personhood in dementia
(Kitwood & Bredin, 2002).

61

Furthermore, Kitwood and Bredin (1992) hypothesized four “global sentient states”
related to the inner experience of individuals with AD that are derived from various
behavioral observations of people with dementia. These states are:
1. Sense of personal worth – Ageing involves losses and this attacks personal worth.
Maintenance of personal worth after losses is associated with general well-being.
2. Sense of agency – This involves control of one’s environment. This is lost as
dementia progresses and as the ability to control one’s self and one’s environment
diminishes.
3. Social confidence – This is being comfortable with others and feeling as if you
have something to offer socially.
4. Hope – Maintaining a state of hope is often very difficult in dementia.
There are behavioral observations that are empirically measurable and are indicative
of these states (Kitwood & Bredin, 1992). These behaviors are divided into 12 categories
as follows: the assertion of desire or will, the ability to experience and express a range of
emotions (both positive and negative), initiation of social contact, affectional warmth,
social sensitivity, self-respect, acceptance of other dementia suffers, humor, creativity
and self-expression, showing evident pleasure, helpfulness, and relaxation.
The study of inner experience in general is thought to be difficult empirically,
especially in individuals with multiple cognitive deficits such as those that occur in AD.
Kitwood (1997) suggested that empirical methods are not suitable to gain valid insight
into the inner experience of individuals with dementia. Instead, Kitwood (1997)
recommended using more imaginative techniques to study the inner experience of
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individuals with dementia. Kitwood (1997) suggested six access routes that may be used
to investigate the inner experience of individuals with dementia:
1. Examining written accounts of individuals with dementia – There are many
publications written by individuals with dementia that are designed to describe the
experience of their dementia. This can help researchers understand the difficulties that
individuals with dementia face, not the least of which is the “struggle to remain a person”
(Kitwood, 1997, Six Access Routes, para. 2). The written accounts of individuals with
AD regarding their inner experience will be presented later in this paper.
2. Interviewing individuals with dementia – This may be helpful for gaining insight
into the inner experience of dementia, but the researcher must pay close attention to
nonverbal communication. Researchers should also pay close attention to metaphor
rather than focusing on the literal meaning of the content of the interview. Interviews of
people with dementia have uncovered insights into the inner experience of dementia,
including the fear of losing control and meaning in one’s life and the need for
reassurance.
3. Paying careful attention to the day-to-day behavior of individuals with dementia –
Again, Kitwood suggested that researchers go beyond the literal meaning of everyday
behavior and speech and interpret the metaphorical meaning of verbal and non-verbal
behavior.
4. Interviewing people who have experienced dementia due to illness and have
recovered – Typically these reports come from individuals who have experienced the
dementing effects of depression or meningitis. One individual described the conscience
experience of her meningitis-induced dementia has having a sense of “strangeness” and
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“weirdness,” at the same time experiencing that “she both is, and is not, herself”
(Kitwood, 1997, Six Access Routes, para. 14).
5. Using poetic imagination – Kitwood suggested that the researcher use his own
poetic imagination in order to hypothesize about the experience of individuals with
dementia. This may be necessary because typical forms of verbal description may not
capture the strange experience of dementia. Kitwood provided his own example of using
poetic imagination as an attempt to gain insight into the experience of individuals with
dementia. This is an excerpt from that example:
You are in a swirling fog, and in half-darkness. You are wandering around in a place
that seems vaguely familiar; and yet you do not know where you are; you cannot
make out whether it is summer or winter, day or night. At times the fog clears a little,
and you can see a few objects really clearly; but as you try to make sense of where
you are you are overpowered by a kind of dullness and stupidity; your knowledge
slips away, and again you are utterly confused. (Kitwood, 1990, p. 40).
6. Using role-play – Kitwood suggested that researchers role-play what it is like to
have dementia in order to gain a better understanding of the inner experience of
individuals with dementia. The role-play will allow researchers to use their own
dementia-like experiences from the past in order to create an “inner narrative” that is
similar to the inner narrative of individuals with dementia.
Using his own research and the research of others, Kitwood (1997) conceptualized
the progressive experience of individuals with dementia as having three stages. The first
involves feelings typically of negative content that are associated with the perils of living
with dementia. The second Kitwood described as involving “global states.” These
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global states consist largely of “raw emotions” and confusion. The third stage involves
“burnt-out” states that may resemble a vegetative existence. Individuals with dementia
can pass in and out of these stages, back and forth, or may experience these stages
simultaneously. Kitwood also claimed that individuals with dementia tend to have
extremely intense and “vivid” emotional experiences.
Another analogy that Kitwood and Bredin (1992) drew regarding the experience of
individuals with AD is that of a fluid, frozen, and shattered self. These researchers
suggested that the self remains fluid in childhood and moves into a frozen state in
adulthood. In individuals with dementia, their self becomes shattered and their
subjectivity is fragmented. In this state the individual needs others to help shape their
reality as well as their sense of personhood.
Sabat (2001) also investigated the inner experience of individuals with AD and
dementia. Sabat and colleagues’ primary method of inquiry was to interact with
individuals with AD (Sabat, 2001; Sabat & Cagigas, 1997) while paying close attention
to metaphor, individuals’ idiosyncratic use of language (Sabat, 2001), and non-verbal
communication (Sabat & Cagigas, 1997) in order to draw conclusions about inner
experience (Sabat, 2001). This method can help increase understanding of AD and
complement standard quantitative methods and can aid in treating AD by identifying and
stressing abilities still present in individuals with AD (Sabat, 2000).
Sabat and colleagues held that individuals define their reality through language and
that autobiography is a public manifestation of the self (Sabat & Harre’, 1992). They
define three different aspects of the self: a singular point of view or consciousness (Self
1), the attributes that an individual possesses and the beliefs the individual has about
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those attributes (Self 2), and the manner in which an individual presents himself to the
rest of the world (Self 3) (Sabat, Fath, Moghaddam, & Harre’, 1999). According to these
researchers, the use of personal pronouns is indicative of the existence of Self 1 (Sabat et
al., 1999) and is therefore examined in individuals with AD to infer the maintained
existence of Self 1 (Sabat & Harre’, 1992). Through this method, Sabat and colleagues
concluded that individuals with AD typically maintain Self 1 until the very final stages of
AD (Sabat & Harre’, 1992; Sabat, 2000). Individuals with AD often maintain their Self 2
deep into the progress of the disease as individuals are aware of many of the attributes
they have as well as many of the attributes they have lost due to the progress of the
disease (Sabat et al., 1999). A person to interact with is required in order for the
existence of Self 3 to be manifested and therefore this aspect of the self is affected
differently in AD depending on how those around them interact with them (Sabat et al.,
1999).
Sabat (2001) drew further conclusions regarding the inner experience of individuals
with AD. He stated that individuals with AD, even in very severe stages, maintain a
sense of self-worth and behave in ways that attempt to maintain this sense of self-worth
even though there is typically a loss of the sense of self (Sabat 2001; Sabat & Harre’,
1992; Sabat et al., 1999). However, although there is some loss of the sense of self in
the severe stags of AD, sense of self is rarely totally depleted evidenced by the continued
use of first person pronouns (Sabat & Harre’, 1992). He also stated that individuals with
AD engage in dialectical reasoning where they think of their past positive attributes,
realize they no longer possess many of these positive attributes, and wonder what their
life would be like if they did not develop AD. This leads to tension and negative affect.
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Sabat’s observations have further allowed him to hypothesize that the inner experience of
individuals with AD typically includes great pride in positive attributes, embarrassment
about the symptoms of AD, frustration when others focus on the symptoms of AD over
positive attributes, and delight upon presenting themselves in a positive way (Sabat,
2001).
Watkins et al. (2006) also focused on the discourse of individuals with AD in drawing
inferences about their inner experience. These researchers suggested that individuals
have many different internal voices and that some are stronger than others. Individuals in
the early stages of AD may deny the existence of their disease by drowning out the voice
or voices that tell them that something is wrong. Therefore, a major therapeutic goal in
treating AD is to help these voices become louder so that individuals can process the
meaning of their disease.
Asp, Song, and Rockwood (2005) similarly paid close attention to the verbal
communications of individuals with AD. They showed that individuals with AD often
ask for certainty after making statements, such as, “My daughter will be 65 next week,
won’t she?” These researchers suggested that when individuals follow statements with
questions such as these that this indicates that they are aware of memory difficulties they
are having associated with AD. Therefore, these questions are positive signals that at
least the individual that uses these words is not experiencing anosognosia and is aware
that they are having memory difficulties.
Gubrium (2000) suggested that we pay particular attention to the narratives created by
caregivers and loved ones of individuals with AD and dementia in order to construct a
hypothesis of their inner experience. He stated that story-telling is one major way in
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which we can understand the inner experience of others. Narratives of older individuals
are becoming a more common method to obtain subjective data of the reality of aging
(Kenyon, Ruth, & Mader, 1999). Although Gubrium (2000) was aware of the speculative
nature and the potential dangers and inaccuracies that can come with relying on one’s
theoretical account of another’s inner experience, he believed that these narratives and
stories can provide important insight into the inner experience of individuals with AD
and dementia.
Cheston (2004) also relied on narratives created by individuals with dementia in order
to gain an understanding of their experience. Cheston (2004) asserted that in the early
stages of AD individuals use narratives/stories to first distance themselves from their
plight and then to relate experiences that are not entirely in their awareness. Eventually,
patients with AD use narratives/stories to integrate information regarding their disease
into their awareness. From examining narratives/stories in this manner, Cheston (2004)
arrived at the following conclusion regarding the inner experience of those with AD and
how these individuals come to be aware of their disease:
The gradual emergence of awareness is a process that is analogous to entering a
brightly lit room from a dark corridor: first people blink and look away, perhaps
defending themselves from the harsh new light by placing their hand over their face.
It is only over time that we can open our eyes fully (p. 108).
Stiles et al. (1990) developed a systematic method to evaluate the experience of
individuals with AD using narratives. This method is called the Assimilation of
Problematic Experiences Scale (APES), which uses the narratives of individuals with AD
to gauge how aware individuals are of their disease. Stiles et al. (1990) used this scale to
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hypothesize five levels of awareness. At first, narratives/stories are at Level 0 and are
used to “ward off” awareness of dementia. At Level 1, narratives/stories express
“unwanted thoughts” about dementia. That is, these narratives/stories act as a method to
remove problems related to dementia from awareness. Level 2 narratives/stories are used
to express a “vague awareness” about the disease. Level 3 narratives/stories are used
more specifically to identify the problem of dementia and problems the individual has
that are associated with dementia. Here, individuals are trying to define the disease for
the first time. Finally, at Level 4, narratives/stories express “understanding/insight” and
are typically coupled with more positive emotion and a more in depth examination of
their disease and its related problems.
Lawton, Van Haitsma, and Klapper (1996) developed the Apparent Affect
Rating Scale (AARS) to assess the affective component of experience of
individuals with dementia. The AARS trains caregivers to observe individuals
with dementia for a 5 minute period and record the amount of times the
individuals display different emotions. The caregivers are given a list of specific
behaviors that indicate certain emotions. For example, depression is indicated by
crying, tearing, wiping of the eyes, moaning, sighing, frowning, and putting the
head down while having no expression on the face. If an individual is displaying
these behaviors the caregiver records depression for the appropriate amount of
time. Although the researchers believe the AARS is valid and reliable, they admit
that using behavioral observations to infer emotion is limited at times due to a
lack of precise understanding about how behaviors reflect affective states (Lawton
et al., 1996).
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Gil et al. (2001) focused on self-consciousness or self-awareness in trying to
understand the inner experience of individuals with AD. These researchers used 14
questions designed to evaluate various aspects of self-consciousness of individuals with
AD (identity, knowledge of cognitive disturbances, self-knowledge of affective state,
bodily awareness, awareness of future plans, capacity to introspect, and moral
awareness). They concluded that although AD does not destroy self-consciousness, it
does cause alterations in self-consciousness. Knowledge of cognitive disturbance and
moral awareness were correlated with dementia severity, suggesting deficiency in these
aspects of self-consciousness. Gil et al. (2001) suggested that it is possible that
alterations in self-consciousness may be the central difficulty faced by individuals with
AD.
Perrin (1997) hypothesized that individuals with severe dementia experience the
world as if they were in a plastic bubble of approximately three feet diameter.
…from inside the bubble, the physical conditions of the general environment, along
with the conversations and interactions of everyday social intercourse, are perceived
in a distorted and muffled fashion and therefore fail to impinge appropriately upon
the individual within. (p. 940).
Perrin suggested that individuals who care for people with dementia must physically
remain within the bubble’s three-foot diameter and remain there in order to be effective
caregivers.
Some psychotherapeutic interventions designed specifically for individuals with AD
have been designed based on assumptions regarding the inner experience of individuals.
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Validation therapy (Feil, 2002) is based on eight assumptions that are related to the inner
experience of individuals with AD:
1. Expressing painful feelings diminishes the experience of painful feelings.
2. Painful feelings that are ignored will become more prevalent in experience.
3. Memories with strong emotions are maintained in individuals with AD.
4. Recalling early memories that are affect-laden is used as a coping mechanism
when more recent memories begin to fail.
5. When vision becomes poor, individuals with AD are able to use their “mind’s
eye.” When hearing becomes poor, individuals with AD focus on auditory stimulation
that occurred in the past.
6. All people, including individuals with AD, have multiple levels of awareness.
7. Old memories are used when individuals with AD experience intense negative
emotion.
8. Affect that is experienced in the present will cause affect from the past to come
into awareness.
Thus, assumptions about the inner experience of individuals with AD currently inform
intervention strategies.
Data from cognitive and neuropsychological tests have been used to inform
speculations regarding the inner experience of AD. Overman and Becker (2004)
suggested that because individuals with AD have impairment in episodic and
autobiographical memory, their experience loses personal relevance. Specifically,
although individuals with AD might know that events in their lives and events in the
history of their family have occurred, they lose access to the memory of actual

71

experiences and therefore lose touch with their past (Overman & Becker, 2004). Their
experience of the past is like facts read from a history book rather than like the
remembrance of experience from their own lives.
Much of the research of experience in individuals with AD and dementia has focused
on the individual’s experience of care in residential facilities (see Cheston, Bender, &
Byatt, 2000; Kitwood & Bredin, 1994). A number of methods have been devised to
assess the experience that individuals with dementia have regarding their care, including
DCM, questionnaires, and structured and semi-structured interviews (Cheston et al.,
2000). Nevertheless, due to severe deficits in cognitive and communicative skills in
many individuals with AD and dementia, their experience and viewpoints concerning the
caregiving process are often difficult to discern and are often ignored (Cheston et al.,
2000).
Unfortunately, in spite of the research efforts above, caregivers, loved ones, and
researchers do not have any definitive answers as to what the inner experience of those
with AD and dementia is really like. Most individuals must resort to speculations and/or
use subjective interpretations to imagine what the inner experience of AD and dementia
is like because science has to this point failed at accurately describing the inner
experience of those with AD. This is due at least partially to the difficulty that
individuals with AD and dementia have communicating their inner experiences with
others or perhaps because there are few methodologies that systematically attempt to
study the inner experience of people in a careful way.
It should be noted that there may be some discrepancy between the above
researchers’ definitions of inner experience and definition of inner experience used in this
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study. The researchers above seem to define inner experience in a number of ways, but
largely as the experience of difficulties associated with depleting skills and their
accompanying mood states. They also seem to use the phrase inner experience to refer to
general emotional experiences, such as anger, depression, confusion, etc. The definition
of “inner experience” in this study is literally the form and content of conscious
experience. Although anger, depression, or confusion may be a part of an individual’s
experience at a given time, these words are far too broad given the author’s definition of
inner experience. In this study when the term “inner experience” is used it is referring to
the literal and highly specific contents of consciousness that occur at any given moment
in time. For example, this may involve a phrase being spoken in the individual’s voice,
in another’s voice, an inner seeing of something the individual may have seen in the past,
an inner seeing of something the individual may have never seen, a physical feeling (e.g.
a sense of heat in the chest, a tingling sensation in the back of the head, etc.), or myriad
other things, or a combination of these things. Nevertheless, the purpose of previous
research and the present study is ultimately the same: to gain an in depth understanding
of the inner experience, however defined, of older individuals with and without cognitive
impairment, including AD, in order to facilitate early diagnosis, early intervention,
effective treatment, and a public understanding of AD and dementia in order to increase
the life satisfaction of those with AD and dementia and their loved ones and caregivers.

The Inner Experience of Alzheimer’s Disease – The First-Person Perspective
As discussed above, studying the first-person accounts of individuals with AD is an
important tool in the investigation of the experience of those with AD (Kitwood, 1997).
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A number of individuals with AD have written accounts of their experience with the
disease. Although the majority of these writings do not focus upon the inner experience
of AD the way that the present study does, these writings are still potentially useful in
gaining some insight into the inner experience of these individuals. This section will
discuss a few of the major works of individuals with AD focusing on how these writings
relate to the inner experience of AD.
Cary Smith Henderson held a Ph.D. in modern American history when he was
diagnosed with AD. Henderson received a diagnosis of AD very early in its course and
used a tape recorder to document his experiences through the moderate stages of the
disease. These experiences were recorded in his book, Partial View: An Alzheimer’s
Journal (1998). Henderson’s wife Ruth (who helped edit the book) stated that his
recordings were surprising in that he revealed much more insight into his disease than he
expressed in day to day life.
Henderson described his experience with AD in a variety of ways. He called it
“somebody’s version of hell” (p. 4). At one point he had difficulty calling himself a
human being, difficulty considering himself alive, and stated that he was not a normal
person. His struggles with memory were apparent and poignant: “I just had a brilliant
idea, but before I could push down the little recording mechanism, it was absolutely
totally gone” (p. 7). He struggled to remember how old he was on his 62nd birthday,
stating he should have been a year younger, and had trouble remembering where his long
time home was located. He stated that he had no ability to comprehend time and that
every minute and every moment are “separate” (p. 41). He expressed anxiety about his
compromised ability to communicate: “It’s kinda nice to talk to a dog that you know is
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not going to talk back. And you can’t make a mistake that way” (p. 13). He said that his
words became “tangled” easily and that they were forgotten easily (p. 18). Eventually he
could no longer read nor write. He stated that his difficulty reading was at least partially
due to the experience that words move or waver and he “can’t catch them” (p. 23).
Henderson described severe mood swings as well: “Sometimes I feel on top of the world,
a couple of days ago I did and today I just feel absolutely devastated” (p. 32). He stated
that although he does not think very much, everything he does is “full of feelings” (p.
56). Paranoia is so prevalent in Henderson’s experience that he stated that it must be
“basic to Alzheimer’s people” (p. 81).
The variability of the disease in general was expressed when Henderson called AD a
“come and go disease” (p. 36). He explained that his ability to think is easily
compromised by the presence of others, even one other person. He explained that taking
social cues from others is very important when one is confused about how to behave in
social situations. He stressed the importance of humor, calling it the most valuable tool
one can have to deal with AD. He called music “the only real constant friend I’ve got”
and music repeatedly gave him comfort throughout his musings (p. 17).
In direct relationship to his inner experience, he stated that he could not “visualize
things” (p. 8).

He stated that he had numerous problems surrounding bodily awareness,

most commonly regarding the positioning and movement of his feet and the feeling that
he was unbalanced. He stated repeatedly that he felt severely restricted and that he was
“half a person” (p. 19). Henderson made a plea specifically to understand the common
inner experience of others who have AD:
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It would be very interesting for Alzheimer’s patients to correspond with one another,
not necessarily to learn very much, but to, just to see what other people are thinking.
Well, if you’re like me, I’m not sure you’re thinking a whole lot, but you have a lot of
feelings. I must say a heck of a lot of feelings. Everything we do is just full of
feelings…But I would sincerely like to share my—our—experiences and our feelings,
and what I’m trying to do in this series of talks, if that’s what you want to call it,
these are straight from the victim’s own words and whatever I say is sincere…I think
we do have experiences which might be worthwhile, especially to anybody who had
any reason at all in this world to want to know a little bit about Alzheimer’s. I do
suspect we do know more than we seem to know because it gets so hard to express
what we know. I’d just like to know from anecdotal experiences what people with
Alzheimer’s had, to what degree are they clumsy, to what degree do they very quickly
forget things, and to what degree can they make themselves useful…I’ve got lots of
questions. And I have very few answers…I really want to find out from other people
what they have experienced. (pp. 56-57).
Larry Rose was diagnosed with early onset AD at the age of 54 (Rose, 1996).
His symptoms seemed to come on without warning. He was driving to his cabin
in the mountains, something he had done countless times, when he became lost.
He did not recognize where he was, could not remember the trip he had taken, and
after several hours, had to stop at a hotel. The next day when he made it to his
cabin, he forgot for hours about a pizza he was cooking. He had not noticed any
forgetfulness prior to these two incidences. Within the ensuing weeks, Larry was
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at times not able to remember what year it was, how old he was, or what he had
for breakfast.
Within a year Rose began to feel anxiety, depression, and anger. He also experienced
isolation, repeatedly expressing wonderment at the fact that there could be so many
people with AD in the world but that he never met one. When he did finally meet people
with AD he stated that he felt much less alone and much less empty.
Rose described his thoughts as being tangled and out of order. He began to have
tremendous difficulty making the smallest decisions, such as whether to wear boots or
sneakers. Eventually he began to experience anger, uncertainty, and fear that he
described as a physical sensation in his stomach. Rose also described many instances of
joy, and especially humor, throughout his experience with AD. He also stated that AD
caused him to become more compassionate. Like Henderson, Rose found solace in a pet.
A little over a year after diagnosis, he bought a pig that he became very close to and
enjoyed very much.
The variability of Rose’s experience of AD was present throughout his account. At
times he could travel long distances and arrive easily at his destination. Other times he
would get lost on his own street, forget what car he drove to get to his destination, or
forget his phone number. At other times he heard the phone ring, but could not identify
what the sound meant although he knew he had heard the sound before. He stated that at
times he felt perfectly fine cognitively, but at other times he would become extremely
disoriented.
Diana Friel McGowin also suffered from early onset AD (McGowin, 1993). It started
when she began to notice problems with memory, make mistakes at work as a legal
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secretary, and have difficulties with everyday activities such as cooking. She initially
attributed there problems to tension. She sometimes became lost driving traveling roads
she had traveled hundreds of times. She told a doctor that she had to relearn directions,
forgetting the meaning of left, right, up, and down. She also had distortions in visual
perception that caused her to lose her balance and began slurring her words when she
spoke. She quickly had periodic difficulty remembering the name of the street that she
lived on. One day she lost consciousness at work and this eventually led to her diagnosis
of AD, although her primary care physician and neurologist did not initially diagnose AD
or any other neurodegenerative impairment.
Diana’s initial symptoms caused her significant anxiety. She often tried to hide her
symptoms from others. When she did not recognize a co-worker she stated that she had a
very bad headache. When she did not recognize her cousin she again covered for her
memory problems. She pretended that she was a tourist and asked directions to places
she had been many times. Sometimes she had to ask for directions three or four times on
one trip. She visited a childhood friend whom she revered for his intelligence partly to
see if she could successfully hide her AD-related problems from someone with high
intellect. Eventually she had to resign from her job and take a temporary job stating “I
figured that no one would expect a temporary assistant to know her way around a
building or office, nor recognize the employees on sight. If I erred, it would seem
natural, nothing amiss” (p. 30). She also stated “I was playing a game of ‘I’ve got a
secret’ with everyone, even with myself” (p. 48).
The course of McGowin’s AD was highly variable. At times she was able to perform
complex tasks with relative ease while at other times the simplest tasks could not be
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performed effectively. “One minute I was coping fine with my work. The next, I had
lost complete recall of whom I was speaking to on the telephone, and why” (p. 39).
Emotionally, Diana experienced anxiety, anger, increased desire for sex, a loss of
patience with others, guilt for no longer being able to work and hiding her diagnosis from
some loved ones, depression, and paranoia. She developed insomnia, lost a great deal of
weight, and developed compulsive checking behaviors. The desire for affection grew as
the disease progressed and her sense of smell improved. Eventually she felt worthless,
especially in large groups of people. Her love of music remained unblemished, however.
She stated that counseling helped her cope with AD, but did not explain specific
therapeutic techniques. She started a support group for early onset AD, which was
invaluable to her. She repeatedly stated how helpful it was to have understanding of the
experience of AD and the only people who can truly understand are others with AD. At
times she felt as if she was losing a grip on her existence. This was partially due to the
way others treated her, but also had internal sources: “I am painfully aware that less of
me exists than the day before, for now, I can say, I am still here! Diana McGowin
exists!” (p. 116).
Solace often came to McGowin through remembrance of joyful events from her past.
She explained that memories from her past seemed especially vibrant and comforting:
I can actually smell the aroma of the small town library where I spent so many
childhood hours…Although I have not seen snowflakes for decades I can taste them
on my tongue…I can experience the total, absolute quiet of a snowbound world.
Even the bitter pain endured when warming my frozen fingers after walking to my
piano teacher’s home becomes a bittersweet memory…Visions of first daffodils of an
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Ohio spring float through my memory…My own voice echoes in my ears as I
remember laughing with great glee while chasing fireflies. (pp. 109-110).
McGowin eventually renewed two lost friendships from childhood, and these became,
in some ways, the most important relationships in her life after being diagnosed with AD.
She intensely pursued a number of other past relationships as well. She hoped that these
people would see her as she was before she developed AD and allow her to see herself in
that was as well.
McGowin’s family was not emotionally supportive when she revealed her diagnosis.
Many of them did not believe or comprehend the seriousness of it. Others simply chose
to ignore it. Her own husband chided her to “rise above” the disease (p. 67). Eventually,
McGowin explained that the reason for their reactions was because of their differing
understanding of the experience of the disease. “It was as though I was standing at one
end of a telescope and my family at the other, each peering intently into the instrument,
each with a quite opposite perspective” (p. 97). She did find solace in pets however,
must notably her pet terrier.
Surprisingly, McGowin stated that the medical and research community do not want
individuals with AD to attempt to fight the disease or to communicate insights they have
about the disease. She stated that when individuals with AD are able to express their
insight regarding the disease, that this challenges the scientific community. By not
giving up and slowly deteriorating into a vegetative state, McGowin stated that she and
those like her are breaking the “mold” created by researchers of AD, and that this causes
resentment in the scientific community.
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Thomas Debaggio was diagnosed with AD at the age of 57 (Debaggio, 2002).
Debaggio described his experience with AD in a variety of ways. “I start thinking about
something intently and then my thoughts wander through fields of memory and I bob to
the surface suddenly and wonder for a moment who I am, and whether I have truly lost
my mind” (p. 13). He said that his mind cannot stay focused on one thing, that it “skitters
from place to place” (p. 96). “Clouded memories flit through my brain, wandering
moments in a jumble of events only half-remembered. Faces smiling and sullen rise
through a mist of years” (p. 113). He described images coming and going very quickly in
his awareness. At times he would have surreal experiences and feel as if he was in a
different world that was foreign to him. “My mind is becoming one-dimensional. I have
almost lost my ability to hold two thoughts simultaneously. Along with this is the long,
frustrating wait for the word I need in conversation” (p. 142). He said that he became
more aware of subtleties in his environment as his disease progressed.
Debaggio stated that he was “ready to leap from one stone to the next in the crowded
stream of consciousness.” (p. 46). He hinted at the possibility that AD and its symptoms
are often not directly in his awareness or at least not central to his awareness. “This evil
disease sleeps on the edge of my consciousness, always there to remind me of its wicked
strength over me” (p. 46).
Debaggio described a number of unusual sensory experiences that he had only after
AD was diagnosed. A number of these occurred before he went to sleep. He saw
…bouncy colored lights, mountains in fantastic colors, pictures that resemble the
landscape of the moon seen from a slow-moving vehicle…Some nights the visual
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pyrotechnics are so strong it is difficult to get to sleep, something that never happened
to me before (p. 24).
As I lay awake this morning in 4A.M. darkness, I was treated to a light show. A
series of yellow images with edges torn in irregular patterns began to flash slowly
before me as I stared at the wall opposite me. They danced before my eyes as if they
were projected on the wall but there was no source of light for them. They could only
be generated in my mind but they were as real as if Picasso was squirting the wall
with random objects painted in yellow. I lay there alone and insignificant and for
several minutes the yellow-lit objects snapped on and off in different places on the
wall (p. 184).
Debaggio described similar visualizations, almost always late at night or early in the
morning, throughout his account. Eventually these images went away and were replaced
by “a raw sheet-metal color that reminds me of a trashcan” (p. 99) but stated that
sometimes he saw yellow before going to sleep. Debaggio also had sensory experiences
of the sidewalk moving as he walked. He experienced other bizarre sensory experiences:
Often when I awaken in the dusty morning light, the new day I see around me is
patterned in tiny square checks through which I see the world. I blink my eyes but
the images before me remain. It is as if I am looking close-up through an old screen
door. The precision of the tiny checks makes me think I am awakening in some kind
of cell, a prisoner behind minute, rigid crisscross bars. Before long the apparition
disappears and the world becomes clear and normal as the sun comes up. Is this
another signal from the war in my brain where I am on the losing side in a battle with
Alzheimer’s? (p. 172).
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In reference to verbal difficulties, Debaggio stated that “The words are under control
but the letters that form the words squirm in their own directions” (p. 20). He also stated,
“Words slice through my mind so fast I cannot catch them and marry them to the eternity
of the page” (p. 27). “I have only a few seconds to capture a thought before it disappears
from my mind. Scraps of ideas flit like birds…Ideas evaporate like snowflakes on a
warm roof” (p. 48). Debaggio described these and similar difficulties numerous times
throughout his account of his experience with AD. He had difficulty writing lengthy
passages, where he often got lost while writing and although he could see the words, he
sometimes could not comprehend what they meant. Within four months Debaggio
noticed a lessened ability to recall words, a decreased vocabulary, and problems spelling
and reading. He had trouble naming the plants that he made a career of studying.
Not long after diagnosis, Debaggio began having difficulties with spatial abilities,
getting lost when attempting to travel to places he had been many times. When sitting
outside of his niece’s apartment, he began to think that he was not in the correct place.
“My mind was flooded with images of another place nearby where she might be” (p.
128). Eventually, Debaggio had difficulty orienting himself to space or time, and had
difficulty with activities of daily living, as is expected as AD progresses. He stated that
before he had AD he would imagine a map when traveling to a particular destination.
After AD, he was no longer able to use this ability.
Debaggio’s handwriting deteriorated to the point that he could not read it. The fine
movements required for typing became extremely difficult as well. He stated that his
office became very disorganized and cluttered like his mind. He quickly became
obsessed with his disease and with death itself. He stated that he became very emotional
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as the disease progressed, only a few months after diagnosis. Debaggio, like the other
authors with AD, was very close to his pets. He stated that his cats taught him patience
and that one of the few joys he had remaining as AD progressed was playing with his
cats.
These first-person accounts of the experience of AD indicate a number of important
points. First, it appears that all of these individuals attempted to hide their symptoms as
best they could due to the obvious anxiety and embarrassment that their new, unexplained
cognitive difficulties caused. Although this is an understandable reaction, these
behaviors clearly make AD diagnosis more difficult. Understanding the inner experience
of individuals with AD is not only important to aid in the diagnosis of the disease, but
also could help individuals in the early stages of the disease identify their own symptoms,
relate them to AD, and seek help. Second, the course was highly variable for all of these
individuals. The effects of AD seem to shift within moments, many times for no
apparent reason. Third, people around the authors of these accounts were often initially
dismissive of their symptoms. When first notified of the symptoms many loved ones
encouraged the individual with AD to not worry about their symptoms. Many times the
same advice would be given by doctors before a diagnosis was made. Fourth, all of these
individuals experienced prolonged plateau phases where they experienced a stabalization
of their symptoms. Each author held out hope that something could be done about their
condition and all attempted to be part of clinical drug trials, either hoping for a cure or
being comforted by the idea that they were doing something for themselves and other
individuals with AD. Fifth, most of these authors found solace either in pets, music, or
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both. Sixth, each author had a strong desire to be understood and to understand the inner
experience of others with AD.
Many initial, highly tentative hypotheses about the inner experience of individuals
can be made based on these first-person accounts. For example, many of the authors
reported thinking in words and images, suggesting that symbolic inner experience is
maintained at least in some individuals with AD. Also, there may be unusual sensory
experiences that involve color or strong sensations. Furthermore, increases in emotional
experiences may be part of AD. Of course, these speculations should be taken with
substantial skepticism as these speculations are based on only four individuals’
experiences and are dependent on the care with which these individuals observed their
inner experience.

Vascular Dementia
Vascular Dementia (VaD) is dementia that is due to a cerebrovascular event or
events. Essentially, it is any type of dementia that is caused primarily by disease in
cerebral blood vessels (Miceli, 2006). This disease may be verified by
neuropsychological evidence and/or evidence of a cerebrovascular event or events
obtained from techniques such as MRI (APA, 2000). Motor dysfunction (such as
abnormal gait) and physical symptoms or cardiovascular problems (such as extremity
weakness or abnormal reflexes) typically occur in VaD (APA, 2000). Usually, lesions in
the brains of individuals with VaD exceed what would be considered to be normal for
their age and often exist in white matter and gray matter, as well as in sub-cortical
structures (APA, 2000). The DSM-IV-TR (APA, 2000) specifies that for VaD to be
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diagnosed there must be the presence of dementia, defined as significant memory
impairment and either aphasia, apraxia, agnosia, or disturbances in executive functioning,
evidence of cerebrovascular disease, and evidence that the dementia is caused by
cardiovascular disturbance (APA, 2000).
Many researchers have suggested that VaD represents a variety of conditions that
have cerebrovascular pathology, as opposed to being a single entity (Libon, Price, Davis,
& Giovannetti, 2004). In fact, there are many subtypes of VaD, including vascular
cognitive impairment – no dementia (a mild form of VaD still characterized by small
deficits in a variety of areas including memory, executive function, and language;
Nyenhuis et al., 2004); multi-infarct dementia (due to multiple cerebrovascular events;
VaD was once classified as “multi-infarct dementia”); single-infarct dementia; and a host
of others that are categorized by the location and type of the cerobrovascular event.
There is also a category for mixed-dementia, which occurs when there is the presence of
dementia due to neuropathology congruent with both VaD and AD.
VaD is the second leading cause of dementia following AD (Roman, Erkinjutti,
Wallin, Pantoni, & Chui, 2002; Skoog, 2004). The prevalence of VaD is approximately
1.5 percent in Western countries, and VaD accounts for approximately 20 to 30 percent
of dementia cases overall (Skoog, 2004). Risk factors for VaD are essentially the same
as stroke, although increased age in combination with high stroke risk puts individuals at
even greater risk for VaD (Miceli, 2006). However, other risk factors include sex (male),
ethnicity (Asian ethnicity increases risk), and lower educational level (Miceli, 2006).
Cognitive difficulties associated with VaD include slow processing speed, reductions in
executive functioning, problems with immediate memory (recognition is intact, but free
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recall is compromised, primarily due to an inability to implement an effective retrieval
strategy; Lezak, 1995), as well as behavioral and mood changes with a high occurrence of
depression (Miceli, 2006).
The presentation of VaD is highly variable among individuals and the cognitive
deficits that manifest themselves in VaD are especially heterogeneous (Poore, Rapport,
Fuerst, & Keenan, 2006). The location of lesions in the brain largely determines the type
of impairment that will be present. In general, symptoms of VaD will correspond to the
anatomical location of lesions in the brain (Roman et al., 2004; Cummings & Benson,
1992). Still, some individuals with VaD exhibit a more global dementia that is not
necessarily location specific (Paul, Garrett, & Cohen, 2003). Problems with executive
function, attention, and processing speed are the most common and severe deficits
associated with VaD (Almkvist, Backman, Basun & Wahlund., 1993).
As with AD, there appears to be a pre-clinical phase of VaD. Cognitive symptoms
related to memory and executive function can often be found 3 years before stroke
(Backman & Small, 2007). This impairment is often very similar to the pre-clinical
phase of AD. One study found no difference on any cognitive measure between
individuals with pre-clinical VaD and AD (Laukka, Jones, Small, Fratiglioni, &
Backman, 2004). This pre-clinical phase is likely due to problems in cerebral circulation
that are typically present before stroke, the incident that brings on frank VaD (Backman
& Small, 2007; Laukka et al., 2004).
One of the primary treatments for VaD is reducing the probability of strokes and
other cerebrovasuclar events. Many studies have suggested the potential benefit of the
use of acetylcholinesterase inhibitors (AChEI’s) for the treatment of VaD (see Bullock,
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2004), but this treatment has not yet been improved by the Federal Food and Drug
Administration. For example, galamantine is an AChEI that has been shown temporarily
to improve cognition and executive function in individuals with VaD (Auchus et al.,
2007). Donepezil, another AChEI, has also been shown to temporarily improve various
cognitive functions including working memory and delayed recognition recall (Thomas,
Libon, & Ledakis, 2005) as well as MMSE scores (Pratt & Perdomo, 2002). A recent
study supported the effectiveness of the use of reminiscence therapy with people with
VaD for the reduction of overall cognitive problems that was maintained through a 6
month follow-up (Tadaka & Kanagaway, 2007).
The symptoms of VaD and AD are often very difficult to distinguish from one
another. There are many similarities between deficits in AD and VaD (such as
dysfunction in memory, language, and executive function) that makes differential
diagnosis difficult. The highly variable presentation of VaD causes difficulty in studies
that attempt to determine different presentations between the two groups (Braaten et al.,
2006). Further complicating this issue is that VaD represents a wide range of conditions
with variable neurological manifestations rather than a single neuropsychological
disorder (Micieli, 2006). Although VaD and AD are defined by different neurological
abnormalities, both exhibit a substantial decrease in acetylcholine (Lojkowska et al.,
2003). Furthermore, the presence of mixed dementia complicates differential diagnosis
(Rockwood et al., 2000). Overall, the utility of using neuropsychological tests to
distinguish VaD from AD has been mixed (Villardita, 1993).
However, there do appear to be some differences between the two disorders.
Probably the most salient difference between individuals with VaD and individuals with
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AD is that individuals with VaD tend to have more of a deficit in executive functioning,
sometimes with no or little overt memory impairment, while individuals with AD have
more pronounced memory difficulties, especially episodic memory (Freeman et al.,
2000). However, this finding is somewhat inconsistent (Oosterman & Scherder, 2006;
Micieli, 2006). A meta-analysis of WAIS subtest performance in AD and VaD
demonstrated that individuals with VaD that is primarily due to sub-cortical lesions (one
of the most common forms of VaD) performed worse on subtests that rely heavily on
executive functioning (i.e., Digit Span backwards, Object Assembly, and Picture
Arrangement), whereas individuals with AD scored significantly lower on Information, a
test that relies heavily on semantic memory (Oosterman & Scherder, 2006).
Another key difference between VaD and AD is that VaD typically has a sudden
onset and progresses in a step-wise manner where decreases in functioning coincide with
new cerebrovascular events (APA, 2000). This is in contrast to AD, which has an
insidious onset and typically advances as a steady decline after an initial plateau phase
(APA, 2000). Still, although this is one of the primary distinguishing factors that
separate these two groups, there is substantial evidence that for many individuals VaD
has a slow onset with a slow and steady progression (Paul et al., 2003).
There are many other potential differences between individuals with VaD and AD
that are not as salient. Individuals with VaD sometimes show only mild episodic
memory impairment or even a total absence of episodic memory impairment (Miceli,
2006). However, working memory is often compromised in VaD due to the executive
component of working memory (Miceli, 2006). Also, individuals with AD tend to have
more difficulty with delayed memory and semantic fluency while individuals with VaD
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tend to have more difficulty with immediate recall and phonemic fluency (Zakzanis,
Leach, & Kaplan, 1999; Braaten et al., 2006).
However, these differences are not consistently found in all studies. In one study, a
range of neuropsychological symptoms in individuals with VaD and AD were compared.
The only differences between the presentations of the two groups were that individuals
with AD had more sleep disturbances, appetite changes, and aberrant motor behavior
compared to those with VaD (Fernandez-Martinez et al., 2008). In another study no
difference was found among individuals with AD and VaD on any neuropsychological
measures that included tests of memory and executive function, among others (Misciagna
et al., 2005). At least one group of researchers has suggested that reliable differentiation
between VaD and AD using neuropsychological measures is impossible (Almkvist et al.,
1993). Overall, there is no consensus regarding neuropsychological differences between
VaD and AD outside of the relatively more severe executive function dysfunction in VaD
compared to AD and the relatively more severe memory dysfunction in AD compared to
VaD, although this is not a universal difference.
It is impossible to say definitively whether the inner experience of individuals with
VaD differs in some systematic way from the inner experience of individuals with AD.
Because no research has been done to investigate the inner experience of either of these
populations, no conclusions can be made at this point. However, some speculations can
be made:
1. The inner experience of individuals with VaD may be different than those with
AD. Because they have different underlying neuropathology, it is quite possible that they
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have systematically different inner experience as well. However, comparing these two
groups may be difficult due to the presence of mixed-dementia.
2. The inner experience of individuals with VaD will vary substantially from one
another depending on the location of neurological damage, just as symptoms vary
depending on location of neurological damage in VaD.
3. Features of inner experience that are possibly affected by executive functioning
could be substantially altered in individuals with VaD due to the relative decrease in
executive functioning in many individuals with VaD. For example, there may be content
that is less goal-directed and/or future oriented than others as goal-directed behavior and
planning for future events are primary components of executive functioning. Likewise,
the form of inner experience of individuals with VaD could be altered in ways that reflect
deficits for executive functioning. For example, inner experience could be substantially
disorganized as executive functioning is important to intellectual and behavioral
organization.
In spite of these speculations, virtually nothing is known about the inner experience
of individuals with VaD.

Cognition in Normal Aging
“Normal aging” is commonly conceptualized as aging that occurs without the
influence of neurodegenerative disorders such as AD, VaD, or Mild Cognitive
Impairment (MCI). Although major cognitive impairments are not seen in normal aging,
aging still consists of a virtually inevitable cognitive decline (Christensen, 2001).
Because there is such substantial variability in the type and amount of cognitive decline
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among older individuals and because this variability increases as a function of age it is
very difficult to obtain a uniform picture of normal aging (Christensen, 2001; Hedden &
Gabrieli, 2004). Furthermore, age-related cognitive decline is not linear and is domainspecific. Some areas of cognition improve over time, some do not decline significantly
until very late in life, and some begin declining relatively early in adulthood. Still, the
most typical pattern is a slow decline until approximately age 70 with a sharper decline
thereafter (Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004).
One of the most common problems associated with normal aging is the slowing of
cognitive processing speed (Salthouse, 1985). Individuals’ reaction times to external
stimuli begins to slow fairly consistently after the age of 30 (Finch & Zelinski, 2005).
Because there is a decrease in axonal myelin starting after age 30 and myelin is important
to the speed with which action potentials travel through neurons it is not surprising that
reaction time becomes slower at this point (Finch & Zelinski, 2005). This processing
speed deficit seems to increase steadily throughout one’s lifetime but with a sharper
increase in older age (Christensen, 2001). This slowing is most readily observed in
cognitive tasks that are not automatic or overlearned (Hasher & Zacks, 1979).
A decrease in some types of memory, perhaps most notably working memory (Haut,
Chen, & Edwards, 1999), is natural with age. Memory difficulties in normal aging
appear to be primarily due to problems with attention which adversely affects encoding
(Craik, 1986). In tasks that require a high amount of attention older individuals have
more difficulty encoding episodic memories. When attentional demands are low, older
individuals encode episodic information as well as younger individuals (Blanchet,
Belleville, & Peretz, 2006). Likewise, when to-be-remembered information is presented

92

at a high rate, age-related deficiencies in memory increase suggesting encoding slows as
a function of age (Arenberg, 1982; Poon & Siegler, 1991).
There appear to be storage and retrieval deficiencies that are related to age as well
(Mejia, Pineda, Alvarez, & Ardila, 1998), although there is less of a consensus in this
area. Forgetting slopes appear to remain relatively stable as people age, suggesting that
storage and retrieval are relatively free of age-related cognitive decline (Trahan &
Larrabee, 1992). However, free recall, compared to recognition, is much more
diminished in normal aging compared to recognition suggesting some retrieval problems
(Craik, 1987). Likewise, the tip-of-the tongue phenomenon is much more pronounced in
older individuals compared to younger individuals suggesting a retrieval deficit (Ramsay,
Nicholas, Au, Obler, & Albert, 1999; Shafto, Burke, Stamatakis, Tam, & Tyler, 2007).
There also appears to be a global slowing of retrieval in older individuals (Poon &
Siegler, 1991).
There is typically a global decrease in executive functioning in older individuals (for
a review, see Treitz, Heyder, & Daum, 2007). Problems related to executive functioning
typically observed in older individuals include problems with inhibition (Pignatti et al.,
2005; Treitz et al., 2007), divided attention, attentional switching (especially when there
is high cognitive demand; Baddeley et al., 1991; Ramsden et al., 2008), perseveration
(Ridderinkhof, Span, & van der Molan, 2002), and task management (Treitz et al., 2007;
Pignatti et al., 2005). Significant deficiencies in executive functioning have even been
found in individuals with perfect scores on the MMSE (Royall, Chiodo, & Polk, 2000).
Decreases in executive functioning seem to progress in a stable linear fashion throughout
aging (Royall, Palmer, Chiodo, & Polk, 2004). As executive functioning is primarily
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controlled by the frontal lobes decreases in executive functioning are expected as the
frontal lobes are selectively atrophied in older individuals (Coffey, Wilkinson, Weiner, &
Parashos, 1993).
There is substantial variability regarding linguistic decline in older individuals.
Although vocabulary tends to increase with age, other functions decline. For example,
the tip-of-the-tongue effect represents linguistic retrieval problems and is pronounced in
old age. Likewise, naming objects and word finding problems are somewhat common in
normal aging (Balthazar, Cendes, & Damasceno, 2008). Processing of both written and
spoken language slows with age as well (Just & Carpenter, 1992). Essentially, as
individuals age their storage of lexical and semantic information increases but their
ability to retrieve this information, produce it phonologically, and learn new linguistic
information decreases (Shafto et al., 2007).
Other common cognitive problems related to normal aging include a decrease in fluid
intelligence, difficulty solving everyday problems (Poon & Siegler, 1991), slower
processing speed of effortful non-automatic cognitive functions (Salthouse, 1985;
Cronholm & Schalling, 1987), maintenance and manipulation of information in working
memory (Ridderkinhof et al., 2002), attentional switching (for a review see Hedden &
Gabrieli, 2004), problem solving (especially complicated problems; Cronholm &
Schalling, 1987), slower performance on mental rotation tasks (Inagaki et al., 2002), and
the learning of abstract words and ideas (Trahan & Larrabee, 1992). One study tested
orientation, memory, language, attention, abstract thought, praxis, and perception in older
individuals and found declines in all areas (Cullum et al., 2000). Most individuals in this
study exhibited at least some decline on at least three of these domains.
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Not all areas of cognitive functioning are adversely affected by age. Crystallized
intelligence actually tends to increase with age, although it may decrease somewhat in
extremely old ages (Christensen, 2001). Many aspects of memory and knowledge tend to
stay stable over time including sensory memory, remote memory, autobiographical
memory, semantic knowledge, semantic memory, and vocabulary (Hedden & Gabrieli,
2004; Poon & Siegler, 1991; Huppert 1991; Zamarian, Sinz, Bonatti, Gamboz, &
Delazer, 2008). Also, well-learned, implicit, and intuitive skills tend to be highly
resistant to aging (Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004; Poon & Siegler, 1991). A variety of studies
have also demonstrated that older individuals make very good use of cues and external
aids to help memory retrieval (Bäckman & Small, 1998; Giffard, Desgranges, Kerrouche,
Piolino, & Eustache, 2003; Karlsson, Adolfsson, Börjesson, & Nilsson, 2003). However,
internal aids to memory such as mnemonic devices are not used very well by older people
in general (Wegesin, Jacobs, Zubin, Ventura, & Stern, 2000).

Neurology in Normal Aging
The human brain goes through numerous natural and expected changes throughout
the lifetime losing a significant amount of its mass and volume as people get older.
Significant synaptic loss and loss of brain volume typically begins between the ages of 30
and 55 (Finch & Zelinski, 2005). This loss of brain volume typically accelerates as
people get older. There is an average of zero to two percent brain atrophy per year
between the ages of 30 and 50 while the atrophy rate increases to three to five percent
between the ages of 70 and 80 (Fox, Shahill, Crum, & Rosser, 1999).
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However, the progressive loss of brain volume is non-linear and varies by brain
region (Fox & Schott, 2004). The largest age-related volume loss occurs in the prefrontal cortex of the brain (Coffey et al., 1993). An average volume loss of 17 percent
occurs in the frontal lobes from ages 20 to 80 (Haug et al., 1983). Another estimate
suggests that volume in the frontal lobes decreases an average of 8.9 percent per decade
over the age of 65 (Van Petten et al., 2004). Likewise, glucose metabolism significantly
decreases in the frontal lobes as people age (Haut et al., 1999). The frontal lobes are not
the only parts of the brain that are affected by aging, but it is the area that is consistently
affected the most.
Selective neuronal loss in the frontal lobes is also demonstrated on neurocognitive
assessment tools. West (1996) used these tests to develop a frontal lobe aging hypothesis
that suggests that age-related cognitive decline is primarily due to atrophy in the frontal
lobes and accompanying cognitive impairment associated with the frontal lobes. Many
researchers have replicated this pattern (e.g. Parkin & Java, 1999) and a meta-analysis of
studies assessing age-related cognitive decline demonstrated that the primary cognitive
decline in aging is due to frontal lobe dysfunction (Parkin & Walter, 1992). Age-related
frontal-lobe dysfunction is perhaps most apparent via the significant problems that older
individuals have in tasks that rely heavily on executive functioning (West 1996).
Manipulation and maintenance of information in working memory, skills that rely heavily
on the frontal lobes, are also significantly depleted in older individuals who age normally
(Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004). Furthermore, tasks that rely heavily on the frontal lobes
show more frontal lobe activation in older adults suggesting the need for increased use in
coping skills in these tasks (Cabeza, 2002).
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Methodological Problems in Normal Aging Research
There are many methodological difficulties that are unique to normal aging research
that could lead to misleading results and interpretations of cognition in elderly
individuals. One of the primary difficulties is the fact that subtle changes in cognition in
individuals with neurodegenerative disorders occur well before they can be reliably
detected. Therefore, individuals with MCI or pre-clinical dementia are often included in
studies of normal aging thus causing an overestimation of cognitive decline in the normal
elderly (Sliwinski, Lipton, Buschke, & Stewart, 1996). Furthermore, it is estimated that
up to 20 percent of older individuals in the “normal” adult control groups may be in the
early stages of AD (Fleischman & Gabrieli, 1998). Another difficulty is that results from
longitudinal studies of aging and cross-sectional studies of aging yield results that are
consistently and systematically different. Results from cross-sectional studies typically
indicate greater cognitive decline than in longitudinal studies (Finch & Zelinski, 2005;
Christensen, 2001). It is possible that longitudinal studies underestimate decline due to
learning effects (Christensen, 2001) while cross-sectional studies are vulnerable to cohort
effects that could affect results (Finch & Zelinski, 2005).

Inner Experience in Normal Aging
There has thus far been very little research investigating the conscious experience of
older individuals. Most of the research related to the experience of older individuals
focuses on things such as attitudes, aspirations, motivations, fears, and internal conflicts
that could affect the conscious experience of older individuals but are not direct
manifestations of conscious experience (for a review, see Abrams, 2007). For example,
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Freud believed that individuals over the age of 50 are mentally inflexible. Jung
hypothesized that older individuals have little conscious conflict and do not limit their
conscious experience to societally-imposed limits. Erikson viewed the primary conflict
of older age as a battle between despair and ego integrity where an individual finds
happiness and comfort in finding meaning and spirituality. Although none of these
theorists sought to explain how these characteristics manifest in conscious experience,
one might postulate a lack of variability in content or form of inner experience, little
content in inner experience involving conflict or societal rules, or despair or spiritual
content as a theme of inner experience, respectively. Many other theorists have formed
their own hypotheses regarding themes of experience in older individuals but do not
address conscious experience directly.
Although there are many different theories espoused by many different theorists
regarding common characteristics and conflicts in the minds of older individuals, there
are some themes that are common across many of these theories. For example,
psychodynamic theories of aging have many themes, including dealing with and
integrating grief and loss, conflicts between attachment and disengagement as
relationships are altered and lost, maintenance of self-identity, a changing self-identity
that is based more on the past, maintenance of self-esteem and narcissistic gratification,
and dealing with the inevitability of death (for a review, see Cath & Sadavoy, 1991).
Many other theorists suggest that older individuals contemplate meaning and spirituality
more than younger individuals and focus more on reminiscence than planning for the
future. Still, the fact remains that there has been very little empirical research and very
little discussion that focuses on the manifest conscious experience of older individuals.
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At this point only broader characteristics and conflicts like those discussed above have
been studied.
The research that does exist regarding the inner experience of older individuals has
focused primarily on emotional experience. The research in this area suggests that the
ability to process emotional experience remains throughout normal aging (Abrams,
2007). Some research has demonstrated that the experience of emotions may change in
later life however. In a study by Gross et al. (1997) older individuals reported fewer
experiences of negative emotion and more control over their emotional experiences
compared to their younger counterparts. Furthermore, there is evidence that older
individuals pay more attention to their positive emotional experiences than their negative
emotional experiences (Carstensen, Fung, & Charles, 2003).
One study investigated the experience of individuals who had aged normally when
they were feeling particularly passionate about life (Abrams, 2007). This study used
retrospective interviews as an attempt to gain an unbiased depiction of the experience of
being passionate about life in old age. Although this study was not aimed directly at
manifest conscious experience and most participant reports focused on general themes
such as the importance of attitude and humor, some participants in the study described
elements of manifest conscious experience. For example, individuals described the
experience of weightlessness, lacking worries or cares, being lost in one’s inner world,
and the absence of thought. One theme that arose regarding conscious experience across
the participants was having greater access to one’s feeling states when feeling passionate
about life. These feelings often involved self-contentment, exhilaration, selftranscendence, and a feeling of increased connection with the cosmos.
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Another study that investigated the inner experience of older individuals focused on
daydreaming throughout the lifespan (Giambra, 2000). This study used retrospective
self-reports that asked people of various ages to analyze the frequency and characteristics
of their daydreams. The results from this study suggest that daydreaming decreases with
age, with a sharp drop from the age group consisting of 76 to 81 year-olds to 82 to 87
year-olds. Likewise, absorption in one’s daydreams and the emotion contained in
daydreams appears to decrease with age. Many characteristics of images in daydreams
also appear to decrease, including image generation, maintenance, and transformation.

Inner Experience Research
Unfortunately, the history of psychology is fraught with methodological difficulties
pertaining to introspection and the study of inner experience in general. Perhaps the
earliest difficulty with introspection-based methodology involved the dispute over
imageless thought between German psychologists using introspective techniques to study
inner experience and American psychologists (led by E.B. Titchener) using similar
techniques. Monson and Hurlburt (1993) showed that the debate between these two
groups was over the interpretation of their findings not the content of their findings. At a
purely descriptive level, these two groups had discovered the same thing, namely
thoughts that had no manifest imaginal content. The difference between these two groups
lies in the interpretation of the findings. Unfortunately, because these introspectionists
could not agree on such a simple matter, reports of inner experience and introspective
methodology were largely discredited and careful scientific study of inner experience was
mostly abandoned (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001).
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The general lack of acceptance of introspective methods has remained for almost a
century. One reason that introspection is so important yet so controversial today is due to
the paradox of introspection described by Schooler and Schreiber (2004). While it is
impossible to deny the existence of inner experience it is impossible to observe it directly
and thus study it empirically. Because inner experience is not fit for direct observation or
empirical study, most psychologists have abandoned its study and introspective
methodology in general (Schooler & Schreiber, 2004).
Fortunately, psychology can contribute a great deal to the understanding of why the
original introspection movement failed. Hurlburt, Heavey, and Seibert (2006) identified
fifteen guidelines for effective introspective research. These guidelines are informed by
what psychology has learned about effective introspective methodology over the past
century. The guidelines include remaining skeptical about introspective reports,
introspecting with little delay, introspecting very brief, concrete moments, disturbing
experience as little as possible when introspecting, introspecting in natural situations, and
not requiring too much of participants who are introspecting including asking participants
to infer causation for the contents of their awareness.
Although Hurlburt et al. (2006) may give the most thorough prescription for the
successful investigation of inner experience, other authors have recognized the
importance of some of the above guidelines. For example, Hnatiuk (1991) believed that
sampling methods used as a means of introspection can be especially useful because they
require little delay between recording of the inner experience and the reporting of that
experience thus minimizing inaccuracies. Furthermore, reports of inner experience in the
natural environment are often possible in sampling methods, and thus yield data that are
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ecologically valid (Hnatiuk, 1991). Klinger (1978) suggested that two keys in attempting
to accurately study inner experience is to eliminate the use of memory as much as
possible and to ask individuals to describe discrete experiences rather than provide
generalizations.
There remains a divide today among psychologists regarding the study of inner
experience (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001; 2004). On one side of the divide there are
psychologists who believe that studying inner experience is quite easy and very
important. The belief that it is fairly easy to obtain accurate reports of inner experience is
most readily observed in cognitive realms of psychology, especially cognitive
psychotherapy (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2001). Cognitive psychotherapy is largely based on
the introspection of the client, including things such as recording thoughts (i.e., inner
experience) and questioning maladaptive beliefs. However, if researchers are under the
assumption that introspection is easy and that people can report their inner experiences
with little or no difficulty, then scientists subject their research to a substantial amount of
potential error (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2004).
Scientific studies of inner experience have found that people are often mistaken about
their own inner experience when asked to describe it in a cavalier fashion without the use
of systematic investigation. One systematic investigation of inner experience showed
that an individual had multiple simultaneous cognitions although she was not aware that
she had multiple simultaneous cognitions before the study began (Hurlburt 1993;
Hurlburt, 1997). Hurlburt and Sipprelle (1978) presented a case of a man with freefloating anxiety who had angry thoughts toward his children, but had no awareness that
he had these thoughts prior to undergoing a thought sampling procedure.
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The assumption that individuals can easily report their inner experience accurately
without the aid of systematic methodology has permeated cognitive psychotherapy. This
assumption has come to dominate diagnostic methodology used today. That is, the
clinical interview is often used as the basis of clinical diagnosis, yet it is insufficient in
gaining an understanding of the actual experience of individuals (deVries & Delespaul,
1989).
Hurlburt, Koch, and Heavey (2002) stated that there are four assumptions in the
cognitive model that are related to introspection and inner experience: behavior and
thinking influence one another, individuals have the ability to introspect their thoughts,
individuals can introspect accurately, and individuals can change they way they think.
These assumptions dominate current cognitive psychotherapy and potentially lead to
misunderstandings regarding the true nature of people’s inner experience.
Whereas cognitive psychotherapy represents one side of the divide that says that
investigating inner experience is trivially easy, the other side states that inner experience
cannot be studied at all due to the fact that inner experience is not directly observable.
This is most readily observable in the theoretical framework of behavioral psychologists
and scientists who believe that psychology is limited to the study of behavior (Hurlburt &
Heavey, 2001). Many studies have suggested that it is very difficult for individuals to
accurately describe their inner experience. For example, Nisbett and Wilson (1977) have
shown that it is extremely difficult for individuals to draw accurate conclusions regarding
the motives underlying their overt behavior. These authors concluded on the basis of
their studies that nearly all introspective reports are unreliable and cannot be used as a
basis for scientific research due to their substantial inaccuracy. Nisbett and Wilson’s
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(1977) study has greatly influenced the side of the divide that denies the utility of all
introspective research.
Although Nisbett and Wilson’s (1977) influential study discredits nearly all
introspective reports, they did allow a small caveat with regard to the successful study of
inner experience. They stated that if individuals could be cued to pay direct attention to
their inner experience as it was occurring and could be trained to accurately report on
their inner experience at the point of this interruption then accurate reports of inner
experience could be possible.
There is one method that follows Nisbett and Wilson’s prescription and is also
designed to incorporate what psychological science has learned about reports of inner
experience in the last 100 years in order to avoid the pitfalls that destroyed introspection.
This method is Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) developed by Hurlburt (1990;
1993). DES was created specifically to provide accurate descriptions of inner experience
(Hurlburt et al., 2002) and to overcome the pitfalls that plagued, and eventually doomed,
the introspective enterprise a century ago.
DES has five main features that make it a useful methodology for gaining an accurate
representation of peoples’ inner experience. First, it simply asks participants to describe
their inner experience rather than interpret it. As Nisbett and Wilson (1977) have shown,
individuals often have difficulty accurately giving reasons for their behavior or inner
experience. Second, experience is defined as broadly as possible and encapsulates
whatever participants report to be directly in their awareness at a randomly sampled
moment. Whatever happens to be in an individual’s awareness is what DES is interested
in. DES is not interested in any pre-determined content or form of inner experience but
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instead focuses on what is present in an individual’s awareness at a randomly sampled
moment regardless of what is in awareness (Hurlburt & Heavey, 2004). Third, DES uses
random sampling in order to gain the most accurate contents of an individual’s everyday
awareness. Fourth, it investigates the participant’s inner experience in his or her natural
environment, thus providing ecological validity to the method. Finally, the DES
procedure is not a hypothesis testing procedure and therefore allows for the pure
investigation of inner experience, unclouded by preconceived theories about what a
particular individual’s or group’s experience might be like.
DES uses a beeper that randomly signals participants. Participants are instructed to
note any aspects of inner experience that were ongoing at the moment of the beep such as
thoughts, feelings, perceptions, etc. and to jot down characteristics of those sampled
moments in a notebook. During an initial instructional interview, participants are often
given the metaphor that they should view the process of capturing what is in their
awareness at the moment of the beep as taking a picture. Just as a photograph captures or
freezes a moment in time, so too should the beep capture or freeze a moment in
awareness or consciousness. After six or eight samples have been collected in what is
typically a two to three hour period, the participant meets with the investigator for an
extended interview about those samples. This interview typically occurs either the same
day as the samples were collected or the next day in order to minimize the effects of
memory distortion that come with time. The interview itself is unstructured in that there
are no specific questions or goals other than to allow the individual to describe accurately
and fully the contents of their inner experience at the moment of the beep. These
interviews typically last about one hour. The participant is in no way asked to interpret
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their inner experience or intuit motives for their experience. They are simply asked to
describe its contents.
This sample and interview process is then repeated the next day and then repeated on
subsequent days until an adequate number of samples are obtained. Typically
participants collect approximately six samples each day. Many times, due to the length
of many interviews, not all six beeps are discussed during a given interview. This
procedure is typically repeated for about four to six days for a total of about 25 samples,
although this number can vary substantially.
Typically, participants in the DES method need some level of training in order to
accurately describe their inner experience. The requirement of a training period is not
only intuitively supported in DES work, but also suggested by other researchers to
increase the accuracy of introspections (Schooler & Schreiber, 2004). Furthermore,
participants are often initially unprepared regarding the level of detail of each sampled
experience that the interviewer is investigating. Therefore, participants are often unable
to describe their experiences in adequate detail during the first interview. For these
reasons, the contents of the first interview day are often not used and the first day is
typically viewed as a day of training. However, some participants may be proficient
enough during the first day that analysis of the first day is possible.
DES has been used to shed light on a number of important psychological phenomena
related to inner experience. DES has proven to be effective in uncovering many
cognitive peculiarities in many psychological disorders including anxiety, Asperger’s
Syndrome, borderline personality disorder, bulimia nervosa, depression, hypomania and
schizophrenia (Hurlburt 1990, 1993, 1997). For example, DES has suggested that at least
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some individuals with Asperger’s Syndrome think almost entirely in images or have no
inner experience at all (Hurlburt, Happe’, & Frith, 1994). Results from DES have shown
that at least one individual with borderline personality disorder had multiple, complex,
simultaneous “cognitions” (Hurlburt, 1993; Hurlburt, 1997). These studies suggest that
individuals with different diagnoses have substantially different inner experience and that
different diagnoses may have an inner experience with a specific “signature” (Hurlburt et
al., 2002). Even individuals who exhibit a seemingly mundane behavioral characteristic
may have characteristics of inner experience that are linked to that behavior. For
example, Hurlburt et al. (2002) found that individuals who had a high rate of speech had
complex inner experience compared to others that was characterized by the consistent
presence of simultaneous, multiple cognitions.
DES has identified a number of common forms of inner experience (Hurlburt 1990;
1993). The five most common forms are:
1. Inner Speech – The experience of speaking in one’s own voice (but internally) that
includes characteristics of typical external speech, such as pitch, pauses, inflection, etc.
This is a very common characteristic although there is a significant amount of variability
among individuals, with some individuals experiencing no inner speech and others
experiencing it very frequently.
2. Inner Seeing – The experience of seeing something internally that is not present
externally. The internal seeing may or may not have the characteristics of the actual
external object. Typically, the internal seeing has characteristics of external vision (this
is generally supported by research, Schooler & Schreiber, 2004; i.e., center is more in
focus and more attention is paid to the center, no obvious edge or border, etc.) but not
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always. The DES method has found that individuals can have no inner seeings or have
over 50 percent of their sampled experiences contain inner seeings (Hurlburt et al., 1994).
3. Unsymbolized Thinking – The experience of having a thought without that
thought being represented in symbols such as words or images. The participant is
typically sure that there was a thought at the time of the beep but states that it did not
occur in words, images, or any other symbols. For example, a participant might say that
“I was having a thought about my mother and how good it feels to be at home with her
but I wasn’t thinking of it in words or images or having a feeling about it or anything but
I was definitely thinking it.” Some individuals report never having this form of
experience while others report it in more than 50 percent of their samples (Hurlburt et al.,
1994).
4. Feeling – The experience of having an emotion of any kind. These are often
located somewhere in the body but not always. Again, individuals can report no
experiences of feelings or over 50 percent of an individual’s samples can contain feelings
(Hurlburt et al., 1994).
5. Sensory Awareness – The experience of either having an experience that is
perceptual in nature (such as feeling heat on the skin) or focusing on the physical
properties of an external object (such as paying particular attention to the blueness of the
sky).
There are many other forms of experience that are less common. Here is a
description of some of these forms:
1. Worded Thinking – The experience of explicit words that are not internally or
externally spoken, heard, or seen.
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2. Inner Hearing – The experience of innerly hearing but not actually producing the
sound.
3. Imageless Seeing – The experience of innerly seeing something but the visual
component of that something is not directly in awareness.
4. Feeling (Fact of Body) – When a feeling is present but not actually in awareness.
5. Just Doing (Talking, Reading, Laughing etc.) – Perfoming a behavior that is not in
awareness.
There is also a category called multiple awareness. This is the experience of
simultaneously having more than one experience where each experience is disconnected
and unrelated to the other(s). For example, experiencing two unrelated inner seeings
simultaneously or experiencing sensory awareness simultaneously with unrelated inner
speech.
Other researchers have used various sampling methods to divide inner experience in
different ways than those listed above. For example, many researchers have studied the
“directedness” of thought, operant vs. respondent thought, task-irrelevant vs. task-related
thought, fanciful vs. realistic thought, and well-integrated vs. fused thought (Klinger,
1978). However, these conceptualizations of thought are largely theory driven whereas
the forms of thought outlined by Hurlburt (1990; 1993) are based on observations that are
independent of any particular theoretical framework.
DES is not the only sampling method that is used to excavate the inner experience of
people. Another method that systematically attempts to study the inner experience of
people is the experience sampling method (ESM). ESM was designed specifically to
obtain ecologically valid data regarding individuals’ experiences across a wide variety of
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settings (Hormuth, 1986; Punzo & Miller, 2002; Prescott, Csikszentmihalyi, & Graef,
1981) and attempts to obtain a representative sample of a person’s or population’s daily
experience and social settings (deVries, 1992; deVries, Dijkman-Caes, Delespaul, 1990).
Although no single person can be credited with the development of ESM, Scollon, KimPrieto, & Diener (2003) credit Csikszentmihalyi and colleagues with the earliest study
that resembles the current use of ESM. ESM has become increasingly popular since its
initial development in the 1970s (Scollon et al., 2003).
ESM requires participants to fill out questionnaires repeatedly in their natural
environment when signaled by a quasi-random pager, adding ecological validity to the
precision of questionnaires (Hektner & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). ESM questionnaires
can be tailored to investigate what the researcher is interested in investigating including
mood, thoughts, behavior, environment, any combination of these, or any specific aspects
of these.
Although a number of experience questionnaires may be used, the one most
commonly used is based on the MMSE and evaluates an individual’s cognition, mood,
motivation, and psychopathology (deVries, 1992). Typically, questions are rated by
participants on a 7-point Likert scale (Punzo & Miller, 2002). There are typically 40 or
more items per questionnaire and participants fill out approximately 30 to 50
questionnaires during the course of the study (Hektner & Csikszentmihalyi, 2002).
Typically, individuals are asked to record their experience from 4 to 20 times a day
over a week-long period, although the frequency of beeps and length of the study may
vary (deVries et al., 1990). The participants’ questionnaire data are then analyzed and
are often grouped so researchers can analyze experiences in specific environmental
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situations, individuals, or individuals in specific environmental situations (Hormuth,
1986).
ESM has been used to study a wide variety of populations, environmental situations,
and behavioral and psychological phenomena (for a review, see Hektner &
Csikszentmihalyi, 2002). For example, Hillbrand and Bradley (1994) used ESM in a
study that demonstrated that convicted sex offenders had significantly more sexual
thoughts and thoughts involving anger towards women than did controls. deVries et al.
(1990) used ESM to perform a study where depressed individuals tended to experience an
increase in rumination and a decrease in focused thoughts while in public. A study
conducted by Gauvin and Szabo (1992) used ESM where regular exercisers reported an
increase in physical symptoms after a one week break in exercise. ESM has been used to
study the distance from which individuals use computers, read, and do other work
involving close visual inspection (Rah, Mitchell, Bullimore, Mutti, & Zadnik, 2001).
Prescott et al. (1981) used ESM to demonstrate differences between age groups and their
experience, gender and their experiences, a relationship between subjective experience
and setting (i.e., work, transportation, and recreation/home), and an interaction between
age groups and these settings. deVries, Delespaul, and Dijkman-Caes (1992) used ESM
to study the relationship between depression and anxiety. ESM has also been used to
study patterns of experience, fluctuations in experience and symptomatology, and how
these patterns and fluctuations related to psychological diagnoses (deVries et al., 1990).
ESM has also made important discoveries regarding the relationship between
schizophrenia and environment. Individuals with schizophrenia felt best when they were
with one to three other people, whereas they felt the worst when they were either alone or

111

in groups that contained more than three other people (deVries & Delespaul, 1989). This
is an important finding that can inform group treatment practices and the structure of
residential treatment for individuals with schizophrenia.
Participants appear generally to comply with ESM and find the difficulty of the task
to be minimal (Punzo & Miller, 2002; Hormuth, 1986). However, there is difficulty at
times responding to the beeper on time or responding at all (Hormuth, 1986). Because
ESM requires participants to carry the beeper for all waking hours, individuals are often
caught in situations when they cannot carry the beeper (for example, while swimming)
(Hormuth, 1986; Prescott et al., 1981) or cannot respond to the questionnaire
immediately (for example, while performing a difficult task at work) (Hormuth, 1986).
Participants in studies using ESM typically do not respond to beeps 15 to 20 percent of
the time (Rah et al., 2001).
Csikszentmihalyi and Larson (1987) have argued for the validity of ESM. They
stated that ESM has shown that people’s experiences correlate in expected ways with
environment and that people from varying clinical populations also vary in their ESM
data. That is, individuals in different diagnostic categories can be consistently
differentiated through the use of ESM (deVries, 1992). Furthermore, there is typically an
average to strong relationship between data obtained from ESM and data obtained from
standard summary questionnaires (Csikszentmihalyi & Larson, 1987; Hormuth, 1986).
Convergent validity has been shown via correlating data from ESM and physiological
measures (Klinger & Kroll-Mensing, 1995). Questionnaires, procedures for instruction,
and data analysis have been validated on a total that exceeds 1,000 participants (deVries,
1992).
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Scollon et al. (2003) have catalogued the strengths of ESM. These strengths include
the ability to understand how behavior, affect, and cognition vary as a function of
environmental circumstances, increased ecological validity, increased idiographic
understanding, avoidance of many of the difficulties related to introspective reports based
on memory, and the ability to supplement data obtained by more traditional means such
as personality tests and self-report measures that rely on global recall. Furthermore, ESM
avoids error-prone retrospection and allows individuals more room in describing their
experience than classic self-report measures (Klinger & Kroll-Mensing, 1995). Klinger
and Kroll-Mensing (1995) pointed out numerous weaknesses to the method, such as lack
of motivation on the part of the participant, difficulty completing the task, limitation to
certain populations, reduction in data quality as the study continues, participant selection
of when to comply with the signal, inability of participants to respond to signal
immediately, reactivity, differences in time frame for reporting, and a host of data
analysis difficulties. The authors concluded that ESM is beneficial and can help aid
research, especially when researchers are aware of the weaknesses inherent in the
method.
Another method that is similar to DES and ESM is the thought sampling method. An
early version of thought sampling asked participants to record answers to questions about
their external environment and mood in a notebook at random intervals (Brandstatter,
1978; Hurlburt, 1979). The thought sampling method signals participants to respond to a
questionnaire regarding their inner experience and to spontaneously report their inner
experience at the time of the signal (Klinger, 1978-79). In many of these experiments,
individuals repeatedly fill out the Thought-Sampling Questionnaire when prompted by a
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random or quasi-random beeper. The Thought Sampling Questionnaire measures
experience on a number of dimensions including the sharpness, vividness, and detail of
mental imagery, modalities of thought (verbal, imagery, etc.), spontaneity, fancifulness,
controllability, time orientation, and extent of attention being paid to the external
environment at the time of the beep (Klinger & Kroll-Mensing, 1995). Furthermore, it
allows for both free responses on the part of the participants with regard to their
experience as well as experimenter-designed questions designed to assess specific aspects
of experience that are of particular interest to the experimenter (Klinger & KrollMensing, 1995).
This method may also call for individuals simply to record their experience when
prompted (Klinger, Barta, & Maxeiner, 1980; Klinger, 1984; Davis & Johnson, 1983-84)
where experimenters later analyze the content of these reports to excavate features that
are of interest to the experimenters. For example, individuals in one study were
prompted by a quasi-random beep while taking an exam in order to study the experience
of test anxiety. When the beep occurred, the participants were simply instructed to record
their thoughts on a sheet of paper (Klinger, 1984). In another study, basketball players
reported their last thought whenever they exited the game for substitution and at quasirandom times while sitting on the bench (Klinger, Barta, & Glas, 1981).
Think-aloud methods are also used to study the experience of people. In this method
individuals are simply asked to speak out loud what they are thinking, reporting on their
inner experience as it is occurring (Klinger, 1978). Individuals are often asked to
perform a task (such as solving a puzzle or performing a logic problem) and to verbalize
out loud what they are thinking while they are performing the task (Klinger, 1974).
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Although this method has the advantage of immediacy, it has a number of disadvantages,
including the fact that it feels unnatural to most participants, the participant is limited in
what he or she can report at a given time, and that it may influence the content of
individuals’ inner experience (Klinger, 1978).
Diary methods are also used to collect reports of individuals’ experiences. Diary
methods are different from other thought sampling methods in that individuals can record
their experience in general over a longer period of time (as long as a month) or at an
instant as with other sampling methods (Hedges, Krantz, Contrada, & Rozanski, 1990).
Diaries are often structured so that participants report on specific activities, cognitions,
emotions, etc. that the researcher is interested in studying. For example, Hedges et al.
(1990) have developed a diary that asks participants to record when they were engaged in
a number of behavioral activities (i.e., driving, eating, recreation, etc.) and cognitive
activities (i.e., thinking, planning, daydreaming, etc.). Participants using this diary would
record how long they were engaged in the activity, where they were, and would make a
new entry every time their activity changes. Validity for this diary was established by the
fact that observers keeping simultaneous diaries on a participant correlated highly with
the entries made by the participant. Furthermore, the entries of individuals working a
white-collar job were much different during their time at the workplace than on the
weekend.
Articulated Thoughts During Simulated Situations (ATSS) is a thought sampling
technique that was developed by Davison, Robins, and Johnson (1983). ATSS requires
participants to listen to a simulated recording of a conversation and to imagine that they
are actually involved in the social interaction that they are hearing. They are told that the
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experimenters are interested in what is in their awareness as they imagine they are
involved in this social interaction. Participants listen to these recordings for 15 to 25
seconds and are then given 30 seconds to write down what was in their awareness during
the previous segment. This process is repeated at the discretion of the experimenter.
Time-budgeting studies are similar to the methods listed above, although they are
geared more toward a person’s behavioral activity rather than mental activity. In these
studies, participants typically use diaries to record how often they are engaged in a
particular activity, how long they are engaged in these activities, and the environment in
which they engaged in these activities (deVries, 1992).
The above methods have collectively yielded some important results to introspectionbased methodology in general. First, participants find the tasks minimally intrusive and
not very difficult (Hormuth, 1986; Hurlburt, 1979). Second, the results of experience
sampling studies often show that individuals’characterizations of their experiences before
undergoing these studies often differ substantially from the actual data produced from the
study, suggesting that individuals are not very good at giving general characterizations
regarding their own experience (Hurlburt, 1979). Furthermore, thought sampling
methods can be both therapeutic for participants and “microdiagnostic” in that they can
discover specific cognitive activity that is related to symptomatology (Klinger & KrollMensing, 1995).
One thing that sets experience sampling procedures apart from classic assessments is
that they do not rely on recall and generalizations, processes that are highly prone to
distortion (Klinger & Kroll-Mensing, 1995). Furthermore, participants may vary greatly
in the way they interpret items on a self-report inventory thus producing data that do not
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represent the experiences of individuals in a consistent manner (Klinger & KrollMensing, 1995).
Of course, determining the reliability and validity of sampling techniques is limited,
as it is with more traditional methods of inquiring about inner experience (i.e., depression
inventories, personality tests, etc.; Hurlburt, 1997). In these measures it is impossible to
directly validate individuals’ reports of their inner experience. That is, validation of an
internal, non-public event simply cannot occur. Rather, the method of reporting inner
experience can be the only thing validated, not the inner experience itself (Hurlburt,
1997). However, this is true whether the method is sampling inner experience, asking
questions about inner experience in an interview, personality assessment, depression
inventory, etc. Nevertheless, Hurlburt and Heavey (2002) have established that
independent observers reliably agree in their classification of the five major forms of
inner experience discovered by DES.
One sampling procedure has been successfully used with an elderly population.
Hnatiuk (1991) used ESM to sample the experiences of widows between the ages of 69
and 94. Part of this study assessed how acceptable the procedure was to these individuals.
Nearly 80 percent of the participants reported that it was either a positive or neutral
experience and only one of the participants stated that the process changed her day to day
behavior. Furthermore, a large majority of the sample was able to complete the study,
although attrition rate was a bit higher in this population as compared to others. Those
who remained in the study completed the records involved with ESM tasks at the same
rate as different populations in other studies although many did not follow the procedures
as they were instructed (i.e., did not take pagers into the community with them, did not
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complete records at the time of the beep, etc.). Finally, the women’s reports were found
to be highly reliable from sample to sample and were found to exhibit high validity. This
suggests that elderly individuals are capable of successfully completing and participating
in thought-sampling procedures.

The Importance of Understanding the Inner Experience of Older Individuals
The current study was cross sectional in nature and used DES to investigate the inner
experience of individuals over the age of 65 with and without cognitive impairments.
DES was used for four primary reasons:
1. DES is not theory driven and is therefore interested only in the experience of
individuals. DES does not look for anything pre-determined about experience, allowing
results to drive theory. This allows for an unbiased look at the experience of older
individuals with and without cognitive impairment.
2. DES researchers believe that the use of questionnaires with the lack of an extensive
interview may not capture individuals’ inner experience accurately. Hurlburt et al.
(2002) argued that individuals may have difficulty accurately reporting their inner
experience because of their beliefs about their experience. For example, Hurlburt et al.
(2002) stated that individuals typically do not believe that they have unsymbolized
thinking at the beginning of the DES procedure. However, after undergoing repeated
interviews, many individuals report inner experiences that seem to be congruent with
unsymbolized experience as DES defines it.
3. DES does not require individuals to wear the beeper for as long a period of time as
do other sampling methods. Individuals must carry and respond to the beeper for
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approximately 2 to 4 hours a week and engage in an expositional interview that is an hour
long each week. Other methods require the beeper to be worn all day for a number of
days.
4. DES also has a definitive time frame across studies (i.e., the moment of the beep),
a major advantage over non-sampling methods (see Nisbett & Wilson, 1988; see Hurlburt
et al., 2006).
The present study used DES to investigate the inner experience of people over the age
of 65, some with diagnosed cognitive impairment, some with undiagnosed cognitive
impairment, and some with no cognitive impairment. The study was primarily
exploratory in nature. DES has never been applied to older individuals as a group or with
any older individuals with noticeable cognitive impairment. One of the study’s goals was
to discover if individuals with cognitive impairment could engage meaningfully in the
DES process and if not why this was the case. This could lend insight into the
development of cognitive impairment in older individuals and could potentially provide
new ideas regarding the diagnosis and treatment of cognitive impairment in the elderly.
The study also sought to uncover a “cognitive signature” (a pattern of inner experience
unique to a particular group of people) in individuals over the age of 65 if one exists, as
well as differences between older individuals who are and are not cognitively impaired.
Cognitive signatures have been found in a variety of populations using DES and it is
possible that one exists in the populations used in this study. Such a discovery could
potentially aid in the understanding, diagnosis, and treatment of the cognitive impairment
in the elderly.
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CHAPTER 3

METHOD
Participants
There were a total of 12 participants in this study, all of whom were at least 65 years
of age. Six of these individuals demonstrated no cognitive impairment and were not
diagnosed with any form of cognitive impairment. The other six individuals had some
form of cognitive impairment; two were diagnosed with VaD, two were diagnosed with
MCI, one was diagnosed with AD, and one was not diagnosed but exhibited impairment
on the MMSE and throughout the DES interviewing process. An attempt was made to
find individuals with mild cognitive impairment so that they would have a good chance
of being able to engage sufficiently in the DES procedure. All of the cognitively
impaired individuals could be classified as being mildly or moderately impaired. The
individual with AD had the lowest score (19) on the MMSE. The undiagnosed individual
had a score of 21 on the MMSE (mild to moderate). The individuals with MCI received
scores of 23 (mild to moderate) and 27 on the MMSE (mild). The two individuals with
VaD received 29’s on the MMSE suggesting very little cognitive impairment. The other
6 participants received scores of 30 out of 30 on the MMSE suggesting no cognitive
impairment.
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Participants were recruited from a variety of places and in a variety of ways. Eight of
the participants came from the Las Vegas, Nevada area, three came from Pennsylvania,
and one came from Ohio. Some responded to newspaper advertisements, some were
involved in dementia support groups, some came from assisted living facilities, and some
were acquaintances of the author.
All individuals reviewed and signed the informed consent form. Caregivers were
consulted as needed. The study was explained to all of the participants before they
signed the consent forms. All participants received $10 per interview.

Materials
A small, portable beeper (Hurlburt, 2006) was used by each participant. The beeper
randomly emits a 700-Hz tone through an earphone that each participant wore. At times
participants used an external speaker rather than the presence of earphones due to hearing
aids that made it impossible to insert the earphone or for variations in procedure (see
individual participant descriptions for details). The average time between random beeps
was varied depending on the participant and the procedure, although the most common
interval was an average of 30 minutes (with a maximum interval of one hour; see
individual participant descriptions for details). Most participants were given a small
(3X5 in) notebook.to jot down notes regarding their inner experience at each beep, but
again, this varied by participant.
The MMSE (Folstein et al., 1975) was administered to all participants to assess the
level of cognitive ability. The MMSE is a short test (5 to 10 minutes) that assesses very
basic cognitive functioning, such as orientation to space and time, attention, memory,
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language functioning, simple reading, and simple arithmetic skills. The maximum score
on this test is 30 points, representing no cognitive impairment. Cut off scores for “mild”,
“moderate”, and “severe” impairment vary as a function of educational level.

Procedure
All participants agreed to one of three levels of consent. Participants either consented
to participate in the study but refused videotaping of the interviews (N = 3), they
consented to be in the study and to be videotaped but that the videotape could not be used
beyond the scope of the study or the DES lab (N = 1), or they consented to use of the
videotape and agreed that the video could be used for instructional purposes beyond the
confines of the DES laboratory (N = 8). All participants’ confidentiality was assured
commensurate with their level of consent. Individuals in the study with a possible
cognitive impairment were given the MMSE as a screening tool to make it likely that
they could adequately participate in the sampling procedure; an MMSE score of 15 or
higher was used as the cutoff although no participant scored below 19. A score of 18 or
below indicates the clear presence of dementia in individuals with an eighth grade
education (Weiner, 1991).
All participants participated in the DES procedure described by Hurlburt (1990; 1993;
Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006) with small variations in some instances, described below in
the summary of each participant. Essentially, participants wore a beeper that beeped at
random intervals. Participants were asked to “freeze” their inner experience at each beep
and to jot it down in a small note book. Participants typically collected four to six beeps
and were interviewed regarding the details of each of their beeped experiences within 24
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hours. Some participants were interviewed directly after the beep sounded to minimize
difficulties related to memory. The purpose of the interview was to gain an
understanding of the contents of each of the sampled moments. This interview
essentially involved asking one question: “What was in your inner experience at the
moment of the beep?” This question took a number of forms throughout the interview,
but all were designed with one purpose in mind: to aid the participant in communicating
the contents of their awareness at the moment of the beep. Discussion of the interview
method, with annotated examples, is in Hurlburt and Heavey (2006), Hurlburt and
Schwitzgebel (2007), and Hurlburt and Akhter (2006). Interviews typically lasted about
one hour. Please see the transcripts of excerpts from interviews from this project below
for examples of sampling interviews.
This sample/interview procedure was then repeated up to six times. These interviews
were videotaped depending upon the level of consent of the participant. Descriptions of
each sample were written by the researchers. The salient characteristics of the inner
experience of each participant were identified. Each written description was coded by
the author and this project’s advisor, Dr. Russell Hurlburt, according to applicable forms
of inner experience identified by Hurlburt (1990; 1993; Hurlburt & Heavey, 2006).
Although there were some initial disagreements about coding in a small minority of
samples a consensus between the two raters was reached for all samples. This study was
prepared to discover some never-before-described forms of inner experience as well,
discussed below. Although salient characteristics are typically of the form of experience,
salient characteristics that were content-related were also identified.
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Results
The results of the study are presented in the following chapters. Each participant was
given a separate chapter and a pseudonym and all potentially identifying information was
altered. Chapters 4 through 9 present participant summaries of the six seemingly
unimpaired individuals. Chapters 10 through 15 present participant summaries of each of
the six impaired individuals. These chapters are arranged in order of apparent cognitive
impairment based on MMSE scores from least impaired to most impaired; pseudonyms
were selected so these chapters would be in alphabetical order. Chapter 16 presents
across participant results and discussion as well as diagnostic and treatment implications
of the results, limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research.
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CHAPTER 4

UNIMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “ANNA”
Anna was a 71 year-old female who completed high school and has taken many
college classes, although she never completed a degree. She had no evidence of
cognitive impairment and scored a 30 on the MMSE indicating that she likely has no
cognitive impairment. She contacted the researchers after reading about the study in a
local newspaper. Anna was not familiar with the DES procedure prior to the study. She
was fairly adept at becoming acclimated to the DES process. As is typical of DES
participants of any age, she gave somewhat unreliable reports of her experience on the
first sampling day (samples from day one will not be included in the analysis) but by day
two gave reports that appeared very reliable. During and after day two, Anna was very
confident in the reports of her samples. Therefore, 23 samples from sampling days 2
through 6 will be analyzed.
A summary of Anna’s experience frequencies is shown in Table 1. Although the
forms of Anna’s experiences were sometimes difficult to classify due to their complexity
and idiosyncratic nature, feelings were the most prominent form in Anna’s experience,
present in 48 percent of her samples. Other forms in Anna’s experience were sensory
awareness, (39 percent), unsymbolized thinking (35 percent), inner speech (22 percent),
and inner seeing (17 percent). Anna also experienced laughing (4 percent), just doing (2
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percent), and had no experience in 4 percent of her samples. She experienced multiple
awareness in 54 percent of her samples.

Table 1
Percentages of characteristics in Anna’s samples of inner experience
Characteristic
Percentage
Feeling
48
Inner Seeing
17
Inner Speech
22
Just Doing
2
Laughing
4
No Experience
4
Sensory Awareness
39
Unsymbolized Thinking
35
Multiple Awareness
54
Number of samples
23
Total number of characteristicsa
48
Characteristics per sample
2.09
a
Total number of characteristics excludes categories that are not directly
experienced (in this case, Just Doing, Laughing, No Experience and
Multiple Awareness), and counts uncertain instances as .5.

The “Percentage” column in Table 1 refers to the percentage of samples that
contained each of the form categories. Forms that appeared to be ambiguously between
two categories were counted as .5 in each category. Also, if it was not clear if a certain
experience was present at all or not right at the moment of the beep, it was counted as .5.

Feelings
Feelings were the most common form of experience for Anna and were present in 48
percent of her samples. These feelings often had a physical component (74 percent) that
sometimes also had a mental component (35 percent).
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Below is an example of a feeling that occurred in isolation that had both physical and
mental components:
Beep 2.2 – Anna was sitting at the computer while a song by a female singer was
playing. At the moment of the beep, Anna was feeling sad, experienced primarily as a
lump in her throat and also probably as a feeling of heat behind her eyes and cold on her
forehead. She was not certain about these two aspects of the experience, but said that she
was 70 percent sure that they were there. The sadness was about being old, about the
things that she had done when she was younger (as at the time when this particular song
might have been popular). Also, although Anna wasn’t paying particular attention to the
music that was playing, she was somehow aware of the music and this music may have
brought on the experience of sadness.
On one occasion a feeling was entirely mental:
Beep 4.2 – Anna had finished writing her description of beep 4.1. She had just sighed
and turned her attention back to the computer with relief. At the moment of the beep,
Anna was experiencing relief/accomplishment at getting all of her experiences down in
the notebook for beep 4.1. This was experienced as the release of the ideas/experiences
of beep 4.1 (see below) and/or the words associated with the ideas/experiences of beep
4.1 from herself into the external world. The ideas/words were somehow visually present
but not explicitly seen. There also may have been an experience of getting ready to not
think, but it is not certain the extent to which (if at all) or how this was present at the
moment of the beep.
Anna had only one feeling experience that was entirely physical and occurred without
the presence of other forms of awareness:
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Beep 3.3 – Anna was lying on the bed and talking to her partner Sarah about the progress
that Sarah’s academic department has made. At the moment of the beep, Anna was
feeling proud of Sarah for helping the program progress so much. This pride was
experienced physically as a release of tension that is somehow similar to sighing,
although actual sighing was not taking place at this moment. The feeling of pride may
have included a feeling of pride in herself for being partnered with a women who was
achieving such an accomplishment; it was not clear whether Anna actually recalled
feeling that at the moment of the beep, or was presuming that it was there.
Anna had two feelings that contained a visual component. One of these is beep 4.2
above where ideas and or words were somehow visually present. Below is the other
occurrence of a feeling with a visual component that also includes an instance of sensory
awareness and an ambiguous experience that is either sensory awareness or just doing:
Beep 5.5 – Anna was tossing a salad and talking with her friends. One of her friends had
just asked Anna if she grew the vegetables for the dinner in her backyard. Just prior to
the moment of the beep Anna had sarcastically said “I hand picked all the veggies” and
everyone was laughing, including Anna. At the moment of the beep, Anna was aware of
the colors in the salad, an instance of sensory awareness. She was also experiencing a
very slight pleasure at the way the colors in the salad looked. Anna may have
experienced this pleasure partially as a vibration in her vision, but she was very unsure
when talking about this aspect of her experience. Also in Anna’s awareness was both the
experience of her own laughter and the laughter of her friends.
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Sensory Awareness
Of Anna’s 23 samples, 39 percent contained sensory awareness. Beep 5.5 above
contains a clear instance of sensory awareness (noticing the colors in the salad) as well as
one that was ambiguously between sensory awareness and just doing (awareness of the
laughter). Here is a sample that contains four different sensory awarenesses (sensation of
tapping, seeing finger tap, hearing finger tap, and seeing time change):
Beep 5.2 – Anna was setting the timer on her oven. She was in the process of using the
oven keypad to get the appropriate time (1 hour and 30 minutes). At the moment of the
beep, she was tapping the keypad 30 times in quick succession to get the minute part of
the display to 30 and was very close to 30. Anna was focused on this process. She was
feeling the physical sensation of tapping the key pad on the end of her finger, seeing her
fingers tap on the keypad, hearing her fingernails make a clicking noise on the keypad,
and seeing the timer display change as she pressed the numbers on the keypad.

Unsymbolized Thinking
Unsymbolized thinking was present in 35 percent of Anna’s samples. Here is a clear
example of unsymbolized thinking with a feeling:
Beep 4.4 – Anna was playing poker on the computer. She was thinking about going to
California next week. At the moment of the beep, Anna was cognitively wondering if
she could arrange going to California with the interviewers so to not break DES
arrangements. She was also experiencing a feeling of mild anxiety about possibly
breaking DES arrangements. The anxiety was very mild and was experienced both
physically and mentally. The physical experience was located in the upper chest, neck,
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and head, was well below the skin, and was similar to the heat of blushing, but not
exactly. There was a rising to this experience, as it originated in the upper chest and rose
to the head. The mental component of the anxiety was not explicit, but somehow
affected Anna cognitively, although Anna was not entirely sure about this component of
the anxiety.

Inner Speech
Anna had inner speech in 22 percent of her samples. Below is an example of inner
speech with an instance of sensory awareness:
Beep 6.5 – Anna was having difficulty getting the lid on a to-go cup of coffee. At the
moment of the beep, Anna was innerly speaking in her own voice “Damn to go cup, lid
doesn’t fit.” She was also feeling the pressure on her hand as she was trying to screw the
lid on the cup.

Inner Seeing
Seventeen percent of Anna’s samples contained inner seeing. Here is an example of
an incidence of inner seeing:
Beep 5.4 – Anna was cutting her friend Jane’s hair and was simultaneously having a
conversation with her. Anna was talking, but she had no idea what she was saying—the
words were apparently just rolling out of her on autopilot, as were the actions of cutting
the hair. Rather than pay attention to either of those activities, at the moment of the beep,
Anna was innerly seeing a vegetable chopper that she owns. The inner seeing was very
sharp and was floating with no background like a hologram or a projected image. The lid

130

of the imagined chopper was down; she could see the transparent plastic bottom and the
top part of the chopper. Anna was somehow aware of the chopper from different angles,
but was not actually seeing it from different angles at the moment of the beep. Anna’s
interest in this seeing was in the mechanics of how the chopper works rather than in how
the chopper looks.
Here is another example of an inner seeing accompanied by a feeling and an
unsymbolized thought:
Beep 4.1 – Anna was playing poker at the computer. Earlier that day, she had been
playing Canasta with some friends. One of her friends (Jan) had made a mistake and had
repeatedly criticized herself and her Canasta partner for it. At the moment of the beep,
part of Anna’s experience was a mixture feelings and thoughts related to the incident that
were somewhat homogeneous in that they were all mixed together to form a mostly
uniform experience. The predominant part of this experience was Anna’s questioning of
whether or not she was too tough on Jan. The word “tough” or “too tough?” was present
to Anna visually and was experienced as a grayish/pinkish/beigeish color that had
jaggedy edges, was not overwhelmingly large, was flat, was pliable, and was clear. Anna
was very specific about the jaggedy edges of the experience; when drawn, she
commented that the drawing was too jaggedy and that the jags weren’t sharp enough.
Anna knew that the visual experience meant the word “tough” or “too tough?” at the
moment of the beep. There also may have been a cognitive component to this experience
where Anna was questioning if she was too tough on Jan. Also at the moment of the
beep, Anna was experiencing doubt/indecision about whether she did the right thing in
confronting Jan. This was experienced as an “icky,” sour, almost nauseous feeling in the
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upper chest and throat region. She was also simultaneously thinking cognitively that she
did the right thing by confronting Jan. Also at the moment of the beep, but not as
predominant, was the thought that Jan was a jerk. This thought was not in words. There
may also have been the experience of simultaneously loving Jan but thinking she’s
annoying as well, but this was not entirely clear.

Multiple Awareness
Multiple awareness was very common for Anna, occurring in 54 percent of her
samples. Beeps 5.5 (where Anna was noticing colors in the salad and experiencing
pleasure) and 5.2 (where Anna was experiencing four sensory awarenesses while setting
the timer) above are examples of multiple awareness. Beep 4.1 above where Anna was
experiencing the word “tough” or “too tough” visually while simultaneously experiencing
the feeling of being icky and the unsymbolized thought of Jan being a jerk is another
example of multiple awareness.
It is notable that Anna did not begin reporting multiple awareness until the third day of
sampling, but by day six all six of Anna’s samples contained multiple awareness. This is
most likely due to Anna’s training and increased sensitivity to her experience.

Unusual Aspects of Experience
A substantial number of Anna’s experiences were very unusual either in complexity or
form and are worth describing here. Below is a description of an experience that
contained a substantial complexity of inner seeings:
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Beep 3.4 – Anna was talking with Sarah. Sarah had said shortly before the beep that
Anna had not changed very much since they met. Anna was in the process of saying “I
wasn’t the P.T.A. lady when I met you,” meaning that she had changed a lot prior to
meeting Sarah, and was laughing at that thought. At the moment of the beep, Anna was
recalling how she has changed over her life. This recollection consisted of the inner
seeing of numerous freeze-frame pictures of herself (Anna estimated about 50 of them)
that were experienced in extremely rapid succession like fast time-lapse photography.
Anna could describe some of the inner seeings. One inner seeing was of an actual
photograph of her when she was about 19 years old taken from the side and wearing a
full-length white polka dot on blue dress. One of the last inner seeings was of Anna as
the P.T.A. lady that she was before she met Sarah. The inner seeings often showed Anna
having a facial expression that was indicative of her emotional state at that phase of her
life. For example, one showed a very fearful expression as she was generally very
anxious at that stage of her life. The inner seeings also showed Anna as she was at that
particular time of life, with variations in a number of aspects of her physical appearance.
Many of the inner seeings were of Anna’s face from an extremely close range that
showed Anna’s face from just above her eyes to about her chin. There was also a
knowing that her children were related to some of the pictures. There may have been
other knowings around or during the experience of the inner seeings, but this is highly
speculative as it was not discussed in detail. It was not clear if the inner seeings
proceeded in chronological order or not. It should be noted that Anna did not mention
these freeze-frames until well into the conversation about this beep and that when she
first mentioned them she used many subjunctifiers. However, after this initial
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uncertainty, Anna was very confident about the existence and nature of these freezeframes. Anna was also aware of her laughter. The laughter blended in with the
recollection of change.
Anna also had two instances of feelings that had visual components. These examples
are listed above in beep 4.2 where she was somehow visually experiencing ideas or
words, and beep 5.5 where pleasure involved vibration in her vision. Visual components
to feelings are highly unusual.
Some of Anna’s experiences of inner seeings also had the uncommon feature of
movement and analysis. Beep 5.4 above where Anna was innerly seeing the chopper is
one example. Here is the other example:
Beep 6.4 – Anna was at the computer working on an article that she is writing. She was
reading a part of the article where she had written about a helicopter-carrying ship. At
the moment of the beep she was re-reading “which would divide and slide open and
allow a helicopter pad to be raised to deck level.” At the moment of the beep, Anna was
innerly seeing the scene she was re-reading. She was innerly seeing a colorful scene
including the deck of the ship splitting and the helicopter pad rising. There was no
helicopter on the pad. Anna was also in the process of gradually changing the
perspective from which she was seeing the inner seeing. The perspective started from
above and then went below the deck, as if she had gone through the deck of the ship. The
inner seeing under the deck was of the elevator. There was also a light green light under
the deck. From this perspective she was primarily interested in how the elevator worked.
Also at the moment of the beep, Anna was thinking about what was in Harold’s
imagination (Harold is a character in the book). There were no words in this thought,
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but rather the understanding of the concept. Anna was also seeing an after image of the
last few words she was reading. They appeared as if they were coming toward her off of
the computer screen and were fading away.
Anna also had at least one experience that seemed to be somewhat undifferentiated or
lacking some aspect of experience. This was beep 4.2 that contained ideas and words
that were somehow present visually but lacked actual visual qualities so that Anna could
not “see” these ideas and words.

Discussion
Anna had many features of inner experience that are noteworthy, such as a high rate of
multiple awareness, visual components to some feelings, motion and analysis in some
inner seeings, complexity in some experiences, and a lack of common aspects of
experience at times. It is unclear if any of these aspects of Anna’s experience are related
to age or a process of degeneration of her inner experience. The complexity of her
experience suggests that her experience is quite rich and not degenerating at all, although
it is conceivable that an inhibitory or attentional deficit could create rich and complex
inner experience. Overall, Anna was a very convincing participant and even when her
experiences were very complex and/or unusual she typically demonstrated a high level of
confidence in her reports.
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CHAPTER 5

UNIMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “BENJAMIN”
Benjamin was a 68 year-old male with no diagnosed or notable cognitive impairment.
He scored 30 out of 30 on the MMSE suggesting that he had no cognitive impairment.
He was an acquaintance of one of the researchers and agreed to undergo the DES process.
He did not receive education after high school and currently does work in genealogy,
writing independently as well as in partnership with professors from a small rural college.
Benjamin seemed fairly adept throughout his first day of sampling at narrowing his
experience to the moment of the beep. He was able to make distinctions between events
and experiences that came slightly before or slightly after the beep. However, Benjamin
did exhibit enough inconsistencies during his first day to eliminate these samples from
the analysis. All other beeps will be considered in analysis, a total of 19 in five days.
Beeps 4.2 and 4.4 were excluded because they occurred while he was writing
descriptions of the previous beep.
As shown in Table 2 below, Benjamin’s most common form of experience was
sensory awareness, present in 84 percent of his samples. Other forms that Benjamin
experienced were unsymbolized thinking (42 percent), unvocalized inner speech (29
percent, (see below for a description of unvocalized inner speech), and worded thinking
(5 percent). Benjamin also was just talking in five percent of his samples and had no
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experience in five percent of his samples. Benjamin had multiple awareness in 79
percent of his samples.

Table 2
Percentages of characteristics in Benjamin’s samples of inner experience
Characteristic
Percentage
Just Talking
5
No Experience
5
Sensory Awareness
84
Unsymbolized Thinking
42
Unvocalized Inner Speech
29
Worded Thinking
5
Multiple Awareness
79
Number of samples
19
a
Total number of characteristics
45.5
Characteristics per sample
2.39
a
Total number of characteristics excludes categories that are not directly
experienced (in this case, Just Talking, No Experience and Multiple
Awareness), and counts uncertain instances as .5

As in Table 1, the “Percentage” column in Table 2 refers to the percentage of samples
that contained each of the form categories. Forms that appeared to be ambiguously
between two categories or if it was not clear that they were present at the moment of the
beep were counted as .5 in each category.

Sensory Awareness
The most salient feature of Benjamin’s sampled experience was the frequent presence
of sensory awareness which was present in 84 percent of his samples. The only samples
that clearly did not involve sensory awareness were one sample when Benjamin was just
talking and another when he had no inner experience. Below is an example of sensory
awareness (with an unsymbolized thought):
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Beep 6.2 – Benjamin was in his garage. He was thinking about cleaning the earpiece of
the beeper. He was considering possible ways to clean it. At the moment of the beep,
Benjamin was thinking about water and alcohol as a means of cleaning the earpiece. This
experience was not in words. Benjamin was also noticing the colors outside as he viewed
them through the garage window. He was noticing mostly green, but also pink, white,
and yellow.
Benjamin often experienced multiple sensory awarenesses at one time. He
experienced 28 clear instances of sensory awareness with an additional six potential
sensory awarenesses contained in 17 samples. If the unclear instances are counted as .5,
Benjamin averaged 1.8 instances of sensory awareness in the 17 samples that contained
sensory awareness. The most sensory awarenesses that he experienced at one time was
four. Below is an example of a sample containing four sensory awarenesses and an
unvocalized inner speech:
Beep 2.1 – Benjamin was in his house playing Sodoku on a hand held electronic device.
He was having some difficulty with the game, but had just figured out many of the
numbers. At or very near the beep, Benjamin had five overlapping experiences. First,
Benjamin was innerly saying “I got it now,” referring to figuring out the numbers on
Sudoku. This was experienced internally as if he was externally speaking, but the words
came significantly faster and did not have qualities such as volume and pitch. Second,
just after this inner saying had begun, Benjamin became aware of his sister Laura
speaking on a phone in another room in the house. Right at the beep, Benjamin was
hearing Laura speak, but was not comprehending what she was saying. Third, a
motorcycle was approaching on the street in front of Benjamin’s house. Benjamin was
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hearing the sound of the motorcycle at the moment of the beep. Fourth, Benjamin was
aware of the smell of chicken being cooked. Finally, Benjamin was faintly aware of the
sound of traffic passing by his house. The sound was a whooshing sound.
Benjamin’s sensory awareness was typically auditory in nature. Of the 34 possible
instances of sensory awareness 27 were auditory in nature. Every time Benjamin had an
instance of auditory sensory awareness it consisted of his simply hearing something in
the external environment. Three of the other instances were visual, two were olfactory,
one was tactile, and one was gustatory.
A frequent theme of Benjamin’s auditory sensory awareness was traffic. He
experienced 11 instances of sensory awareness related to traffic spread across 50 percent
of his samples. Benjamin’s awareness of the motorcycle passing in beep 2.1 above is an
example of traffic-related sensory awareness. On six occasions Benjamin was hearing a
voice (always either one of his sisters or the television). The words being spoken were
never comprehended, but the voices themselves were in Benjamin’s awareness in these
instances. On three occasions Benjamin was hearing sparrows. Beep 2.1 above, is an
example of both hearing traffic and a voice.

Unsymbolized Thinking
Unsymbolized thinking occurred in 42 percent of Benjamin’s samples. Here is an
example (with sensory awareness):
Beep 5.1 – Benjamin was sitting outside on his glider. He was reviewing notes written
by an acquaintance who is in ill health. At the moment of the beep, Benjamin was
thinking about the health of this man. There were no words or images accompanying this
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thought. This thought was not strong in Benjamin’s awareness, but it was definitely
present. Benjamin was also faintly aware of the sound of sparrows tweeting. There may
have been more than one, but Benjamin was not certain. He was simply hearing the
sparrow(s).

Unvocalized Inner Speech
Benjamin frequently experienced a form of inner speech that was similar in many
ways to typical inner speech (i.e., words were present, it was experienced as being
produced by Benjamin, the words came in sequential order, they were meaningful, etc.)
but also differed substantially from typical inner speech in two important ways:
1. The speech was not vocalized - Benjamin was confident that specific

vocalized

qualities such as inflection, pitch, and volume were not present in these experiences at the
moment of the beep but that it was still as if he was innerly speaking words. Benjamin
did not report this lack of vocalization until sampling day four but once he recognized
that these experiences were not vocalized he stated that similar experiences in the prior
four days also were not vocalized. It is likely that Benjamin did not report this until day
four because prior to this day Benjamin was simply asked if these experiences had
auditory qualities, which he affirmed. When Benjamin was asked specifically if these
experiences had volume, pitch, and/or inflection he said that they did not. Benjamin also
may have had a presupposition that his internal worded experience had to be vocalized,
but once an alternative possibility became an option this pre-supposition disappeared.
Regardless, Benjamin’s reports that his worded experiences prior to day four were not
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vocalized were very believable as were his reports about his worded experiences on and
after day four.
2. These experiences occurred almost instantly - Benjamin stated very early on that
his worded experiences occurred very fast. He later consistently reported that they
happened “almost instantly.” However, the words themselves were not experienced as
being rapid. That is, whereas the words were experienced as being produced at a normal
rate of speech the entire spoken sequence was apprehended as occurring almost instantly.
Here is an example of one of these experiences:
Beep 4.5 – Benjamin was walking through his kitchen to go outside. At the moment of
the beep, Benjamin was innerly saying, “Gonna go sit on the glider.” The words
occurred very fast, almost instantaneously. It was as if Benjamin was speaking the words
and the words were definitely present. However, there were no vocalized qualities to the
experience. The words had no volume, no pitch, and either no or flat inflection. The
experience was apparently “spoken but not auditory.” Benjamin also may have been
hearing his sister Stephanie laugh at the moment of the beep, but the laughing may have
ended just before the moment of the beep.
Benjamin often stated that his unvocalized inner speech was frequently directly
preceded by unsymbolized thinking. Benjamin viewed his unsymbolized thinking as a
thought that had not yet been fully formed. He described unvocalized inner speech as the
fully realized form of the thought and often discussed the transition from unsymbolized
thinking to unvocalized inner speech. Although Benjamin is very adept at making subtle
distinctions in the temporal progression of his experience, it is still quite possible that this
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is more of a generalization about his inner experience than anything that was caught
exactly at the moment of the beep.

Worded Thinking
Benjamin had one sample that contained worded thinking along with sensory
awareness and a possible unsymbolized thought (wondering about the title):
Beep 2.2 – Benjamin was listening to classical music on the radio but was not aware of
the music at the moment of the beep. Benjamin was mulling over who the composer of
the music he was, trying to think of many possibilities. At the moment of the beep,
Benjamin was thinking that it was Rossini. The word “Rossini” was definitely present at
the moment of the beep, but it had no auditory or visual qualities. It also was not
experienced as being spoken, but was simply present in Benjamin’s awareness. There
also may have been a wondering what the title of the piece was that was connected to the
Rossini experience, but Benjamin was not entirely certain. Benjamin was also aware of
someone yelling somewhere in front of his house. The Rossini experience began slightly
before the yelling, but both appeared to be present at the moment of the beep.

Multiple Awareness
Multiple awareness was present in 79 percent of Benjamin’s samples. All of the beeps
mentioned above are examples or clear instances of multiple awareness except for beep
4.5, where Benjamin was innerly saying “gonna go sit on the glider” and may have been
hearing his sister laugh. Beep 4.5 is a questionable occurrence of multiple awareness
because he may have been hearing his sister laugh in addition to having an unrelated
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occurrence of unvocalized inner speech, but it is unclear if the awareness of his sister
laughing was actually present at the moment of the beep. The only samples that clearly
did not contain multiple awareness were one where Benjamin was just talking, one where
he had no inner experience, and one where he had one sensory awareness. Here is the
one instance where Benjamin was experiencing only a sensory awareness:
Beep 4.3 – Benjamin had just finished writing his response to 4.2. At the moment of the
beep, he was quickly going over it to make sure that there were no major errors. He was
not comprehending what he was reading. He was also hearing his sister Stephanie
talking on the phone. He was not comprehending what she was saying or hearing any
words in particular.

Discussion
Benjamin was very adept at focusing on and describing the moment of the beep. He
made very small distinctions between what came before, at, and after the moment of the
beep, seemingly on the order of tenths of seconds. He was also quite skilled at
distinguishing between things that were not in his awareness and things that were faintly
in his awareness. Benjamin was an excellent participant in every conceivable way.
Benjamin’s experience is notable in seven ways: (a) the frequent presence of sensory
awareness, (b) the frequent presence of auditory sensory awareness, (c) the frequent
awareness of traffic-related awareness, (d) the presence of inner speech that was
unvocalized, (e) the nearly instantaneous nature of unvocalized inner speech, (f) the
frequent presence of multiple awareness, and (g) the limited range of form Benjamin
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experienced. These characteristics suggest the following things about Benjamin’s inner
experience and his engagement in the DES process:
1. He is unusually aware of sensory information coming from his environment,
especially information that is auditory in nature.
2. He is pre-occupied with traffic. In fact, when the interviewer suggested that
Benjamin may be pre-occupied with traffic, he stated “No, I’m obsessed with it.”
3. He lacks some aspects of experience that are typically present in the inner
experience of others. For example, inner speech is a very common form of inner
experience and typically has qualities of vocalization. However, Benjamin’s unvocalized
inner speech lacks vocalized qualities such as volume, pitch, and inflection. This
unvocalized inner speech is also nearly instantaneous and therefore lacks the temporal
dimension that inner speech usually has.
4. He lacks a wide range of form in his inner experience as his only forms of
experience were sensory awareness, unsymbolized thinking, unvocalized inner speech
and a single occurrence of worded thinking.
5. He may be especially adept at describing the fringes of his experience and that
auditory awareness is frequently at the fringes of his experiences. This sometimes
seemed to be the case, but it was almost as common that Benjamin’s auditory sensory
awareness was quite prominent in his experience.
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CHAPTER 6

UNIMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “CLARA”
Clara was an 81 year-old woman with no apparent cognitive impairment. She scored
30 out of 30 on the MMSE (suggesting no cognitive impairment) and had a Master’s
degree in a health-related field. She was referred to the researchers by a family member
who had gained knowledge of the study. Clara was not familiar with DES prior to
sampling but was very adept at DES from the first day with the apparent ability to narrow
her experience to the moment of the beep and report it reliably and accurately.
Therefore, her samples from the first day were counted in the analysis below. Thirty-five
samples were discussed across six sampling days.
As shown in Table 3, Clara had a wide range of forms of awareness in her samples.
Overall, 33 percent of her samples included unsymbolized thought, 30 percent of her
samples included inner speech, 26 percent included inner seeing, 16 percent included
feelings, 11 percent worded thinking, 6 percent just doing, and 3 percent each for
imageless seeing and sensory awareness. Nine percent of her samples included multiple
awareness. Below is a more in-depth look at each of these forms:
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Table 3
Percentages of characteristics in Clara’s samples of inner experience
Characteristic
Percentage
Feeling
16
Inner Seeing
26
Imageless Seeing
3
Inner Speech
30
Just Doing
6
Sensory Awareness
3
Unsymbolized Thinking
33
Worded Thinking
11
Multiple Awareness
9
Number of samples
35
Total number of characteristicsa
43.5
Characteristics per sample
1.24
a
Total number of characteristics excludes categories that are not directly
experienced (in this case, Just Doing and Multiple Awareness), and
counts uncertain instances as .5

As in Tables 1 and 2, the “Percentage” column in Table 3 refers to the percentage of
samples that contained each of the form categories. Forms that appeared to be
ambiguously between two categories were counted as .5 in each category. For example,
in the fifth sample from day six, it was ambiguous if Clara’s experience was an instance
of inner speech or worded thinking. Therefore, this sample was counted as .5 inner
speech and .5 worded thinking. Also, if it was not clear if a certain experience was
present at all or not right at the moment of the beep, it was also counted as .5.

Unsymbolized Thinking
Clara had 11 instances of unsymbolized thinking and one instance which may have
been unsymbolized thinking. If one counts the uncertain instance as .5, then 33 percent of
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her samples included unsymbolized thinking, as shown in Table 1. Here is an example of
unambiguous unsymbolized thought:
Beep 4.3 – Clara was standing in her living room. At the moment of the beep, she was
thinking about whether to clean the bathroom or to dust the living room. This was a
wondering about the next course of action she would take that contained no words,
images, or symbols. It was a “mental thought.”
The one sample where it was unclear if Clara was experiencing an unsymbolized
thought occurred in beep 2.6. It was not clear if this beep contained symbols (i.e., words)
or not:
Beep 2.6 – Clara was sitting in her apartment and looking out the window. She had
moved to Las Vegas within the past year. At the moment of the beep, she was wondering
why she was not adjusting to living there better than she has been. This was experienced
as an unworded thought process that was accompanied with the definite presence of the
word “adjusting,” although no spoken words or images of the word were actually
experienced.

Inner Speech
Clara experienced inner speech on ten occasions and one additional occasion where
she may have been experiencing inner speech. If the questionable occasion is counted as
.5, she was experiencing inner speech in 30 percent of her samples, as shown in Table 3.
Here is an example of an unambiguous instance of inner speech:
Beep 6.5 – Clara was thinking of how she could talk a family member into letting her
have her car for the weekend while the daughter was out of town. At the moment of the
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beep, Clara was innerly speaking “Can I talk Lisa into letting me have the car this
weekend when they go out of state?” The beep came near the word “car.” Clara was
producing this speech internally in what was experienced as her own voice.
The one occasion that was uncertain was when Clara was uncertain if there were vocal
qualities to her experience, making it possibly more of a worded thought than inner
speech:
Beep 4.5 – Clara was standing in the living room after she had finished cleaning. At the
moment of the beep, Clara was innerly saying to herself “Why am I so slow getting
things done now. Is it part of old age or having less to do?” Clara was sure that words
were present, but she was not sure whether or not these words were experienced vocally.
Either the words were present and were heard vocally or the words were present without
any vocal qualities. Clara was also sensing an emotion of frustration. This frustration
was a mental process and was not independent of the verbal experience.

Inner Seeing
Clara was innerly seeing on nine occasions, or 26 percent of the samples. On eight of
nine occasions, Clara’s inner seeings were in black and white. On the other occasion, it
was in brown and white. Here is an example of an inner seeing in black and white:
Beep 3.5 – Clara was sitting in her front yard watching traffic and thinking about an
experience she had had the previous week. She had been at the DMV, and because she
had a walker, she had been instructed to go to the beginning of the long line of people.
At the moment of the beep, she was innerly seeing a long line of people. This line was
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on her right and the people were facing largely away from her at a diagonal, left to right.
There was no background. This seeing was clear and detailed, but in black and white.
Here is another example of an inner seeing, this time in conjunction with inner speech:
Beep 5.2 – Clara was sitting outside knitting. She was innerly speaking in her own voice
“Flowers, leaves, and green grass in March.” The beep came on the word “grass.” She
was also innerly seeing a small group of flowers standing in a dirt bed. She was not
certain what kind of flowers they were, but they were small and similar to pansies and
viewed from a perspective that was within a few feet. The inner seeing was in black and
white.
Clara had one example where the inner seeing was not in black and white but was in
brown and white with an inner speech:
Beep 5.6 – Clara was outside knitting. The previous day she had gotten copies of
pictures of her brothers. These copies contained four pictures on approximately an 8x11
inch sheet. At the moment of the beep, Clara was innerly seeing this sheet that was very
similar to how it exists in reality. This experience was very clear. Clara could make out
the details in each of the four pictures (such as who was in each picture, the positions of
the people, and some of the surrounding details). This experience was in brown and
white (as the reproductions were in real life). Also at the moment of the beep, she was
innerly speaking in her own voice “The picture of my brothers were reproduced and they
came out better than the originals.” Clara was not sure if this was the exact phrase she
was innerly speaking, but she was certain that the beep came on the word “reproduced.”
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Feelings
Clara had five samples with feelings and another sample that may have involved a
feeling. If this sample is counted as .5, then 16 percent of Clara’s samples involved
feelings. A clear example of a feeling was presented in sample 4.5 above where Clara
was experiencing frustration at being slow. Here is another example (accompanied by
inner speech):
Beep 5.3 – Clara was outside knitting. She was innerly speaking in her own voice “Why
am I living alone? Some of the relatives think it’s strange that I can do it.” The beep
occurred on the word “alone.” She was also aware of being angry at the moment of the
beep. This anger was a mental process with no symbols or physical sensation. The inner
speaking was more prominent in her awareness than the anger. Clara estimated a ratio of
85 to 15 between the inner speaking and the anger.
The one instance where it was uncertain whether or not Clara was experiencing a
feeling was in beep 4.2. This beep was accompanied by inner speech that may or may
not have had a separate experience of a feeling:
Beep 4.2 – Clara was in the kitchen. At the moment of the beep she was innerly saying
“Now I have to do the dishes.” The beep came between the words “to” and “do.” Clara
was also aware of feeling compelled to do the dishes. However, this feeling did not seem
to be separate from the words and did not exist independently from the words.

Worded Thinking
Clara had three unambiguous instances of worded thinking and two instances where it
was not clear if she was experiencing worded thinking. If these two ambiguous instances
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are counted as .5, Clara had worded thinking in 11 percent of her samples. Below is a
clear instance of worded thinking:
Beep 6.1 – Clara was thinking about the shootings that occurred at Virginia Tech earlier
that day. At the moment of the beep, she was thinking, “How useless it was. (pause) The
poor parents.” The beep came during “the poor parents.” These words were in her
awareness, although they were not spoken, heard or seen. The entire phrase occurred all
at once. That is, the phrase “the poor parents” appeared simultaneously, not in a
sequence where “the” came first, “poor” second, and “parents” third.
The two instances where it was uncertain if worded thinking was present occurred in
beeps 2.6 (where Clara was wondering about not adjusting to Las Vegas) and 4.5 (where
Clara was wondering why she is getting slow) above. It was not clear if beep 2.6 was an
unsymbolized thought or worded thought and it was not clear if beep 4.5 was an
incidence of inner speech or worded thought.

Just Doing
Clara had two instances of just doing, constituting six percent of her samples. Below
is an example of one of the two occurrences of just doing:
Beep 6.2 – Clara was staring at a picture of her and her husband. At the moment of the
beep, she was not aware of any inner experience other than the seeing of the picture. She
stated that she had been staring at the picture for approximately 20 minutes, as if she had
been locked onto the picture. Clara found this weird and surprising; she believed she had
never done this before. She attributed it to the shock of the Virginia Tech killings.
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Imageless Seeing
Clara had one experience of innerly seeing (in conjunction with two feelings) where
there was nothing actually being seen, a phenomenon DES calls imageless seeing. As
seen in Table 1, this makes up three percent of her samples. Here is her one instance of
imageless seeing:
Beep 2.5 – Clara’s friend Joan had sent her a picture of Wayne, Clara’s recently deceased
husband. Clara was in the process of writing a thank you note to Joan, and paused while
she considered what to write. At the moment of the beep, Clara was somehow
visualizing Wayne’s face as it had been shortly before he died. However, there was no
actual face being innerly seen, although it was understood to be a seeing phenomenon.
There was also a feeling of sadness that was connected to this visual experience; this
sadness was somehow experienced in her head. She was also thinking/feeling irritated at
Joan for sending the picture—an irritation that, if expressed in words (which it was not)
might be something like, why did she send it, she should mind her own business, I don’t
want a picture like this, butt out! This negative thinking/feeling, contrasted with her
general sense that she should say thank you for sending the present, had brought the letter
writing to a temporary halt.

Sensory Awareness
Clara had one instance of sensory awareness, constituting three percent of her
samples. Here is the one example of sensory awareness that was accompanied by a
feeling:
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Beep 3.4 – Clara was experiencing pain and numbness in her hand due to arthritis. At the
moment of the beep, she was aware of the fingers of her right hand being in a curled
position and numbness throughout each of the fingers. She was also frustrated by the
pain which was an intense emotional experience. Clara stated that she felt like she
wanted to cry, although the literal experience of wanting to cry was not in her awareness.
She was not sure if this part of the experience was in her head or contained in her body.

Content Themes
Clara also had some themes involving the content of her experience. For example,
Clara was judged to have had from 9 to 12 samples that involved negative content. Of
those that have been discussed above, six had negative content: beep 2.5 where Clara was
innerly seeing her husband’s tombstone and feeling sadness, 2.6 where she was thinking
about not adjusting well to living in Las Vegas, 3.4 where she was experiencing pain and
frustration, 4.5 where she was feeling frustrated, 5.3 where she was experiencing anger,
and 6.1 where she was thinking about the Virginia Tech shootings and thinking about the
poor parents.
Clara was also judged to have had seven, possibly eight samples with family-related
content. Family-related content was counted when she was clearly having an experience
that involved a specific family member. This most commonly involved her husband or
her daughter, but others involved other family members as well. Of those discussed
above, three had family-related content: beep 2.5 where she was thinking about her
husband, beep 5.6 where Clara was innerly seeing pictures of her brothers, and beep 6.5
where she was thinking about her daughter’s letting her drive.
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Clara had four, possibly five samples that contained content related to death. Three of
these involved her husband and two involved the shootings at Virginia Tech that occurred
on sampling day six. Beeps 2.5 (when Clara was visualizing her husband’s face as it
looked before he died) and 6.1 (thinking about the “poor parents” of the victims of the
Virginia Tech shooting) discussed above are two examples.
Clara also had three beeps thinking about the beeper specifically. Here is an example:
Beep 2.1 – At the moment of the beep, Clara was drinking coffee and was aware of
waiting for the beeper to go off and wondering if it would go off. This was a mental
process that did not contain any words, images, or symbols, nor did it contain any
emotional or physical experience.

Discussion
Samples from the first sampling day
DES reports often exclude discussion of the first sampling day on the logic that the
first day is typically required as training in the method. Clara, however, seemed to grasp
the method immediately, so we have discussed all her samples including the first day’s to
this point and have included Clara’s first day in the analysis below. The only moderately
large change that would occur by not counting day one is that Clara’s inner seeings
would drop from 26 percent to 14 percent because five of Clara’s nine possible inner
seeings occurred on day one.
Missing features of inner experience
A substantial amount of Clara’s experience was missing an important feature.
Specifically, all nine of her inner seeings lacked color other than black, brown, or white.
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Also, she had three, four, or five instances of worded thinking which is similar to inner
speech in that it is a clear verbal experience, but it has no auditory qualities. Also, in
Clara’s experience the words were present simultaneously rather than in a sequential
manner that occurs in inner speech.

She also had one instance of imageless seeing,

which can be conceptualized as an inner seeing that does not have visual qualities. The
meaning of experience that is lacking in common features is unclear. However, one
interpretation is that it somehow represents a deficiency in inner experience.
Unfortunately it is difficult to determine if this is the case. It is quite possible that Clara
always had inner experience that was missing common features and therefore does not
represent deterioration in inner experience. Nevertheless, this is a somewhat unusual
occurrence that is shared with some other participants in this study.
There have been very few investigations regarding color in mental imagery.
However, since the 1940’s psychological researchers debated the extent to which people
dream in black and white versus color. Many researchers attempted to estimate the
percentage of time people dreamed in black and white and color based on interviews (for
a review, see Schwitzgebel, 2002). Fifty-six percent of respondents in a poll by America
On-Line in 1999 stated that they dreamt in color while 31 percent stated that they dreamt
in black and white or both black and white and color (Schwitzgebel, 2002). Prior to the
early 1900’s, dreams were largely assumed to be in color, but, according to Schwitzgebel
(2002), this trend changed due to the presence of black and white media (newspapers,
then TV) in the culture. Schwitzgebel (2002) speculated that this could be due to black
and white media actually changing the way that people dream, but concluded that it is
much more likely that the reports of people’s dreams changed rather than the dreams
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themselves. He also offered the possibility that the color or lack thereof in dreams is
undetermined and not explicit in the dreams themselves. Schwitzgebel (2002) only
briefly discussed the possibility of black and white inner seeings while awake, but did
suggest that this phenomenon as at least a possibility.
Although there are no investigations about the presence of color in the visual images
of older individuals there have been discussions regarding color in the visual images of
children. Investigations into the presence of color in early childhood memories have
found a range of approximately 10 to 40 percent of memories where colors are directly
mentioned (for a review, see Clark, 2004). In one study where participants were directly
asked if color was a part of their childhood memories only 34 percent of the memories
contained color (Howes, Siegel, & Brown, 1993). Clark (2004) estimated that
approximately 1 out of 6 reports of childhood memories contain color when it was not
directly asked for. This may be important to the current study as it suggests the
possibility that children may have to develop the ability to have color as a component of
their mental images. This would make color in imagery a developmental process that
could increase with age, but then decline in some individuals as they reach old age.
Although color in the mental imagery of older individuals has not been investigated,
many aspects of mental imagery in older individuals have been investigated. Perhaps the
most attention has been paid to mental rotation in both younger and older individuals.
Older individuals consistently perform more slowly in mental rotation tasks relative to
their younger counterparts (Dror & Kosslyn, 1994). For example, it appears to take
longer for elderly individuals to form, maintain, and manipulate mental images (Dror &
Kosslyn, 1994; see Palladino & De Beni, 2003). Older individuals also appear to
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generate different types of mental images that younger individuals. For example,
Palladino and De Beni (2003) had participants generate a mental image for each word on
a 40 word list. The participants had 40 seconds to generate each image. Older
individuals tended to generate images that were less specific and more self-referential
(i.e., their images were of things they have actually observed) than younger individuals.
Older individuals also had more irrelevant information in their images compared to
younger people, but each group had the same amount of relevant details. However, older
individuals produced less details overall than younger individuals when time constraints
were reduced to 20 seconds (Palladino & De Beni, 2003).
The possibility that images change as a function of one’s age has been considered by
Fodor (1981), who suggested that children could think in images while adults think in
words. Also, various studies on imagery suggest that more detailed images take longer
to construct (see Kosslyn, Pinker, Smith, & Schwartz, 1981). Furthermore, there is
evidence that the vividness of an image is inversely related to the time one is allowed to
form that image (Campos, Perez-Fabello, & Gomez-Juncal, 2006). This suggests that the
quality of images (in this case, vividness) may not be present instantly but rather take
time to develop.
One might infer from the above investigations that more detailed images take a higher
level of mental effort. Assuming that an image in color is more detailed than one in black
and white, this might suggest that it takes more mental effort or cognitive resources to
have a color image than a black and white image. Therefore, the exclusive presence of
black and white images opposed to color images in Clara’s awareness could be due to a
deficiency in cognitive functioning.
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Content of inner experience
Clara had some themes in the content of her experience. It is not clear if this is
significant or not. It is possible that Clara experienced a limited range of content,
although the rest of Clara’s content appeared typical in terms of range. It is also possible
that Clara ruminated about some of these topics. The negative content may represent that
Clara was depressed and there is some research to suggest that people who are depressed
tend to ruminate (Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 1993).
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CHAPTER 7

UNIMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “DOLLY”
Dolly was a 67 year-old woman with a Bachelor’s degree in Liberal Arts. She
exhibited no cognitive impairment and scored 30out of 30 on the MMSE suggesting no
cognitive impairment. She was referred to the study by a daughter of another participant.
Dolly was not familiar with DES prior to the study. Dolly was quite adept at narrowing
her focus to the moment of the beep and describing inner experience early on in the
sampling process. Therefore samples from her first day were included in the analysis.
There were seventeen samples discussed across three sampling days.
As shown in Table 4, Dolly had a wide variety of forms of experience in her samples.
Overall, 50 percent of her samples included unsymbolized thinking, 26 percent included
feelings, 18 percent had inner speech, 12 percent contained feeling fact of body, while
sensory awareness, just doing, and no experience were each involved in six percent of the
samples. Multiple awareness also characterized six percent of the samples.
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Table 4
Percentages of characteristics in Dolly’s samples of inner experience
Characteristic
Percentage
Feeling
26
Feeling Fact of Body
12
Inner Speech
18
Just Doing
6
No Experience
6
Sensory Awareness
6
Unsymbolized Thinking
50
Multiple Awareness
6
Number of samples
17
Total number of characteristicsa
16.5
Characteristics per sample
0.97
a
Total number of characteristics excludes categories that are not directly
experienced (in this case, Feeling Fact of Body, Just Doing, No Inner
Experience, and Multiple Awareness), and counts uncertain instances
as .5

As in Tables 1 through 3, the “Percentage” column of Table 4 refers to the percentage
of samples that contained each of the form categories. Forms that appeared to be
ambiguously between two categories were counted as .5 in each category. For example,
in beep 1.2 below, it is unclear if the experience is an instance of unsymbolized thinking
or a feeling. Therefore, this sample was counted as .5 unsymbolized thinking and .5
feeling. Also, if there was substantial skepticism that a certain experience was present
right at the moment of the beep the form of that experience was scored as .5 as well.

Unsymbolized Thinking
Dolly’s most common experience was unsymbolized thinking. Unsymbolized
thinking was present in 50 percent of Dolly’s samples. Below is an example of one of
Dolly’s unsymbolized thoughts:
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Beep 3.2 – Dolly was sitting at the computer doing research on video cameras she was
considering buying. She was looking at different models of cameras on her computer
screen. At the moment of the beep, Dolly was wondering what camera to buy. This was
a mental process that contained no words or images. She was also aware of what was on
the computer screen.
Dolly had three instances where it was not clear if she was experiencing an
unsymbolized thought or a feeling. Here is an example of one of those instances:
Beep 1.2 – Dolly was using color blocks on a piece of paper to work on her brochure. At
the moment of the beep, she was thinking why making the brochure was so hard today
and was experiencing frustration. She does not think there were words associated with
this experience but was not entirely sure. This was more of a mental experience than a
physical feeling.

Inner Speech
Dolly had inner speech in 18 percent of her samples. Here is an example that also
includes a feeling:
Beep 2.1 – Dolly was sitting outside drinking coffee. At the moment of the beep, she
was innerly saying “I enjoy the outside quiet.” This inner speaking had the same
characteristics as external speech. The beep sounded right after the word “quiet.” Dolly
was also enjoying the external quiet as well as the internal quiet at the moment of the
beep, but it was difficult to say how this enjoyment took place. She also said she was
experiencing inner quiet although she was speaking to herself; even so, she understood
this inner speaking to be somehow quieter than her inner chatter had been earlier.
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Feelings
Dolly had one, possibly two experiences of feeling in addition to the three that were
not clearly a feeling or an unsymbolized thought. Here is the one clear example of a
feeling:
Beep 1.1 – Dolly was on her computer, working on designing a brochure. At the moment
of the beep, she was feeling frustrated: she did not like the design although she had been
working on it for a long time, and would have to change it again. This frustration was
experienced as a pressure that pushed inward in the middle of her torso below her heart.
This was a somewhat intense emotional experience.
The uncertainty in the second occurrence is because Dolly was not certain if the
experience was at the moment of the beep or not.

Other Forms of Awareness
Dolly also had two instances of feeling fact of body, one sensory awareness, one just
doing, one sample with no inner experience, and one instance of multiple awareness.

Discussion
Samples from the first sampling day
Although the first day of DES is typically not counted, Dolly was fairly adept at
narrowing her focus to the moment of the beep and reliably describing her inner
experience on the first day of sampling. However, Dolly did have some inconsistencies
and presuppositions during her first day, so although her first day has been included in
the discussion thus far and in the table above, there is reason for some skepticism.
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However, the difference between an analysis that includes the first day and an analysis
that excludes the first day is not large. The only notable differences are that three of
Dolly’s seven clear instances of unsymbolized thought occurred on day one and two of
the three experiences that were between an unsymbolized thought and a feeling occurred
on day one. If day one were to be excluded, her percentage of unsymbolized thought
would move from 50 percent to 27 percent and the percentage of feelings would move
from 26 percent to 14 percent.
Conclusion
Perhaps the most important aspect of Dolly’s experience is that it was fairly clear and
substantially varied. Dolly also was able to perform the DES task well, even on the first
day. Overall, her inner experience and ability to perform the task was similar to that of
young adults.
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CHAPTER 8

UNIMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “ELLEN”
Ellen was a 68 year-old woman. She contacted the researchers after reading about the
study in a Las Vegas newspaper. She was not familiar with the DES procedure prior to
the study. She received 30 out of 30 on the MMSE which does not indicate the presence
of cognitive impairment.
On Ellen’s first sampling day she, like many other first-day participants of any age,
had apparently not adopted a careful understanding of “the moment of the beep.” This
was evidenced by Ellen’s difficulties discussing the form of her experience in her
samples as well as her uncertainty about the actual content of her experience at the
moment of the beep. She was also contradictory at times during her reports and was
often unsure if what she was describing was at the moment of the beep, before the
moment of the beep, or after the moment of the beep. Therefore, samples from this day
will not be analyzed.
Ellen improved during her second sampling day, but she still had substantial
difficulty. Her ability to focus on the moment of the beep and to understand what is
meant by inner experience improved, but her focus was still not entirely clear. For
example, she was uncertain at times when exactly the beep came in her awareness and
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often tried to resort to logic to determine when the beep sounded. Furthermore, Ellen
changed her responses dramatically on at least two occasions.
Ellen continued to struggle somewhat throughout her six days of sampling. She
became less contradictory as time went on, but continued to have persistent difficulty
with questions about form. She periodically seemed disorganized in general and in her
responses to the beep. It is also notable that she routinely became frustrated with the
detailed nature of the interviewers’ questions, which she expressed directly. She also
stated on one occasion that she felt as if the interviewers did not believe her due to their
persistent questioning. Overall, all of Ellen’s 21 beeps from day two to day six will be
analyzed, except for beep 6.4, which Ellen did not respond to. Many of these beeps
involved contradictions or substantial changes during the course of the description of the
beep. Therefore, additional skepticism is needed for many of Ellen’s samples. Below are
examples from early in the interview process and on the last day that demonstrate both
Ellen’s improvements and continued uncertainty even on the last day of sampling:
Beep 2.3 – Ellen was sorting through a number of papers related to a car she had
purchased. She was searching for a particular piece of paper and was looking at a sales
slip. It was difficult to pinpoint Ellen’s experience at the moment of the beep. At first
she stated that she was worried and that there was tension in her upper body, but she
could not state where. She then thought that this worry was in her head, experienced as
tightness behind her eyes. She later said that she may have been somehow experiencing
tension, but this was not in her awareness at the moment of the beep. She stated at this
point that what was in her awareness was that it was not self-evident that this was the
paper that she needed, that she was frustrated with herself and concerned that she would
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have to continue searching. She reported that there were no words or images in this
experience. At this point, Ellen was very frustrated by the questioning process.
Therefore, questioning about this beep was stopped. A clear understanding of Ellen’s
experience at this beep could not be discerned. Beep 2.3 was scored as a possible feeling
or unsymbolized thought.
Beep 6.1 – Ellen was driving, but apparently little or no attention was devoted to this
task. At the moment of the beep she was thinking, “I think I would call myself a liberal
democrat.” At first, Ellen could not discern whether or not this thought was in words;
perhaps “a liberal democrat” was in words but the rest of the thought was not.
Eventually, Ellen believed that the entire sentence was present in words, but these words
were not heard or spoken and all the words were in her awareness simultaneously rather
than being spoken in a sequence. Although Ellen was certain of this by the end, her
initial uncertainty leaves room for skepticism. Beep 6.1 was scored as a possible worded
thinking and a possible inner speech.
As best could be ascertained given the uncertainty about her samples, Ellen’s primary
form of experience was unsymbolized thinking, present in 69 percent of her samples as
shown in Table 5. Other forms of experience were feelings (18 percent), inner speech
(14 percent), inner seeing (11 percent), worded thinking (7 percent), feeling fact of body
(5 percent), imageless seeing and inner hearing (1 percent each). Multiple awareness was
present in 24 percent of Ellen’s samples.
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Table 5
Percentages of characteristics in Ellen’s samples of inner experience
Characteristic
Percentage
Feeling
18
Feeling Fact of Body
5
Imageless Seeing
1
Inner Hearing
1
Inner Seeing
11
Inner Speech
14
Unsymbolized Thinking
69
Worded Thinking
7
Multiple Awareness
24
Number of samples
21
Total number of characteristicsa
33.5
Characteristics per sample
1.60
a
Total number of characteristics excludes categories that are not directly
experienced (in this case, Feeling Fact of Body and Multiple
Awareness), and counts uncertain instances as .5 or .33.

Like Tables 1 through 4, the “Percentage” column of Table 5 refers to the percentage
of samples that contained each of the form categories. Forms that appeared to be
ambiguously between two categories were counted as .5 in each category. Forms that
were ambiguously between three categories were counted as .33. Also, if there was
substantial skepticism that the form of experience was actually present at the moment of
the beep then the experience was also counted as .5.
Some experiences may have appeared ambiguously between two or three forms of
experience because Ellen had difficulty accessing her experience. That is, some of these
experiences may not represent an actual ambiguity between or among forms of
experience, but when forced to code these experiences the most accurate way is to
represent them as ambiguously between two or three forms as that is the best that could
be discerned from her descriptions. Here is an example of one of the three instances that
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Ellen’s experience was coded as three possible forms of experience (unsymbolized
thinking, inner speech, and inner hearing):
Beep 5.6 – Ellen was watching Jeopardy. The question involved a novelist from
Minnesota. At the moment of the beep, Ellen was trying to think of the novelist from
Minnesota. At first, Ellen said she was thinking the words “novelist from Minnesota,”
but she had some difficulty describing the nature of this experience. She was not sure if
she was hearing the words or saying the words internally; then she was not certain if the
words were present at all; she later said that she was saying the words to herself. Due to
Ellen’s difficulty accessing her experience additional skepticism is needed for this
sample.

Unsymbolized Thinking
Unsymbolized thinking appeared to be present in 69 percent of Ellen’s samples, by far
the most common form of experience for her. There were 12 of 21 samples where it
appeared likely that unsymbolized thinking was present at the moment of the beep. Here
is an example where an unsymbolized thought was likely present at the moment of the
beep:
Beep 6.3 – Ellen was having a conversation on the phone with her friend Jane. Jane had
just said something regarding a 14.99 percent interest rate. At the moment of the beep,
Ellen was thinking that 14.99 for a couple of hundred of dollars does not sound right.
There were no words in this experience. This experience was a process of inner
calculation.
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Ellen may also have been experiencing unsymbolized thinking on six other occasions,
but either her uncertainty or lack of reliability in her report was substantial enough to
warrant significant skepticism. Beep 2.3 above where Ellen was searching for paperwork
regarding her car is an example of one of these ambiguous instances.

Difficulty Apprehending Experience
Ellen had substantial difficulty apprehending her experience throughout sampling.
Difficulty apprehending experience was present on 13 of 21 samples with the possibility
of an additional four samples. If the uncertain instances are counted as .5, Ellen had
difficulty apprehending experience on 71 percent of her samples. Difficulty
apprehending experience was present in all of the samples presented above except for
beep 6.3, where Ellen was unquestionably internally calculating. Here is an example
where it was not clear if Ellen had difficulty apprehending her experience.
Beep 6.2 – Ellen was listening to the McNeil report on the radio and looking at a tote
bag. At the moment of the beep, Ellen was wondering if she dropped her eraser upstairs
where she stores her tote bag. This wondering did not contain words. Ellen was also
visualizing the spot where she leaves her tote bag. She was innerly seeing the bottom
part of the corner of her bedroom wall and part of the floor. She may also have been
innerly seeing the tote bag leaning against that wall, but was not sure. She saw
something against the wall, but it was not very vivid. The entire inner seeing was dark
and unclear. The thought seemed to have started before the inner seeing, and then
continued so that both thought and inner seeing were present at the moment of the beep.
This example is considered not clear because although Ellen is convincing that she was
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experiencing an inner seeing at the moment of the beep she had some uncertainty about
one of the substantial details of the inner seeing (i.e., the presence of the tote bag).

Symbols
Symbols (i.e.,, words or images) occurred possibly in 7 out of 21 samples. However,
every time a symbol may have been present, there was substantial reason for skepticism.
Ellen reported a possible four inner speakings. However, in all of these situations she
exhibited substantial uncertainty regarding the presence of the experience itself or the
presence of the actual words in the experience. Ellen reported three possible inner
seeings. In two of these, Ellen had substantial difficulty describing the details of the
inner seeing, and in the other she was very uncertain if there was an inner seeing at all.
Perhaps Ellen’s most certain occurrence of symbolic experience (inner speech) occurred
in beep 6.1 above where she was thinking the words “liberal democrat” but even then it
was uncertain if the experience was actually in words.

Content Themes
One theme that ran through many of Ellen’s samples was negative or anxious content.
This content was sometimes in the form of a feeling, but often seemed to be more
accurately characterized as unsymbolized thinking. She was judged to have experienced
annoyance in two samples directly. In one sample she was annoyed but this was not
directly in her awareness. She also had experiences of worry, frustration, angst,
insecurity, self-consciousness, and self-criticism. Overall, these experiences were present
consciously in 8 of the 21 samples and were present once where it was not directly
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apprehended. Below is one example of self-criticalness and one of annoyance,
respectively:
Beep 3.3 – Ellen was backing out of a parking space in a parking lot. Another car was
going to pass her, driving toward her from her right. She was looking at this car. Ellen
initially stated that at the moment of the beep, she was determining if she should wait or
pull out, but she wavered in her certainty as to the existence of this experience at the
moment of the beep. She also said that she was judging or criticizing herself, telling
herself to just make a decision as to whether to pull out or not and to quit dawdling. She
stated that this self-judging was automatic and that there were no words in any of these
experiences. The only aspects of this beep that Ellen seemed confident in were the actual
external events occurring at the beep and that there were no words in her experience at
this beep. Ellen went back and forth in her descriptions of what was in her awareness at
the moment of the beep. This raises skepticism about any and all of the specific contents
reported at the moment of this beep.
Beep 5.5 – Ellen’s dog was whining. At the moment of the beep, Ellen was feeling quite
strongly irritated about the dog being spoiled. Ellen initially said that this irritation was
throughout her body, but later said that it was more mental than physical. She was also
trying to decide if she should get the dog a treat. There were no words or images in this
experience. The irritation had begun before she considered getting the dog a treat, but
both were present at the moment of the beep. Although the exact form of the irritation is
uncertain it appeared that Ellen was somehow experiencing irritation at the moment of
the beep.
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Discussion
Perhaps the most notable aspect of Ellen’s experience with DES is that she had
substantial difficulty apprehending her experience, especially the forms of her
experience. She did not evidence general difficulty with communication and received a
perfect score on the MMSE. However, when describing her beeps Ellen often appeared
to be having substantial difficulty and seemed disorganized and frustrated at times when
describing her inner experience (evidenced by her frequent contradictions), but this was
not evident when speaking with her casually.
Ellen’s difficulty apprehending her experience could be due to many factors:
1. Ellen’s inner experience is somewhat undifferentiated and/or unclear – It is
possible that Ellen’s experience is such that it is so diffuse and/or unclear that it is
difficult to determine exactly what is occurring at the moment of the beep. Evidence for
this exists in the fact that Ellen often wavered on her descriptions of her experience,
especially regarding form and was clearly frustrated throughout the interviewing process.
It is possible that there is no clear form in Ellen’s experience, and, at times, no clear
content. This appears to be the most likely candidate for Ellen’s difficulties.
2. Ellen’s lack of symbols in her inner experience makes it difficult to describe –
Participants often have difficulty describing unsymbolized thought early in the
interviewing process, but typically improve over the course of the DES process. It is
possible that Ellen has predominately, if not entirely, unsymbolized thought, but for some
reason did not benefit from training in describing this experience. However, because
Ellen exhibited no other cognitive deficiency and participants typically benefit from
training, this is not a likely candidate.
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3. Ellen does not have adequate ability to introspect – Ellen’s frustration and her nonverbal behavior suggested that it was very difficult for her to go through the interviewing
process. This may be due to a decreased ability to introspect, and hence increased
frustration, effort, and difficulty describing her experience. However, because Ellen did
not exhibit any particular difficulties in higher-order thinking, as might be present in
someone who could not introspect adequately, this appears to not be a strong explanation.
4. Ellen cannot focus on the moment of the beep – Ellen’s contradictions suggest that
she may not be able to narrow her experience down to a single moment. This may cause
a difficulty in describing experience. Forms of experience may change over a period of
time. If Ellen is reporting on a longer period of time (say, a few seconds for example)
and is experiencing many forms of experience during this time, this may make her
experience difficult to describe. However, Ellen did not exhibit any problems with
attention either informally or on the MMSE, so this is not very likely.
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CHAPTER 9

UNIMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “FAY”
Fay was a 70 year-old woman with a Bachelor’s degree in political science. She
contacted the researchers after reading about the study in a local newspaper. Fay was not
familiar with the DES procedure prior to the study. She had no psychiatric diagnosis at
the time of the study. She received a perfect score of 30 on the MMSE which does not
indicate the presence of cognitive impairment.
Fay’s first day of sampling was very difficult. She had more trouble than most
describing her inner experience although she appeared to have adequate intellectual
ability. She was very easily led by the interviewers and often changed and contradicted
her reports as the interview continued. She also had difficulty reporting her inner
experience rather than external circumstances that may have been related to her inner
experience. For example, in Beep 1.1, she stated that she was thinking about a church.
When queried further, Fay repeatedly referred to the church itself and why it had been
closed rather than reporting her inner experience. This pattern repeated itself throughout
each of the beeps on the first day.
Similar difficulties occurred during the second sampling day, although they appeared,
perhaps, to have lessened somewhat. Fay’s conception of the moment of the beep
appeared to shorten slightly, but was still substantially larger than what DES defines as
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the “moment” of the beep. Fay also was better able to discuss her inner experience more
efficiently with fewer intrusions of discussions of external reality, although this was still
a problem. Fay also had difficulty operating the beeper. Some of her samples on this
day were caused by her turning the beeper on and off, causing it to beep. Below is an
example of a sample from day two that was obtained via proper DES procedure:
Beep 2.1 – Fay was at her rental property. She reported having three experiences at or
near the moment of the beep. She frequently wavered regarding which of the three
components was in her awareness. Fay reported that she was innerly seeing herself
holding a broom and moving from the front door of her property toward a dust bin. This
seeing reportedly contained movement. However, Fay was not sure of the viewpoint
from which the seeing was being perceived, making the interviewers skeptical about
whether an actual inner seeing was involved. Fay also reported that at or near the
moment of the beep she was innerly seeing a property manager whom she had not hired.
The inner seeing reportedly was of her face, from the front, in color with medium clarity.
The face was expressionless. Finally, Fay stated that she was innerly seeing the property
manger she had hired. This was reportedly a full-body image from the front.
Throughout this beep, Fay gave clues to suggest that she may be describing reality
rather than her actual experience. For example, when asked if the two images of the
property managers were separate or on top of one another she said “They’re separate.
They probably don’t even know each other.” As a result, the interviewers were not
confident about determining whether Fay was experiencing three, two, one, or no inner
seeings at the moment of the beep.
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Although Fay appeared to be adequately intelligent (evidenced by her eloquence and
substantial vocabulary), she continued to have substantial difficulty focusing on the
moment of the beep and describing her inner experience during the third and fourth days
of sampling. During discussion of every beep on days three and four, Fay described long
conversations that were either imagined or remembered (in her inner world or part of her
inner experience) as well as real conversations. She could not describe at all where in the
conversations she was at the moment of each beep although the question “what was in
your awareness at the moment of the beep” was posed numerous times in a variety of
ways. When Fay was prompted to describe only the moment of the beep she would
invariably describe entire conversations rather than a moment within that conversation.
Likewise, Fay was repeatedly told that the interviewers were only interested in her inner
experience rather than background information or facts of reality. Still, Fay would nearly
always describe facts of reality and background information in conjunction with events
that were in her awareness. This made it extremely difficult to ascertain what Fay’s
experience was at any of the beeps on the third and fourth days.
On day five, the standard DES procedure was altered and Fay was interviewed
immediately after the beep in an attempt to minimize any potential interference that
memory disturbances may have played in Fay’s difficulty with the DES process. The
investigators stayed in a back bedroom of Fay’s house while she wore the beeper and
went about her activities in the rest of the house. When the beep sounded, she came
immediately to the researchers and the expositional interview was conducted on the spot.
This procedure seemed to help reduce slightly Fay’s reference to external reality when
describing her inner experience, but it did not eliminate it entirely. Fay continued to have
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difficulty describing the form of her inner experience. Also, her descriptions continued
to be contradictory at times. Below is a sample from day five:
Beep 5.3 – Fay was playing Scrabble on her computer and at the moment of the beep Fay
apparently somehow thinking about the word “slotter.” Fay’s descriptions of this thought
process were inconsistent, so it is impossible to know exactly what was in her awareness
at the moment of the beep, but the general idea was wondering whether or not “slotter”
was a word; that she would play it and find out whether or not the computer would reject
it or not; that she could remember that the word had been played in some past Scrabble
game, but she couldn’t remember the outcome of the protest. These sub-thoughts may
have all been parts of the same thought process that were all present at the moment of the
beep, or they may have been explicit thoughts that were in the vicinity of the beep but not
simultaneous, or they may have been ways of describing her activity, none or which was
actually present in her experience at the moment of the beep. The interviewers pressed
her on those issues. For example, the interviewers asked twice if there were words in her
experience at the moment of the beep and both times she described external reality (i.e.,
the words on the Scrabble board and that she didn’t know if “slotter” was a word or not)
instead of answering directly about her experience. Thus Fay’s reports of her experience
seemed discursive or wandering; however, there did seem to be limits on how far that
wandering could go. For example, Fay confidently and believably said that she was not,
at the moment of the beep, thinking of other computer Scrabble systems and their ways of
responding to incorrect words, but may have been thinking about that near the beep. This
may be evidence that Fay has some reliable access to her experience at the moment of the
beep. However, the investigators’ overall impression was that Fay did not, even when
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interviewed immediately after the beep, distinguish adequately between what was in
experience at the moment of the beep and what were the characteristics of the situation
surrounding her at the moment of the beep.

Discussion
It appears that none of Fay’s samples can be considered reliable due to her substantial
inconsistency, seeming inability to focus on the moment of the beep, and reliance on
external reality throughout the sampling process. This unreliability continued even when
the retrospection of the sampling procedure was minimized as much as possible—
conducting the expositional interviews within a minute of the beep. There are many
possibilities for Fay’s difficulties:
1. Fay has undifferentiated inner experience - Fay reported throughout the DES
process that she was having many possible inner experiences at the moment of the beep.
Although this may signify an inability to focus on the moment of the beep, it may signify
undifferentiated experience. That is, Fay may have a vast array of content in her inner
experience at any given time that does not occur in temporal order. This may make it
difficult to express exactly what was in her experience because so much was in her
experience, especially if her experience is predominately non-symbolic. Given Fay’s
overall command of language and seemingly high intelligence, this appears to be a likely
candidate.
2. Fay lacks inner experience or has no inner experience – If Fay has no inner
experience or very little inner experience she may rely on discussions of external reality
and may not fully understand the DES procedure, as the target of DES is inner
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experience, something that she may not have. It is common that individuals with no
inner experience, rather than reporting that they have no inner experience instead discuss
external reality rather than internal experience, as Fay did. Individuals that seemingly
have no inner experience are also often inconsistent, as Fay was. This suggests that no
inner experience is a fairly strong possibility in Fay’s case.
3. Fay cannot introspect – Evidence for this hypothesis can be found throughout Fay’s
descriptions. In nearly every sample, she spoke more about external reality than inner
experience. If she cannot introspect, then she could not describe inner experience.
Skepticism for this lies in the fact that Fay did not exhibit any other deficiencies in
cognitive or social abilities, other than somewhat diminished eye contact. This is still
certainly a possibility, but does not appear as likely as some others.
4. Fay does not have the cognitive abilities to focus on the moment of the beep – It
did not appear that Fay could narrow the window of her inner experience to a discreet
moment, evidenced by her continued discussion of events that happened vaguely near the
beep and the vast array of content she discussed at each sample. Fay did not appear to
have difficulties with attention or other cognitive abilities, however. She scored 30 on
the MMSE; she has and uses a wonderful vocabulary, and evidences a mastery of skills
both in real life (she manages several properties) and in recreation (she successfully plays
competitive Scrabble). So a general cognitive deficit seems unlikely.
5. Fay has rigid pre-suppositions about what inner experience is – Evidence for this
hypothesis is shown throughout the interviews as the nature of Fay’s descriptions
changed very little from the first day to the fifth day, which is somewhat unusual as
participants become trained in the DES process. Fay did not exhibit any rigidity in any
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other way, however, and does not seem to have difficulty learning in any other area.
Therefore, this possibility is unlikely.
6. Fay actually experiences entire conversations in a moment – Many of Fay’s beeps
revolved around the inner experience of conversations. She could never pinpoint the
exact point in the conversation that she was experiencing. However, the fact that Fay
seemed to not distinguish very well between internal experience and external reality
suggest that there is much more involved than simply unusual inner experience in Fay’s
case. Therefore, this possibility is somewhat unlikely.
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CHAPTER10

IMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “GARY”
Gary was a 70 year-old male with a diagnosis of Vascular Dementia (VaD), which he
received in 2003. He received a score of 29 on the MMSE, missing only one item in the
recall section which suggests that he has little or no cognitive impairment. He was
recruited from a local support group. Gary was not familiar with the DES procedure
prior to sampling. During the initial interview, after the initial introduction and
explanation of the DES task, Gary was given a “practice beep:” he was given the beeper
that was set to beep within 10 minutes after being set. He was instructed to wear the
beeper and walk, with his wife who had accompanied him to the interview, the 100 yards
to the University Student Union and have a cup of coffee; when it beeped, he was to
respond as instructed and return to the interview site. He followed those instructions
adequately, and his performance in the interview seemed to indicate that he understood at
least preliminarily what was asked of him. However, because Gary was new to the
procedure and this beep was for purposes of training only, the contents of the beep will
not be analyzed. The first real sampling day and its interview were scheduled for the
following week.
When Gary arrived for the first interview, he reported that he had forgotten to bring
his notes about the beeps to the first interviewing day. Gary’s wife reported that Gary had
had a small stroke between the initial training day and the first day of interviewing. She
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stated that he had “really gone down hill” but that we probably would not notice
anything. Eventually, it was determined that Gary had not had a stroke, but had had a
transient ischemic attack (TIA). A TIA is a cerebrovascular event that occurs when
blood flow to part of the brain is blocked temporarily. Although an individual may
experience stroke-like symptoms, blood flow eventually returns and there is no
permanent damage to the brain (Weigh et al., 1999). For training purposes, we
interviewed Gary about the beeped experiences as best he could remember them.
Because these beeped experiences were not discussed in the standard manner, they were
not be included in the analysis.
For sampling day two, Gary had some difficulty operating the beeper. He had
apparently missed a beep and confused the battery-saving “chirps” with beeps. He also
had some difficulty understanding what was meant exactly by “inner experience” and
“moment of the beep.” He had collected two beeps the morning of the interview and two
beeps two days prior to the interview. Therefore, this interview was again used only for
training purposes.
Gary substantially improved his undertaking of the DES process for the third
interview day: he remembered his notebook, and was responding to beeps, not chirps.
Therefore, beeps will be analyzed starting with this day (day three) and will go through
day six for a total of 18 beeps.
Gary’s responses throughout the interviews included frequent generalizations. For
example, when asked about his at-the-moment-of-the-beep experience, he frequently
used phrases like “I usually…” and “In general…” Such locutions frequently signal that
the participant is not describing actual beeped experience, and thus skepticism about his
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reports may be warranted. In such cases, the interviewers took great care to try to focus
Gary on the moment of the beep rather than on generalizations. This rarely, if ever,
changed Gary’s descriptions of the experience at each beep; that is, he dropped the use of
the phrases “I usually...” and “in general” and averred that the description adequately
conveyed the beeped experience. We eventually came to believe that it is likely that
Gary’s “I usually…” and “in general” reflected simply a style of communication rather
than a suggestion that he was indeed generalizing. That is, we came to believe that his
descriptions usually conveyed his experience at the moment of the beep although some
additional skepticism was warranted in certain instances.
As shown in Table 6 below Gary had a fairly wide range of experiences. Worded
thinking was the most common form of experience and was present in 69 percent of his
samples. Other experienced forms were inner seeings (22 percent), feelings (14 percent),
unsymbolized thinking (8 percent), and sensory awareness (6 percent). Multiple
awareness was present in 24 percent of Gary’s samples.

Table 6
Percentages of characteristics in Gary’s samples of inner experience
Characteristic
Percentage
Feeling
14
Inner Seeing
22
Sensory Awareness
6
Unsymbolized Thinking
8
Worded Thinking
69
Multiple Awareness
24
Number of samples
18
a
Total number of characteristics
23
Characteristics per sample
1.28
a
Total number of characteristics excludes categories that are not directly
experienced (in this case, Multiple Awareness), and counts uncertain
instances as .5
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As in Tables 1 through 5, the “Percentage” column in Table 6 refers to the percentage
of samples that contained each of the form categories. Forms that appeared to be
ambiguously between two categories were counted as .5 in each category. Also, if it was
not clear if a certain experience was present at the moment of the beep it was also
counted as .5.

Worded Thinking
By far the most common characteristic of experience for Gary was a verbal inner
experience that somehow had no auditory qualities that resembled worded thinking. This
type of experience was present in 69 percent of Gary’s samples. These experiences
typically contained some qualities of speech, such as words appearing sequentially, with
pauses and inflections at appropriate places, but the words were not innerly heard nor
innerly spoken. Nevertheless, the words were clearly present to Gary. Although this
experience involved a stream or sequence of specific words, Gary could often not
pinpoint the exact word that was in his awareness at the moment of the beep (that is
frequently true as well for those who experience clear inner speaking). Sometimes there
was a visual quality to this verbal experience, as if Gary were seeing the words, usually
moving left to right. The worded part of the experience also typically occurred slightly
faster than the rate in which words are normally spoken. Here are some examples of this
type of experience:
Beep 3.1 – Gary was at home reading the newspaper. He had just turned to a page with
an article about a pastry chef with an accompanying photograph and had just read the
caption to the photo. At the moment of the beep, Gary was wondering if his daughter’s
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roommate knew the pastry chef and if she had worked with him. This thought was in
words, but had no auditory qualities. This worded experience started with “I wonder if,”
but Gary was not sure of the exact words after this introduction, although he was certain
of the subject of the experience. The thought was experienced very quickly (less than a
second) and was almost simultaneous with the beep (Gary could not discern whether it
occurred a moment before, a moment after, or at the exact time of the beep).
Beep 4.2 – Gary was gathering things that he needed to leave his house and was talking
to his wife Alice. At the moment of the beep, Gary was wondering if he had everything
that he needed to leave, if Alice had everything she needed to leave, and was thinking
about a doctor to whom he owed money. These thoughts were in words, perhaps
somewhat like speech but with no auditory component, and were faster than regular
speech, but also perhaps somewhat visual. The sentences seemed to interrupt each other,
and the entire rate might have been a bit faster. For example, before Gary could complete
thinking “Do I have everything I need?” another thought, such as, “Does Alice have what
she needs?” would interrupt the first thought. Then a third, also worded, thought would
interrupt the second before it had completed, and so on. The impression was of a jumble
of thoughts, all of which were incomplete.
Beep 5.1 – Gary was eating breakfast and reading a newspaper article about the
possibility of deleting the motto “In God We Trust” from U.S. currency. At the moment
of the beep, Gary was thinking something very similar to, “How are other people and
religions going to react to this newspaper article?” There were words present in this
experience but there was no auditory quality to the experience, although the experience
did have aspects of speech (such as the question mark at the end being implicit in the
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experienced word), the words were sequential, but a bit faster than if actually spoken.
This aspect of Gary’s experience compromised about half of his awareness. The other
half was the actual article that Gary was reading and comprehending.
At times, Gary’s worded experience was more visual than at other times. The
visualness of Gary’s worded experience seemed to fall on a continuum where at times it
was not visual at all (the above beeps, for example) and at other times it was substantially
visual. Below is an example of two somewhat visual worded experiences (occurring
simultaneously with an inner seeing) that fall somewhere in the middle of the continuum:
Beep 6.1 – Gary was at home eating breakfast. At the moment of the beep, Gary was
having three simultaneous experiences. One of these experiences was wondering if
people he knows are affected by the fires in southern California. This was experienced as
innerly seeing a neighborhood that he knows and has been to in California; this area is
seen to be in flames. He is not sure what specific neighborhood he was innerly seeing,
but the houses in the inner seeing were familiar and it was a specific place that he has
been. He was confident that the neighborhood was not actually affected by the fire; that
is, he was representing the California fires by imaging a familiar California neighborhood
and superimposing the flames. The inner seeing was fairly clear, in color, and there was
motion in the picture (i.e., the flames were moving). The second experience was feeling
bad for the people in the fire. This experience clearly involved words, although Gary
could not recall the exact words during the interview. There was no auditory quality to
the words. These words were occurring a bit faster than speech and seemed somehow to
move from left to right. There also may have been some visual quality to the words, but
the exact nature of this visual quality was difficult to discern. The third experience was
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wondering if the beeper was going to sound while he was thinking about the fire. This
was experienced as words, but with no auditory quality. The words were moving a bit
faster than actual speech, the words may have been moving left to right somehow, and
there may have been a visual quality to the experience, but Gary was not certain of this.
This was also a thought process similar to previous beeps. Thus there were two worded
experiences occurring simultaneously during this sample. All three of these experiences
were equally present in his awareness.
The following is a summary of Gary’s most visual worded experience accompanied
by an inner seeing:
Beep 6.3 – Gary was attending a support group and was talking about coin collections.
At the moment of the beep, Gary was innerly seeing a coin book that he owns. There was
little detail to this inner seeing, and the inner seeing was out of focus. Gary could discern
that the book was open and almost white in color. The coins were not very detailed and
looked like round disks that were a little darker than the book. There were about 45 coins
that he was innerly seeing in his experience. He could also see about five empty holes in
the book that did not have coins. These holes were a bit darker than the book and coins.
This inner seeing filled his visual field. Gary was also seeing words scroll across the
middle of the inner seeing. The words were something very similar to “when am I going
to get the rest of the quarters that are being issued this year?” These words were in focus.
The words were similar to the words that scroll at the bottom of some television news
channels, but were vertically in the middle of his image and were moving faster. The
verbal part of this experience was similar to previous beeps in that the words did not have
an auditory quality, moved faster than normal speech, and moved from left to right.
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However, the worded part of this experience was clearly visual and the words were
clearly seen moving from left to right when others were typically more vaguely visual.

Inner Seeing
Gary experienced inner seeing on 22 percent of his samples. Six of Gary’s samples
potentially had occurrences of inner seeing, however only two of these were clear and
convincing. The other four inner seeings were present on day five and all occurred while
working on a crossword puzzle. All four of these inner seeings lacked substantial detail
which is grounds for increased skepticism. Below are two examples from day five:
Beep 5.2 – Gary was eating breakfast and just beginning a crossword puzzle. Gary was
thinking of words that could go in the crossword puzzle, specifically in the “1 Across”
and “1 Down” section. At the moment of the beep, Gary was imaginarily seeing words
for both “1 Across” and “1 Down” superimposed on the blank crossword puzzle he was
actually looking at. At the time of the expositional interview, he could not recall what the
words were, but he seemed to indicate that he could have written them down had he
known the interviewers wanted that detail. The imaginarily seen words were in capital
block letters as if he had written them. He was not focused on the entire puzzle, just the
upper left corner where “1 Across” and “1 Down” were. Gary’s lack of detail (i.e., which
words he was imagining) suggests that there should be some skepticism regarding the
accuracy of Gary’s report at this beep.
Beep 5.3 – Gary was again working on a crossword puzzle. He had completed some of
the puzzle, but was now going back and trying to fill in the blank spaces. At the moment
of the beep, Gary was imagining a word superimposed on the crossword. He was
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envisioning one word in the middle of the puzzle.

He was not sure what the word was

or if it was going across or down. Gary’s lack of detail in describing this beep is grounds
for some additional skepticism.

Feelings
Gary experienced feelings on 14 percent of his samples. Here is a summary of his
clearest experience of a feeling, coupled with an experience of a worded thought:
Beep 5.4 – Gary was outside of his house checking the landscaping and sprinkler system.
He was checking for wet dirt where water had come out of the sprinkler, signifying that
the sprinkler was working. The dirt was in fact wet in the appropriate areas. At the
moment of the beep, Gary felt relieved that the dirt was wet and the sprinkler system
appeared to be working. This relief was experienced as a tingling on the surface of his
upper torso that included his chest and his back. Also, somehow related to the relief,
Gary was thinking that he was glad the sprinkler worked, that the crew seems to have
done their job properly, and that they set up the system properly. This experience was
similar to past experiences in which Gary was thinking in words that had no auditory
quality.

Unsymbolized Thinking
Gary experienced unsymbolized thinking on eight percent of his samples. Here is his
clearest experience of unsymbolized thinking:
Beep 3.2 – Gary was in the kitchen getting ready to make a bowl of cereal. He was
looking at various boxes of cereal. At the moment of the beep, Gary was trying to
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determine which type of cereal he was going to eat. This was a mental process that did
not contain words or images.

Lack of Variability in Content
Another notable feature of Gary’s experience is that the content of his awareness
often remained the same or similar from across a day’s samples. For example, on day
three, Gary was aware of being late on two occasions (3.3 and 3.5). On day four, Gary
was thinking about his wife’s eye problems or a closely related topic during on four out
of five beeps (4.1, 4.2, 4.4, 4.5). On day five, Gary was aware of a crossword puzzle on
four out of six beeps (5.2, 5.3, 5.5, 5.6).

Discussion
Gary’s non-auditory verbal experiences are rare among other people sampled. It is
difficult to determine for certain why this form of experience is common for Gary. One
possibility that is consistent with a degenerative view of inner experience is that Gary has
lost the ability to have inner experience that is auditory in nature. He may have had
genuine inner speech in the past, but now must experience inner speech with no auditory
component and a substitute visual component. It is also possible that Gary has always
had this form of experience, although it is rare.
Possible evidence for a theory of degeneration of Gary’s experience may also be
present in his inner seeings. When Gary did report an inner seeing, it typically lacked
substantial detail. Furthermore, only one of Gary’s possible six inner seeings was in
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color. The others were in black and white, although four of the inner seeings were related
to crossword puzzles that were black and white in reality.
Gary’s consistency of content across beeps is also unusual. Typically participants
report a high degree of variability in the content of their experience from beep to beep. It
is possible that Gary was fabricating the content of his beeps and did not bother to change
the content on every beep. This seems unlikely as Gary showed no evidence of being
untruthful, although he had a tendency to utilize generalizations at times. For example,
when asked detailed questions about his non-auditory verbal experience he would often
refer to the fact that that is just how he thinks. Another possibility is that this lack of
variability of the content of Gary’s experience may also be due to a degenerative process
associated with his dementia.
Although Gary had some initial difficulties with the DES process and sometimes
spoke in generalizations, his reports of his inner experience starting on day three were
fairly convincing. He exhibited virtually no cognitive impairment, and although some of
his experience lacked details and he was inconsistent in his reports at times, it was fairly
convincing overall that Gary was accurately reporting his actual momentary inner
experience.
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CHAPTER 11

IMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “HENRY”
Henry was a 72 year-old male who was recruited from a support group in Las Vegas,
Nevada. He has a high school diploma and attended college briefly. He was diagnosed
with VaD in 2001 after having a stroke. He obtained a score of 29 on the MMSE, losing
a point on delayed recall, suggesting mild or no cognitive impairment.
Henry was not familiar with the DES process prior to this study. During the initial
meeting, Henry was given a “practice beep” to help familiarize him with the DES
process. He seemed to understand the DES process well from the outset, although he was
led fairly easily by the interviewers regarding the details of his experience. This beep
seemed to contain properties of inner speech; however, because this beep was used for
practice purposes only, it will not be included in analysis.
On the first full sampling day (day one), Henry had substantial difficulty
understanding what was meant by “the moment of the beep.” Henry’s definition of the
moment of the beep seemed to encompass several seconds near the moment of the beep.
He recorded and spoke about what he was doing and experiencing for many seconds
around the beep for all six beeps that were discussed. Therefore, he was not able to
report his experience with the specificity that is required for the DES method to be useful.
He also relied on generalizations about himself and his relationship with his wife when
discussing the beeps and was easily led when given suggestions. During the interview,
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the interviewers’ attempted to refine Henry’s understanding of what is meant by “the
moment of the beep” so that he would hopefully narrow his attention to the precise
moment of the beep for the next sampling. Therefore, the content of the beeps collected
for this day will not be analyzed.
Henry collected beeps the morning of the interview on day two. Prior to the
interview, Henry seemed to be confused about the moment of the beep. He stated that he
now understood that the researchers were interested in the “impact” of the beep (i.e., his
reaction to the beep). The procedure was further explained before the interview began.
The samples from this day were taken with great skepticism and therefore were will not
be analyzed due to Henry’s lack of understanding of the process. Furthermore, Henry
continued to discuss experiences occurring many seconds before and after the beep.
Finally, Henry may have been fabricating his experience at times, for example during
beep 2.5:
Beep 2.5 – Henry was talking to Todd, one of the interviewers, before the interview
began, when the beep sounded through Henry’s earphone. Henry, according to Todd’s
observation, may have been talking about Thanksgiving or what Todd was currently
doing in school. During the subsequent interview, Henry stated that at the moment of the
beep he was saying, “Todd, what are you doing in school?” and that the beep came
between the words “Todd” and “what.” However, although Henry asked Todd about
school, Todd’s recollection is that Henry did not ever ask “Todd, what are you doing in
school?” Henry may also have been aware of being in a happy mood at the moment of
the beep, but he again discussed his general happy mood when asked rather than his
experience at the moment of the beep. When Dr. Hurlburt, the other interviewer,
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inquired whether this mood was experienced bodily and/or mentally, Henry seemed to
agree that it was bodily and mental, as if following Dr. Hurlburt’s suggestion.
Henry collected the beeps from day three on the morning of the interview for day
three. He appeared to have taken few notes and referred to them very little during the
interview. He often changed his reports of his inner experience and was easily led. All of
these factors indicated the need for substantial skepticism and will not be analyzed. Here
is an example from this day:
Beep 3.3 – Henry was at home eating lunch with his wife and they were discussing going
out later that evening with friends. Initially, Henry reported that he was saying “What
clothing are you going to wear?” out loud to his wife, stating that the beep had come
between “you” and “going.” He later stated that he had specific clothing in mind that he
was going to wear and that at the moment of the beep he was asking for approval from
his wife about what he was going to wear that night. It was difficult to discern whether
this was a change in his report about his experience (from being about his wife’s clothing
to being about his own clothing) or whether the question about his wife’s clothing was
actually a part of his consideration of what he should wear. We tried to differentiate
those aspects without success. He also reported a desire to move that was similar to a
previous beep. We asked to see Henry’s notes for this beep; they simply stated “eating
lunch, getting ready for affair for today.”
To increase Henry’s chances of success, the researchers interviewed Henry
immediately after he was beeped on day four. Henry wore the beeper in his home while
the interviewers waited outside. As soon as the beeper sounded Henry came outside and
notified the interviewers and the interview then took place. Nevertheless, Henry
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continued to have difficulty reporting his experience and focusing on the moment of the
beep. It appeared to the researchers that after four sampling days and one practice beep
that Henry was not going to be able to give reliable reports of his inner experience. It
was also clear that Henry was becoming somewhat frustrated with the interviewing
process. For these reasons, sampling with Henry was terminated.

Discussion
There are many possible explanations for why the interviewers could not gather
reliable data from Henry:
1. An obvious difficulty throughout sampling was Henry’s inability to narrow the
moment of the beep to a specific enough time frame to report momentary experience.
This was clearly a challenge for Henry and was certainly a contributing factor to the low
reliability of Henry’s reports. It cannot be determined, however, if this was the sole
reason for Henry’s difficulties.
2. It is also possible that Henry has inner experience but cannot communicate it
properly. It is difficult to discern if this is the case although he did not exhibit any
problems with communication outside of DES. Although Henry did not seem frustrated
at an inability to describe his experience, he was often frustrated at the highly detailed
questions inherent in the DES procedure. He also did not openly state that he could not
describe his experience. It is still possible that Henry used generalizations and
confabulations because these were simpler ways to describe his inner experience.
3. It is possible that Henry could not adequately remember what was occurring at the
moment of the beep. Henry reported no difficulty remembering his inner experience.
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Evidence against this possibility can be seen in the fact that the reliability of Henry’s
reports did not improve even when he was interviewed immediately after receiving
beeps. However, it is possible that Henry’s memory, especially for details, faded so
quickly that immediate interviewing showed no benefits.
4. It is possible that the beep disrupted Henry’s inner experience to the point that he
could not retrieve it. This may help explain why Henry did not improve upon immediate
interviewing after samples.
5. It is possible that Henry does not have inner experience or his inner experience is
unclear and/or undifferentiated. Individuals who do not have inner experience or have
unclear or undifferentiated inner experience often have a range of difficulties similar to
Henry’s. Because Henry appeared to have adequate cognitive abilities to peform the
DES task successfully this appears to be a likely explanation.
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CHAPTER 12

IMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “IRVING”
Irving was a 97-year old male living in an assisted living facility in Pennsylvania.
Although he did not have a diagnosis of dementia, he exhibited some mild memory
impairment during sampling. The interviewer met with Irving approximately 2.5 weeks
prior to the first sampling day to explain the procedure and gain consent. At the
beginning to the first sampling day Irving stated that he remembered who the interviewer
was, but could not remember some of the specifics of the initial meeting. He received an
MMSE score of 27, missing a point each for orientation, attention and calculation, and
recall. This score is indicative of mild cognitive impairment and is well above average for
Irving’s age.
Irving was not familiar with the DES procedure prior to being involved in this study.
He was sampled on 6 days, most of which came within a 2 week period. In total, 24
samples were collected. During the first 3 sampling days, the interviewer waited in the
hall of Irving’s assisted living facility while he wore the beeper in his apartment. When
the beeper sounded, Irving called the interviewer on his phone prompting the interviewer
to walk down the hall to Irving’s room and immediately interview him. During the last 3
sampling days the interviewer remained in Irving’s apartment with him while he wore the
beeper, sometimes sitting quietly and sometimes engaging Irving in conversation while
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he was wearing the beeper (see below). For every beep, Irving was sitting in a chair in
his living room, at times reading the newspaper.
Irving seemed to understand the task very well during the first sampling day. He was
typically confident in his reports and seemed able to distinguish among before, after, and
at the beep. However, during the first day the typical thoroughness of questioning was
lessened slightly as Irving appeared distressed at times with overly detailed questioning.
Also, Irving was given options for answers frequently rather than truly open-ended
questions to help acclimatize him to the procedure and not overwhelm him. This
lessened rigor in the interview procedure and evidence from later days of sampling are
grounds for substantial skepticism regarding Irving’s reports from this day. Here are two
samples from day one:
Beep 1.2 – Irving had just glanced at the newspaper where he had read an article about
the New York governor’s sex scandal. He was not reading the newspaper at the moment
of the beep. Irving stated that at the moment of the beep he was innerly seeing the
governor making his public announcement that he was involved in the scandal and his
wife was standing next to him. Although Irving believed that the governor was talking in
his experience, he was not hearing any words (i.e., his mouth was moving but there was
no sound being made in Irving’s experience). This seeing was exactly the same as the
announcement he had seen the previous evening on television, although it is not clear if
Irving was seeing a television screen in his experience. Irving was confident in his
description of the inner seeing and described many details. For example, the governor
and his wife were viewed slightly to the side, the governor’s wife was on the governor’s
right, he could see the governor from about the bottom of the neck up, he could see his
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wife from about the middle chest up. Irving could not tell what they were wearing,
although the inner seeing was very clear. However, because of the variation in
interviewing for this day and later evidence, this beep should be taken with substantial
skepticism.
Beep 1.4 – Irving was sitting in a chair in his apartment. The previous evening, Irving’s
son and wife had visited him and mentioned that they were having a dinner for him soon
and would invite many people. Irving reported that at the moment of the beep he was
wondering who was going to be at his dinner. This wondering appeared to have no
symbols. Also, within this same experience, Irving was somehow thinking of his son. It
is not certain how his son was present in this experience, but Irving was fairly certain that
his son was in this experience. Irving also may have been remembering his son and wife
visiting the previous night, but he was not certain if this was in his experience and if it
was it was much less prevalent than the wondering. Irving was slightly inconsistent
during the interview for this beep, but once the discussion of what was before, after, and
at the beep occurred, Irving became much more consistent. Nevertheless, Irving’s
account was not very believable when considering the lack of rigor of the interview and
evidence from later sampling days.
Irving seemed to have substantial difficulty on the second sampling day that he did
not exhibit on the previous sampling day even though these sampling days occurred on
consecutive days. He specifically had three consistent difficulties during this sampling
day. First, Irving was not able to limit his focus to the moment of the beep. For all
samples on this day he described what was in his experience at and around the beep but
could not reliably discern exactly what he was experiencing at the beep from what was
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near the beep. Second, Irving consistently described external reality rather than his
experience. Third, Irving was often inconsistent in his descriptions. There appear to be
three possibilities for this change:
1. Irving’s abilities fluctuated from the first to the second sampling day.
2. Irving was over-confident his first sampling day and was not actually reporting his
inner experience very accurately. After receiving some training in truly observing his
inner experience and increasing his awareness of his task, his ability seemingly declined
as his attempts to observe his inner experience became more forthright.
3. The interviewer did not lead/aid Irving as much on the second day. Taking away
this leading had a substantial impact on Irving’s ability to perform the task.
Although option one is possible, options two and three appear much more likely.
Regarding option two, as sampling continued, Irving had a difficult time distinguishing
reality from inner experience and narrowing his focus to the moment of the beep.
Regarding option three, the interviewer aided Irving much less on the second day than the
first, asking more open-ended questions rather than giving Irving multiple options.
Irving also did not respond to the beep on two occasions during the second sampling
day when the interviewer happened to be with him when the beeper sounded. On the first
occasion, the headphone was out of his ear, so he appeared not to hear the beep (and
stated he did not hear the beep when asked). On the second occasion, Irving was talking
when the beep sounded. The interviewer called Irving’s attention to the beep before
Irving was finished talking, so it is not clear if he would have noticed the beep once he
stopped talking. Irving spoke continually throughout the sounding of the beep with very
little pause. The beep was sounding approximately 30 seconds before the interviewer
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notified him. For these reasons, very little could be discovered about Irving’s inner
experience on this day, although a great deal was discovered about his ability to
participate in the DES process. Below is a sample from day two:
Beep 2.2 – When asked about the moment of the beep, Irving said that he was thinking
about a vacation he took with his wife and children many years ago. He then proceeded
to tell a very long story about the actual vacation. When asked again what exactly was in
his awareness at the moment of the beep he said “more or less the first part of the trip.”
When asked if he was thinking about a specific aspect of the first part of the trip at the
moment of the beep he stated that he may have been thinking about the part of the trip
when his son went across a particular state line (the interviewer is not sure which one,
although Irving knew which one it was). Irving stated that this was very close to the
beep, but was not sure if it was exactly at the beep. He then said that he was thinking
more about the excitement of his children during the trip at the moment of the beep. He
stated that the excitement part of his experience and the state line part were close to one
another and occurred close to the beep. Irving was fairly certain that he was not
experiencing any symbols at the moment of the beep. Throughout this beep, Irving
appeared to rely heavily on external reality. It was difficult to determine to what extent
Irving was discussing the actual trip and to what extent he was discussing his inner
experience.
Irving exhibited the same difficulties during day three that he did on day two.
Approximately half an hour after initially setting up the beeper for Irving, he had not yet
called the interviewer in from the hallway. The interviewer went to Irving’s room to
check to make sure nothing was wrong with the beeper or Irving. When the interviewer
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approached Irving the interviewer could hear the beeper sounding. Apparently, the
beeper sounded either just before or after the interviewer entered the room as it sounds
for only one minute. Irving did not respond to the beep. The beep ended very shortly
after the interviewer approached him. Irving gave no indication of being aware that the
beep sounded and the beeper was simply reset by the interviewer.
Irving called the interviewer for the second beep (3.2). Irving stated that at the
moment of the beep he was thinking about seeing Barack Obama’s minister on television
the night before. Irving then went on to discuss the minister himself, what he was
wearing, the effect it will have on Obama in the election, his concern about ending the
war in Iraq, and other issues. When Irving was repeatedly asked what he was
experiencing at the moment of the beep, he was very inconsistent, but always mentioned
something in relation to Obama’s minister or an issue surrounding him. Eventually,
Irving stated that he was uncertain exactly what he was experiencing at the moment of
the beep but that it had something to do with the minister.
Irving did not call the interviewer for beep number three (3.3). The interviewer again
checked on the beeper. Irving was looking at the interviewer as he approached. The
interviewer asked Irving if the beep had sounded and Irving said that it had not. The
interviewer was actually right beside Irving bending down to listen for the beep when it
sounded. Irving stated that he was thinking about a trip he took with his father in 1933
and then explained various details of the trip. The interviewer attempted to make a
distinction between what Irving was experiencing at the moment of the beep and the
reality of the trip. Irving again was not certain exactly what he was experiencing at the
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moment of the beep, but that it had something to do with getting ready to go on the trip.
He was again unable to describe the form of his experience.
It appeared at this point that there was the possibility that Irving was creating stories
about his inner experience rather than actually describing his inner experience despite
repeatedly being instructed to describe inner experience at the moment of the beep. First,
Irving has reported thinking about something substantial at every sampled moment so far
except for beep 1.3 where he reported no inner experience. During this beep, the
interview for 1.2 had just ended and the interviewer was still in the room. Second, it
seems unusual that Irving would have been thinking about a trip with his father from
1933 when he was in the midst of interacting with the interviewer (beep 3.3).
For sampling day four, the interviewer remained in Irving’s apartment with him while
he wore the beeper. For most of this day, the interviewer sat in a chair approximately 12
feet to the left of Irving, but still slightly in front of him. The interviewer may have been
in Irving’s peripheral vision. Irving could easily turn his head to see the interviewer.
Irving notified the interviewer when the beeper sounded. Throughout this sampling day,
Irving sat in a chair in his living room.
Because Irving seemed to be thinking about something substantial at nearly every
beep, the interviewer asked Irving after the interview for beep 4.3 if he was trying to
think of things while wearing the beeper. He stated that he was attempting to think of
things and was instructed that he was not to do so. He was encouraged to simply behave,
both internally and externally, as if he were not wearing the beeper. Irving stated that he
was not attempting to think of anything for beep 4.4. Still, this beep was similar to others
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in that it was very similar to an actual event that had happened in the past and had
substantial content:
Beep 4.4 – Irving reported not attempting to think of anything in particular prior to this
beep. At the moment of the beep Irving was reportedly thinking about a meeting that he
had earlier in the day. The meeting was for residents of his assisted living program.
Irving was innerly seeing a man (Steve) next to him asking a question about a model
cottage in an adjacent facility. Steve was on the right side of the inner seeing while the
man running the meeting was on the left side but in the distance. This was the same
perspective that Irving had in reality. There were other people in the inner seeing that
were attending the meeting but Irving could not describe any details about these people or
how many there were. The inner seeing itself was fairly clear and it was either in black
and white or had very little color. Irving may have also been hearing Steve talking in his
experience. He was talking very loudly, but was difficult to understand (both in real life
and in his experience). Irving was not certain of the exact words Steve was saying.
The interviewer again remained in the room while Irving wore the beeper for
sampling day five. Irving was reminded that he was not to be trying to think or
experience anything in particular. At beep 5.1, Irving again reported an experience that
seemed like it could have been a story rather than his actual inner experience. Because
Irving’s only report that did not seem to involve the possibility of a story occurred while
in the midst of conversation (beep 1.3), the interviewer engaged Irving in conversation
after the end of the interview for beep 5.1 until the end of the interview for beep 5.5 in
order to determine if Irving would still report story-like content in his inner experience
during conversation, to assess Irving’s ability to process the beep in the midst of
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conversation, and to investigate if Irving could accurately describe what was occurring
externally at the moment of the beep. Therefore, beeps 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, and 5.5 occurred in
the midst of conversation and had fairly drastic effects.
Beep 5.2 – Irving was just given the MMSE. Irving had just said “I appreciate that I’m
as good as I am” referring to his cognitive ability. The beep sounded slightly after he
finished this sentence. Irving did not respond to the beep but rather kept having a
conversation with the interviewer with small periods of silence in between talking (a few
seconds). The beep continued to sound during the conversation and Irving did not
respond. Eventually, Irving recognized the “chirp” of the beeper while he was talking
about 4 minutes after the beeper initially sounded.
Beep 5.3 – Again, Irving did not respond to the beep while he was talking. When the
beep sounded, Irving simply continued to talk with no pause in his talking. Eventually
Irving reported hearing the chirp sound. The interviewer did not hear the beep this time
so it is uncertain how long it took for Irving to recognize the chirp. This seemed to be the
same thing that happened during beep 5.2. However, the interviewer cannot determine
how long the beeper was going off.
It appears that talking often interferes significantly with Irving’s ability to process the
beep, but not always:
Beep 5.4 – Irving was telling a story about a sexton he knew when he was younger who
liked to tell stories. This time, Irving immediately recognized the beep even though it
sounded while he was talking. At the moment of the beep, Irving was reportedly innerly
seeing the sexton standing outside of a church door on the steps. Irving stated that the
inner seeing was clear and the sexton was only a few feet away from the perspective of
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the inner seeing and Irving could see most of his body. He was wearing trousers, but
Irving could not describe them. Irving may have also seen himself in the inner seeing,
but only reported this when specifically asked. Irving may have been standing a little to
the left of the inner seeing while the sexton was talking. Irving could not hear what the
sexton was saying in his experience. Irving frequently intertwined reality with his inner
experience during this interview. For example, when directed toward his inner
experience Irving seemed to describe it and then continued to discuss reality. Irving also
said that the inner seeing was in the summer, but later said that this was an external fact
and not necessarily part of his experience at the moment of the beep.
Beep 5.5 – This beep occurred immediately after the end of the interview for 5.4. Irving
had just said “I can see him standing and talking.” There was a pause in the conversation
when the beep sounded and Irving heard it and responded to it. Irving was just getting
ready to tell the interviewer more about the sexton, but it was not clear if this was in
Irving’s experience or not. Irving was not sure what, if anything, was in his awareness at
this beep. It is the DES procedure to omit interview of beeps that occur when other beeps
are being examined.
Due to a conflict in Irving’s schedule only two beeps could be collected for day six:
Beep 6.1 – Irving began this interview by discussing his son and his wife in general and
how they own a house in Ocean City, New Jersey and how his family is currently in
Ocean City, New Jersey. When questioned specifically about the moment of the beep,
Irving stated that he was wondering what his son was doing today (the day of the
interview). Specifically, he was wondering if he was running on the boardwalk or if he
was repairing something. When questioned further, Irving stated that he was wondering
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at the beep if he was running, but later said that this came a little bit after the beep. Near
the end of the interview, Irving stated that this experience came a little before the beep.
Irving also stated that at the moment of the beep he was innerly seeing his son repairing
something.

This inner seeing was unclear and difficult to describe, although his son

seems to have been holding a hammer (Irving later added a saw to the inner seeing).
Finally, Irving stated that he was not sure which of the above was exactly at the moment
of the beep, saying that he did not think that he did very good with this beep and that
what occurred at the beep “slips my mind.”
Beep 6.2 – Irving was sitting in his chair. After approximately 35 minutes, the
interviewer asked Irving if the beep sounded (it was set for a maximum of 30 minutes).
Irving said it had not. Irving was then asked if he was hearing little beeps (i.e., chirps)
and he said no. The interviewer listened to the beeper and it was in chirp mode, signaling
that Irving had missed the beep. Irving did not appear to be asleep during this beep, but
was not watched closely.

Discussion
There were numerous reasons for skepticism regarding Irving’s reports:
1. Irving misunderstood the procedure somewhat, especially during the first four days
of sampling. Specifically, Irving believed that he was to attempt to think of something
while wearing the beeper. When this was discovered, Irving was repeatedly instructed
that this was not part of the procedure. Still, the nature and extent of the content of
Irving’s reports did not change. It is possible that Irving did have substantial content in
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his inner experience, but it appears likely that the extent of the content would change if
he was no longer attempting to think of something substantial.
2. Irving had difficulty answering open-ended questions about the details of the
content of his experience. He often appeared confident when given options, but was
often inconsistent. He had even more difficulty answering questions about form unless
given options.
3. Irving was frequently inconsistent in his responses in general.
4. Irving often intertwined descriptions of actual events with descriptions of inner
experience. It is very difficult to discern to what extent Irving was describing inner
experience versus external reality, but it is clear that the two often overlapped.
If Irving’s interviews are taken as valid, one of the most consistent features of his
experience was remembering events that have occurred in his life, mostly recent events,
whether they were interactions he had with others, things he had read about in the
newspaper, or thing he had seen on television. Irving reported no instances of inner
speech, but did frequently report inner seeings, many of which may have had limited
color. Irving may have had limited occurrences of unsymbolized thinking and feelings,
but did not report sensory awareness.
However, the above list of difficulties suggests that Irving’s reports cannot be taken at
face value. Here are some possibilities for interpreting Irving’s responses. These are by
no means definitive conclusions, but hypotheses based on the evidence:
1. Irving may have not entirely understood what was meant by “inner experience.”
His reports were almost always more focused on external reality rather than inner
experience. Irving often answered questions about inner experience in an appropriate
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manner, but was inconsistent, could often not describe details, needed options to be able
to answer, and typically returned to describing external reality as soon as he felt he
adequately answered a given question about inner experience.
2. Irving may not have entirely understood what was meant by “moment of the beep.”
Irving’s reports were often but not always somewhat general temporally, although he
could usually answer appropriately when directed to the moment of the beep and given
options and/or close-ended questions.
3. Irving may have been fabricating his reports. He may actually not have had inner
experience, may not have been able to process the beep, may not have been able to recall
inner experience even when interviewed immediately, and/or may not have understood
the task at all. Therefore, he thought of real-life stories to tell and answered inner
experience questions as realistically as possible. Evidence for this hypothesis includes
the substantial content of his reports, inconsistencies in his reports, inability to get to
exactly the moment of the beep, and an inability to describe details. However, Irving
appeared to be giving substantial effort and appeared to take the process seriously,
making this hypothesis seem unlikely.
4. Irving may have no inner experience. It appears common for people with no inner
experience to have difficulty reporting inner experience and often avoid stating that they
have no inner experience, reporting reality in its place. Furthermore, Irving’s difficulty
with details and inability to answer open-ended questions may be further evidence for
this. This appears to be a likely possibility given the fact that although Irving has some
cognitive impairment it cannot entirely explain his inability to produce a single reliable
report.
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5. Irving was somehow thinking about what he reported at or near the beep, but could
not describe it very well, either due to a misunderstanding of some step or all of the
procedure, has weak inner experience that is difficult to report, or forgot details nearly
instantly. Irving could answer some questions about his experience, but typically not
detailed ones. He also needed options or closed-ended questions regarding the specifics
of his experience. He typically was very confident about the general topic he was
thinking about at the moment of each beep, but was not nearly as confident regarding
form or details of these experiences.
One of the most interesting findings sampling with Irving was the difficulty that he
had responding to the beep during conversation despite only minor hearing difficulties.
He responded to the beep on only one out of four occasions while engaged in
conversation. He consistently was able to respond to the beep when not in conversation,
although he did miss three beeps while not in conversation (one while sleeping, one when
the head set came out of his ear, and one under normal circumstances). It is possible that
he had exhausted his cognitive resources during conversation in a way that did not allow
him to respond to the beep. It is also possible that he could not hear the beep for some
reason while talking. However, on some occasions he did not respond to the chirps even
after the conversation had ended. When asked after the conversations if he was hearing
chirps, he sometimes responded that he did hear them and other times said that he did not
hear them.
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CHAPTER 13

IMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “JUNE”
June was an 84 year-old female living in an assisted living facility in Pennsylvania.
She received a score of 23 on the MMSE, which is indicative of mild to moderate
cognitive impairment and is below average for a woman of June’s age and level of
education (Master’s degree). Although she did not have a diagnosis of dementia, she did
exhibit some memory impairment. She was highly verbal and spoke very well,
exhibiting no linguistic or memory impairment in casual conversation. However, June
did exhibit some memory impairment if she was asked specific questions that required
episodic memory. The interviewer met with June approximately 2.5 weeks prior to the
first sampling day. Upon arriving at the first sampling day, June stated that she
remembered who the interviewer was, but could not remember some of the specifics of
the meeting or the interviewer’s name. During this sampling day, June collected six
beeps and was then interviewed after all six were collected.
June had substantial difficulty understanding the DES process on the first sampling
day. On a few occasions June said things like “what I came up with for this one” or
“what I thought to write for this beep.” The interviewer then asked if June responded to
the beeps by inventing a thought. She initially said yes, but quickly recanted saying that
she did not quite understand the interviewer’s question.
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Another key difficulty on the first sampling day was June’s inability to understand the
difference between discussing generalizations and focusing on the moment of the beep.
For example, for the first beep June said that she was concerned about a friend who is ill.
The interviewer acknowledged that she was concerned in general about her friend, but
asked her if she was experiencing concern at the moment of the beep. June said she was
sometimes experiencing concern and said that she was not at other times. The interviewer
attempted to explain avoiding generalizations and the difference between generalities and
the moment of the beep in a variety of ways, but June did not seem to understand and
stated that she was not certain if she understood or not.
Throughout the interview, June repeatedly discussed generalizations and external
reality rather than her momentary inner experience. Several attempts were made to
clarify the DES process, inner experience, and the moment of the beep. It was not clear
to what extent June understood DES on the first day but it was clear that she was not able
to give reliable reports of her inner experience on this day.
Due to June’s difficulty during day one, the sampling procedure was changed from
the standard procedure used on day one. June wore the beeper while in her apartment at
her assisted living facility while the interviewer waited in the hall. When the beep
sounded, June called the interviewer and was immediately interviewed after the beep.
However, between the first and second beep of this day it was discovered that June
did not understand the DES procedure at all. After beep one the interviewer became
suspicious that June was not responding to a beep at all. She had seemed to not
understand the difference between “moment of the beep” and what she thinks in general
(see day one description). Now on day two, after preparing the beeper and reiterating the
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instructions to June, she called the interviewer within 5 minutes to signal that the beep
had sounded. When interviewed, June continued to discuss her general experience. She
began the interview with the statement “all morning I have been thinking” and then
described wanting to contact a friend in the western U.S. June continued to seem
perplexed by questions regarding the moment of the beep.
After the interview for beep 2.1, the interviewer instructed June to call him when the
beeper sounded. June asked “What am I supposed to be thinking about now?” The
interviewer again explained that she was not to think about anything specifically, that the
interviewer was interested in her naturally occurring experience, and that she should
make no effort to think about anything but just continue as if the beeper were not present.
June again called the interviewer within 5 minutes after the interview for the first
beep ended. Upon beginning the interview for this beep the interviewer asked June if the
beep had sounded and she said that it had not. June apparently believed that her task was
to create thoughts, and when she had created a thought she was to call the interviewer. It
is not clear what June thought the function of the beeper was. The interviewer explained
the method to June again. Still, she did not seem to entirely understand. June then
explained that she was having a bad day, that she had not slept well, and that she was
frustrated and could not concentrate. June estimated that this occurs about once every 2
weeks. At this point sampling day two was ended.
For the third sampling day, the interviewer stayed in the room while June wore the
beeper. She seemed equally confused on this day regarding the DES procedure as she
was on the previous days. After the DES procedure was reviewed and the beeper was set
up, June immediately began talking about what she had been thinking all day long. She
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then seemingly tried to think of things to tell the interviewer prior to the beep’s sounding.
This continued despite multiple explanations of the procedure by the interviewer.
Eventually, June seemed to realize that she was to wait for the beep to identify a moment.
However, when she was interviewed after the beeper sounded it seemed that June still
could not understand what was meant by “the moment of the beep” as she would talk
about what she was thinking in general throughout the day. She was again instructed that
she did not have to try to think of anything in particular as she seemed to misunderstand
this aspect of the process and continued to misunderstand after repeated explanations.
For the first beep, the interviewer heard the chirp sounding (the interviewer did not
hear the beep prior to the chirp). When asked if she heard the chirps, June stated that she
did. When asked if the actual beep had sounded she said that it did. June and the
interviewer were having a conversation while the beeper was sounding. June was again
reminded of the DES procedure. After this incident, June sat quietly, waiting for the
beep.
June then responded to two beeps. Here is a description of one of those responses:
Beep 3.2 – At and before the beep sounded, the interviewer and June were talking about
her granddaughter. Specifically, June had just finished saying that she thought her
granddaughter would get married shortly after graduating from college. Throughout the
interview for this beep, June spoke in generalities. She often responded to questions
about her momentary inner experience with statements such as “that’s what I was
thinking about the whole time” or “Well, really, that’s what’s been on my mind.” She
was also very inconsistent with her reports and was easily led throughout the interview.
She began the interview by saying that she was thinking about her granddaughter going
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to Mexico. She then elaborated, saying that she was thinking about what she would be
experiencing when she got there. She then stated that she was thinking about the people
who live in Mexico and that she would be anxious to speak with her about her opinion
about Mexico. When asked which of these was in her experience at the moment of the
beep, she said that all of them were. When asked how those were in her experience, she
stated that she had been thinking about these things all day. When asked if she was
having an inner seeing, she said that she absolutely was, but could not describe the inner
seeing. When asked if she was innerly speaking, she said that she absolutely was, but
could answer no further questions about form. It appeared that she simply did not
understand what was meant by “the moment of the beep,” did not understand what was
meant by “inner experience”, or often confused reality with inner experience and could
not reliably answer questions about form.
For the fourth beep, the interviewer and June were in the midst of conversation. June
was not sure what, if anything, was in her experience at the moment of this beep.
It was clear that June was having substantial difficulty engaging meaningfully in the
DES procedure after 3 days of sampling even though she was interviewed immediately
after the beeps occurred. Therefore, the fourth day consisted of many variations to the
DES procedure to try to determine the exact nature of June’s difficulty with DES.
To begin sampling day four, June was instructed to undergo the DES process as
usual, but, at the moment of the beep, instead of reporting inner experience June was
simply to report what she was seeing. This experiment was done to help determine if
June could get to the moment of the beep while focusing on a supposedly easier task

215

(reporting external vision as opposed to inner experience). It also allowed the interviewer
to verify the accuracy of June’s report as she would be reporting on external phenomena.
When the first beep sounded, it took June approximately 20 seconds to respond to it.
Her initial response, after 20 seconds, was “do I turn it off?” After being re-instructed, a
new random interval was initiated. When the beep sounded, June reported that she was
seeing a man talking to a woman on television. She first said that she was not sure which
of the two (or both) were on the screen at the moment of the beep, but later said that the
man was on the screen. June stated that she was not seeing anything else. She could
describe some details, but the characters were still on the screen so she may have been
relying on that information.
June was indeed watching “Just Shoot Me” at the moment of that beep, and a man
and woman on the show were talking. The interviewer is unsure exactly who was on
screen right at the moment of the beep as the screen shots were switching back and forth
fairly rapidly. Nevertheless, June’s report was either entirely accurate or very close to
being entirely accurate.
The interviewer was talking to June at the moment of the next beep while her eyes
were directed toward the television. The interviewer paused when he heard the beep
sound and after approximately one second June notified the interviewer that it was
sounding. It was unclear if June was responding to the beep or to the interviewer’s
pause. At first, June stated that one of the characters on the television had just gotten up
and run from a table in a restaurant. She then stated that one character was sitting and
eating while another was standing nearby and talking.
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June was looking at the television at the moment of this beep. She seemingly
described the correct sequence of events (one character standing and talking, the other
sitting and eating, and then the standing character walking or running away), although the
interviewer was focused more on June than the television during this beep. Again, June’s
description was at least close to being accurate, although June was unsure what point in
the sequence the television program was in when the beep went off.
It was still not certain, however, that June was responding to the beep itself. The
interviewer’s pause and instant questioning did not allow for much interpretation on
June’s part regarding what was to be done when the beep sounded. However, it did seem
that June was able to narrow the moment of the beep down to at most a few seconds.
For the next experiment June was asked to think about either one or both of her
granddaughters and to continue thinking about them until she was notified by the
interviewer. The interviewer waited approximately ten seconds then asked her to
describe her thoughts. This was done in order to: 1. simplify the procedure for June by
eliminating the beeper. Perhaps there was something about the beeper that destroyed
June’s inner experience, was too distracting, caused misunderstanding, etc.; and 2. to
attempt to see if June could report inner experience under fewer demands (i.e.,
purposefully creating inner experience rather than trying to catch it “on the fly”). June
could not exactly describe what she was thinking, but rather talked about her youngest
granddaughter in general. The interviewer decided that this experiment was set up
somewhat poorly and may have been a bit too broad for June and therefore decided to
move on to a clearer variation of this procedure.
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June was then instructed to think about her youngest granddaughter. She was told
that the interviewer was going to snap his fingers rather than use the beeper (i.e., the
finger snap would simulate the beep). When the interviewer snapped his fingers she said,
“I just think she is very courageous.” June then began to discuss various aspects of her
granddaughter’s life and personality, such as the fact that she is in her twenties, that she is
in love, that she gets very good grades, and that June is happy for her. When asked if she
was thinking of all, some, or none of these things at the moment of the finger snap, June
stated that she was thinking of all of them “because we’re just so proud of her.” When
questioned further, June stated that she has great admiration for her granddaughter and
that she is very energetic. When questioned, she said that these things were also present
at the moment of the beep. The interviewer then began asking June about form, using
both open-ended questions and providing options. After the first form question June
stated, “She’s a very attractive young lady” and continued to talk about her
granddaughter. After the second form question, June stated that “I really think about
them” (them meaning both of her granddaughters).
It was clear that June was not describing her momentary experience. In fact, it is
likely that she was not describing her experience at all. This modified procedure
suggested that June either has virtually no understanding what is meant by “moment of
the beep” (or finger snap in this case), or has no understanding of what inner experience
is, or has no inner experience at all. Perhaps there are other options as well. Her
previous descriptions, as well as this one, suggest that she was describing generalities
rather than experience at the moment of the beep, although she had shown some evidence
for understanding the “moment of the beep” concept during the television experiment
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described above. This is evidenced by both the content (i.e., multiple topics in
awareness, easily led into descriptions of new content, etc.) and language of her
descriptions (discussing what she has been thinking during the day or previous few days,
the inability to describe form, etc.). Furthermore, June continued to discuss reality (i.e.,
“She is a very attractive young lady.”) rather than inner experience.
The interviewer then asked June if she could visualize her granddaughters if she tried,
and June stated that she could. June was then instructed to form an inner seeing of either
or both of her granddaughters. June said that this was difficult to do and then started
talking about her eldest granddaughter living in the eastern U.S. She was asked
repeatedly if she was having an inner seeing of her and June repeatedly said “yes.” When
she was asked to describe the inner seeing she would discuss the granddaughter in reality,
and did not provide any details that would suggest an inner seeing.
Interestingly, June often used the word “see.” For example, the interviewer asked her
to describe the details of the image (the interviewer did not use the word “see”) and June
stated, “I can see them getting excited about it,” and continued discussing her
granddaughter and her friends in general. When asked, she said that she was not having
an inner seeing. This happened on two occasions (i.e., June using the word “see,” going
on to talk about her granddaughter in general, and then saying that she was not describing
an inner seeing).
At some point either during or after this portion of the interview, the interviewer gave
the following paraphrased example of an inner seeing:
“Right now, I am visualizing my parents’ garage in my head. I’m seeing it as if I’m
looking at it from the back of the house. It’s a sunny day, sometime in the afternoon. I
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can see part of a tree in the upper left hand corner of the image.” June was then asked if
she could visualize something like that, and she said that she thought she could. She was
then asked to visualize the house that she lived in for most of her life. When asked to
describe the inner seeing, she described the house in general and various circumstances
surrounding the house. For example, she said that “It was a very nice house. It had four
bedrooms,” and then went on to talk about people that used to visit. The interviewer
asked about the visual characteristics of her inner experience, giving examples to
distinguish this from reality, but June continued to talk about the reality of the house and
memories that she had involving the house. It seemed clear that either June was not
having a visual experience at this point or that she could not describe it at all.
Finally, June and the interviewer returned to the initial procedure where June was to
describe what she was seeing at the moment of the beep. June seemed to perform best in
this scenario, so further investigation was done.
When the beep sounded the next time she stated that she was seeing a couple of guys
talking on television. However, June was clearly describing what was on the television
while she was talking. When the beep had sounded a commercial was on television that
did not involve men talking. By the time she started describing what she was seeing
when the beep sounded the show had come back on. She stated “there were a couple of
guys talking, and look, there they are.” When asked if she was certain that was what she
was seeing at the moment of the beep she said that she was. This is more evidence that
June could not get to “the moment of the beep” or perhaps perform the DES task in
general, although it was explained many times in a variety of manners.
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During the next beep, June was watching a commercial. She said that she was seeing
a golden retriever in the commercial at the moment of the beep. There was a golden
retriever on the television near the beep, but the interviewer thought that it was on a
second or two before the beep, not at the beep. She stated that she was focused on the dog
and was not really seeing anything else. The dog on the commercial was computerized,
so the interviewer asked if it was a real dog or a computerized one and June stated that it
was definitely real. Then, the television program came back on and two men were
talking and shaking hands. When this came back on, June stated that she was seeing two
gentlemen talking and shaking hands at the moment of the beep. June was asked again if
she was seeing these men specifically when the beep first sounded, and she said yes.
Throughout this sampling day, June was engaged in conversation with the
interviewer. This conversation was detailed, appropriate, and provided no evidence of
cognitive impairment, except in instances when June was attempting to remember details
and times of upcoming appointments. However, when the discussion turned to DESrelated topics, it was clear that June had substantial cognitive impairment, evidenced by
many phenomena:
1. June exhibited substantial variability in responding promptly to the beep. To
various beeps she responded instantly, after a delay of a second or two, or after
approximately 20 seconds. She demonstrated no evidence of hearing loss. Up until and
including the most recent sampling day she had not once asked the interviewer to repeat
himself during conversation and always seemed to understand what the interviewer was
saying in casual conversation. Nevertheless, June clearly had some difficulty responding
to the beep in a timely manner. Delayed reactions did not seem to be directly associated
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with June’s being involved in other activities. For example, it took June approximately
20 seconds to respond to the first beep. At the time, June and the interviewer were
engaged in light conversation, but there were one or two significant pauses in the
conversation during the 20 second period that would have allowed her to respond to the
beep if she was indeed distracted by talking or listening during the conversation. At other
times, June responded much faster even in the midst of conversation. June’s difficulty
seemed to lie in processing the beep itself, processing the beep adequately but having
trouble physically responding to it, or both.
2. June had substantial difficulty describing what was occurring externally at the
moment of the beep. June did an adequate job of describing what she was seeing during
the first beep, described what was at and somewhat near the beep during beep two, and
did not describe it at all during the next to last beep.
3. June had little if any ability to describe any aspects of inner experience that might
be occurring at the moment of the beep. She almost always referred to her experience in
generalities and could not, for example, distinguish between something she had thought
during the day or proceeding days and the content of some experience that might have
been occurring at the moment of the beep. This evidence suggests that June could not
consistently narrow her attention to a moment, or that she did not understand the concept
of “moment of the beep,” or that she had no inner experience whatsoever.
4. June had substantial difficulty understanding what was meant by inner experience.
When asked about her inner experience, her responses were almost always mixed with
external reality. When asked specifically about the form of her experience, she would
inevitably refer to content, usually the content of external reality. It is possible that June
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has inner experience but cannot describe it, that she has no inner experience and therefore
there is nothing to describe, or that she does not understand what the interviewer means
by “inner experience.”
5. June could not engage in an adequate discussion of inner experience when the
beeper was removed and June was asked to imagine familiar people and places in her life.
Again, June described having numerous experiences during this exercise, including many
suggested by the interviewer. She also described reality rather than inner experience and
relied on generalities rather than her in-the-moment experience. This again suggests that
June cannot describe inner experience, that she has no inner experience, or that she does
not understand what is meant by inner experience.
6. June may not have understood the language involved in the DES process. Her
understanding of the purpose of the beeper, the moment of the beep, and inner experience
varied drastically. She often felt confused when discussing these concepts and answered
questions about these concepts that often do not reflect an understanding of them (e.g.
describing reality when asked about inner experience, describing what she was currently
seeing when asked about what she was seeing at the moment of the beep, etc.). This
difficulty persisted despite four days of repeated description and explanation of all of
these concepts, using direct definitions, metaphors, and visual prompts.
For sampling day five, more variations on the standard DES procedure were used.
For the first beep, June was simply to describe exactly what she was doing at the moment
of the beep, whether it was talking, hearing the interviewer talk, getting ready to talk,
hearing music, etc. After this was described to June, the interviewer asked “Do you
understand?” June said “No, not really, but let me tell you about what I’ve been thinking
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today.” The interviewer then re-explained the procedure and June stated that she
understood, although she still appeared uncertain.
Before the first beep, the interviewer had asked June about her granddaughters. June
spoke about one of them for about 4 minutes. After this, she began talking about the
other granddaughter. Shortly afterward, a woman came into June’s room to take out the
trash, interrupting the conversation. After she left (about 2 minutes later), the interviewer
asked June “What were we talking about?” June thought for a few seconds and said “Oh
yes, my sons.” In reality, the conversation involved her granddaughters, although there
had been a discussion of her sons earlier in the meeting.
In the period leading up to the first beep, June had been talking about her sons
hunting, how they love going out in the forest, and how they loved swimming. At the
moment of the beep, June was saying “They turned out to be fine young men, and
they…” June did not respond independently to the beep, but the interviewer notified her
that the beep was sounding almost instantly after it began sounding. The beep came right
around “and they.” June stated that at the moment of the beep she was talking about her
sons and “keeping track of them.” She then continued to talk about her sons. June was
not able to report the exact words at the moment of the beep, and although she was
correct that she was talking about her sons, she was not able to accurately say what
exactly she was talking about at the moment of the beep.
June was then instructed to try to pay attention to either what she was saying or what
the interviewer was saying at the moment of the beep. She was asked to report the exact
words and subject of the conversation at the moment of the beep if possible.
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At the moment of the second beep, the interviewer was talking about the DES
method. June had asked what the interviewer was looking for in his study. The
interviewer was stating that he was not looking for anything specific, but that studies in
psychology often are looking for something specific. At the moment of the beep, the
interviewer was saying “people are looking for something specific.” It is not certain
exactly where the beep came in this phrase, but it was definitely during this phrase. June
could not describe the exact words that were being spoken. She stated that, at the
moment of the beep, the interviewer was talking about what people are thinking.
The interviewer explained the procedure again to June. She then said “I’m trying to
tell you what I’m thinking” and then described what she had been thinking lately. It
appeared in this instance, and at other times, June believed that her task is to simply tell
the interviewer what she has been thinking recently in general. The procedure was
explained again, and June seemed to understand.
At the moment of the third beep, June and the interviewer were talking about the
importance of travel. The interviewer was saying that people who have never traveled
tend to think that the world is very similar to the area in which they have lived, but when
they do travel they tend to appreciate differences in other cultures. The interviewer was
specifically saying “When you go somewhere, you appreciate it.” The beep occurred
within this statement. June alternately stated that, at the moment of the beep, the
interviewer was saying “you should appreciate it” and “I should appreciate it.” When
asked about the general subject that was being discussed at the moment of the beep, June
stated that the interviewer was saying that he would like to travel.
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June exhibited some memory problems between the third and fourth beeps. Earlier in
the meeting, the interviewer told June what sports he had played in high school. A
similar subject arose again and June again asked what sports the interviewer played in
high school. Also during this period, June stated that she thought that when her sons go
hunting they are more interested in partying than hunting. This was the third time that
she made this statement during the interview.
At the moment of the fourth beep, June was saying “I was born and raised in
Scranton. And my husband was in the service, and he came out and we were married and
lived in Chambersburg. From there we moved to York. After he got out of the
service…” The interviewer did not hear the beep, but June’s first visible reaction came
just after “service.” However, June said that she was talking and then noticed the sound
and seemed to think that it may have been sounding a bit before that. Still, she first
noticed it very close to the word “service.” June stated that the exact words that she was
saying at the moment of the beep were “I lived in Scranton.” She stated that the subject
was where she was living and what she was doing, which was generally true.
June exhibited two more instances of memory problems after this beep. The
interviewer and June had discussed the street that June lived most of her adult life on at
least two occassions during previous meetings (Maple Avenue). The interviewer asked
her what the street was and June could not remember at first, but after about 15 seconds,
said Maple Avenue. June also wanted a list of the interviewer’s relatives who grew up in
York as she might know them from being a school nurse and wanted to look them up in a
yearbook. The interviewer wrote the interviewer’s name (Todd) and the names Mike,
Randy, and Linda. Shortly after this, June became confused and believed that the
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interviewer’s name was Randy. June seemed to exhibit more memory problems than in
the past during casual conversation on this day, but did not report having a “bad day.”
For sampling day six, the interviewer used a beeper with an external button that
would allow the interviewer to control when the beep sounded. The button was on the
end of a long wire so that the interviewer could sit well across from June while still
operating the beeper.
A series of activities were performed using this beeper. For the first activity, the
experimenter held ten index cards. Written on each card in large writing was a single
number from 1 to 10. The cards were held in front of June in a stack so that she could
only see the card that was on the top of the stack. The interviewer removed the card
facing June, placing it at the bottom of the stack revealing a new card and a new number.
This was repeated fairly quickly (about three every two seconds). June was asked to
identify which number she was seeing when the beeper sounded. The interviewer varied
the amount of time between beeps so that June would not see a pattern in the timing of
the beep (approximately 5 to 20 seconds between beeps and 6 to 50 cards).
For the first three trials, the cards were in order from 1 to 10. June began by calling
out the numbers that she was seeing before she heard a beep (i.e., “one, two three”). The
interviewer reminded June of the procedure and gave her two examples. June was then
accurate on three subsequent trials. The cards were then scrambled. The interviewer reexplained the procedure to her. June was accurate on the first trial. She then said “nine”
before a beep sounded. She was then accurate on the next two trials. The cards were
shuffled again and June was accurate on the next two trials. She then said “five” before
the next beep ever sounded. She was accurate on the next two trials. On the following
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trial June called out the correct number before the beep. She then pressed the white
button on the beeper (which resets the beep), apparently to make it sound (but the
interviewer is not entirely certain of the motivation). She also pressed the white button of
the beeper on the next two trials. She was accurate on the next trial, but then called out a
number in the absence of a beep, then pressed the white button on the next two trials.
The task was then re-explained to June and the headphones were removed and the
onboard speaker was used to deliver the beep so that the interviewer could hear the beep
clearly and ensure that June was actually receiving the beep. On the next two trials
before the beep sounded, June again called out a number and then pressed the white
button. The interviewer explained to June that she should wait for the beep and not touch
the white button until told to do so. She then called out a number without any beep at all.
The instructions were then thoroughly re-explained to her. She stated that the interviewer
was confusing her and that she did not entirely understand. June then did the next ten
trials accurately (i.e., she identified the correct numbers at the moment of the beep) even
when beeps came very close to a transition in the cards. June kept holding the white
button down for a period of time to stop the beeper even though she was told repeatedly
to press it very quickly and then release.
This demonstration suggests that:
1. June could perform the task at times, but her ability varied substantially.
2. June may have had difficulty understanding the task. This was especially evident
at the beginning, when June began calling numbers out before the beep occurred. This
was also suggested when June would respond to a number before hearing the beep, and
then press down on the white button.
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3. June may have difficulty with inhibition given her calling out of numbers before
the beeper sounded. She also could not inhibit pushing the white button on the beeper
when instructed not to do so.
4. June may have had some problems with learning and these problems may be
related to memory. Even after repeated instruction, June often made mistakes with the
procedure.
June’s second task was to tell the interviewer what she was seeing on the television at
the moment of the beep. June was instructed to focus only on what she was seeing rather
than the content of the conversation on the television because this would make June’s
reports easily verifiable and allowed her to focus only on a small part of her external
environment. However, in an attempt to simplify the task, the interviewer may have
made it even more difficult, as it is likely that June does not watch television in this
manner in her everyday life (i.e., rather than just watching and understanding what is
occurring, trying to focus on exactly what she is seeing on a moment-to-moment basis).
Immediately after this task was explained to her, she began to tell the interviewer what
she was currently seeing on television, trying to update as the scenes on the television
rapidly changed. The instructions were then re-explained.
For the first beep, a man was talking on the Florence Henderson Show about
performing at a fair in Seattle. The camera angle was a fairly close shot of only the man.
At the moment of the beep, June did not initially react. It is not certain if June heard
and/or processed the beep, and if so, to what extent. After about two seconds, the
interviewer turned to her and asked what she was seeing on the television at the moment
of the beep. She said “they were just having a conversation.” When June was asked if
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there were both Florence Henderson and the man, or just one or the other on the screen at
the moment of the beep June stated that it was both of them. Both of them were on the
screen while June was describing this beep, but not at the beep. When asked who was
talking at the moment of the beep, June said the man was. She could not describe any
other details without relying on actually looking at the man on television as she described
the scene.
The interviewer re-explained the procedure before the next beep, emphasizing
freezing the visual scene at the moment of the beep. At the moment of the beep, there
was a commercial with a child of about 7 years of age talking about autism. June
accurately stated that there was a little boy talking about autism at the moment of the
beep. The interview was then interrupted by the entrance of a staff member. She spoke
with June and the interviewer for approximately 3 minutes and then left. June was asked
if she remembered what had been on the television at the moment of the beep and she
stated that she did not remember.
Upon returning attention to the television, a new male guest was talking about his
experience as a psychic. June spontaneously stated that it was the same man that was
being interviewed before the commercial, but this was not true.
For the next beep, June again did not respond. After several seconds, the interviewer
turned toward her. June said “I turned it off,” which was accurate. June had not turned
off the beeper instantly, but it was very shortly after the beep began to sound. The
procedure was again re-explained to June.
For the next beep, the same male psychic was talking with Florence Henderson about
an experience he had of talking to his grandmother after her death even though he had
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never met her. The camera showed only him. June again did not respond initially until
the interviewer looked at her. She then turned off the beep after the interviewer looked at
her and stated that the man was explaining something about his grandmother. She said
that she was seeing them in conversation. When asked if she was seeing both or one of
them, she said she was seeing both of them at the moment of the beep. When this
question was asked, both of them were on the television. June was directed to the
moment of the beep, but still stated that she was seeing both of them.
June then seemed a bit distressed. She stated that “I don’t know if I’m just getting old
or my mind’s not working, but T.V. doesn’t make sense to me.”
There are three potential explanations for these results:
1. June continued to have difficulty understanding the procedure. The nature of this
misunderstanding will be discussed at the end of this day’s summary.
2. June could not adequately “freeze” her experience, as she often confused what she
was seeing while describing the beep with what was occurring at the moment of the beep.
3. June did not have any awareness of what she was seeing, and therefore could not
respond adequately to the beep.
June’s third task followed her request to switch to a television channel that plays easy
listening music. This channel had music accompanied by still pictures, sometimes of the
musician, other times of nature scenes. The pictures lasted about 20 to 40 seconds before
switching to the next picture. June was asked to attempt to memorize what she was
seeing in the picture. She was then to describe what she had seen in the picture as soon
as the television switched to a different picture. The first picture was in black and white
and showed a man from chest up smirking somewhat. Around his face was a saxophone.

231

When the picture changed, the interviewer asked her to describe what she had just seen.
She stated that there was a horn of some sort. When asked if he was holding the horn or
not, she said he was (this was not accurate; the horn was somewhat suspended to frame
his head). When asked if he was playing the horn, she said he was not (which was true).
June stated, when asked, that his hair was dark (true). She said he did not have much of
an expression (could be considered true), that he was sitting down holding the horn (the
sitting down could not exactly be discerned from the picture), and that it was in black and
white (true).
The same procedure was used for the next picture. It was of a man sitting down,
holding a guitar, looking away from the viewpoint of the camera. The picture was
“browned out” so that the picture appeared to be largely in brown and white. June was
mostly correct in her description, although she had to be prompted with questions. She
was slightly inaccurate when she said he was looking at the guitar rather than away from
the viewpoint of the camera. She could not accurately name the instrument. She said it
was a banjo or some kind of stringed instrument. It is unlikely that this was due to lack
of knowledge of musical instruments as June’s father was a musician and she has always
had a strong love of music. When asked if there was color, June said there was some
color, but the colors were not bright, which was accurate, although she did not mention
that everything had a brownish hue.
This suggests that:
1. June can form memories long enough to describe them somewhat accurately,
although with some mistakes.
2. June may have benefited from trying to memorize the picture.
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3. The beeper may be significantly distracting for June as she was largely successful
in this task when no beeper was involved.
4. What occurs after the beep may distract June. Because there were only still
pictures being shown rather than continual discussion or switching of camera angles on
the television show, this task may have been a bit easier for June.
For the fourth task, June was read a list of one syllable nouns that was about twelve
words long and was asked to identify which one was said right before the beeper
sounded. Again, the interval between beeps was varied so that she could not get used to a
pattern.
June did not understand this task. It was explained twice, and June said she would
give it a try. For the first five trials, the words were read at a moderate pace, about two
per second, stopping when the beep sounded. June was accurate in all of these trials.
However, this may not represent her ability to respond to the beep as she simply needed
to repeat the last word that she heard. Nevertheless, the procedure may have helped as an
introduction to the next task.
The speed was then increased to as fast as the interviewer could read the words
accurately, about three to four a second. June got the first trial correct. On the second
trial, she could not remember. She was correct on the third trial. The interviewer then
continued to read words after the beep sounded. On the next three trials, June was one
word late (i.e., she identified the word that came just after the beep). On the next trial,
she identified the word that came four words after the beep. June was then correct on the
last three trials. June was asked if she could identify any of the words from the list about
5 minutes later as they were read several times. She could not. The interviewer told her
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that they were all one syllable nouns and the first one was chair. Still, June could not
identify any of the words, although she was not initially asked to remember them.
June’s fifth task was a return to the task of describing what was on television when
the beeper sounded. June immediately began to describe what she was seeing, even
though no beep had sounded. The procedure was re-explained three times. June stated
that she was not certain if she understood, but would do her best.
The first beep for this task occurred during a commercial for John McCain. June did
not initially respond to the beep. After a short period (about two seconds), the
interviewer asked her what she was experiencing at the moment of the beep. At the
moment of the beep, John McCain was shaking hands with someone. When asked, June
said she did not know what was at the moment of the beep, that her mind was
“somewhere else.” For the second beep, guests were being introduced on the Dr. Phil
show. At the moment of the beep, a woman was on screen being introduced. About a
second after the beep, the camera switched to another person. June stated that they were
discussing something but was not able to report what she was seeing at the moment of the
beep. Again, June did not respond until the interviewer prompted her shortly after the
beep began.
For the next beep, Dr. Phil was on the television, although they switched to another
person about a half second after the beep. When asked what she was seeing on the
television at the moment of the beep, June stated that they were having a controversy of
some kind (which was true), but that she did not know what they were talking about and
did not know what she was seeing at the moment of the beep.
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June then stated that she was feeling somewhat confused and the interview was
ended.

Discussion
The following are important issues that arose over the course of 6 days with June:
1. It is impossible to accurately investigate June’s inner experience due to her
inability to describe inner experience, focus on the moment of the beep during the
standard DES procedure, and otherwise meaningfully engage in DES.
2. It is possible that June has no inner experience or very little inner experience.
However, because she could not engage in the standard DES procedure in a meaningful
way, this is difficult to answer. However, other reasons for her difficulty were apparent,
so this can only remain a speculation.
3. June can do the following:
a. June can have seemingly normal conversation. The only abnormalities occur
when issues of recent memory are discussed. Otherwise, she speaks quite well on a full
range of topics.
b. June can hear the beeper. She can respond to it, but in a very inconsistent
manner. She would usually not respond to the beeper until prompted additionally by the
interviewer.
c. June can discuss generalizations about her experience, although it is impossible
to discern if these generalizations are accurate.
d. June may be able to communicate the general topic she was thinking of at a
given moment, but this seems unlikely due to her inability to engage in the process.
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e. June can report what is occurring in her external environment at the moment of
the beep, although this reporting is inconsistent. She has accurately reported the topic of
conversation, numbers see was seeing on a card, words that were just said to her, and
what was on the television at the moment of the beep. However, June also was
inaccurate many times in all of these situations.
f. June can form memories (pictures on music channel) and immediately describe
them with minimal detail and some inaccuracies.
Perhaps the most important question is why June had such substantial difficulty with
DES? There are many potential reasons for this:
1. No or little inner experience – Individuals with no or very little inner experience
often have substantial difficulty with DES.
2. Lack of understanding of the purpose of the beep/beeper – June repeatedly asked
questions regarding the purpose of the beep/beeper. She also was frequently confused as
to what to do when the beep sounded.
3. Problems with inhibition – At the outset of sampling days, June frequently simply
began discussing what she was experiencing either throughout the day, the day before, or
at that moment rather than waiting for the beeper. Furthermore, June frequently called
out numbers on the number naming task prior to the beep, suggesting difficulty with
inhibition.
4. Inability to “freeze” experience – June would often discuss her ongoing experience
(internal and external) rather than freezing it at the moment of the beep.
5. Distraction after the beep – June had more difficulty with tasks where information
was presented after the beep. Specifically, in the word naming task, she was much more
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accurate when the interviewer stopped reading words at the beep compared to when the
interviewer kept reading words. Of course, in the former case, June may have been
responding to the cessation of the list rather than the beep itself.
6. Weak memory trace – June may not have been able to remember her experience
long enough to communicate it post-beep.
7. Beeper destroys experience for June – June’s experience may have been
completely destroyed by the beeper, making it difficult if not impossible to report.
8. Difficulty learning new tasks – June simply could not learn the DES procedure.
Perhaps this is due to a deficiency in learning.
Another way to conceptualize June’s difficulty is to break down the processes that
occur when one is involved in the DES procedure. The following is not meant to be an
assertion that this is the definitive way that DES occurs, but it is one way to divide the
process. These steps do not necessarily occur in this exact sequence and may overlap:
1. There is a welter of inner and outer processes ongoing in and around the person.
Some may have more or less of this welter; some may have no inner or outer awareness.
In June’s case, she is aware of her external environment at times. It is impossible to
discern if she has inner experience.
2. Out of that welter, the more-or-less-normal person selects or transforms some part
or parts to be “experienced” as DES defines the term. That is, they determine what is
before the footlights of consciousness. This is a continuous and idiosyncratic stream of
experiences. If June can do this, she cannot communicate it or it gets disrupted by the
beep or she cannot remember long enough to communicate, etc. It is also not readily
apparent if June has inner experience.
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3. At some moment, in the welter, the beep sounds in the real physical environment.
4. Vibrations are collected by the pinna.
5. Collected vibrations are transduced, converted into neural impulses. June appears
to have no problem with this as she exhibited no hearing problems throughout sampling.
6. Impulses are interpreted. The beep becomes part of awareness. This is somewhat
unclear in June’s case. She typically did not respond to the beep instantly or
independently. Sometimes she responded to the beep, although typically she did not
respond and needed to be notified by the interviewer to respond to the beep.
7. The participant then reports what was ongoing in experience just before the beep
came into awareness. June cannot do this. Although she can sometimes report external
experience, she can never report momentary inner experience.
Still, it is impossible to definitely state why June is having problems with the DES
procedure. However, speculations can be made:
1. Hearing itself is not an issue for June, although efficiently processing the beep may
be.
2. It is possible that June has no inner experience. Very often, individuals with no
inner experience have substantial difficulty understanding the questioning involved in
DES, including the concept of inner experience. However, it is also possible that June
could not answer adequately due to cognitive difficulties. This is unlikely though
because June appeared to have enough cognitive ability to get much closer to
successfully engaging in DES. Therefore, a lack of inner experience is at least a likely
partial explanation for June’s problems with DES.
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3. Problems with inhibition cannot entirely explain June’s difficulties. Although
inhibition was a problem at times throughout sampling, it does not explain why June
could not understand “moment of the beep” or understand the function of the
beep/beeper.
4. Inability to freeze inner experience may be a problem, but again, it cannot account
for everything. June could freeze external experience under the right circumstances.
5. Memory problems were present, but do not account for all of June’s problems with
DES. If memory was the only difficulty, it is likely that a substantial variation in June’s
ability to respond to the beep would be observed as a function of the length of time since
instruction. June had difficulty whether the instructions were given to her just before the
beep sounded or if the beep sounded after a substantial period of time since instruction.
One alternative explanation is that June’s working memory is so poor that memory is
substantially deficient within seconds. June’s ability to engage so meaningfully in
conversation suggests that this is not the case.
6. June was almost always confused by what her task was in DES, the point of the
beeper/beep, the meaning of “moment of the beep,” and the meaning of “inner
experience.” There was a definite problem in comprehension and learning with DES that
was not apparent in casual conversation. It is possible that the task was too unusual
and/or unnatural for her to understand.

239

CHAPTER 14

IMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “KAREN”
Karen was an 88-year-old Caucasian female. She lived alone, but received assistance
from her daughter and son-in-law. She was not diagnosed with a cognitive disability or
neurodegenerative disease, but she did appear to exhibit some cognitive deficiencies. She
scored a 21 on the MMSE, missing all items related to working memory and attention.
This score suggests that moderate cognitive dysfunction is indeed present, specifically in
the areas of working memory and attention. A total of 14 beeped experiences were
discussed over the course of 3 days.
Four beeps were discussed on the first sampling day. Karen was not able to wear the
earphones with the beeper due to wearing hearing aids in both ears. Therefore, the beep
was delivered through an external speaker. The volume of the speaker was adjusted to be
comfortably loud, but using the external speaker rather than the earphone may have
complicated the process for her.
On the first day, Karen had substantial difficulty understanding her task as a
participant in this study. Upon inquiring about the first beep, Karen stated that she wakes
up at night thinking about different things, such as her children. Specifically, she stated
that she wonders why her son had to die so young. Karen was not wearing the beeper at
the time of this experience, and therefore clearly misunderstood what the interviewers
were asking. Furthermore, this indicated that Karen did not initially have a clear
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understanding why the interviewers were in her house, why she wore the beeper the
previous day, and what function the beeper served.
Karen’s daughter stated that when the beeper would sound, Karen would look to her
for instruction. This further indicated that Karen did not understand the purpose of the
beeper. Eventually, it appeared as if Karen began to gain a limited understanding of the
function of the beeper and the function of the interview. For example, she began talking
about her inner experience at or around the moment of the beep.
It is extremely unlikely that Karen’s reports were about experiences actually ongoing
at the moment of the beep on the first sampling day. First, since it seems that she did not
understand the function of the beeper at the time of the interview, it is highly unlikely
that she understood its function while wearing the beeper the previous day. Second, she
often described her inner experience by referring to self-generalizations. For example,
during the description of the first beep she stated that when she sits in her chair she often
worries about people breaking into her home. Although it is possible that she was
thinking about this topic at the moment of the beep, she seemed to present it as a selfgeneralization. Third, Karen was quick to agree with the interviewers when they made
suggestions regarding her inner experience. For example, when the interviewer asked her
if she was thinking about a key to the screen door in the first beep, she confirmed this
hypothesis. Likewise, when the interviewer suggested that she was feeling afraid during
this beep, she agreed with this as well. This could be indicative of a misunderstanding of
the procedure, a lack of a firm grasp on the memory of her experience, an absence of
inner experience or lack of clarity in her inner experience for which she tries to
compensate, or a general cognitive malleability. Fourth, it seemed clear that Karen was
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unable to focus on the moment of the beep. She described her experience at the moment
of the beep in a manner that suggested she was describing a few seconds of experience
rather than a moment. For example, when describing the third beep, she stated that she
was thinking about questions a man was going to ask her. She stated that she was
thinking about several questions in a sequence rather than one in particular that would
have been caught at the moment of the beep. Likewise, during beep one, she described
thinking about people breaking into her house, wondering what to do if this even
occurred, and feeling afraid. Although multiple awareness is not uncommon, in this case
it appeared to be due to either a misunderstanding of the task or an inability to focus and
report her inner experience at a particular moment. Fifth, Karen appeared to have the
belief that her inner experience had to be congruent with reality. For example, on the
fourth beep, Karen was describing an inner seeing of her great-grandson. When asked for
the colors in the inner seeing she said that she would go get the picture to show the
interviewers. It is entirely possible that Karen was having the inner experience of the
picture in her room, but this may also indicate that she was describing the picture rather
than her inner experience. Sixth, it did not appear that Karen recorded information in her
notebook that was relative to each beeped moment. She seemed to record generalizations
about herself or what she was experiencing in general around the moment of the beep
rather than at the moment of the beep. Finally, Karen was somewhat tangential during
the interview process on the first day of sampling. She often seemed more interested in
talking about things she was interested in, such as her family and the television shows she
enjoys, rather than her inner experience at each beep.
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In sum, this interview allowed the interviewers little insight into the nature of Karen’s
inner experience, if any inner experience exists. However, the first day of sampling is
primarily used for training and often does not yield reliable reports of inner experience.
Nevertheless, Karen did exhibit more difficulties than is common on the first day of
sampling.
Four beeps were discussed on the second day of sampling. On this day Karen
continued to have difficulty understanding the task and focusing on her experience at the
moment of the beep. Her reports were also unreliable due to the use of generalizations
and the ease with which she was led by the interviewers.
During Beep 2.1, Karen described inner experience that seemed to be vaguely around
the moment of the beep, but was not able to focus on the beep. She described watching
television and watching a news report about earthquakes, but could not describe exactly
what was on the television at the time of the beep. Rather, she spoke in general about
what was on television at and around the beep (i.e., earthquakes). This was similar to the
first day of sampling when Karen spoke in generalizations about external reality (i.e.,
watching television about earthquakes) rather than inner experience.
At the beginning of Beep 2.2, Karen seemed unsure of what to describe and had to be
prompted by her daughter to report her awareness at the beep. She initially stated that
she was not thinking of anything at the moment of this beep. Shortly later she stated that
she was wondering why the television show at this beep was so much different from the
one during Beep 2.1. Ultimately, Karen reported that she could not remember what was
happening at this beep.
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At Beep 2.3 she was watching television, but could not recall which program was on
television at the moment of the beep. She stated that she was confused as to why a
different program was on and was aware of this at the moment of the beep. She could not
describe how this confusion was experienced however. She also said she was confused
about the images on the television changing too fast. Again, these reports seemed to be
generalizations about external reality. Furthermore, it was difficult to tell whether Karen
was actually confused at the moment of the beep or was experiencing confusion at the
moment of the beep as she was often contradictory in her reports about this and was
easily led.
At Beep 2.4, Karen said she was still sitting in her chair. She had trouble again
describing the moment of the beep. She said that she was waiting for a television
program at the beep and it was dinner time and she had a good dinner. Eventually Karen
verified that she was watching television at the moment of the beep and wondering if the
next program was coming on. She also stated that she was a little bothered after the
interviewer suggested the possibility of being bothered. When asked if she experienced
being bothered in her chest, she said she is not allowed to feel bothered in her chest
because that may negatively affect her pace maker. She then said she was thinking about
eating dinner at the moment of the beep. Karen’s inconsistency during her reports
suggests that she was not at all able to describe inner experience at the moment of this
beep.
At Beep 2.5 Karen was watching a childrens’ program but was not too focused on the
program. She said she was wondering if she wanted to watch the program or change it.
Due to Karen’s difficulties with DES and the length of the interview, the interview was
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terminated at this point without further questioning. Therefore, the report of this beep
can not be taken to be reliable.
The procedure was changed on the third day because Karen had had substantial
difficulties with the procedure on the previous two days. On this third day, the
interviewer sat with Karen in her living room while she wore the beeper so that he could
immediately interview her when the beep sounded. This reduced the length of
retrospection required for Karen to remember what was in her experience at the moment
of the beep. This procedure also allowed the interviewer to know what was occurring in
the external environment at the moment of the beep (because the beep was delivered by
an external speaker), allowing him to verify any comments that might be made about the
external environment at the moment of the beep. Karen sat in her chair during the entire
sampling day and either read or engaged in conversation with her daughter or the
interviewer. Six samples were discussed on the third sampling day.
Although this reduction of retrospectiveness seemed to help somewhat, Karen’s
reports were still highly unreliable and her ability to focus on the moment of the beep
also remained tenuous. Karen seemed more convincing about the content of her
awareness in general as it occurred near the moment of the beep, but little else. She
could not reliably answer questions regarding the specifics of the content or form of her
experience, and continued to be easily persuaded as she was during other interview days.
She also could not orient her self to the moment of the beep exactly.
When asking questions about form throughout Karen’s interviews, she responded in a
way that suggested that she did not understand the question. Almost every time she
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would return to talking about the content of the beep or reality as it related to her inner
experience.
Below are two examples of the six samples taken from day three that are
representative of that day:
Beep 3.1 – At the moment of the beep, Karen was in the act of talking about people from
Pennsylvania and their idiosyncratic language. Before asking about Karen’s inner
experience, which is is the usual DES procedure and had been the procedure on the first
two sampling days, the interviewer asked Karen what she was doing when the beep
sounded. This question allowed the interviewer to determine if Karen had the ability to
accurately report her behavior at the moment of the beep (which was observed by the
interviewer and therefore verifiable). Karen was able to respond correctly in general
(discussing if people from Pennsylvania have a language of their own) but could not
identify her exact words or where within those words the beep fell. Then the investigator
inquired about Karen’s experience at the moment of the beep. Karen frequently changed
her reports about her inner experience at the moment of the beep, but her reports always
had something to do with Pennsylvania and/or people who live in Pennsylvania. She
alternately agreed with many of the suggestions the interviewer made regarding her
experience at the moment of the beep (how people in Pennsylvania dress, thinking about
children in Pennsylvania, trying to explain to her daughter the different cultures in
Pennsylvania). Karen could not focus on the exact moment of the beep, nor could she
answer any questions related to form. Therefore, her reports of this experience did not
seem trustworthy.
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Beep 3.2 – Karen was reading. She reported that she was thinking about the wedding in
Jerusalem she was reading about at the moment of the beep. When asked a question
about the form of this experience, she stated that she was thinking about her daughter’s
wedding. She then returned to saying that she was thinking about the wedding in the
book. Next, she said she was thinking about both. These changes all occurred within a
minute of one another and were largely influenced by details in the interviewer’s
questions. The interviewer repeatedly tried to orient her to the moment of the beep.
Karen stated that she could not orient herself to the exact moment, but could comment on
what was in her awareness near the moment of the beep (within a few seconds). She also
stated that she was comparing her daughter’s wedding to the one in the book near the
book. This inconsistency makes her report of this sample unreliable.

Discussion
It seems clear from sampling with Karen for three days that she could not adequately
complete the task. Her difficulties occurred on a variety of levels (i.e., difficulty focusing
on the moment of the beep, focusing on external reality rather than inner experience, not
being able to answer questions about form, etc.). The majority of these difficulties may
be directly related to Karen’s cognitive difficulties, specifically with working memory
and attention, as demonstrated by the MMSE. Although Karen improved somewhat
when memory demands were reduced by interviewing her directly after the beep, she still
was not able to adequately complete the task, suggesting cognitive deficits other than
memory interfering with her ability to do the task. Below are some speculations
regarding Karen’s inner experience and ability to perform the DES task:
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1. Although it appears to be an unlikely possibility, Karen may not have understood
the DES task. Although Karen had difficulty understanding the task at first, she seemed
to understand it fairly well on the third day of sampling.
2. Karen may not have been able to narrow her focus to the moment of the beep, and
thus could not give reliable reports. This appears to be a likely partial explanation for
Karen’s difficulties. She often directly reported that she could not report what was
occurring in her inner experience at the moment of the beep, but instead what was near
the moment of the beep. Her reports also fluctuated frequently, suggesting the possibility
that she was reporting on a time frame significantly larger than a “moment.”
3. Karen may not have inner experience. This is a significant possibility. Individuals
who seem to have difficulty understanding the DES procedure and reporting inner
experience often seem to not have inner experience. Karen’s inability to discuss form
and the fact that she was easily led by the interviewers is often possible evidence for a
lack of inner experience.
4. Karen may lack inner experience in some way. It is possible that Karen has some
inner experience, but that it lacks clarity and/or differentiation or is rarely present. This
would likely make the DES procedure quite difficult. Again, the fact that Karen could
not adequately discuss form and was easily led suggests that her inner experience may be
lacing in some way.
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CHAPTER 15

IMPAIRED PARTICIPANT “LILLY"
Lilly was a 92 year old woman who was diagnosed with AD in 2001 and has a
Master’s degree. The interviewer met her and her daughter at an assisted living facility in
Ohio designed specifically for individuals with AD where Lilly lives. Lilly and her
daughter were very willing to be engaged in the study.
After briefly explaining the DES procedure, both Lilly and her daughter signed the
consent form (Lilly’s daughter has power of attorney for Lilly). Lilly had significant
difficulty signing the document as she is legally blind and exhibited some substantial
short term memory impairment during the early stages of this initial meeting, such as
forgetting the interviewer’s name and the content of a very recent conversation.
Lilly was then given the MMSE. She received a score of 19, suggesting the presence
moderate dementia. She had the most difficulty with time orientation, only knowing the
season but not the year, date, day of the week, or month. She also had significant
problems with delayed recall. When asked if she remembered the three words the
interviewer had her repeat approximately one minute prior, she said that she did not even
remember that the interviewer had her repeat three words. Lilly did very well with
attention and calculation, spelling “world” backward with relative ease, although she later
forgot that she had done so. Lilly could not write a sentence or copy a design, but this
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may have been at least partially due to Lilly’s vision impairment. Therefore, Lilly’s
MMSE score may slightly underestimate her cognitive ability.
Lilly then immediately underwent the DES process in the presence of the interviewer
and her two daughters. While she wore the beeper, she conversed with her daughters
while the interviewer waited nearby.
At the first beep, Lilly and her daughters were discussing a television commercial that
one of their relatives was recently in. Lilly stated that she was paying attention to what
her daughters were saying at the moment of the beep, but could not recall what they were
saying. When asked what she was experiencing at the moment of the beep, Lilly did not
think that she was experiencing anything, but was not certain.
After this beep, the interviewer asked Lilly to visually imagine her childhood house.
After she stated that she was innerly seeing it, the interviewer asked Lilly to report what
she was seeing in her picture. She said that the picture was not very clear, although it
was not fuzzy. She could not describe exactly how it was not clear. She was seeing the
front corner of the outside of the house so that she could see both the front and side of the
house. There seemed to be two doors and two windows in her inner seeing. The house
was “sort of green.” At one point she said that she was seeing a garage of a faded rust
color, but later did not indicate that this was in her inner seeing when asked. Later,
Lilly’s daughter volunteered that what Lilly was describing was not accurate, that it
sounded like a conglomeration of houses: her childhood house, a house she lived at as an
adult, and her sister’s house. This is not evidence against the validity of Lilly’s
description as she very well could have combined these places in her inner seeing.
However, she had many inconsistencies throughout the description which suggests that
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she may have not been innerly seeing at all or if she was it was not very detailed or clear,
or was transient.
The interviewer and Lilly’s daughters heard the second beep before Lilly responded.
It seemed to be sounding for about 5 seconds when it was brought to Lilly’s attention.
This is interesting in that Lilly exhibited no or very little hearing problems for the hour
the interviewer spent with her. When the interviewer asked what she was experiencing
right before he brought the fact that the beeper was sounding to her attention, she stated
that she was thinking that she had forgotten she had the beeper on. The interviewer
pointed out that this must have come after the beep. When asked what was in her
experience just prior to the beep, Lilly stated that she did not know. Although Lilly’s
auditory processing appeared intact, Lilly did not seem to be processing the beep on this
occasion, at least enough to elicit a response.
On day two, Lilly did not remember the interviewer, although they had spent
approximately 2 hours together 5 days earlier. She also did not remember anything about
the DES process. Nevertheless, Lilly was very willing to engage in the study after it was
described again to her.
In order to minimize distractions, sampling occurred in Lilly’s room. The interviewer
sat with Lilly throughout the process. There were some minimal distractions as the door
to Lilly’s room remained open and some noise in the facility could be heard, but this
noise was minor and did not seem to distract her. However, between the second and third
beeps, a resident of the facility came into Lilly’s room. The interviewer called this to a
staff member’s attention, but she said that it was normal and Lilly was not distracted by
him, although he stayed in the room for the remainder of the session.

251

Prior to the first beep, the interviewer turned Lilly’s beeper on and off to ensure that
she could hear the beeper. Every time the beeper was turned on, Lilly stated that she
could hear it. She also appeared to have fairly normal hearing during conversation.
Nevertheless, Lilly did not respond at all to the first beep (beep 2.1). The second beep
(beep 2.2) also did not elicit a response. It occurred while Lilly was talking to the
interviewer, saying something like “Some kids (beep) at the Montessori School…” In
both cases, the interviewer allowed the beeper to beep continuously for approximately 1
minute, but Lilly still did not respond.
Beep 2.3 also occurred while Lilly was talking (saying something like “It’s good for
the children.”). When asked she stated that she was puzzled at the moment of the beep.
When asked what she was puzzled about, she stated that she was puzzled about the
questions that the interviewer was asking. This seems unlikely because the interviewer
was not asking her any questions at the moment of the beep, although she could have
been ruminating about the questions that the interviewer asks and the purpose of the
study. When asked, Lilly stated that there were no words or images in this experience,
that she was just puzzled. She later stated that she was wondering what the beep meant
when it sounded, but this was clearly a reaction to the beep.
Lilly could not remember what she was experiencing for the fourth beep (beep 2.4).
At this moment, Lilly was sitting quietly while the interviewer was answering a question
posed by the gentleman in Lilly’s room. It is notable that it took Lilly about 5 seconds to
respond to this beep.
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Discussion
Sampling with Lilly was suspended after the second day. It did not appear possible to
learn anything about her inner experience using the DES method. However, the obstacles
experienced with Lilly may have lent some insight into difficulties using DES on
individuals with moderate dementia. First, on three out of six occasions Lilly did not
respond to the beep at all. This is especially interesting because Lilly had good hearing
and if she did have hearing problems they were relatively minor. It appeared that the
processing of the beep became compromised in a manner that did not involve hearing
directly. A lack of this ability is a major obstacle to engaging effectively in the DES
procedure as processing and responding to the beep is perhaps the most basic ability
needed to engage in DES. Second, severe memory problems made sampling with Lilly
nearly impossible. The training process would be very difficult (if not impossible) as
Lilly could not remember what the beeper was for, or that she even underwent the
process previously. It is possible that some implicit learning took place, but even this is
not enough to overcome her severe memory problems. It is likely that this would be a
difficulty that would be hard to overcome with people at her stage of dementia. Third,
Lilly also had difficulty remembering what was in her experience at the moment of the
beep even though she was interviewed immediately after the beep. This again is a very
basic ability that is needed to begin to engage in the DES process. In spite of all of
Lilly’s cognitive difficulties it is still quite possible that she lacks inner experience based
on the results of some of the other participants in this study. However, this is a
speculation given that Lilly was nowhere near producing reliable reports of inner
experience.
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CHAPTER 16

ACROSS PARTICIPANTS RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
The Ability of Older Individuals to Participate in DES
This study was designed to investigate the inner experience of older individuals with
and without cognitive impairment. There have been no prior DES studies of older
individuals and therefore there was no guarantee than any of the participants would be
able to produce reports of momentary inner experience that the researchers would take to
be reliable. In order to discover anything about an individual’s inner experience via DES
he or she must first have the cognitive, linguistic, and sensory abilities to understand the
task, hear and respond to the beep, and describe momentary inner experience. Table 7
briefly summarizes each participant’s MMSE score, diagnosis, and DES performance:
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Table 7
Participants’ ability to do DES
Participant
MMSE/Diagnosis
Ability to Perform DES?
Anna
30/None
Yes
Benjamin
30/None
Yes
Clara
30/None
Yes
Dolly
30/None
Yes
Ellen
30/None
Some
Fay
30/None
No
Gary
29/VaD
Yes
Henry
29/VaD
No
Irving
27/MCI
No
June
23/MCI
No
No
Karen
21/Nonea
Lilly
19/AD
No
a
Although Karen had no official diagnosis she had clear cognitive impairment and at
least had MCI although there was the possibility of the presence of another age-related
neurodegenerative disorder.

DES Performance and Diagnosis
As can be seen in Table 7, four of the six non-diagnosed participants (Anna,
Benjamin, Clara, and Dolly) had no more than typical problems producing reliable
reports of momentary inner experience. Benjamin and Clara were especially adept at
DES. Benjamin was able to narrow his conception of “moment of the beep” to a very
small period of time and was very detailed in his descriptions. Clara was able to produce
reliable reports from the first day of sampling to the last. Anna and Dolly’s ability to
peform the DES task successfully was fairly typical. Therefore it is clear that at least
some older individuals can participate in DES adequately.
However, Ellen and Fay, two individuals who had no diagnosis of age-related
cognitive impairment and no observable cognitive impairment (MMSE of 30) had
substantial difficulty engaging successfully in DES. Although some younger individuals
cannot engage successfully in DES it would be unlikely that two out of six would not be
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able to do so. Ellen produced questionable although not uniformly unreliable reports
during all six of her sampling days even though she did not have an age-related
neurodegenerative diagnosis, scored a perfect 30 out of 30 on the MMSE, and did not
exhibit any obvious cognitive, linguistic, or sensory impairments in casual conversation.
She was frequently contradictory in her reports and had an especially difficult time
describing the form of her experience. Her reports were often disorganized and she
routinely became frustrated with the persistent questions of the interviewers. Ellen’s
DES difficulty could represent some underlying cognitive impairment that is common in
normal aging. For example, her disorganization could represent problems with executive
function, a common area of deficit in normal aging even for individuals who show no
impairment on the MMSE (Royall et al., 2000).
Fay’s reports were entirely unreliable throughout all sampling days even though she
scored a perfect 30 on the MMSE and exhibited no apparent cognitive impairment. This
pattern continued even when she was interviewed directly after the beep. Her reports
exhibited substantial inconsistency, she seemingly could not narrow her focus to the
moment of the beep, and she often reported external reality rather than inner experience
when interviewed. These problems continued even when Fay was interviewed
immediately after the beep (thus reducing potential problems with memory). Because
Fay exhibited no noticeable cognitive problems outside of DES, a cognitive explanation
for her difficulties is not easy, although it is possible that DES is sensitive to a cognitive
impairment that is not readily observable via the MMSE or in casual conversation. It is
also possible that the struggles of both Ellen and Fay are due to some aspect of their inner
experience. This possibility is discussed in more detail below.
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Only one of the six individuals with cognitive impairment was able to engage
successfully in DES. Gary, a 70 year-old male with a diagnosis of VaD and a 29 on the
MMSE had some substantial difficulties during the first 2 days of sampling but produced
consistent and seemingly reliable reports starting on the third day of sampling. Thus the
presence of an age-related neurodegenerative diagnosis does not categorically rule out the
use of DES. However, the other five impaired individuals did not produce a single
reliable report.
Henry, like Gary, had a 29 on the MMSE (suggesting very little or no cognitive
impairment) and a diagnosis of VaD. However, unlike Gary, Henry could not produce
any reliable reports on any of his samples. He frequently reported generalizations about
himself and his inner experience rather than momentary inner experience, and his reports
were easily influenced by the interviewers. His reports were nearly always either directly
contradictory or inconsistent. He also could not seem to narrow his focus to the moment
of the beep, frequently reporting what occurred a few seconds before and after the beep.
Thus two individuals, both with a diagnosis of VaD and both with a score of 29 on
the MMSE, differed greatly in their ability to engage in DES adequately. This is perhaps
not surprising because the cognitive effects of VaD are highly variable (Poore et al.,
2006) and they are dependent on where in the brain the vascular event or events have
occurred (Roman et al., 2004; Cummings & Benson, 1992). It is not known where Gary
and Henry’s cerebrovascular events had occurred. The variability between the adequacy
of Gary’s and Henry’s reports could be due to cognitive impairment related to VaD,
cognitive impairment not related to VaD, or some other factor that did not involve
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cognitive impairment at all. For example, Henry may have had difficulty engaging in
DES even prior to his cerebrovascular event.
Because diagnosis of VaD is often brought about by a specific event (i.e., a stroke),
diagnosis often happens before pervasive cognitive impairment occurs. This potentially
makes investigation of the inner experience of individuals with VaD more fruitful than
with AD. Furthermore, although the cognitive symptoms of VaD are highly
heterogeneous among individuals, there tends to be less memory impairment in VaD
compared to AD, although there also tends to be more executive functioning deficiency
in VaD compared to AD. It is possible that participation in DES is highly sensitive to
problems with memory functioning but not as sensitive to problems with executive
functioning, although this is highly speculative. Further use of DES with both diseases is
necessary in order to come to a firm conclusion on these issues.
The two individuals with MCI (Irving and June) could not give adequate DES reports.
Irving apparently never reported momentary inner experience and had substantial
difficulty following instructions required in DES. Sometimes he did not respond to the
beep at all. June also could not follow DES instructions and often had difficulty
responding to the beep. Her difficulties with DES appeared more substantial than
Irving’s despite the fact that she could interact very well socially with only occasional
signs of memory impairment. In responding to DES beeps, she often described external
reality as opposed to inner experience, and frequently became frustrated with consistent
attempts to probe inner experience. On one hand these results are not surprising, as
individuals with MCI are susceptible to numerous cognitive impairments such as
memory, executive function, and linguistic problems (Petersen, 2003) that would likely

258

have an adverse affect on DES. However, given June’s lack of cognitive, linguistic, and
social disturbance on the MMSE and in everyday conversation it is surprising that she
had such significant difficulty with DES and was never close to producing a reliable
report of inner experience. This again suggests that the ability to perform DES is highly
sensitive to cognitive disturbance.
Although Karen was not diagnosed with an age-related neurodegenerative disorder
she received the second lowest score on the MMSE (21) of all individuals in this study.
This score suggests moderate cognitive impairment. Karen had particular difficulty with
the attention and working memory sections of the MMSE, and her difficulties could be
seen clinically, even though they had not been diagnosed. Because attention and working
memory are important when engaging in the DES process, it is not surprising that Karen
could not produce reliable DES reports. Karen’s problems with DES occurred on a
number of levels such as difficulty focusing on the moment of the beep, discussing
external reality rather than her inner experience during interviews, and having particular
difficulties with questions about form.
Therefore, the two individuals with MCI and the one individual with at least MCI
could not produce a single reliable report of inner experience via DES. This is a very
small sample, so it does not, of course, rule out the possibility that some individuals with
MCI might be able to participate adequately in the DES process. These three individuals
seemingly had enough verbal fluency, working memory, attention, and conceptual ability
to perform the DES task but still could not produce a single reliable DES report. The
likelihood that individuals with MCI are able to engage in DES meaningfully compared
to individuals with AD is much greater as there are, by definition, fewer cognitive deficits
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and a higher level of functioning in MCI compared to AD. Still, because none of these
individuals produced a single reliable sample it is possible that very few individuals with
MCI can peform the DES task successfully because even some older individuals with
apparently no cognitive impairment had significant problems doing DES. Therefore, it is
likely that only a small percentage of individuals with MCI could peform the DES task
adequately.
Finally, Lilly had by far the most difficulty with DES. Lilly was diagnosed with AD
in 2001 and received a score of 19 on the MMSE suggesting moderate dementia. Lilly’s
cognitive deficiencies made it impossible for her to learn the DES process as she often
could not remember recent conversations. She also could not maintain any memories of
what occurred at the moment of the beep even when interviewed immediately after the
moment of the beep.
It is unwise to generalize from a single case, but Lilly had such substantial difficulty
with DES that it suggests that individuals who are impaired enough to receive a diagnosis
of AD may not be able to peform the DES task successfully. DES requires cognitive
skills that are likely to have been depleted even before the earliest clinical stages of AD.
For example, DES requires the use of episodic memory (i.e., remembering one’s
momentary experience from the near past), organization and inhibition (i.e., making
distinctions between what was in inner experience at the moment of the beep rather than
near the moment of the beep, what was actually in one’s awareness rather than one’s
preconceptions about inner experience, and distinguishing between what was in one’s
inner experience and what was in one’s environment that was not in inner experience),
and language (i.e., being able to report adequately what was in one’s inner experience at
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the moment of the beep). All of these factors may have had a role in Lilly’s difficulty
with DES. However, Lilly’s memory impairment was most noteworthy. For example,
during the administration of the delayed recall portion of the MMSE where individuals
are asked to recall three words that were read to the participant about a minute prior, Lilly
did not remember that the interviewer read three words to her. This extreme
degeneration of memory clearly interfered with the DES procedure as this individual
could not remember the DES procedure and repeatedly inquired about the reason the
interviewer was asking her questions.
It is significant that even though she had mild to moderate AD, Lilly received a
diagnosis of AD approximately 7 years prior to engaging in DES. Perhaps if she engaged
in DES shortly after diagnosis she would have been able to meaningfully participate in
the procedure. Clearly more research with individuals diagnosed with AD is important to
fully answer this question, specifically with individuals who are in the very early stages
of the disease. Even though only one individual in this study had AD she was so far away
from successfully engaging in DES that it seems possible that very few individuals with
enough cognitive impairment to be diagnosed with AD could adequately engage in DES.
Still, this conclusion is highly tentative as Lilly is the only individual with AD to ever try
DES.
It is clear that there was a high amount of variability across participants in their
ability to produce reliable reports of momentary inner experience. This variability is not
surprising as there is substantial variability in cognitive abilities across older individuals
and this variability increases with age (Christensen, 2001; Hedden & Gabrieli, 2004).
This variability is also expected because individuals in this study had a wide range of
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type and extent of cognitive impairment. Furthermore, DES requires some basic
cognitive abilities that are commonly impaired in both normal aging and in individuals
with age-related neurodegenerative disorders such as episodic memory, learning, and
expressive language ability. Therefore, some difficulties in performing the DES
procedure adequately are expected even in the unimpaired participants.
However, it should not be assumed that the variability in the production of reliable
reports is entirely explained by variability in cognitive abilities across these participants.
For example, Gary received a 29 on the MMSE and was diagnosed with VaD but seemed
to be able to produce reliable reports of momentary inner experience by the third day of
sampling. However, Ellen and Fay each scored a perfect 30 on the MMSE, did not have
a diagnosis of a neurodegenerative disorder, and did not exhibit any cognitive impairment
outside of DES. Nevertheless, Ellen could not consistently produce reliable reports of
inner experience while Fay was entirely unable to produce reliable reports. The MMSE
is somewhat of a crude instrument in terms of detecting cognitive impairment so it is
certainly possible that Fay and Ellen have cognitive impairment, but they exhibited no
signs of cognitive impairment other than their DES performance.
Likewise, Henry, who had the same MMSE score as Gary (29) and the same
diagnosis (VaD), could not produce a single reliable report of inner experience. Both of
these individuals displayed no cognitive impairment in casual conversation although both
of their spouses observed some mild to moderate impairment in their husbands.
Therefore, what separates older individuals who can peform the DES task successfully,
who can do it with some difficulty, and who cannot seem to do it at all remains unclear.
Some possibilities include subtle deficits in cognitive functions such as memory,

262

executive functioning, and language, sensory problems that make processing the beep
difficult, and a degradation of some or all aspects of inner experience itself. There may
be other possibilities, but further investigation is needed to determine this.
DES and MMSE score
It is also likely that DES is extremely sensitive to cognitive impairment. Although
more research with older individuals needs to be done to make a definitive conclusion, it
appears that the ability to peform the DES task successfully may go from one hundred
percent to zero percent at some point around an MMSE score of 29 or 30. Therefore, the
MMSE may be a useful screening tool in ruling out individuals who cannot peform the
DES task successfully. The four individuals who could peform the DES task successfully
with no more than normal difficulties had MMSE scores of 30. The one individual who
experienced only slightly more difficulty had a score of 29 on the MMSE. Shiela
produced some reliable reports and had an MMSE score of 30. The other six individuals
produced no reliable samples. The MMSE scores of these individuals were 30, 29, 27,
23, 21, and 19. Therefore the four individuals with the lowest MMSE scores could not
peform the DES task successfully and no one with a score lower than 29 could peform
the DES task successfully. This suggests that only individuals who score in the high 20’s
or 30 on the MMSE can peform the DES task successfully while those in the midtwenties and below may not be able to peform the DES task successfully.
DES and memory disturbance
Because memory deficits are known to be common in the population from which the
participants in this study were drawn, whenever a participant had such substantial
difficulty producing reliable reports via DES an attempt was made to minimize the DES
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memory requirements by altering the standard DES procedure to interview participants
immediately after each beep. These individuals included Fay, Henry, Irving, June,
Karen, and Lilly. However, interviewing immediately after the beep produced no
improvements in DES performance: not a single participant appeared to benefit from this
alteration. This significantly reduces the probability that failure in prolonged long-term
memory storage was a reason for these individuals’ inability to engage in DES.
Failure or delay in responding
At times some participants (Irving, June, and Lilly) were delayed in responding to the
beep or did not respond to the beep at all. Irving, June, and Lilly showed few or no signs
of problems with hearing. Irving wore a hearing aid and demonstrated some hearing
problems but they were mild. All of these participants, at times, had more difficulty than
would be expected responding to the beep in relation to their level of hearing. One
explanation for this is that there is some difficulty with central auditory processing
(CAP).
CAP refers to one’s ability to process auditory information independent of the ability
to hear (Davignon & Leshowitz, 1986). CAP is largely controlled by auditory
association areas in the cortex. CAP difficulties are present in elderly individuals at an
increased rate of approximately 50 percent compared to non-elderly individuals (Strouse,
Hall, & Burger, 1995). CAP typically decreases somewhat during the fifth and sixth
decades, but often declines sharply in the seventh decade (Humes & Christopherson,
1991). Difficulties with CAP in older individuals and with individuals with AD are often
cited as at least partial explanations for difficulties with auditory memory and auditory
learning (Lund, 1997).
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Older adults with mild to moderate cognitive deficiencies often show a slowed preconscious brain response to auditory information (Pekkonen et al., 1999). Older
individuals, and even more so individuals with AD, often have deficiencies in
communication between the cerebral hemispheres. This may cause auditory information
from one ear to be processed inefficiently in the opposite hemisphere (Pekkonen et al.,
1995). EEG responses to a tone that modulates from 875 to 1175 Hz are different even in
middle adulthood compared to early adulthood (Poulsen, Picton, & Paus, 2007).
Difficulties with CAP and its underlying biological abnormalities could both help
explain the problems that some individuals in the current study. Lilly and Irving both had
incidences where they did not respond to the beep at all. June consistently had delays in
her responses. It is certainly possible that these individuals have problems with CAP that
translate to the successful processing of the beep despite relatively normal hearing,
especially since they each exhibited some cognitive deficiencies.
Aging deficits in hearing are often frequency-specific. That is, age-related hearing
loss begins with high frequencies, such as 2,000 hertz and higher (Helzner et al., 1995).
In one large study with over 2,000 participants with a mean age of 77.5 years, 77 percent
exhibited hearing loss with frequencies over 2,000 hertz (Helzner et al., 1995). Still, 60
percent of these individuals exhibited hearing loss between 500 and 2,000 hertz.
However, the 500 to 2000 hertz frequencies were tested at 25 decibels, approximately the
sound of a whisper or a quiet library. It is impossible to tell exactly where the volume of
the beeper was set with each participant, although it was either at the maximum level or
near the maximum level in those participants who had difficulty responding. Still, in
each of these cases, the decibel level of the beep was at least 60, which is the level of
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normal conversation and much louder than those tones used in the study above.
Although it is possible that those individuals who had difficulty responding to the beep
had hearing loss that affected the 700 hertz frequency it is unlikely as hearing loss at such
a frequency would likely be readily apparent in normal conversation.
Deficiencies in attention and inhibition could also help explain some of the problems
that some participants had responding to the beeper. Substantial deficits with attention
and inhibition are well documented in AD (see Perry & Hodges, 1999 for a review).
Specifically, deficiencies in switching attention seem to be the first that are evident and
the most substantial in AD (Norman & Shallice, 1987). Attention deficits can be seen in
normal aging as well (Pignatti et al., 2005). Although only 1 participant in the study was
actually diagnosed with AD, the others who had difficulty responding to the beep all
experienced some cognitive impairment that could be a pre-cursor to AD or other form of
dementia.
DES requires one to not only pay attention to the beep itself, but to switch attention
from what was being attended to before the beep, to the beep, then to inner experience
that was occurring before the beep. Although this may not explain situations in which
participants did not respond at all, it certainly could explain instances in which response
to the beep was slow. Furthermore, this slowness could help explain inaccuracies,
inconsistencies, and other difficulties exhibited by many of the individuals with cognitive
impairment in the current study.
A general slowing in cognitive processing is well documented in normal aging and
significantly in AD. Some propose that many of the cognitive deficiencies associated
with AD are due to a general slowing in processing speed (Baddeley et al., 2001).
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Because DES requires instant, immediate retrospection, any slowing in cognition could
make this process more difficult. If participants were experiencing a general slowing of
cognitive processing, this could not only explain a delayed reaction to the beep, but also
difficulty performing the task adequately.
Although there is some conflicting research, it appears that reaction time is also
compromised in individuals with AD, VaD (Mendez, Cherrier, & Perryman, 1997), and
normal elderly individuals, and is often viewed as a sign of a decrease in executive
functioning (DiFabio et al., 2005). Muller, Richter, Weisbold, and Klingberg (1991)
found that individuals with mild dementia showed a 23 percent increase in response time
to visual stimuli (flashes) and a 34 percent increase in time to respond to auditory stimuli
(clicks) compared to normal elderly controls. However, healthy controls did not show
increases in RT in these two conditions compared to healthy younger controls, although
they did have a 49 percent increase in RT in when asked to respond to complex visual
stimuli (i.e., participants respond only when a four digit display showed all zeros). DES
is a task that requires participants to react to the beep quickly. Therefore, a deficiency in
reaction time in older individuals and individuals with mild AD could compromise the
success of undergoing the DES process.
Learning difficulties are also common in AD, and to a lesser extent, normal aging.
Specifically, auditory learning is compromised in normal aging, perhaps due to
deficiencies in working memory (for a review, see Lund, 1997). Individuals who had
difficulty in this study appeared to benefit little from repeated exposure to DES,
suggesting that learning was not adequately taking place. However, this lack of learning
could be due to a variety of things, such as inflexible pre-suppositions, the absence of

267

inner experience, and/or the lack of differentiated inner experience. Nevertheless,
learning difficulties could also be a partial explanation for the difficulties these
individuals experienced.
Summary
To summarize, the following things were learned about the ability of older
individuals with and without cognitive impairment to perform DES:
1. Some older individuals are easily able to peform the DES task successfully.
2. There is substantial variability among older individuals with apparently intact
cognitive functioning regarding ability to peform the DES task successfully. Many
individuals in this group could peform the DES task successfully with no problems while
some could not produce a single reliable report.
3. Some individuals with VaD can peform the DES task successfully while some
apparently cannot. Because some individuals with VaD are able to peform the DES task
successfully it may be fruitful to explore the inner experience of this population in the
future via DES.
4. Individuals with MCI likely have significant difficulty engaging successfully in
DES and none in this study could produce a single reliable report. It is likely that only a
small percentage of individuals with MCI can peform the DES task successfully although
more research is needed in this area.
5. Individuals with AD may not be able to peform the DES task successfully. The
level of cognitive impairment that is needed for a diagnosis of AD may be too much to
overcome to peform the DES task successfully but more investigation is needed to make
a definitive statement.
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6. The ability to peform the DES task successfully is related to MMSE score. It
appears that only individuals who score in the high 20’s and above on the MMSE can
peform the DES task successfully, but this conclusion is tentative due to small sample
size.
7. Eliminating a time delay between the beep and the interview has no beneficial
effect on the reports of those who had difficulty doing DES, suggesting that memory
impairment is not the only obstacle to this population in terms of engaging in DES
successfully.
8. Based on older individuals’ ability to peform the DES task successfully, DES may
be useful as a very sensitive instrument to detect cognitive impairment; more research is
needed in this area.
9. Some cognitively impaired individuals periodically have difficulty responding to
the beep quickly or at all. There are many potential explanations of this. Further
investigation is needed to make a conclusion as to why this might happen.

The Inner Experience of Older Individuals Who Could Peform the DES Task Successfully
This study had two goals: to explore the use of DES with older individuals
(discussed above), and to explore the inner experience of older individuals with and
without cognitive impairment, to which we now turn. We will approach this by
considering first the characteristics of inner experience of those individuals who could
perform the DES task and then speculating about the characteristics of inner experience
of those who could not perform the DES task.
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Six of the twelve participants produced some apparently reliable reports of inner
experience. Table 8 gives the frequencies of forms of experience across these six older
individuals as well as the frequencies found in a group of younger individuals:

Table 8
Percentage of characteristics across older and college-age
individuals
Characteristic
Percentage in Older
Percentage in Youngera
Feeling
20
26
Feeling Fact of Body
2
<3
Inner Seeing
14
34
Imageless Seeing
1
<3
Inner Hearing
0
<3
Inner Speech
16
26
Just Doing
3
<3
Just Talking
1
<3
Laughing
1
<3
No Inner Experience
2
<3
Sensory Awareness
21
22
Unsymbolized Thinking
39
22
Unvocalized Inner Speech
4
<3
Worded Thinking
14
<3
Multiple Awareness
30
4b
Number of samples
133
Total number of
209.5
characteristicsc
Characteristics per sample
1.58
a
Percentages taken from Hurlburt and Heavey (2008)
b
Value comes from Hurlburt and Heavey (2008) but was not reported (personal
communication)
c
Total number of characteristics excludes categories that are not directly experienced (in
this case, Feeling Fact of Body, Just Doing, Just Talking, Laughing, No Inner
Experience, and Multiple Awareness), and counts uncertain instances as .5.

The following discussion of these characteristics must be regarded as highly
speculative. There were very few participants in this study (six were able to participate in
DES effectively), and this was by no means a random sample from the population of
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older individuals. Nevertheless, it may be instructive to compare and contrast these
individuals’ experiences to those reported by Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).
Similarities between older and younger adults
Some of the older individuals in this study (Anna and Dolly, and to a lesser extent,
Clara and Benjamin) apparently have inner experience very similar to that of younger
individuals, including high clarity and differentiation of form and a wide range of form
and content in inner experience. The five most common forms of inner experience that
have been found in younger individuals (inner seeing, inner speech, unsymbolized
thinking, feeling, and sensory awareness; Heavey & Hurlburt, 2008) were also the five
most common in the current population (inner seeing and worded thinking were tied for
fifth in frequency).
Unsymbolized thinking
However, there were differences between the inner experience of the older
individuals in this study and the younger individuals in Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008)
study. For example, unsymbolized thinking occurred in 39 percent of samples in this
study compared to 22 percent in the college students in Heavey and Hurlburt (2008).
Gary was the only individual of the six who could produce reliable reports who
experienced unsymbolized thinking in less than 33 percent of his samples (8 percent) and
less than the average of the younger individuals. Unsymbolized thinking was the most
common form of experience in three of the six individuals who could produce reliable
reports (Clara, Dolly, and Ellen). Therefore, a high rate of unsymbolized thinking may
be more common in older individuals than in younger individuals.
Symbolic experience
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There was a relatively low frequency of symbolic experience in the current study.
As discussed above, the most common form of inner experience was by far unsymbolized
thinking, and the two symbolized forms of inner experience, inner seeing and inner
speech, occurred less frequently in this sample than in the Heavey and Hurlburt (2008)
sample of young adults.
The frequency of inner seeing among our older adults was 14 percent, a much lower
rate than in younger individuals (34 percent). Clara’s 26 percent was the highest
frequency in this study, less than the average of the younger individuals. Clara and Gary
were the only people in this study to have inner seeings in more than 20 percent of their
samples. Dolly and Benjamin had no experiences of inner seeing. This suggests that
inner seeing may be somewhat uncommon in the majority of older individuals.
Furthermore, the visual symbols themselves—the things innerly seen—were, in the
majority of the older-adult samples, less detailed than the symbols of younger adults: the
older adults’ inner seeings lacked detail, clarity, and/or color. Anna was the only
participant that consistently had inner seeings that were clear and fully detailed on a
consistent basis. Clara had clear and detailed inner seeings on nine occasions but they
lacked color, all being either in black and white (eight of the nine inner seeings) or brown
and white (one of the nine inner seeings). Ellen reported three inner seeings but had
substantial difficulty describing details in two of them, leading to speculation that either
these were not seeings at all or that they were seeings with the symbolic aspect
substantially weakened. She was very unsure if there was an inner seeing at all in the
third instance. Gary reported six inner seeings but only two of the reports were clear and
convincing and only one of them was in color (the others being in black and white). The
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other four occurred on the same day, all while Gary was doing a crossword puzzle and
the inner seeings were all said to be of the crossword puzzle but lacked detail.
Older individuals in this study also had a substantially lower frequency (16 percent)
of the other major form of symbolic experience (inner speech) compared to younger
individuals (26 percent). Clara had the highest frequency of inner speech (30 percent).
Gary and Benjamin did not have any occurrences of inner speech. However, Gary and
Benjamin had verbal experiences that were not inner speech. Gary experienced worded
thinking during 69 percent of his samples. Benjamin experienced unvocalized inner
speech during 28 percent of his samples and worded thinking during five percent of his
samples. Benjamin was the only individual to experience unvocalized inner speech.
Clara and Ellen also experienced worded thinking on 11 and 7 percent of their samples,
respectively. Worded thinking was experienced in 14 percent and unvocalized speech in
four percent of the overall samples. Worded thinking and unvocalized inner speech were
each present in less than three percent of samples in Heavey and Hurlburt’s 2008 study of
young adults.
It is notable that worded thinking and unvocalized inner speech are similar to the
more common inner speech but are missing the inner perceptually direct access to the
symbols that is usually present in inner speech. Worded thinking is essentially the
presence of words in experience that are not spoken and do not have auditory qualities.
Benjamin’s unvocalized inner speech was very similar to inner speech except that it
occurred very quickly and had no auditory qualities. Therefore, the relatively low
frequency of inner speech and high frequencies of worded thinking and unvocalized inner
speech represent the tendency of older individuals in this study to have verbal
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experiences where the symbolic aspect, a typically present feature sometimes assumed to
be ubiquitous, is partially or completely absent.
Thus both symbolic forms of inner experience (inner seeing and inner speech) were
less common in this sample compared to younger individuals. When symbolic
experience did occur in either form, it often lacked the inner perceptual details, clarity,
and particular aspects that are common in younger adults. Inner seeings frequently
lacked color. This was the case in the majority of Clara’s and Gary’s inner seeings.
Irving also reported some black and white inner seeings although his reports were
deemed unreliable. Inner words frequently lacked the perceptual characteristics of
speech. This suggests that older individuals may not have as much fully detailed
symbolic experience as younger individuals. Fully detailed symbolic experience (i.e.,
inner seeing and inner speech) occurred in 60 percent of Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008)
college-aged sample but only 30 percent of this sample, or substantially less when one
subtracts the questionable occurrences and the black and white inner seeings. It is
possible that symbolic experience becomes less detailed as individuals move into old age
but a similar study to the current study that is longitudinal in nature would be needed to
verify this speculation.
Multiple awareness
Multiple awareness was much more common in this sample (30 percent) compared to
Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) younger sample (4 percent). Although all of the
participants experienced multiple awareness in this study by far the most were
experienced by Benjamin and Anna. Benjamin had multiple awareness in 79 percent of
his samples while Anna had it in 54 percent of her samples. The two lowest frequencies
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of multiple awareness were Clara and Dolly with nine and six percent, respectively. Thus
the lowest percentage in this study was higher than the average rate of four percent in
Heavey and Hurlburt’s (2008) study of young adults.
The greater frequency of multiple awareness in this study might be related to the lack
of details in symbolic experience also found in this sample. Both may represent a lack of
focus of inner experience. It is possible that the scope of inner experience of older
individuals is broader in a sense and therefore contains more things but less detail. This
high amount of multiple awareness may also represent problems with executive
functioning and inhibition as these problems are common in older individuals (Pignatti et
al., 2005; Treitz, et al., 2007). For example, if older individuals lack inhibition more
information may be present in their inner experience at a given moment. These are, of
course, just speculations. More research regarding the high frequency of multiple
awareness in older individuals would be worthwhile to aid in answering these questions.
Content
Clear content themes emerge only rarely in samples of young adults (Hurlburt &
Heavey, 2006). By contrast, four of the older individuals in this study had consistent
content-based themes in their inner experience or a lack of variability in the content of
their inner experience. That is, by comparison to younger adults, the older adults seemed
to have more repetitive or narrowly focused content. Clara had frequent samples that
were negative, family-related, about death, and beeper-related. Ellen also had frequent
content that was emotionally negative. Benjamin had a substantial number of samples
where his inner experience was related to traffic. Gary often experienced recurring
content within sampling days. He had two experiences involving being late on day three,
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he was thinking about his wife’s eye problems or a closely related issue on four of five
samples on day four, and he had content related to crossword puzzles on four of six beeps
on day five. This could suggest a lack of range of content in the inner experience of
some older individuals or an obsessive quality to their inner experience. Further research
would need to be done to make a stronger conclusion about this however.
Summary
Below is a summary of the findings and implications regarding the inner experience
of individuals in this study who could produce reliable reports:
1. Some older individuals have “normal” inner experience that is clear, differentiated,
and varied in form and content. The five most common forms of inner experience in the
general population were the five most common in this study.
2. There was a very high frequency of unsymbolized thinking that nearly doubled the
frequency of younger individuals in another study. The three most common forms of
experience were unsymbolized thinking, sensory awareness, and feeling. These are all
non-symbolic experiences and may represent a lack of symbolic experience in older
individuals.
3. There was a low frequency of inner seeings. The inner seeings that were present
typically lacked detail or some aspect that is typical of inner seeings, such as color,
clarity, or detail.
4. There was a low frequency of inner speech while there was a high frequency of
worded thinking and unvocalized inner speech. These two forms of experience are
similar to inner speech but both lack auditory qualities.
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5. The symbolic experiences that were present typically lacked a common aspect,
lacked detail, or were unclear. Because there was a relatively small amount of symbolic
experience in the first place this may represent a lack of fully-formed symbolic
experience in older individuals.
6. Multiple awareness occurred at an extremely high rate. This may represent a lack
of focus in experience or a problem with inhibition.
7. Some individuals had repeated themes in the content of their inner experience that
possibly suggests a lack of range of content in inner experience or an obsessive quality to
the inner experience of older individuals.

The Inner Experience of Older Individuals Who Could Not Peform the DES Task
Successfully
Six individuals could not produce a single report of inner experience that the
researchers judged to be reliable: Fay, Henry, Irving, June, Karen, and Lilly. Although
these individuals could not produce reliable reports of inner experience, speculations can
still be made about their inner experience, or lack thereof, based on their unique
difficulties. These speculations must be regarded as highly tentative.
It is likely that none of these individuals had inner experience as that understood by
DES. That is, they may have no inner speech, no inner seeing, no experienced feelings,
and so on. This was particularly likely for Fay (she exhibited no apparent cognitive
impairment and received a 30 out of 30 on the MMSE but was never even remotely close
to producing a single reliable report of inner experience) and for Henry (he also exhibited
no apparent cognitive impairment, although his spouse casually suggested that he has had
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a decrease in cognitive functioning, and his MMSE score of 29 suggested no or slight
cognitive impairment). Even if Fay and/or Henry did have some level of cognitive
impairment it would not fully explain their inability to produce a single reliable report.
One explanation is that these two individuals had no inner experience: they could not
possibly produce a reliable report of inner experience because there was nothing to
report. Supporting this possibility is the fact that both of these individuals frequently
discussed external reality when asked about their inner experience.
Irving and June may also not have had inner experience or lacked some important
aspect of inner experience such as clarity, detail, and/or differentiation. Both of these
individuals had more difficulty with DES than might be expected given their cognitive
impairment. Irving had a score of 27 on the MMSE which suggests mild cognitive
impairment. This is consistent with casual observation of Irving. It seems that his
cognitive impairment might have led him to have some difficulty with DES, but it does
not seem that his cognitive impairment alone was sufficient to render him unable to
produce at least some reliable report of inner experience. Thus it may be likely that
Irving had no inner experience or that his inner experience was somehow substantially
lacking. June had a lower score on the MMSE (score of 23) and exhibited some memory
impairment at times, but often exhibited no cognitive impairment for extended periods of
conversation. However, June was not at all close to giving a single reliable report and
often spoke of external reality rather than inner experience. Thus, like Irving, the gap
between June’s cognitive abilities and her ability to peform the DES task successfully is
likely due to a lack of inner experience or lack of some important aspect of inner
experience. This speculation is not only based on the gap between Irving’s and June’s
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cognitive impairment and their ability to peform the DES task successfully but also the
fact that many individuals in this study with very little or no cognitive impairment
seemed to have either no inner experience or lack an important part of inner experience.
Therefore, it would appear likely that individuals with more cognitive impairment would
have even less fully formed inner experience. Still, this is speculative given that neither
of these individuals could produce any reliable reports of inner experience.
Karen and Lilly were the most cognitively impaired individuals in this study as
judged by the MMSE. Karen received a 21 on the MMSE and exhibited significantly
more impairment in casual conversation than Irving or June. Likewise, Lilly had a 19 on
the MMSE and appeared severely impaired cognitively. Cognitive explanations for the
difficulties of these two individuals are more viable than with the others but can be used
potentially as the sole explanation only for Lilly. Lilly had so much cognitive
impairment that it would not have mattered if she had inner experience or not, she
probably would not have been able to peform the DES task successfully. Karen may
have had enough cognitive impairment that she could not peform the DES task
successfully regardless of her inner experience. Still, these two individuals may not have
inner experience or may have been missing common aspects of inner experience and it is
perhaps most likely that they did not have the cognitive ability or the inner experience to
complete the task. A lack of inner experience with these two individuals appears to be
likely as even some older individuals whose cognitive functioning is intact have shown a
lack of inner experience in this study. However, because reports of inner experience
could not given by these individuals this is speculative and is discussed further below.
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Even though problems with inner experience are a likely explanation for the problems
of many of these individuals to peform the DES task successfully, there are numerous
potential cognitive factors that may have impeded the ability of some individuals in this
study to peform the DES task successfully . One of these is a disturbance in memory. A
certain level of memory ability is required to peform the DES task successfully. One
needs, at the very least, to be able to remember the instructions as well as keep one’s
inner experience in memory from the time of the beep to the time of the interview.
Memory difficulties interfered with Lilly’s ability to peform the DES task
successfully as she could not even remember the purpose of the beeper or the interviewer.
Karen also exhibited some memory impairment, both on the MMSE (she missed all
working memory items) and in casual conversation. However, it was not nearly as severe
as Lilly’s and did not appear to be severe enough to entirely destroy her ability to peform
the DES task successfully, although it is possible. June and Irving also had some
memory difficulties in casual conversation but they did not seem to have difficulty
remembering things related to DES. Henry missed 1 point on the delayed recall section
of the MMSE but otherwise did not evidence memory impairment. Henry’s spouse
reported that he did have some cognitive impairment, although it was not clear if this was
memory-related or not. Fay had no evidence of memory impairment. Therefore, it
appears that memory had a large effect on Lilly’s ability to perform DES and may have
played a smaller role in the ability of the others mentioned above.
However, one piece of evidence against a prolonged storage impairment as a primary
cause of these individuals’ difficulties with DES is that shortening the time between the
interview and the sample had no beneficial effects whatsoever. If difficulties with
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prolonged storage was a primary reason for the problems with DES than reducing the
duration of the storage in this manner should have produced better results. This
shortening of time would not necessarily help if the primary difficulty is with working
memory or encoding.
Another factor that could have contributed to the difficulties experienced by these
individuals is that they may have had some dysfunction in the realm of executive
functioning. Substantial deficits with attention and inhibition are well documented in AD
and these two abilities are part of executive functioning (see Perry & Hodges, 1999 for a
review). Specifically, deficiencies in switching attention seem to be the first that are
evident and the most substantial in AD (Norman & Shallice, 1987). Attention deficits
can be seen in normal aging as well (Pignatti et al., 2005). Although only 1 participant in
the study is actually diagnosed with AD, the others who had difficulty all experienced
some cognitive impairment that could be a pre-cursor to AD or other form of dementia.
DES requires one to pay attention not only to the beep itself, but to switch attention from
what was being attended to before the beep, to the beep, then to inner experience that was
occurring before the beep. Although this may not explain situations in which participants
did not respond at all, it could explain instances in which response to the beep was slow.
Many of the individuals in this study also had difficulty narrowing their focus to the
moment of the beep. For example, Karen frequently reported things that were near the
moment of the beep, but not at the moment of the beep. She also missed all MMSE
questions directly related to attention. Fay did not exhibit cognitive impairment but often
discussed things that occurred near the beep rather than things that occurred at the
moment of the beep. This was also a problem for Henry. Irving and June appeared to
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have more significant problems than the others in this area. It is not clear if this was a
problem for Lilly as she could not even learn the task of DES. Therefore, problems with
executive functioning evidenced by an inability to narrow one’s conception of the
moment of the beep appear to be a possible partial explanation for difficulties
experienced by all 6 participants, but most significantly Karen, Fay, and Henry.
A general slowing in cognitive processing is well documented in normal aging and
significantly in AD. Some propose that many of the cognitive deficiencies associated
with AD are due to a general slowing in processing speed (Baddeley, et al., 2001).
Because DES requires instant, immediate retrospection, any slowing in cognition could
make this process more difficult. If participants are experiencing a general slowing of
cognitive processing, this could not only explain a delayed reaction to the beep, but also
difficulty performing the task adequately.
Although there is some conflicting research, it appears that reaction time is also
compromised in individuals with AD, VaD (Mendez et al., 1997), and normal elderly
individuals and is often viewed as a sign of a decrease in executive functioning (DiFabio,
Zampieri, Henke, Olson, Rickheim, & Russell, 2005). Muller et al. (1991) found that
individuals with mild dementia showed a 23 percent increase in response time to visual
stimuli (flashes) and a 34 percent increase to respond to auditory stimuli (clicks)
compared to normal elderly controls. However, healthy controls did not show increases
in RT in these two conditions compared to healthy younger controls, although they did
have a 49 percent increase in RT in when asked to respond to complex visual stimuli (i.e.,
participants respond only when a 4-digit display showed all zeros). DES is a task that
requires participants to react to the beep in a similar manner that is required in auditory
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reaction time tasks. That is, when testing reaction time, individuals are often asked to
respond as quickly as possible to a sound, often a beep or tone. In DES, participants are
also required to respond to a beep as quickly as possible, although the response is quite
different (instant introspection). A deficiency in reaction time in older individuals and
individuals with mild AD could compromise the success of undergoing the DES process.
Irving and June exhibited slow reaction times to the beep and therefore cognitive slowing
and reaction time could have played a part in their difficulties. However, this does not
seem to explain their difficulties entirely.
Difficulty learning is also common in AD, and to a lesser extent, normal aging.
Specifically, auditory learning is compromised in normal aging, perhaps due to
deficiencies in working memory (for a review, see Lund, 1997). Individuals who had
difficulty in this study appeared to benefit little from repeated exposure to DES,
suggesting that learning may not have been adequately taking place. Some individuals
did not seem to understand DES and therefore could not produce reliable reports,
possibly because of an inability to learn DES. Lilly had the most difficulty learning DES
although it is not clear if this was due to problems with memory, learning, some other
cognitive factor, a lack of inner experience, or some or all of these factors. Unlike the
other individuals, Lilly’s inability to peform the DES task successfully and learn DES
could be explained entirely by her cognitive deficiencies as they were substantial.
However, it is also possible that Lilly had no or little inner experience and that this could
have further impaired Lilly’s ability to peform the DES task successfully and it is likely
that she had neither the ability to learn or the inner experience to peform the DES task
successfully .
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Difficulty learning is also a possible partial explanation for Irving’s difficulties. At
first, Irving believed that he was supposed to try to think of something for the beep.
After it was explained to him that this was not the case his reports did not change very
much. It did not appear that he was reporting inner experience but was either making up
stories or reporting memories. June also largely misunderstood the task at first and was
often confused about the purpose of the beeper and the beep and may have not
understood what is meant by “inner experience.” Irving and June’s difficulties could be
due to a problem with learning although both appeared to have enough cognitive ability
to understand the task, and so therefore a lack of inner experience is more likely. There
was very little evidence for Henry, Karen, and Fay not understanding DES, so although it
is a possible partial explanation for some participants it could only potentially fully
explain Lilly’s problems with DES and cannot fully explain the difficulties of any of the
other individuals.
There is also a possibility that some participants had relatively normal inner
experience but simply had trouble communicating it due to linguistic disturbances. Some
mild linguistic disturbances are often present in individuals who age normally and are
more common in older individuals with neurodegenerative disorders. However, no
individuals in this study, aside from possibly Lilly, exhibited noticeable linguistic
impairments outside of DES so this appears to be an unlikely explanation.
A final possibility is that individuals had difficulty processing the beep due to
problems with central auditory processing (CAP), discussed previously. CAP refers to
one’s ability to process auditory information independent of the ability to hear (Davignon
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& Leshowitz, 1986). CAP difficulties are common in older individuals (Strouse et al.,
1995), especially in the seventh decade of life (Humes & Christopherson, 1991).
Difficulties with CAP could help explain the problems that some individuals in the
current study, specifically Lilly, Irving, and June, had responding to the beep. Lilly and
Irving both had incidences where they did not respond to the beep at all. June
consistently had delays in her responses. It is certainly possible that these individuals
have problems with CAP that translate to the successful processing of the beep despite
relatively normal hearing, especially since they each exhibit some cognitive deficiencies.
Therefore, there are many cognitive, linguistic, and sensory problems that could have
contributed to these individuals’ difficulties with DES. However, the only case in which
cognitive explanations could possibly entirely explain an individual’s inability to perform
DES is Lilly. There is a small possibility that Karen’s difficulties with DES could be
given an entirely cognitive explanation but this is unlikely given the fact that she was not
close to producing a reliable report. The inability of the other four individuals to peform
the DES task successfully far exceeded their cognitive impairments. Therefore, based on
this information and the results from participants who could produce reliable reports, it
seems that a lack of inner experience (or some aspect of inner experience such as clarity,
detail, and/or differentiation) is a key factor in the difficulties experienced in all six
cases.
The following is a summary of possibilities explaining the inability of six individuals
in this study to produce a single reliable report of inner experience.
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1. These six individuals may have no inner experience, thus making it impossible to
produce reports of inner experience. This is a strong possibility for all six of these
individuals and is perhaps most apparent in the cases of Fay and Henry.
2. There is a lack of clarity, detail, and/or differentiation in the experience of these
individuals. Again, this is a strong possibility in all six individuals but more obviously in
Fay and Henry. These problems were present in Ellen’s inner experience and therefore
there is some evidence from one individual who could produce some reliable reports.
3. Memory impairments could have interfered with some individuals. Lilly had
obvious memory-based impairments that were moderate to severe. This seemed to affect
her ability to peform the DES task successfully but a lack of inner experience is also a
likely cause of her difficulties with DES. Memory problems were not clear in the other 5
participants although they may have complicated doing DES, especially for Karen.
4. Problems related to executive functioning may have played a role in difficulty
producing reliable reports. This is a fairly strong possibility with Karen but does not
entirely explain the difficulties experienced by any of the individuals.
5. General cognitive slowing and a slowing of reaction time could have interfered
with reliable reports and with individuals’ ability to respond to the beep quickly. This
may have been a factor for Irving and June but does not explain their difficulties entirely.
6. An inability to learn DES and a lack of understanding of DES is a possible partial
explanation for the difficulties experienced by Lilly, Irving, and June.
7. Normal experience but an inability to communicate experience is a possible partial
explanation that only appears applicable to Lilly.
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8. Problems with CAP could partially account for the difficulties experienced by
Lilly, Irving, and June.
9. None of these cognitive problems could entirely explain the difficulties
experienced by any of the individuals with the exception of Lilly. It appears likely that a
lack of inner experience or some important aspect of inner experience was present in all
of these individuals.
Although only one of these individuals had AD these findings can be related to the
initial speculations made based on the first-person accounts of individuals with AD. The
first-person accounts of individuals with AD suggest that individuals with AD have
symbolic experience, unusual sensory experiences that involve strong colors or
sensations, and a high frequency of emotional experiences. These hypotheses were not
supported, although at least some older individuals do have symbolic experience even
though it appears to be less frequent in this population. It is not surprising that the
findings do not support these speculations as the observations upon which the
speculations are based were not geared towards looking specifically at inner experience
and were not systematically gathered.

Diagnostic and Treatment Implications
Researchers, caregivers, and affected individuals have all emphasized the importance
of gaining a better understanding of age-related neurodegenerative disorders as this could
aid in interacting more effectively with individuals with these disorders (Gurbrium,
2000). The importance of detecting AD in its earliest stages has become even more
important in recent years due to the development of interventions that are best begun in
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the earliest stages of AD (Wetter et al., 2005; Desai & Grossberg, 2005; Gomez-Isla &
Hyman, 2003; Petersen & Morris, 2003; Cummings, 2003; Mohr, Dastoor, & Claus,
1999; Frodl et al., 2002; Morris & Becker, 2004b; Parasuraman, 2004; Leifer, 2003).
The inability of impaired individuals in this study to produce reliable reports of
momentary inner experience via DES suggests that DES is often a very sensitive measure
of age-related cognitive impairment, much more sensitive, for example, than the MMSE.
Many individuals that show very little or no impairment via the MMSE or clinical
observation could not produce a single reliable report via DES. It appears that by the
time the MMSE score drops from 30 to 29 or so, the ability to perform DES drops from
about 100 percent to zero percent. This is perhaps not surprising as there is substantial
literature showing that individuals often experience subtle age-related neurological and
cognitive changes well before tests such as the MMSE can detect them (Kawas et al.,
2003; Snowden et al., 1996). This suggests that DES might provide a sensitive diagnosis
of cognitive impairment for this population before standard instruments such as the
MMSE can detect subtle age-related cognitive changes.
It is possible that DES is not only sensitive to subtle age-related changes in
experience that are related to cognitive impairment, but it may also differentiate between
individuals who will and will not eventually develop an age-related neurodegenerative
disorder. Because differences in the MMSE can often differentiate between individuals
who will and will not develop AD up to 6 years before diagnosis (Small et al., 2000) it is
possible that DES can detect this difference even earlier than the MMSE.
DES may also eventually be used to differentiate between AD and VaD as it is often
difficult to differentiate diagnostically between AD and VaD (Braaten et al., 2006).
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However, one of the two individuals with VaD could peform the DES task successfully
whereas the one individual with AD was not at all able to peform the DES task
successfully. It is possible that individuals with VaD can often peform the DES task
successfully whereas those with AD can rarely or never peform the DES task
successfully due to subtle differences between the diseases. This would be diagnostically
useful as it could help distinguish between the two diseases when a differential diagnosis
is needed. Likewise, the inner experience of individuals with VaD may be different from
those with AD. For example, the inner experience of individuals with VaD could be
substantially disorganized as executive functioning is important to intellectual and
behavioral organization and this may not be as apparent in those with AD. Such a
difference would also be diagnostically useful.
To investigate further the diagnostic validity of DES and the above diagnostic
possibilities, it would be worthwhile to engage individuals in a longitudinal study where
they undertake DES intermittently over a period of several years as they transition into
older age. It is possible that DES could identify subtleties in momentary inner experience
and/or the ability of individuals to report their momentary inner experience that may be
more sensitive than cognitive measures such as the MMSE. For example, Clara had inner
seeings that were black and white but exhibited no cognitive impairment. It is possible
that this lack of color represents degeneration in her inner experience that foreshadows a
decrease in cognitive functioning. But it is also possible that her inner experience has
been black and white throughout her life, and also possible that her experience is actually
in color but she learned to talk about it as if it were black and white. Likewise, Fay and
Ellen both had substantial difficulty reliably reporting their inner experience in spite of
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perfect scores on the MMSE. It is possible that this difficulty could predict future
cognitive impairment. If so, DES could have diagnostic utility with older individuals in
terms of predicting cognitive impairment. A longitudinal study could go a long way in
either verifying or refuting the diagnostic utility of DES in this area.
Treatment implications for older individuals with cognitive impairment based on the
results of this single study are very limited. Because five of the six individuals with
cognitive impairment could not peform the DES task successfully little could be learned
about their inner experience. At this point only speculations can be made. One
speculation is that the presence of symbolic experience decreases as individuals age.
Therefore, older individuals might benefit from exercises involving induced visualization
or inner speaking to help maintain symbolic speech to protect against the effects of aging.
Also, it is possible that a lack of experience or undifferentiated experience led to
difficulties producing reports of inner experience. If this was the case, it may be possible
to produce a method to help individuals maintain clear experience. However, the benefits
of such treatments are extremely speculative.

Limitations of the Current Study
The current study was not longitudinal and was therefore not able to track changes in
inner experience over time. It is difficult to determine if some features of inner
experience in this study were due to the aging process or were always present in these
individuals. For example, it is possible that Clara has always had inner seeings that are in
black and white and that the absence of color was always present and is not due to aging.
Furthermore, it is difficult to determine if problems completing the DES task for some
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individuals (such as Fay and Ellen) are due to age or if the problems would have been
present if the individual was sampled decades earlier.
The current study used a very small and non-random sample. DES is a highly labor
intensive procedure, partially due to its iterative nature; DES usually has small sample
sizes. The procedure was even more labor intensive than typical DES studies due to the
fact that for parts of the procedure for half of the participants the interviewer was with the
participant for several hours while the participant wore the beeper.
Because DES is largely a qualitative method that investigates inner experience it is
difficult to represent the findings that DES produces in quantitatively and statistically
meaningful ways. The only way that samples of inner experience can be given
quantitative and statistical meaning is to code experiences based on form and content and
then to calculate the frequencies of the form and content of experience. Further statistical
analysis, such as investigating significance levels, can be done only with larger samples.
For example, in this study only one member of the impaired group could produce reliable
reports. Therefore, an analysis of a statistically significant relationship between
frequencies of form or content of experiences between the impaired and unimpaired
group is impossible.
Although a lack of theoretical grounding has traditionally been a hallmark of DES,
there is still the limitation that the current study did not advance any specific theory.
Many DES researchers believe that a lack of theoretical grounding is a strength of DES
as it helps reduce potential presuppositions that could adversely affect the accuracy and
value-free nature of the DES interview. Also, the current study was exploratory in nature
and did not seek to investigate a specific theory about aging or cognitive degeneration.
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Still, theoretically grounded research with this population using DES in the future could
be beneficial.
Another potential limitation of the study is that there was a wide range of cognitive
dysfunction in the sample, both in terms of quantity and quality of cognitive dysfunction,
and there was not a clear delineation between the impaired group and unimpaired group.
Although this has the advantage of allowing a glimpse at a broad spectrum on individuals
it makes it difficult to make a comparison regarding the inner experience of two more
cognitively homogeneous groups. However, even if there were diagnostically
homogeneous groups in this study (i.e., an AD group, a VaD group, etc.), these diagnoses
are highly heterogeneous themselves and therefore the meaningfulness of comparisons
between and among groups might still be tenuous.
Likewise, individuals in this study were not eliminated based on the presence of other
psychological disorders. Although this provides a more realistic sample it does present
the possibility that some of the findings of the study could be due to other psychological
problems rather than simply normal aging, MCI, VaD, or AD. Although none of the
individuals in the study reported any psychological problems that were not related to age
this question was not specifically addressed.
Finally, only one individual in the impaired group (Gary) could produce reliable
reports of momentary inner experience. This makes it extremely difficult to discover the
nature of inner experience of older individuals with cognitive impairment. However,
even though these individuals often produced unreliable reports, the nature of their
difficulty allowed some speculation about the nature of their inner experience, such as
lacking inner experience or having largely undifferentiated inner experience.
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Suggestions for Future Research
Perhaps the most important suggestion for future research is that a longitudinal study
that tracks the inner experience of young individuals as they transition into old age might
be very informative. A longitudinal design would answer an important question: were
abnormalities in reporting inner experience and inner experience itself found in this study
due to age-related cognitive dysfunction or due to prior characteristics? Although
numerous discoveries were made regarding the inner experience and the ability to report
inner experience of individuals in this study, it is impossible to determine if these
discoveries are due to the age of the individuals in the study. If the inner experience and
reporting ability of individuals could be tracked through time as individuals move into
their older years the effects of age on inner experience and reporting could be clearly
discerned. This would be very important as information regarding the development of
inner experience as a function of age could be very useful in the understanding of the
special needs of older individuals and could inform both treatment and diagnosis.
It is probably useful for future studies in this area to attempt to focus on participants
with MMSE scores of 30. It seems that individuals below 20 or even in the low or mid
20’s on the MMSE cannot engage meaningfully in DES, but more research should be
done before a definitive statement is made on this issue. Nevertheless, the current study
suggests that once MMSE scores enter the low or mid 20’s, DES may be too difficult for
the participant.
It might also be useful to focus on individuals with VaD and MCI instead of
individuals with AD. Although a definitive statement cannot be made regarding the
exclusion of individuals diagnosed with AD it appears that focusing on individuals with
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VaD and MCI may be much more fruitful. Individuals with VaD are often diagnosed
much earlier in the process of their disease due to the clear presence of a cerebrovascular
event. Because individuals with AD are often diagnosed after significant cognitive
impairment has already taken place, individuals with AD may have difficulty engaging
meaningfully in the DES process. Individuals with MCI are not as impaired cognitively
as individuals with AD and thus may be a better target for future research.
Also, altering methodology via the suggestions made earlier could also be useful and
could limit some of the difficulties in methodology experienced throughout this study.
For example, utilizing cognitive tests such as the MMSE to predict performance with
DES and eliminating individuals who will clearly be unsuccessful with DES based on
cognitive tests could help increase the efficiency of future studies. Also, simplifying
instructions for some individuals, especially those with cognitive impairment, may be
useful as an aid to initially decrease anxiety. Some participants appeared anxious and
overwhelmed when given the standard DES instructions and some individuals may have
dropped out of the study after the introduction but before the first sampling day for this
reason. Still, those who were given a significantly simplified explanation of DES (Lilly,
June, and Irving) could not peform the DES task successfully at all. Therefore, it may be
the case that the simplicity of the introduction to the DES task does not significantly
affect performance on DES, although more research is needed to make a firm conclusion
about this. Altering questions to make them more closed-ended may also increase
comfort in the early stages of DES training in some individuals, especially those with
cognitive impairment. This was apparent with Karen and Irving, although closed-ended
questions did not seem to produce any more accurate reports than open-ended questions.
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Finally, if individuals have hearing aids, it may be necessary to use external speakers
rather than the headset that is typically used. Although this did not allow any of the
individuals in this study to produce reliable reports it eliminates the possibility that
difficulties are entirely due to hearing problems. This also may be beneficial if the
interviewer is with the participant as the interviewer can verify any reports of external
behavior that the participant may give as the interviewer can hear the beep clearly as
well. It is actually sometimes useful to directly ask about external behavior at the
moment of the beep in this situation as it could help establish the participant’s ability to
narrow their focus to the moment of the beep.
It is important to note, however, that none of the alterations improved the actual
quality and reliability of the reports. Because many of the participants in the study had
impairments in memory it seemed logical that interviewing these individuals immediately
after the beep would produce better results than a delay of several hours. However, this
was not the case. It did not appear that any of the participants who were interviewed
immediately after the beep benefited meaningfully from the reduction in time between
beeps and interviews.
The DES methodology was manipulated in a variety of ways to try to obtain reliable
reports of inner experience but ultimately none of them worked toward this end although
some of them may have made the participants more comfortable. This suggests that if an
individual cannot produce reliable reports via standard DES procedure then alterations,
including limiting the delay between the beep and the report, will not signifantly help.
Still, this is only a tentative conclusion and more research with this population is needed
to make any sort of definitive statement about this issue.
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Finally, it appears that further investigation with this population using DES is
worthwhile. The current study has raised numerous questions that are not only
interesting but potentially important to understanding the nature of cognitive
degeneration in older individuals that would aid in diagnosis, and perhaps even the
treatment of older individuals with cognitive impairment. Further investigation into this
population could help confirm or disconfirm findings and speculations made based on
this study and could continue to produce unique, interesting, and ultimately important
findings.
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APPENDIX A

SUMMARIES OF SAMPLES
Letters denoting forms of experience contained in each sample follow the
summaries and are as follows:
F – Feeling
FFOB – Feeling Fact of Body
I – Inner Seeing
IH – Inner Hearing
IS – Inner Speech
JD – Just Doing
SA – Sensory Awareness
U – Unsymbolized Thinking
WT – Worded Thinking
M – Multiple Awareness
? – denotes uncertainty about form with accompanying explanation
Any form code that is in parentheses was not counted in the overall analysis, typically
due to lack of reliability in the participant’s report.

Anna’s Samples
Samples from day one were not included in the analysis due to the substantial
unreliability that is normal on the first day of sampling but they are included here.
Beep 1.1 – Anna was at her computer, reading a blog that somehow referred to Rosie
O’Donnell. Anna initially stated that at the moment of the beep she was “remembering
remembering” that Steve (her comedy mentor) once told Anna that Rosie O’Donnell was
nice to him when he was a beginning comedian at a club in Boston. Anna later backed
off the statement that she was “remembering remembering”, that she likes to say that
when she gets old she doesn’t remember, but that she merely remembers remembering,
but that that wasn’t really true of this event: she was actually remembering what Steve
and said. Anna also stated that she was thinking about various characteristics that have
been attributed to Rosie; that she is crazy, rude, and fat. Anna also said that Donald
Trump was somehow in her awareness at the moment of the beep (only after suggested
by one of the interviewers), but could not describe how. Anna also described that at the
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moment of the beep she was feeling angry in reaction to these reported negative
characteristics of Rosie O’Donnell. This anger was experienced as a tightness near her
diaphragm. Anna at times said that all of the above experiences were present
simultaneously, and at other times said that they were sequential, but very close together
and difficult to tease apart. As is common on the first sampling day, Anna was often
inconsistent in her descriptions of her experience at the moment of the beep; she would
sometimes change what she had originally reported or add descriptions of experiences
when suggested as possibilities by the interviewers. It is likely that some parts of Anna’s
descriptions were present at the moment of the beep, and some were not, but it is
impossible to discern at this early stage of sampling with Anna. She did not appear to
have visual or verbal experience at this beep and may have been having some
unsymbolized and/or emotional experience at this moment, but since this is the first
sample, the interviewers cannot be entirely certain of this.
Beep 1.2 - Anna was watching Six Feet Under on TV, but had withdrawn from the show
in favor of a “potpourri” of thoughts about fidelity. This process had begun a few
moments before the beep and had involved thoughts about fidelity, infidelity, how we
take words and make them into rules and laws, why fidelity is important, and how
fidelity/infidelity had played out in her own life. By the moment of the beep, she had
“formulated” the word “fidelity”; the word seemed to be specifically present to her but
was not spoken, heard, or said. There was, besides the formulated word, a “bloom” of
thoughts, many simultaneouls thoughts or ideas all related to the concept of
fidelity/infidelity. The process was not emotional; it was more cognitive/curious. This
was Anna’s first sampling day, and much or all of that description is of questionable
accuracy.
Beep 1.3 – Anna was watching television and her dog and cat had just jumped on her lap.
The animals caused her to shift her attention from the television to the animals. At the
moment of the beep, Anna was mostly seeing the animals. There may have been
numerous other things in her awareness as well: the startled looks on the animals’ faces,
the startledness of the animals being in the same place even though they hate each other,
Anna’s own startledness at the animals jumping on her lap, the feeling of the animals on
her, how strange it was to have two animals that hate each other on her lap at the same
time, isn ‘t it cute, and knowing that she would have fur all over her, but Anna was
primarily just looking at the animals. Anna’s descriptions at this beep are typical of the
first sampling day. They were inconsistent and often seemed to be influenced by the
suggestions of the interviewers. It is possible that Anna was experiencing a variety of
things at this moment, but it is also common that participants report having a variety of
experiences at the moment of the beep the first sampling day, and this variety decreases
as training continues.
Beep 2.1 – Anna was sitting. She had recently turned off the television. She was having
no inner experience at the moment of the beep.
No Inner Experience
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Beep 2.2 – Anna was sitting at the computer while a song by a female singer was
playing. At the moment of the beep, Anna was feeling sad, experienced primarily as a
lump in her throat and also probably as a feeling of heat behind her eyes and cold on her
forehead. She was not certain about these two aspects of the experience, but said that she
was 70 percent sure that they were there. The sadness was about being old, about the
things that she had done when she was younger (as at the time when this particular song
might have been popular). Also, although Anna wasn’t paying particular attention to the
music that was playing, she was somehow aware of the music and this music may have
brought on the experience of sadness.
Beep 2.2 – Anna was sitting at the computer while a song was playing. At the moment of
the beep, Anna was feeling sad, experienced primarily as a lump in her throat and also
probably as a feeling of heat behind her eyes and cold on her forehead. She was not
certain about these two aspects of the experience, but said that she was 70 percent sure
that they were there. The sadness was about being old, about the things that she had done
when she was younger (as at the time when this particular song might have been popular)
Also, although Anna wasn’t paying particular attention to the music that was playing she
was somehow aware of the music and this music may have brought on the experience of
sadness.
F – sadness, conceptual (recognition) and physical (lump, heat, and cold)
Beep 2.3 - Anna was watching a television report about a man who held teenage girls
captive in a cave and repeatedly raped them; just before the beep he was being
interviewed and didn’t seem to think that he had done anything particularly wrong. At
the moment of the beep, Anna was reacting incredulously (disbelieving shock). This
reaction probably included gasping, simultaneously leaning back, and rolling her eyes,
but it was not clear if Anna was experiencing those reactions either physically or
mentally at the moment of the beep. She was incredulous/shocked, and the bodily
reaction was ongoing, but whether the bodily reaction was experienced at that moment is
not clear.
F – incredulous/shocked (physically and/or mentally)
Beep 2.4 – Anna was online and was completing writing an email. She was hitting the
“send” button at or near the moment of the beep. Anna initially reported that at the
moment of the beep, Anna knew that the beep was coming. This was a conceptual
knowledge that the beep was about to sound. She recognized the oddness of knowing the
beep was coming before it actually came; possibly, she said, she has such experiences
frequently but forgets them when they don’t come true. RH wondered whether it was
possible that she had some neural reaction to the beep that caused the thought process
before she actually apprehended the beep. Anna was equally happy with that
explanation.
U? (presence uncertain) - knowing beep is coming
Beep 2.5 – Anna was at the computer and had just finished typing an email, but had not
sent it yet. This email involved requesting payment from a long-time client who owed
her money. At the moment of the beep, Anna was frustrated/pissed-off about not getting
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paid on time. This frustration/pissed-off experience was very strong and clear. It was
experienced partly as many undifferentiated ideas flooding her mind. It was also
experienced as heat in the area of her breastbone. This heat was about the size of an
opened hand and was internal, under the surface of the skin. The mental part of the
frustration was more present in her awareness than the heat. Anna was also afraid of
losing him as a client and did not want to word her email too strongly, wanting to be
cautious. This feeling of fear/caution seemed to somehow come from the feeling of
frustration and was mostly or entirely a mental process.
F – frustration, mental (ideas) and physical (heat)
F – fear/caution
M
Beep 3.1 - Anna was tiredly walking down the hall dragging her feet noisily on the
carpet. She was thinking, if put into words, something quite like, “Pick up your feet—it
sounds like an old lady.” However, there are no words, images, or other symbols
experienced in that thinking. Despite the lack of words, the sense of the thought was very
explicit: “pick up your feet” is a more accurate rendition of the experienced thought than
would be “I should pick up my feet”; and “it sounds like an old lady” is more accurate
than “I sound like an old lady.” Anna was also looking down at a pile of clothes and
thinking that she should put her dirty clothes there. Also, Anna was tired at the moment
of the beep. This tiredness was primarily experienced as heaviness of the eyelids and
dryness in the eyes, although these sensations do not fully describe the experience of
tiredness. Anna was not particularly paying attention to the feeling of tiredness, but it
was still in her awareness. That slight awareness is similar to the experience of the
Melissa Etheridge song in Beep 2.2.
U – pick up feet
U – clothes
SA – tiredness
M
Beep 3.2 – The following account should be taken with substantial skepticism. The
earpiece to the beeper fell out of Anna’s ear some time before this beep and her partner
Linda had to notify her that the beeper was sounding. This is likely to significantly
increase the difficulty of accurately apprehending experience at the moment of the beep.
Anna was fairly convincing regarding her experience at this moment, but it is very
unlikely that she is describing her experience at the exact moment of the beep since she
had to be notified that it was going off by Linda. It is possible that the following is a
description of Anna’s experience at the moment of Linda’s notification, but this is likely
much less precise than the moment of the beep.
Anna was laying on the bed talking with her partner Linda. Linda was talking about
getting a pilot’s license. At the moment of the beep, Anna was thrilled. This was a very
strong emotion, experienced primarily as eyes widening, inhaling, and a fluttering feeling
in the stomach. Goosebumps on her arms occurred immediately after these sensations,
and the beep (or Linda’s notification that the beep was sounding) occurred very close to
when the goosebumps began. This thrilled experience comprised the majority of Anna’s
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awareness (90 percent according to Anna). The remaining part was comprised of
disappointment/self-pity—that she herself was too old to get a pilot’s license. This
disappointment/self-pity may have included the experiencing of a muffledness at this
moment. This muffeldness was almost like having cotton around her ears and involved a
withdrawing from the conversation. Anna was not paying close attention to this aspect of
her experience at the moment of the beep. Since the last two parts of this experience were
such small parts of Anna’s experience, since they were both mentioned near the very end
of the interview on this beep, and since Anna was not reacting to the beep itself (or at
least it does not seem she was reacting to the beep itself), a very high level of skepticism
is appropriate regarding these particular aspects of her experience is appropriate.
No Form/Not Included in Analysis
Beep 3.3 – Anna was lying on the bed and talking to her partner Sarah about the progress
that Sarah’s academic department has made. At the moment of the beep, Anna was
feeling proud of Sarah for helping the program progress so much. This pride was
experienced physically as a release of tension that is somehow similar to sighing,
although actual sighing was not taking place at this moment. The feeling of pride may
have included a feeling of pride in herself for being partnered with a woman who was
achieving such an accomplishment; it was not clear whether Anna actually recalled
feeling that at the moment of the beep, or was presuming that it was there.
F – pride (physical)
Beep 3.4 – Anna was talking with Sarah. Sarah had said shortly before the beep that
Anna hadn’t changed very much since they met. Anna was in the process of saying “I
wasn’t the P.T.A. lady when I met you”, meaning that she had changed a lot prior to
meeting Sarah, and was laughing at that thought. At the moment of the beep, Anna was
recalling how she has changed over her life. This recollection consisted of the inner
seeing of numerous freeze-frame pictures of herself (Anna estimated about 50 of them)
that were experienced in extremely rapid succession like fast time-lapse photography.
Anna could describe some of the inner seeings. One inner seeing was of an actual
photograph of her when she was about 19 years old taken from the side and wearing a
full-length white polka dot on blue dress. One of the last inner seeings was of Anna as
the P.T.A. lady that she was before she met Sarah. The inner seeings often showed Anna
having a facial expression that was indicative of her emotional state at that phase of her
life. For example, one showed a very fearful expression as she was generally being very
anxious at that stage of her life. The inner seeings also showed Anna as she was at that
particular time of life, with variations in a number of aspects of her physical appearance.
Many of the inner seeings were of Anna’s face from an extremely close range that
showed Anna’s face from just above her eyes to about her chin. There was also a
knowing that her children were there related to some of the pictures. There may have
been other knowings around or during the experience of the inner seeings, but this is
highly speculative as it wasn’t discussed in detail. It wasn’t clear if the inner seeings
proceeded in chronological order or not. It should be noted that Anna did not mention
this freeze-frames until well into the conversation about this beep and that when she first
mentioned them she used many subjunctifiers. However, after this initial uncertainty,
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Anna was very confident about the existence and nature of these freeze-frames. Anna
was also aware of her laughter. The laughter blended in with the recollection of change.
I – many inner seeings
M
Beep 4.1 – Anna was playing a card game at the computer. Earlier that day, she was
playing Canasta with some friends. One of her friends (Jan) made a mistake and
repeatedly criticized herself and her Canasta partner for it. At the moment of the beep,
part of Anna’s experience was a mixture feelings and thoughts related to the incident that
were somewhat homogeneous in that they were all mixed together to form a mostly
uniform experience. The predominant part of this experience was Anna’s questioning of
whether or not she was too tough on Jan. The word “tough” or “too tough?” was present
to Anna visually and was experienced as a grayish/pinkish/beigeish color that had
jaggedy edges, was not overwhelmingly large, was flat, was pliable, and was clear. Anna
was very specific about the jaggedy edges of the experience; when drawn, she
commented that the drawing was too jaddedy and that the jags weren’t sharp enough.
Anna knew that the visual experience meant the word “tough” or “too tough?” at the
moment of the beep. There also may have been a cognitive component to this experience
where Anna was questioning if she was too tough on Jan. Also at the moment of the
beep, Anna was experiencing doubt/indecision about whether she did the right thing in
confronting Jan. This was experienced as an “icky”, sour, almost nauseous feeling in the
upper chest and throat region. She was also simultaneously thinking cognitively that she
did the right thing by confronting Jan. Also at the moment of the beep, but not as
predominant, was the thought that Jan was a jerk. This thought was not in words. There
may also have been the experience of simultaneously loving Jan but thinking she’s
annoying as well, but this was not entirely clear.
I – tough
F – indecision/icky
U – jerk
M
Beep 4.2 – Anna had finished writing her description of beep 4.1. She had just sighed
and turned her attention back to the computer with relief. At the moment of the beep,
Anna was experiencing relief/accomplishment at getting all of her experiences down in
the notebook for beep 4.1. This was experienced as the release of the ideas/experiences
of beep 4.1 (see below) and/or the words associated with the ideas/experiences of beep
4.1. from herself into the external world. The ideas/words were somehow visually
present but not explicitly seen. There also may have been an experience of getting ready
to not think, but it is not certain the extent to which (if at all) or how this was present at
the moment of the beep.
F (w/ visual component) – relief
U? (presence uncertain) – getting ready not to think
M? (presence of U uncertain)
Beep 4.3 – Anna was watching Dateline on television and was eating a salad. At the
moment of the beep, Anna was chuckling at something someone had said on Dateline,
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was feeling queasy from eating the salad too fast, and was experiencing a twinge in her
left knee. Anna was primarily focused on the television. It is not clear the extent to
which Anna was experiencing the chuckling at the moment of the beep or if she was
simply chuckling and not aware of it. The queasy feeling also had a sense of fullness to
it. The twinge in the knee was experienced as a mild-moderate, brief, sharp, electrical
shock in the joint.
Laughing
SA – queasy/full
SA – twinge
M
Beep 4.4 – Anna was playing poker on the computer. She was thinking about going to
California next week. At the moment of the beep, Anna was cognitively wondering if
she could arrange going to California with the interviewers so to not break DES
arrangements. She was also experiencing a feeling of mild anxiety about possibly
breaking DES arrangements. The anxiety was very mild and was experienced both
physically and mentally. The physical experience was located in the upper chest, neck,
and head, was well below the skin, and was similar to the heat of blushing, but not
exactly. There was a rising to this experience, as it originated in the upper chest and rose
to the head. The mental component of the anxiety was not explicit, but somehow
affected Anna cognitively, although Anna was not entirely sure about this component of
the anxiety.
U – wondering about arrangements
F – anxiety
Beep 5.1 – Anna was preparing dinner. She was in the process of looking at different
foods that would make up dinner. At the moment of the beep, Anna was thinking that
she would put the turkey in first, then the yams, then make the salad. This process came
in sequential order, but was extremely close together. There were no words or inner
seeings in this experience. Anna then realized that she may not have bought onions. This
realization was experienced as a sharp intake of air, like a gasp, and a slightly negative
feeling. Anna then innerly said to herself “Did I buy onions?” This was experienced as
if she was saying it out loud. The beep came right after Anna had finished innerly saying
“Did I buy onions?” but the entire process occurred extremely quickly, and was therefore
very close or at the moment of the beep.
U – order of cooking
F – onion gasp
IS – onions
Beep 5.2 – Anna was setting the timer on her oven. She was in the process of using the
oven keypad to get the appropriate time (1 hour and 30 minutes). At the moment of the
beep, she was tapping the keypad 30 times in quick succession to get the minute part of
the display to 30 and was very close to 30. Anna was focused on this process. She was
feeling the physical sensation of tapping the key pad on the end of her finger, seeing her
fingers tap on the keypad, hearing her fingernails make a clicking noise on the keypad,
and seeing the timer display change as she pressed the numbers on the keypad.
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SA– sensation of tapping
SA– seeing finger tap
SA– hearing finger tap
SA– seeing time change
M
Beep 5.3 – Anna was at the computer playing poker. Anna’s friends/family were in the
next room laughing. At the moment of the beep, Anna was primarily trying to decide if
she would give her friend Barbara a haircut before dinner or after dinner. Although there
were no words in this experience, the question “before or after?” is the best way to
describe the experience. Anna had already thought about and/or understood that haircut
and dinner part of the situation prior to the beep, and was now posing the question before
or after to herself. Anna was also hearing the laughter of her friends/family. There was
something nostalgic and pleasant about hearing the laughter that tinged her experience of
hearing it. Anna was also idly seeing the numbers of the cards on the computer screen,
although it is not clear if these numbers were in Anna’s experience or not.
U – before or after?
F?/SA?(form uncertain)– nostalgic hearing
M
Beep 5.4 – Anna was cutting her friend Jane’s hair and was simultaneously having a
conversation with her. Anna was talking, but she had no idea what she was saying—the
words were apparently just rolling out of her on autopilot, as were the actions of cutting
the hair. Rather than pay attention to either of those activities, at the moment of the beep,
Anna was innerly seeing a vegetable chopper that she owns. The inner seeing was very
sharp and was floating with no background like a hologram or a projected image. The lid
of the imagined chopper was down, she could see the transparent plastic bottom and the
top part of the chopper. Anna was somehow aware of the chopper from different angles,
but was not actually seeing it from different angles at the moment of the beep. Anna’s
interest in this seeing was in the mechanics of how the chopper works rather than in how
the chopper looks.
I – chopper
Beep 5.5 – Anna was tossing a salad and talking with her friends. One of her friends had
just asked Anna if she grew the vegetables for the dinner in her backyard. Just prior to
the moment of the beep Anna had sarcastically said “I hand picked all the veggies” and
everyone was laughing, including Anna. At the moment of the beep, Anna was aware of
the colors in the salad, an instance of sensory awareness. She was also experiencing a
very slight pleasure at the way the colors in the salad looked. Anna may have
experienced this pleasure partially as a vibration in her vision, but she was very unsure
when talking about this aspect of her experience. Also in Anna’s awareness was both the
experience of her own laughter and the laughter of her friends.
SA – colors in salad
F (w/ possible visual component)– pleasure
JD?/SA? (form uncertain) – laughing
M
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Beep 6.1 – Anna was at the computer watching a jackpot wheel spin. She had just
finished ordering a prescription on the phone. At the moment of the beep, Anna was in
the process of thinking that she had just gotten the prescription filled and that she could
check it off her list of things to do. Anna was innerly saying to herself in her own voice
“check it off the list” with the understanding that the “it” was getting her prescription
filled. Anna was also experiencing the lingering taste of coffee in her mouth from a sip
she had about 15 seconds prior to the beep. She was also hearing the girls (Linda and
Rosalynn?) shout back and forth between the upstairs floor and the ground floor.
IS – check it off the list
SA – taste of coffee
SA – hearing shouting
M
Beep 6.2 – Anna was at the computer playing poker on the second floor of her house.
Anna’s partner Linda was down stairs talking to Anna and doing the dishes. Linda was
talking about alternative personalities and this was somehow related to Linda currently
being in therapy. At the moment of the beep, Anna was feeling apprehension which she
was experiencing as a fluttering feeling in her chest and throat that was just below the
skin. She was also hearing Linda talk and hearing the sound of the dishes that Linda was
doing. She also may have been aware of a 2 that had just come up on the screen while
she was playing video poker.
F – apprehension
SA – voice,
SA – dishes
SA ? (presence uncertain) – 2
M
Beep 6.3 – Anna was on the computer. At the moment of the beep, Anna was in the
process of planning. She was thinking that if she left her house at 12:30 that she would
have time to drop them (the daughter and perhaps the other daughter or a friend) off at
Buffalo Exchange going to UNLV. Anna was thinking in her own voice “If I leave by
12:30, I can drop ‘em off before.” Anna understood that she was dropping them off at
the Buffalo Exchange before going to UNLV and did not verbalize that part of the
thought. She was also feeling her finger tapping the mouse button.
IS – If I leave…
U – Buffalo Exchange/UNLV
SA – mouse
M
Beep 6.4 – Anna was at the computer working on an article she is writing. She was
reading a part of the article where she had written about a helicopter-carrying ship. At
the moment of the beep she was re-reading “which would divide and slide open and
allow a helicopter pad to be raised to deck level.” At the moment of the beep, Anna was
innerly seeing the scene she was re-reading. She was innerly seeing a colorful scene
including the deck of the ship splitting and the helicopter pad rising. There was no
helicopter on the pad. Anna was also in the process of gradually changing the
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perspective from which she was seeing the image. The perspective started from above
and then went below the deck, as if she had gone through the deck of the ship. The
image under the deck was of the elevator. There was also a light green light under the
deck. From this perspective she was primarily interested in how the elevator worked.
Also at the moment of the beep, Anna was thinking about what was in Harold’s
imagination (Harold is a character in the book). There were no words in this thought,
but rather the understanding of the concept. Anna was also seeing an after image of the
last few words she was reading. They appeared as if they were coming toward her off of
the computer screen and were fading away.
I – boat w/ helicopter pad
U – Noah’s imagination
I – afterimage of words
M
Beep 6.5 – Anna was having difficulty getting the lid on a to-go cup of coffee. At the
moment of the beep, Anna was innerly speaking in her own voice “Damn to go cup, lid
doesn’t fit.” She was also feeling the pressure on her hand as she was trying to screw the
lid on the cup.
IS – damn to go cup
SA – hand pressure
Beep 6.6 – Anna was sitting in the garage waiting for the girls (again, I’m not sure
exactly who the girls are), who she was going to take with her in the car. At the moment
of the beep, Anna was innerly saying in an angry tone “those girls had plenty of
warning.” She was also feeling exasperation that she was experiencing as tightness in her
upper chest. There may also have been a sense of being taken for granted, being
unappreciated, and that she was so good while they were so bad although it is not clear
how or if this was in her experience. She may also have been aware of the heat in the
garage.
IS – plenty of warning
F – exasperation
F?/U? (form and presence uncertain)– granted/unappreciated/so good vs. so bad
SA? (presence uncertain) – heat

Benjamin’s Samples
Samples from day one were not coded due to typical unreliability of reports on the
first day.
Beep 1.1 – Benjamin was cleaning a birdbath in his yard. A sparrow had begun tweeting
a second or two before the beep and this tweeting continued through the beep. The
sparrow was very close to Benjamin, within a few feet of him. At the moment of the
beep, Benjamin was recognizing that the sparrow was close to him. This was just a
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recognition with no apparent symbols. Benjamin was also hearing the sparrow tweet at
the moment of the beep.
(?) – recognition of closeness of sparrow
(SA) - hearing sparrow
Beep 1.2 – Benjamin was in his yard talking to his sister Max and his neighbor Linda.
They were talking about the maximum time that could exist between beeps as it had not
sounded for a long period of time. Benjamin had just said before the beep that he thought
that it had been over the maximum amount of time since the beep sounded. He then
looked at Linda who had a puzzled look on her face. At the moment of the beep,
Benjamin was looking at Linda and may have been expecting her to say something via
interpretation of her expression. He was not entirely certain if this was occurring at the
beep or slightly before the beep. Benjamin was also aware of the puzzled look on
Linda’s face at the moment of the beep.
(?) – expectation of other speaking; noticing puzzled look
Beep 1.3 – Benjamin was coloring a white stripe of glue that he used to fix his birdbath
to match the color of the rest of the birdbath. Before the beep, Benjamin had realized that
the crayon he was using might not last. He then thought something similar to “You know
this wax crayon might not last on here. Well then I’ll have to try something different like
paint.” This thought was in words and the beep definitely came at some point during the
second sentence, mostly likely at the beginning part of the second sentence but Benjamin
was not entirely certain about this. He was also not certain of the exact wording of the
experience. The experience had all of the qualities of external speech except that it
probably occurred faster than external speech, but again, Benjamin was not entirely
certain.
It is also likely that this experience did not have vocalized qualities based on later
sampling with Benjamin.
(Unvocalized Inner Speech?) (form uncertain)– birdbath coloring
Beep 2.1 – Benjamin was in his house playing Sodoku on a hand held electronic device.
He was having some difficulty with the game, but had just figured out many of the
numbers. At or very near the beep, Benjamin had five overlapping experiences. First,
Benjamin was innerly saying “I got it now,” referring to figuring out the numbers on
Sudoku. This was experienced internally as if he was externally speaking, but the words
came significantly faster and did not have qualities such as volume and pitch. Second,
just after this inner saying had begun, Benjamin became aware of his sister Laura
speaking on a phone in another room in the house. Right at the beep, Benjamin was
hearing Laura speak, but was not comprehending what she was saying. Third, a
motorcycle was approaching on the street in front of Benjamin’s house. Benjamin was
hearing the sound of the motorcycle at the moment of the beep. Fourth, Benjamin was
aware of the smell of chicken being cooked. Finally, Benjamin was faintly aware of the
sound of traffic passing by his house. The sound was a whooshing sound.
Unvocalized Inner Speech – I got it now
SA – hearing Venus
SA - hearing motorcycle
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SA - smelling chicken
SA - hearing traffic
M
Beep 2.2 – Benjamin was listening to classical music on the radio but was not aware of
the music at the moment of the beep. Benjamin was mulling over who the composer of
the music he was, trying to think of many possibilities. At the moment of the beep,
Benjamin was thinking that it was Rossini. The word “Rossini” was definitely present at
the moment of the beep, but it had no auditory or visual qualities. It also was not
experienced as being spoken, but was simply present in Benjamin’s awareness. There
also may have been a wondering what the title of the piece was that was connected to the
Rossini experience, but Benjamin was not entirely certain. Benjamin was also aware of
someone yelling somewhere in front of his house. The Rossini experience began slightly
before the yelling, but both appeared to be present at the moment of the beep.
Worded Thinking - Rossini
U? (presence uncertain) – title of song
SA – screaming
M
Beep 2.3 – Benjamin had just finished writing his response to 2.2. Just moments before
the moment of the beep, he had heard an unrecognizable sound like that of an engine.
Just a split second just before the moment of the beep, Benjamin had innerly said, “Is that
a vehicle?” This was similar to previous beeps in that it was just like external speech
except that it was faster, but it was before the beep. It is also very likely that this
experience did not have vocal qualities such as volume, pitch, and inflection.
Simultaneously, Benjamin heard a car horn, which was still sounding at the moment of
the beep and was in Benjamin’s awareness at the moment of the beep. At the moment of
the beep, Benjamin was innerly saying “Is that on South Street?” Again, this was just
like external speech except that it was faster and did not have vocalized qualities. The
beep seemed to come immediately after he finished “street.” Benjamin also believed that
he was smelling dinner and had knowledge that dinner was soon, but this may have been
just before and after the beep with the sound of the car horn temporarily eliminating these
two experiences from awareness. The knowledge that dinner was coming soon was not
in words. If these two things were present at the moment of the beep they were at a very
low level.
Unvocalized Inner Speech – Is that on South Street?
SA – car horn
SA? (presence uncertain) – smell of dinner
U? (presence uncertain)– knowledge of dinner being
M
Beep 3.1 – Benjamin was in his library writing a note. He was stuck and was trying to
find words that he wanted to use. At the moment of the beep, Benjamin was trying to
find a way to say something similar to achievement or accomplishment. He was looking
for a way to try to accurately communicate this. There were no actual words present in
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his awareness. Benjamin also may have been hearing the swooshing sound of nearby
traffic but he was not certain.
U – searching for words
SA? (presence uncertain) – swooshing of traffic
M? (presence of SA uncertain)
Beep 3.2 – Benjamin was still in his library writing and was still having some difficulty.
At the moment of the beep, Benjamin may have been innerly saying “Not so easy.” This
experience was just like external speech, but occurred very fast, almost instantaneously
and did not have vocalized qualities such as volume or pitch. However, Benjamin was
not entirely certain that this experience was present at the moment of the beep and
believes that he may have created it upon thinking about what he was experiencing at the
moment of the beep. Benjamin was also hearing the sound of footsteps walking on a
nearby stairway. Benjamin was also hearing the whooshing of the traffic. This was
present, but was not as strong in his awareness as the sound of the footsteps.
SA – hearing footsteps
SA – hearing traffic
Unvocalized Inner Speech? (presence uncertain) – not so easy
M
Beep 3.3 – Benjamin was discussing with his sister Tracy the battery power left in a
clock in his garage. Benjamin was saying “The second hand is twitching. I guess there’s
not enough power to advance it.” The beep came between the words “power” and “to.”
Benjamin was not particularly aware of anything at this beep.
Just Talking
Beep 3.4 – Benjamin had just finished writing the summary to beep 3.3. He was outside
near his garage. He had just asked Tracy is she had found the battery to replace the old
one in the clock. She said “Mmm, hmm.” The beep came between the “mmm” and the
“hmm” and Benjamin was hearing this. However, primarily in Benjamin’s awareness at
the moment of the beep was the fact that the sunlight was bright. The sunlight itself was
not in awareness, but the fact that it was bright was. Benjamin was also hearing one or
more sparrows tweeting and the sound of traffic nearby.
U – brightness
SA – hearing “mmm.hmm”
SA – hearing sparrows
SA – hearing traffic
M
Beep 3.5 – Benjamin had just walked to the front of his house near the street. A car
turned from a nearby intersection onto the street in front of his house. The driver was a
girl who faintly smiled at him. Just before the moment of the beep Benjamin thought
“Don’t think I know her.” This was immediately followed by “Can’t stay here, too loud”
which occurred at the moment of the beep. This experience was in reference to the
volume of the traffic. Both thoughts were like external speech but occurred much faster
and had no vocalized qualities. Benjamin was also hearing the traffic.
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Unvocalized Inner Speech – can’t stay here
SA – hearing traffic
M
Beep 4.1 – Benjamin was paging through a National Geographic in his house. He
stopped at a page with an article about honeybees. Also on the page was an
advertisement that had a map of the United States with pictures of various fruit and/or
vegetables in different states representing what was grown in that state. At the moment
of the beep, Benjamin somehow knew that he was going to read the article about the
bees. This experience was not in words and images, but was just knowledge. Benjamin
was also hearing a male voice on the television, but was not comprehending what he was
saying or hearing any individual words. He was also hearing his sister Tracy talking. He
also was not comprehending what she was saying or hearing any words in particular.
Benjamin was also hearing a truck pass on the street in front of his house. Benjamin was
also looking at the map when the beep sounded. Specifically, he was looking at the state
of Washington which had a cherry and an apple in it. Benjamin was not sure if the state
of Washington and/or the cherry and the apple were in his awareness, but he thought that
it was possible.
U – knowledge of reading
SA – hearing man on television
SA – hearing sister Tracy
SA – hearing truck
SA? (presence uncertain) – seeing Washington and/or apple and cherry
M
Beep 4.3 – Benjamin had just finished writing his response to 4.2. At the moment of the
beep, he was quickly going over it to make sure that there were no major errors. He was
not comprehending what he was reading. He was also hearing his sister Stephanie
talking on the phone. He was not comprehending what she was saying or hearing any
words in particular.
SA – hearing sister Max
Beep 4.5 – Benjamin was walking through his kitchen to go outside. At the moment of
the beep, Benjamin was innerly saying, “Gonna go sit on the glider.” The words
occurred very fast, almost instantaneously. It was as if Benjamin was speaking the words
and the words were definitely present. However, there were no vocalized qualities to the
experience. The words had no volume, no pitch, and either no or flat inflection. The
experience was apparently “spoken but not auditory.” Benjamin also may have been
hearing his sister Stephanie laugh at the moment of the beep, but the laughing may have
ended just before the moment of the beep.
Unvocalized Inner Speech - gonna go sit on the glider
SA? (presence uncertain) – hearing Stephanie laugh
M? (presence of SA uncertain)
Beep 5.1 – Benjamin was sitting outside on his glider. He was reviewing notes written
by an acquaintance who is in ill health. At the moment of the beep, Benjamin was
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thinking about the health of this man. There were no words or images accompanying this
thought. This thought was not strong in Benjamin’s awareness, but it was definitely
present. Benjamin was also faintly aware of the sound of sparrows tweeting. There may
have been more than one, but Benjamin was not certain. He was simply hearing the
sparrow(s).
U – health of man
SA – hearing sparrows
M
Beep 5.2 – Benjamin was still on the glider reading notes. His sister had found a small
figurine of a sad looking dog. She gave it to Benjamin to look at. At the moment of the
beep, Benjamin was chuckling, but this was not in his awareness. He was hearing the
sound of sparrows and one car whooshing by in front of his house. This was barely in his
awareness, but Benjamin believed that it was indeed in awareness.
SA – hearing sparrows
SA – hearing car
M
Beep 5.3 – Benjamin was walking through his living room. Benjamin stated that he was
telling his sisters Max and Venus that the interviewer had told him to disregard beeps that
occur when he is writing notes for the previous beep, then there was a two second pause,
the beep sounded, “and that was it.” The interviewer asked him is there was anything in
his awareness at the moment of this beep. He paused for a few seconds, and then said
that he was aware of the presence of Max and Venus. The interviewer, being skeptical
due to the pause, asked Benjamin if this was in his notes and he said no. The interviewer
asked Benjamin why this was not in his notes if he was aware of it at the moment of the
beep. This caused Benjamin to be more skeptical of this being in his awareness.
No Inner Experience
Beep 5.4 - Benjamin was in his house writing about a genealogy report. Benjamin had
written the sentence “Set one part of the record straight.” He was contemplating
changing this to “To help to set the record straight.” At the moment of the beep,
Benjamin had made the tentative decision to go with “to help to set the record straight”
but this decision was not final yet. There were no words present in this experience.
Benjamin was also hearing his sister Judy laughing and a car accelerating.
U – to help to set the record straight
SA – hearing laughing
SA – hearing car
M
Beep 6.1 – Benjamin was standing in his garage cleaning a knife. At the moment of the
beep, was looking at the knife and was aware of it. This was the primary part of his
awareness. Benjamin was also aware of feeling chilly, mostly in his hands, but
throughout his body. Benjamin was also hearing the sound of a motor.
SA – knife
SA – chilly
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SA – hearing motor
M
Beep 6.2 – Benjamin was in his garage. He was thinking about cleaning the earpiece of
the beeper. He was considering possible ways to clean it. At the moment of the beep,
Benjamin was thinking about water and alcohol as a means of cleaning the earpiece. This
experience was not in words. Benjamin was also noticing the colors outside as he viewed
them through the garage window. He was noticing mostly green, but also pink, white,
and yellow.
SA – colors outside
M
Beep 6.3 – Benjamin was listening to the radio. A Schumann symphony had just begun.
Just prior to the moment of the beep, Benjamin thought “Good, nice music.” This
experience was in words, as if he was speaking them, but had no vocalized qualities such
as volume, inflection, and pitch. It also occurred almost instantaneously. Although this
experience occurred just prior to the moment of the beep, it was somehow still present at
the moment of the beep. At the moment of the beep, Benjamin was also aware of the
taste of a lemon drop in his mouth. He was also hearing the symphony. He may have
also been aware of the sound of the television, but Benjamin believed that this was
unlikely.
Unvocalized Inner Speech – good, nice music
SA – taste of lemon drop
SA – hearing symphony
SA? (presence uncertain)– hearing television
M
Beep 6.4 – Benjamin was thinking about the lemon drop in his mouth. At the moment of
the beep, he was wondering if he was really aware of the sweetness of the lemon drop.
Benjamin was also hearing the sound of a car that had just past by and the Schumann
symphony still playing. Benjamin was not 100% certain that he was hearing the
Schumann symphony, but he was fairly certain.
U – wondering about sweetness
SA – hearing car
SA? (presence uncertain) – hearing symphony
M

Clara’s Samples
Although beeps from day one were counted in the analysis, they should be taken with
some additional skepticism as Clara was not initially familiar with the DES process.
Participants often require at least a day to become acclimated to DES and produce
reliable reports of momentary inner experience.
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Beep 1.1 – At the moment of the beep, Clara was waiting for the beep of the beeper to go
off. She was wondering if it was going to go off and what it was going to sound like.
This was a thought process or a mental event that contained no words or images.
U - waiting for the beep; wondering what the beep would sound like
Beep 1.2 – Clara was lying in bed and was wondering about the internal mechanism that
causes the beeper to go off and how the beeper works in general. At the moment of the
beep, Clara was innerly seeing the beeper. She saw the beeper with the clip on it and
appeared largely as the beeper appears in reality. This seeing was in black and white,
with the beeper being a light gray.
I – image of beeper
Beep 1.3 – Clara prefaced this beep by saying that it “will give you problems.” She was
trying to decide what headstone she wants for her husband’s and her grave. At the
moment of the beep, Clara was innerly seeing a headstone. It was a double headstone
that was rectangular in shape. Her husband’s name and the date of his death were on one
side of the headstone, although by the time of the interview Clara had forgotten which
side it was on. The inner seeing was in black and white and the headstone was a grayishblack marble.
I – headstone
Beep 1.4 – At the moment of the beep, Clara was innerly seeing a room at a Las Vegas
casino where family members recently stayed. She was seeing the room as if she was
standing in the doorway. There were three windows, a television, and a bathroom in the
room she was seeing. This was experienced in black and white.
I – room at the Wynn
Beep 1.5 – Clara was expecting three relatives. At the moment of the beep, she was
innerly seeing all of them. All of the family members were facing her. Her sister-in-law
was in a wheel chair and was being pushed by her sister-in-law’s son. This seeing
included only these individuals and had no environmental surrounding. It was also in
black and white.
I – family members
Beep 1.6 – Clara was knitting and had made a mistake. At the moment of the beep, she
was having an inner seeing of herself ripping the blanket she was knitting. The inner
seeing was in motion and she was seeing her hands rip the blanket just as she would see it
if she was actually ripping the blanket. This experience was in black and white.
I – ripping blanket
Beep 2.1 – At the moment of the beep, Clara was drinking coffee and was aware of
waiting for the beeper to sound and wondering if it would sound. This was a mental
process that did not contain any words, images, or symbols, nor did it contain any
emotional or physical experience.
U – waiting for beeper to go off
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Beep 2.2 – Clara was knitting. She was thinking “Why am I knitting this baby blanket,
it’s stupid.” The beep sounded on the word “stupid”. This sentence was spoken in
Clara’s own inner voice and had qualities resembling external speech. This phrase was
experienced has having a critical tone and contained a feeling of stupidity. This feeling
was not separable from the phrase, but was contained within the phrase.
IS – the phrase ending in “stupid”
Beep 2.3 – Clara was calculating how many balls of yarn she needed for knitting. She
was using a pencil and paper to do the calculation. At the moment of the beep, Clara was
writing the number “5” on her paper, which was the solution to her calculation.
JD – writing “5”
Beep 2.5 – Clara’s friend Joan had sent her a picture of Wayne, Clara’s recently deceased
husband. Clara was in the process of writing a thank you note to Joan, and paused while
she considered what to write. At the moment of the beep, Clara was somehow
visualizing Wayne’s face as it had been shortly before he died. However, there was no
actual face being innerly seen, although it was understood to be a seeing phenomenon.
There was also a feeling of sadness that was connected to this visual experience; this
sadness was somehow experienced in her head. She was also thinking/feeling irritated at
Joan for sending the picture—an irritation that, if expressed in words (which it was not)
might be something like, why did she send it, she should mind her own business, I don’t
want a picture like this, butt out! This negative thinking/feeling, contrasted with her
general sense that she should say thank you for sending the present, had brought the letter
writing to a temporary halt.
Imageless Seeing – visual experience of husband’s face without image
F – sadness
F – irritation
M
Beep 2.6 – Clara was sitting in her apartment and looking out the window. She had
moved to Las Vegas approximately within the past year. At the moment of the beep, she
was wondering why she was not adjusting to living there better than she has been. This
was experienced as an unworded thought process that was accompanied with the definite
presence of the word “adjusting,” although no spoken words or images of the word were
actually experienced.
U?/WT? (form uncertain)– wondering about not adjusting
Beep 3.1 – Clara had just picked up the mail and was looking at it. She was looking at
the word “Kim” in the return address. At the moment of the beep, she was innerly saying
the word “Kim” in her own voice. This word was a single word and not part of a
sentence. Also at the moment of the beep, Clara was wondering why Kim had sent a card
and was surprised that she sent the card. This experienced thinking did not contain
symbols.
IS – Lois
U – wondering/surprise
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Beep 3.2 – Clara was thinking about a conversation she had had with her daughter and
grandson at a restaurant the night before. At the moment of the beep, she was thinking
about the conversation the night before in general. Clara was focused on the
conversation as a whole, not on some specific part of it. This experience contained no
images or words. At the same moment, Clara was also thinking of the word “Sara.” The
phone was ringing, and Clara was thinking the name of the person she suspected was
calling. Although Clara is sure that this word was in her experience, it was not spoken,
heard, or seen.
U – dinner conversation
Worded Thinking – Donna
M
Beep 3.3 – Clara was going to have a friend over for dinner and was mentally going
through a menu of things she might cook. At the moment of the beep, she was thinking
about what she was going to cook. She was thinking about cooking stir fry with shrimp,
with the focus of her awareness on the shrimp. She is not sure if this focus was occurring
exactly at the beep or very near the beep. This experience contained no words or images.
U – stir fry/shrimp
Beep 3.4 – Clara was experiencing pain and numbness in her hand due to arthritis. At the
moment of the beep, she was aware of the fingers of her right hand being in a curled
position and a numbness throughout each of the fingers. She was also frustrated by the
pain which was an intense emotional experience. Clara stated that she felt like she
wanted to cry, although the literal experience of wanting to cry was not in her awareness.
She was not sure if this part of the experience was in her head or contained in her body.
SA – pain in fingers
F – frustrated by pain
Beep 3.5 – Clara was sitting in her front yard watching traffic and thinking about an
experience she had had the previous week. She had been at the DMV, and because she
had a walker, she had been instructed to go to the beginning of the long line of people.
At the moment of the beep, she was innerly seeing a long line of people. This line was
on her right and the people were facing largely away from her at a diagonal, left to right.
There was no background. This seeing was clear and detailed, but in black and white.
I – line at DMV
Beep 3.6 – It was almost lunch time and Clara was wondering what she was going to
have for lunch. At the moment of the beep, she was thinking about food. She knew that
she was going to have to have something to eat, but was not sure what. She was also
trying to determine what she was going to have. There were no images or words in this
experience.
U – food
.
Beep 4.1 – Clara was in the kitchen cooking. At the moment of the beep, she was innerly
speaking the sentence “Why am I having to cook today?” The beep was simultaneous
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with the word “cook”. This inner speaking had the qualities of speech and was said in a
somewhat neutral tone, although it was an interrogative statement.
IS – cooking
Beep 4.2 – Clara was in the kitchen. At the moment of the beep she was innerly saying
“Now I have to do the dishes.” The beep came between the words “to” and “do.” Clara
was also aware of feeling compelled to do the dishes. However, this feeling did not seem
to be separate from the words and did not exist independently from the words.
IS – dishes
F? (presence uncertain) – dishes
Beep 4.3 – Clara was standing in her living room. At the moment of the beep, she was
thinking about whether to clean the bathroom or to dust the living room. This was a
wondering about the next course of action she would take that contained no words,
images, or symbols. It was a “mental thought.”
U – clean or dust
Beep 4.4 – Clara was looking at towels in her bathroom. At the moment of the beep, she
was wondering what towels to put out. This was a wondering that was similar to the
wondering that occurred in Beep 3.6 (wondering what to have for lunch). This was an
interrogative mental process with no words.
U – towels
Beep 4.5 – Clara was standing in the living room after she had finished cleaning. At the
moment of the beep, Clara was innerly saying to herself “Why am I so slow getting
things done now. Is it part of old age or having less to do?” Clara was sure that words
were present, but she was not sure whether or not these words were experienced vocally.
Either the words were present and were heard vocally or the words were present without
any vocal qualities. Clara was also sensing an emotion of frustration. This frustration
was a mental process and was not independent of the verbal experience.
IS?/WT? (form uncertain) – slow
F– frustration
Beep 4.6 – Clara was walking into the bedroom and was looking at clothes with the
intent to change. At the moment of the beep, Clara was innerly saying “I better change
clothes”. Clara was not sure where in the sentence the beep came.
IS – clothes
Beep 5.1 – Clara was in her bedroom getting dressed. At the moment of the beep, she
was thinking about going outside to sit because it was so nice out. She was aware of the
desire to sit outside, the fact that it was nice out, and the link between the two. This was
a mental process with no words or images.
U – going outside
Beep 5.2 – Clara was sitting outside knitting. She was innerly speaking in her own voice
“Flowers, leaves, and green grass in March.” The beep came on the word “grass.” She
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was also innerly seeing a small group of flowers standing in a dirt bed. She was not
certain what kind of flowers they were, but they were small and similar to pansies and
viewed from a perspective that was within a few feet. The inner seeing was in black and
white.
IS – grass
I – flowers
M
Beep 5.3 – Clara was outside knitting. She was innerly speaking in her own voice “Why
am I living alone? Some of the relatives think it’s strange that I can do it.” The beep
occurred on the word “alone.” She was also aware of being angry at the moment of the
beep. This anger was a mental process with no symbols or physical sensation. The inner
speaking was more prominent in her awareness than the anger. Clara estimated a ratio of
85 to 15 between the inner speaking and the anger.
IS – alone
F – anger
Beep 5.4 – Clara was outside knitting. She was innerly speaking in her own voice
“Should I go to the high school reunion or shouldn’t I? Who will be there?” The beep
came on the words “high school”.
IS – high school
Beep 5.5 – Clara was outside knitting. She had saw a television news program earlier in
the day regarding the sodium content of different Chinese dishes. She was mentally
comparing the sodium content of the different Chinese dishes she and her relatives ate the
previous day. At the moment of the beep, Clara was innerly seeing the letters “Na”.
These letters were meant to stand for sodium. The “N” was capitalized and larger than
the “a” which was lower case. The letters were dark on a light background. This
experience was similar to the flowers inner seeing in beep 5.2, but different in the sense
that it was experienced as a more natural process. The letters were thin as if written by a
pen. She was not aware of the comparison or anything other than the letters at the
moment of the beep.
I – Na
Beep 5.6 – Clara was outside knitting. The previous day she had gotten copies of
pictures of her brothers. These copies contained four pictures on approximately an 8x11
inch sheet. At the moment of the beep, Clara was innerly seeing this sheet that was very
similar to how it exists in reality. This experience was very clear. Clara could make out
the details in each of the four pictures (such as who was in each picture, the positions of
the people, and some of the surrounding details). This experience was in brown and
white (as the reproductions were in real life). Also at the moment of the beep, she was
also innerly speaking in her own voice “The picture of my brothers were reproduced and
they came out better than the originals.” Clara was not sure if this was the exact phrase
she was innerly speaking, but she was certain that the beep came on the word
“reproduced.”
I – pictures
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IS – reproduced
Beep 6.1 – Clara was thinking about the shootings that occurred at Virginia Tech earlier
that day. At the moment of the beep, she was thinking, “How useless it was. (pause) The
poor parents.” The beep came during “the poor parents.” These words were in her
awareness, although they weren’t spoken, heard or seen. The entire phrase occurred all at
once. That is, the phrase “the poor parents” appeared simultaneously, not in a sequence
where “the” came first, “poor” second, and “parents” third.
Worded Thinking – the poor parents
Beep 6.2 – Clara was staring at a picture of her and her husband. At the moment of the
beep, she was not aware of any inner experience other than the seeing of the picture. She
stated that she had been staring at the picture for approximately 20 minutes, as if she had
been locked on to the picture. Clara found this weird and surprising; she believed she
had never done this before. She attributed it to the shock of the Virginia Tech killings.
JD – staring at picture
Beep 6.3 – Clara was thinking about the shootings that occurred at Virginia Tech earlier
that day. At the moment of the beep, Clara was thinking “all those people that were
killed.” This experience was similar to that of 6.1. There were words in her awareness,
although they weren’t actually heard or seen. They also occurred simultaneously, not in
sequential order like they would if the words would be spoken aloud.
WT – people killed
Beep 6.4 – Clara had just finished a phone call. At the moment of the beep, she was
wondering whether or not she should go out with Mary (the friend who just called). This
was a cognitive process that most likely contained no words or images; Clara did allow
the possibility that there were words involved, but she could not be sure.
U – go out or not
Beep 6.5 – Clara was thinking of how she could talk a family member into letting her
have her car for the weekend while the daughter was out of town. At the moment of the
beep, Clara was innerly speaking “Can I talk Lisa into letting me have the car this
weekend when they go out of state?” The beep came near the word “car.” Clara was
producing this speech internally in what was experienced as her own voice.
IS – car
Beep 6.6 – Clara received a call from her grand-daughter prior to the beep. At the
moment of the beep, she was wondering how her grand-daughter was going to fly out of
New York back to Iowa because there was bad weather in New York. She was also
experiencing worry at the moment of the beep, although she was not sure how she was
experiencing this worry. The wondering and the worry occupied approximately equal
parts of her awareness.
U – flight
F – worry
M
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Dolly’s Samples
Although beeps from day one were counted in the analysis, they should be taken with
some additional skepticism as Dolly was not initially familiar with the DES process.
Participants often require at least a day to become acclimated to DES and produce
reliable reports of momentary inner experience.
Beep 1.1 – Dolly was on her computer, working on designing a brochure. At the moment
of the beep, she was feeling frustrated: she did not like the design even though she had
been working on it for a long time, and would have to change it again. This frustration
was experienced as a pressure that pushed inward in the middle of her torso below her
heart. This was a somewhat intense emotional experience.
F – pressure in torso
Beep 1.2 – Dolly was using color blocks on a piece of paper to work on her brochure. At
the moment of the beep, she was thinking why making the brochure was so hard today
and was experiencing frustration. She did not think there were words associated with this
experience but was not entirely sure. This was more of a mental experience than a
physical feeling.
U?/F?(form uncertain) – frustration/feeling of difficulty
Beep 1.3 – Dolly was turning her arm to look at her watch. At the moment of the beep,
she was thinking that she needed to take a break. This experience was not in words.
Dolly was also feeling frustrated near the beep, but was not sure if she was experiencing
frustration at the moment of the beep.
U – take a break
F?(presence uncertain) – frustration
Beep 1.4 – Dolly was on the phone with a friend. At the moment of the beep, the friend
was talking about her relationship. Dolly was mostly withdrawn from the conversation,
tracking just enough of it to know when it would be her turn to respond. At the moment
of the beep Dolly was wondering why her friend is still in the relationship that she always
complains about. Dolly was not certain if there were words in this experience, but she
thinks there were not words. This was a clear experience of which she was certain.
U – relationship
Beep 1.5 – Dolly was writing an email; typing but not paying any attention at all to what
she was typing. At the moment of the beep, she was thinking that she was ready to give
up for the day. Dolly believes this was a cognitive event, but was not entirely sure. The
experience was very clear.
U - give up
Beep 1.6 – Dolly was on the computer and had just glanced at the layout of her brochure
on the table. At the moment of the beep, she was experiencing satisfaction at her
brochure.
U?/F? (form uncertain) – satisfaction
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Beep 2.1 – Dolly was sitting outside drinking coffee. At the moment of the beep, she
was innerly saying “I enjoy the outside quiet.” This inner speaking had the same
characteristics as external speech. The beep sounded right after the word “quiet.” Dolly
was also enjoying the external quiet as well as the internal quiet at the moment of the
beep, but it was difficult to say how this enjoyment took place. She also said she was
experiencing inner quiet even though she was speaking to herself; even so, she
understood this inner speaking to be somehow quieter than her inner chatter had been
earlier.
IS – quiet
F – enjoyment
M
Beep 2.2 – Dolly had just finished reading the phrase “to enjoy the humorous moments in
life.” After reading this, Dolly said out loud “Yes, if I find humor in problems they won’t
seem so bad.” The beep came between the words “problems” and “they.” This speaking
occupied a substantial portion of her experience. Also at the moment of the beep, Dolly
was experiencing some kind of mental realization, like an “a-ha” moment, that if
expressed in words would be something like: Right! I do take things too seriously! This
realization was experienced in her head, from the top of her head to the middle of her
chest, and was more of a mental experience than a physical experience. The description
of this “a-ha” experience seemed to be being done via reconstruction rather than a direct
memory of the experience, and therefore we are more skeptical of this feature of her
experience than others.
F?/U? (form uncertain) – a-ha experience
Beep 2.3 – Dolly was standing at her sink, holding a pot, and looking out the window.
None of that was in her experience at the moment of the beep. At the moment of the
beep, she was having an inner conversation with herself, innerly saying “Do I want
another cup of coffee?” and answering, “No, not really.” The beep occurred just after the
word “really.”
IS – coffee
Beep 2.4 – Dolly was outside meditating. At the moment of the beep, she was having no
inner experience. [In general, she said that part of the purpose of this meditation is to
quiet the mind.]
No Inner Experience- meditating
Beep 2.5 – Dolly was walking around the house attempting to determine what she should
do. She was innerly saying “I have so much to do, where should I start? Unload the car.”
The beep came between the word “unload” and the word “the.” Her eyes were aimed at
the stacks of papers and boxes that awaited her actions, but those objects were not in her
attention at the moment of the beep.
IS – unload the car
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Beep 2.6 – Dolly was trimming the rose bushes just outside of her house. Although she
was engaged in the act of pruning, being careful to get things right and not get stuck by a
thorn, etc., that action was not in her experience. At the moment of the beep, she was
looking at the line of rose bushes and enjoying their beauty. This was largely a visual
experience.
SA – rose bushes
Beep 3.1 – Dolly was making a to-do list and was about half way finished. At the
moment of the beep, Dolly was thinking that she had a lot to do before she left. Dolly
stated initially was a verbal thought that contained words, but the words were not heard
or spoken. But subsequent discussion led the interviewers to believe that that statement
may have reflected Dolly’s presuppositions, and that the thought was more likely
unsymbolized. There also may have been things “rattling around” in Dolly’s mind, and
as she wrote them on her list, they exited her mind, but she was not sure if this was in her
awareness at the moment of the beep. When surveying her situation in responding to the
beep, Dolly recognized herself as feeling overwhelmed, reflected in an increased heart
rate and breathing changes, but this was not in her awareness at the moment of the beep.
U– a lot to do
FFOB – overwhelmed
Beep 3.2 – Dolly was sitting at the computer doing research on video cameras she was
considering buying. She was looking at different models of cameras on her computer
screen. At the moment of the beep, Dolly was wondering what camera to buy. This was
a mental process that contained no words or images. She was also aware of what was on
the computer screen.
U – wondering
Beep 3.4 – Dolly was at the computer writing an email to her sister. At the moment of
the beep, Dolly was in the act of typing. She was tightly focused on typing and was not
sure what was in her inner experience at the moment of the beep if anything. She may
have been thinking of the word she was typing but was not sure.
JD – typing
Beep 3.5 – Dolly had just walked into the kitchen. At the moment of the beep, she was
thinking “What should I fix for lunch?” This experience was as if Dolly was internally
speaking in her own voice. The beep came somewhere in the vicinity of the word “fix.”
IS – lunch
Beep 3.6 – Dolly was writing a check. At the moment of the beep, she was thinking
about all the bills she would have to pay the next month while she would be traveling. At
the moment of the beep she was making a distinction between bills that had to be paid at
the end of the month and bills that had to be paid at the beginning of the month, but it
was not clear how and if this distinction was present in her awareness. There were no
words or images in this experience. When surveying her situation in response to the
beep, Dolly could recognize anxiety in her body. But that was not present in her
awareness at the moment of the beep.
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U – bills
FFOB – anxiety

Ellen’s Samples
Ellen’s samples from day one were not included in the analysis due to unreliability
but are presented here.
Beep 1.1 – Ellen was visiting a group home and was speaking with a man that has a
terminal illness. The man was talking and somewhere near the beep, he was choking on
his food. Ellen reported that near the moment of the beep she was wondering how much
it costs to stay in the group home and was wondering what his room was like. She also
stated that she was also worried about his choking, but she was not sure if this was at the
moment of the beep. Ellen was also not sure if she was having a “deeper” thought at the
moment of the beep. She was also not sure if the merger between Daimler Benz and
Chrysler had been trashed.
Difficulty Apprending Experience
(U?/F?) (form and presence uncertain) - wondering, worrying, merger
Beep 1.2 – Ellen was speaking with the same man. He had been talking about his
grandchildren and how recently they visited. She reported that near the moment of the
beep she was concerned and sad. Ellen reported that she may have first thought that his
grandchildren do not visit him often and that this led to the experience of concern and
sadness, but she was very uncertain about this. She initially described this experience as
an image, although she said that there was nothing visual present in her awareness. Dr.
Kevorkian may also have been in her awareness at or near the moment of the beep, but
this was not described further.
Difficulty Apprending Experience
(F?/U?/I?/Imageless Seeing?) (form and presence uncertain) – concern and sadness
Beep 1.3 – Ellen was still speaking with the same man. He had mentioned that his
quality of life was low and that he would rather die sooner than later. She reported that
near the moment of the beep she was accepting this idea. She believed that this
acceptance was an acceptance of the logic of the man’s statement. As with other beeps,
Ellen had difficulty distinguishing the form of this acceptance. She believed that it was
most likely that the experience was either emotional in nature or was a thought process
that did not contain words.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience
(F?/U?) (form uncertain)– acceptance
Beep 1.4 – Ellen was driving and listening to the Dr. Laura radio program. She had
realized that Dr. Laura had misunderstood the caller. She believed that near the moment
of the beep she was experiencing annoyance regarding Dr. Laura’s misunderstanding but
was not entirely certain.
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Difficulty Apprehending Experience
(F?) (presence uncertain) – annoyance
Beep 1.5 – Ellen reported that near the moment of the beep she was thinking, will they
(the experimenters) ask me what happened just before the beep. She was not sure if this
experience came before the beep or if it was a reaction to the beep. She was also not sure
of the form of the experience.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience
(Form Unknown) - what will experimenters ask?
Beep 1.6 - Ellen was about to go to the veterinarian. She reported that near the moment
of the beep she was thinking that she should call before going to make sure they had the
pills she needed. Ellen was not questioned about this beep, but reported it at the end of
the sampling interview.
(Form Unknown) – needing to call veterinarian (insufficient interview)
Beep 2.1 – Ellen was listening to the news on the radio. The radio had just announced a
potential terrorist plot in London. At the moment of the beep, Ellen was thinking “They
picked London again.” Ellen thinks that the beep came after the word “again,” but she
was not entirely sure. At first, Ellen seemed quite certain that this experience contained
words but that it had no auditory component (i.e., she was not internally speaking the
above phrase or innerly hearing it). With regard to questions of form, Ellen repeatedly
said that her thought was a reaction to the news on the radio. After further questioning,
Ellen was certain that she was innerly speaking the above phrase. The interviewer
repeatedly stressed that it was possible to have words with or without auditory qualities,
but by the end of the discussion, she was certain that she was innerly speaking and did
not know why she said she was not at the beginning. Nevertheless, Ellen’s uncertainty
and inconsistency is grounds for substantial skepticism regarding both the nature and
presence of this experience.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience
IS?(form uncertain) – London
Beep 2.2 – Ellen was taking apart an old pair of running shoes and noticed that there was
a heel pad in only the left shoe. At the moment of the beep, Ellen was wondering if the
having the heel pad in only one shoe had a negative effect. There may have been a mild
worrying or concern associated with this experience, although she was not certain. This
was a “mental thing” that contained no words, images, or emotional components.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience
U – heel pad
U?/F? (form and presence uncertain) - worry/concern
Beep 2.3 – Ellen was sorting through a number of papers related to a car she had
purchased. She was searching for a particular piece of paper and was looking at a sales
slip. It was difficult to pinpoint Ellen’s experience at the moment of the beep. At first
she stated that she was worried and that there was tension in her upper body, but she
could not state where. She then thought that this worry was in her head, experienced as
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tightness behind her eyes. She later said that she may have been somehow experiencing
tension, but this was not in her awareness at the moment of the beep. She stated at this
point that what was in her awareness was that it was not self-evident that this was the
paper that she needed, that she was frustrated with herself and concerned that she would
have to continue searching. She reported that there were no words or images in this
experience. At this point, Ellen was very frustrated by the questioning process.
Therefore, questioning about this beep was stopped. A clear understanding of Ellen’s
experience at this beep could not be discerned.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience
F?/U? (form uncertain)– sale’s slip (tension, frustration, concern)
Beep 2.4 – Ellen was trying to recollect the place where she took some courses many
years ago. She was trying to find the telephone number of her friend who might know
and was looking at a list of telephone numbers. At the moment of the beep, Ellen was
experiencing three things simultaneously. First, she was asking or wondering if her
friend would know. This was a “mental process” with no words, images or emotions.
Equally as prominent in her awareness was the asking or wondering if her friend was
there. This also had no words, images, or emotional content and was a “mental process”.
She was also asking “Should I use the cell number?” This experience was a bit less
prominent than the other two. Ellen was 80-90 percent sure that this experience was in
words. At first she said that the words were not in her own voice, but shortly later said
that they were. She was not sure why she initially said they were not in her own voice.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience
U – will the friend know?
U – is the friend there?
IS? (form uncertain) – should I use the cell number?
M
Beep 3.1 – Ellen was at a funeral service and was sitting behind Margaret, a woman Ellen
knows. At the moment of the beep, Ellen was visualizing Margaret sobbing. This inner
seeing was of Margaret the way Ellen had seen Margaret a few days earlier. Margaret
was seen from about the chest up; that was the portion of Margaret that Ellen had actually
seen earlier, since Margaret had been sitting behind a table. The imaged Margaret was
facing Ellen and seemed to be located about five feet away from her. This was a still
picture. There was some color to the picture (Margaret’s hair was blonde) but Ellen was
not confident in the presence of other colors. Other specific details could not be
described. At the moment of the beep, Ellen also knew why Margaret did not say any
words at the funeral (because it was too emotional for Margaret). This knowledge did not
contain any words or images.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience?
I – woman sobbing
U – knowledge
Beep 3.2 – Ellen was standing inside a funeral home talking to Paula. Ellen had just
finished saying something to Paula and noticed that the woman was no longer
“connecting” with her. Ellen stated that at the moment of the beep she knew that the
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woman was not interested in talking to her, was thinking that she was overdoing it as
usual, was feeling self-conscious, and was experiencing tightness in her throat or mouth.
Ellen also reported that she may have been aware of the fact that other people were near,
but because she was very unsure about whether this was in her awareness or not at the
moment of the beep, it does not seem like a reliable report. Ellen also stated that the
experience that the woman was no longer interested in her was both a feeling and a
thought. She had substantial difficulty describing the form of this experience and often
went back and forth in her explanations. Therefore, Ellen’s report on the form aspect of
this experience is not very believable. Ellen stated she then thought that she was
overdoing this (i.e., talking too much), but again was not sure if this was in her awareness
at the moment of the beep, and therefore should be met with skepticism. The form of this
experience was also not explained, but it was a familiar self-judgment. She stated that
she then experienced tightness in her throat or mouth and the feeling of selfconsciousness. These experiences may have come in the above sequential order. They
were all reactions that seemed familiar. In general, Ellen had difficulty focusing in on the
moment of the beep. She also changed her answers quite frequently and often made
contradictory statements regarding her experience at this beep. Therefore it is difficult to
discern what, if any, of Ellen’s description was actually in her awareness at the moment
of the beep.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience
U?/F?/SA? (form uncertain) – entire experience
M? (not sure if one or many experiences)
Beep 3.3 – Ellen was backing out of a parking space in a parking lot. Another car was
going to pass her, driving toward her from her right. She was looking at this car. Ellen
initially stated that at the moment of the beep, she was determining if she should wait or
pull out, but she wavered in her certainty as to the existence of this experience at the
moment of the beep. She also said that she was judging or criticizing herself, telling
herself to just make a decision as to whether to pull out or not and to quit dawdling. She
stated that this self-judging was automatic and that there were no words in any of these
experiences. The only aspects of this beep that Ellen seemed confident in were the actual
external events occurring at the beep and that there were no words in her experience at
this beep. Ellen went back and forth in her descriptions of what was in her awareness at
the moment of the beep. This raises skepticism about any and all of the specific contents
reported at the moment of this beep.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience
U? (form uncertain) - pulling out decision
U? (form uncertain) - self-criticism
Beep 4.1 – Ellen was watching a quiz program on the television. There was a question
with choices for the answer presented on the screen. Ellen was looking at the choices on
the screen. One of the answers was “L’il”. At the moment of the beep, Ellen was
recognizing that “L’il” was the correct answer. This recognition was not in words, but
was a thought process. There was also an ongoing angst or generalized anxiety that made
her jumpy. It seemed mostly mental/emotional, mostly in her head. As far as Ellen could
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tell, she was not directly experiencing this at the moment of the beep, but it was
nontheless occurring somehow.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience
U – L’il
F? (presence uncertain) – angst
M? – (not sure if F is present)
Beep 4.2 – Ellen was shopping and was looking at a white jacket. At the moment of the
beep she was comparing the weight of the fabric in the jacket to the weight of the fabric
in a pair of pants that she already owned that might go with the jacket. There was a
knowledge that the jacket was heavier than the pants and that they would not go well
together. At first, Ellen stated that she was innerly seeing the two items; later she said
that there was nothing visual about the experience; later still, she said the experience had
a visual component even though she was not innerly seeing anything. She did not seem
to have access to how the comparison was being made, and yet she was in the act of
comparing, as if everything (color, weight, jacket, pants) was somehow implied in some
organic whole.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience
Imageless Seeing?/I?/U? (form uncertain) – jacket/pants comparison
Beep 4.3 – Ellen was standing in the kitchen. At the moment of the beep, Ellen was
having three experiences. First, Ellen was wondering if she got five beeps already.
There were no words in this experience; it was a thought process. Second, she was
wondering if the beeper was working. Again, this was a thought with no words. Third,
she was hearing an almost inaudible sound and was wondering if it was coming from the
beeper. Ellen was not sure if these experiences occurred simultaneously or if they were
in very close sequential order. These experiences were distinctly different but tightly
connected in that they were all about the same subject. There did not appear to be
anything wrong with the beeper, it simply had appeared to have a longer than normal
delay between beeps.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience? (not certain of sequential nature)
U – five beeps
U – is beeper working
U – inaudible sound
M? (not sure if overlapping or not)
Beep 5.1 – Ellen was on the phone to Cox cable. She was looking at and specifically
seeing the clock, which read 4:50. At the moment of the beep, she was acknowledging
the fact that if Cox is open until five, then she will not make it! She was somehow
assessing how long it would take to drive there, somehow recognizing that she would
take I95, but there was nothing specific in her awareness about this. There were no
words or images in this experience. She was also annoyed that she wasn’t going to make
it, but the annoyance was not apparently being experienced directly. The annoyance was
part of the acknowledgment that she wouldn’t make it and was the reason for the
exclamation point that was somehow known to part of that thinking even though the
thinking was not in words.
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U – not going to make it
Beep 5.2 – Ellen was reading the New York Times. She was about to rip the first column
of page 1 so she could show it to Louise, a friend Ellen knows through a class they take
together. At the moment of the beep, there was some internal pressure to start the ripping
process. Also at the same time, Ellen was remembering Louise’s telling her that she was
not going to be in class Friday. Ellen was remembering the gist of what Louise had
said—that she would be leaving for Europe on Tuesday—but there were no symbols in
this experience; it was a recalling without words or images. Ellen was also thinking that
she had better cut the newspaper with scissors. There were also no symbols associated
with this experience.
U – pressure to rip
U – Mary Ann
U – scissors
M
Beep 5.3 – Ellen was watching the McNeil report on television. A senator was on the
television talking about leaving Iraq. He had made a comment regarding what other
countries would think if we left Iraq to Al-Qaeda. At the moment of the beep, she was
thinking that it was a ridiculous argument/stupid statement. She was being critical of the
statement’s meaning. There were no words or images in this experience. There was also
a feeling of agitation/irritation about this comment ongoing in her body (when assessed at
the beep) but not in her experience at the moment of the beep.
U – stupid statement
FFOB - agitation/irritation
Beep 5.4 – Ellen was talking with her friend Louise on the phone. Ellen had asked what
Louise was doing and Louise said she was watching M*A*S*H. At the moment of the
beep, Ellen was recognizing that M*A*S*H was on now and that maybe she should
change the channel to watch it. There were no words or images in this experience. Ellen
was also feeling insecure that Louise did not really want to talk to her. This was an
underlying concern that Ellen was aware of at the moment of the beep. Ellen was not
sure if this was experienced in her body, and if so, where in her body it was experienced.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience? (not sure of if experienced in body or not)
U – change channel
F – insecurity
M
Beep 5.5 – Ellen’s dog was whining. At the moment of the beep, Ellen was feeling quite
strongly irritated about the dog being spoiled. Ellen initially said that this irritation was
throughout her body, but later said that it was more mental than physical. She was also
trying to decide if she should get the dog a treat. There were no words or images in this
experience. The irritation had begun before she considered getting the dog a treat, but
both were present at the moment of the beep. Although the exact form of the irritation is
uncertain it appeared that Ellen was somehow experiencing irritation at the moment of
the beep.
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Difficulty Apprehending Experience
F? (form uncertain)– irritation
U – treat
Beep 5.6 – Ellen was watching Jeopardy. The question involved a novelist from
Minnesota. At the moment of the beep, Ellen was trying to think of the novelist from
Minnesota. At first, Ellen said she was thinking the words “novelist from Minnesota,”
but she had some difficulty describing the nature of this experience. At first she was not
sure if she was hearing the words or saying the words internally; then she was not certain
or even if the words were present at all; she later said that she was saying the words to
herself. Due to Ellen’s difficulty accessing her experience additional skepticism is
needed for this sample.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience
U?/IS?/IH? (form uncertain)- novelist from Minnesota
Beep 6.1 – Ellen was driving, but apparently little or no attention was devoted to this
task. At the moment of the beep she was thinking, “I think I would call myself a liberal
democrat.” At first, Ellen could not discern whether or not this thought was in words;
perhaps “a liberal democrat” was in words but the rest of the thought was not.
Eventually, Ellen believed that the entire sentence was present in words, but these words
were not heard or spoken and all the words were in her awareness simultaneously rather
than being spoken in a sequence. Although Ellen was certain of this by the end, her
initial uncertainty leaves room for skepticism.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience
Worded Thinking?/IS? (form uncertain)– liberal democrat
Beep 6.2 – Ellen was listening to the McNeil report on the radio and looking at a tote
bag. At the moment of the beep, Ellen was wondering if she dropped her eraser upstairs
where she stores her tote bag. This wondering did not contain words. Ellen was also
visualizing the spot where she leaves her tote bag. She was innerly seeing the bottom
part of the corner of her bedroom wall and part of the floor. She may also have been
innerly seeing the tote bag leaning against that wall, but was not sure. She saw
something against the wall, but it was not very vivid. The entire inner seeing was dark
and unclear. The thought seemed to have started before the inner seeing, and then
continued so that both thought and inner seeing were present at the moment of the beep.
This example is considered not clear because although Ellen is convincing that she was
experiencing an inner seeing at the moment of the beep she had some uncertainty about
one of the substantial details of the inner seeing (i.e., the presence of the tote bag).
Difficulty Apprehending Experience? (not sure if tote bag in inner seeing)
U – eraser
I - bottom corner of wall
Beep 6.3 – Ellen was having a conversation on the phone with her friend Jane. Jane had
just said something regarding a 14.99 percent interest rate. At the moment of the beep,
Ellen was thinking that 14.99 for a couple of hundred of dollars does not sound right.
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There were no words in this experience. This experience was a process of inner
calculation.
U – interest rate
Beep 6.5 – Ellen was talking on the phone with someone at Cox cable company. At the
moment of the beep, Ellen was wondering where she had left her water bottle. She did
not believe that there were words present in this wondering but was not entirely certain.
Also, Ellen originally stated that at the moment of the beep she was wondering if Cox has
a record of whether or not she returned the remote. The wondering about the Cox record
experience did not contain any words or images. However, on further reflection Ellen
decided that the wondering about the Cox record experience had ended just before the
moment of the beep.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience
U? (presence uncertain) – water bottle
Beep 6.6 – Ellen was watching the Lehrer report on the television. The person on the
television had said that John McCain had lost some people close to him on his campaign
and referred to these people as a “band of brothers”. At the moment of the beep, Ellen
was considering the words “band of brothers” and the idea that McCain had lost them.
She was echoing the words “brothers left” internally, but she was not saying or hearing
these words. Fay also may have been feeling empathic (“humanistic”) towards John
McCain, and she may have been feeling some kind of reaction to her own brother’s
having left her years ago, but it was not clear to Fay or to us whether or not this was
actually in her awareness at the moment of the beep.
Difficulty Apprehending Experience
WT –brothers left
F? (presence uncertain) – empathy
M? (not sure if F is present)

Fay’s Samples
All of Fay’s beeps are worthy of substantial skepticism. It seems unlikely that any of
Fay’s reports reflect her inner experience to a meaningful extent. Therefore, forms are
not given at the end of each summary. Even in the few instances that a guess could be
made regarding the form of Fay’s experience, her reports are still substantially unreliable
so it would be misleading to give report such guesses.
Beep 1.1 – Fay reported that near the moment of the beep she was thinking about a
church that she used to attend but is now closed. She also mentioned that she may have
been envisioning that it was run down, but she was not at all certain about this. Other
possibilities at this moment reported by Fay were thinking about a meeting she had the
previous night, thinking about how to get to the church, and thinking about what the
church might look like.

329

Beep 1.2 – Fay was sitting at breakfast reading Atlantic Magazine. At the moment of the
beep, she was looking at a picture of Poncho Barnes, a female aviator that she initially
believed was a movie star. There were many reported possibilities of the contents of
Fay’s inner experience at or near the moment of this beep. These reported possibilities
were an awareness of movie stars trying to look sultry, that sultriness has changed over
the years, that these old pictures might be valuable, that Charles Lindberg did not like
female pilots, noticing the cigarette being smoked in the picture, being critical of
smoking, and being fascinated by the picture of someone looking sinful. Some of these
possibilities were suggested by the interviewers that Fay confirmed as possibilities and
some were created by Fay without suggestion by the interviewers.
Beep 1.3 (reported 5th as Fay accidentally skipped it earlier in the interview) – Near
the moment of the beep, Fay reported that she was wondering why the beeper was not
sounding. She may have also been thinking that it was not set right and/or that maybe
something was wrong with the beeper.
Beep 1.4 – Fay was at a thrift store and was about to try on some shorts. Near the
moment of the beep, Fay believed that she was hoping that the shorts would fit her and
may have been wondering if the shorts would fit her.
Beep 1.5 – Fay was at her rental house. Near the moment of the beep she may have been
experiencing frustration about having to re-paint parts of the house, thinking about
having to re-do the paint, and/or thinking about putting water in the refrigerator to keep it
cold.
Beep 1.6 – Near the moment of the beep Fay believed that she may have been thinking
about putting the paint bucket and paint brush away and getting ready to leave. She also
suggested that she may have been wishing she had started an hour earlier.
Beep 2.1 – Fay was at her rental property. She reported having three experiences at or
near the moment of the beep. She frequently wavered regarding which of the three
components was in her awareness. Fay reported that she was innerly seeing herself
holding a broom and moving from the front door of her property toward a dust bin. This
seeing reportedly contained movement. However, Fay was not sure of the viewpoint
from which the seeing was being perceived, making the interviewers skeptical about
whether an actual inner seeing was involved. Fay also reported that at or near the
moment of the beep she was innerly seeing a property manager whom she had not hired.
The inner seeing reportedly was of her face, from the front, in color with medium clarity.
The face was expressionless. Finally, Fay stated that she was innerly seeing the property
manger she had hired. This was reportedly a full-body image from the front.
Beep 2.2 – Fay was at her rental property. She noticed that there were stones on a
walkway. Fay stated that at the moment of the beep she realized that she should sweep
the stones and that this was one more thing that she needed to do. She could not describe
the form of this experience other than stating that it was not in words (Fay suggested that
she doesn’t think in words). It is notable that when asking Iris about the form of her
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experience and giving her examples of possible forms during this beep, she stated “I
don’t quite get all of these distinctions.”
Beep 2.3 – This beep was caused by Fay turning the beeper on and off. Fay stated that at
or the moment of the beep she was remembering that one interviewer told her about
running the headset cord under her shirt for added stability. Further details of this beep
were not clear.
Beep 3.1 – Fay was watering plants at her rental property. At the moment of the beep,
she was thinking about a conversation she had with Beth, a woman she knows, about the
Alzheimer’s research project in which Fay is involved. Beth was telling Fay that Beth
has symptoms of Alzheimer’s Disease. When Fay was asked about her awareness at the
moment of the beep, Fay continually referred to numerous facts about the conversation.
When given several options regarding the form of her experience at this beep, she said
that she was visualizing the woman. This report requires some skepticism because 1. she
did not mention visualizing the woman until the option was presented and 2. she
continually referred to how Beth actually looks rather than the visualization she was
reportedly having and 3. she used multiple subjunctifiers when describing this beep (I
guess, probably, etc.). Fay eventually stated that she was visualizing the woman from the
front. The woman was probably by herself and was wearing a black bathing suit. This
was a head-to-toe image. Fay’s report of visualizing the black bathing suit is one
example of how she often used external reality to describe her inner experience: she
stated that she was visualizing her in a black bathing suit she usually sees the woman
wearing a black bathing suit. Likewise, she stated that the beep was clear because “I’ve
seen her quite a few times in the last year.” Fay also reported hearing the woman talk in
the inner seeing. She could not report what exactly was taking place in the conversation
at the moment of the beep. She was not hearing the woman speak word for word, but
was rather recalling the gist of the conversation (the woman talking about her symptoms
of Alzheimer’s Disease). Again, Fay’s description of this aspect of her experience was
frequently subjunctified and often seemed to refer to the reality of the conversation rather
than her experience of it.
Beep 3.2 – Fay was looking at a zucchini plant at her rental house. Fay’s experience at
the moment of this beep was difficult to discern. She repeatedly intermingled
background knowledge, realities of the external world, and often shifted her reports of
what was occurring in her inner experience at the moment of the beep. Fay described
having a feeling of anticipation/accomplishment regarding the large size of the zucchini
at the moment of the beep that was more of a mental process than a physical sensation.
She also reported visualizing the zucchini on the plant being ready to harvest. The leaves
were “enormous” and there was another smaller zucchini on the plant. She also said that
she was noticing that the bloom itself getting very large. She states that she may also be
thinking of the zucchini growing.
Beep 3.3 – Fay was thinking about her conversation with her handyman. Again, when
Fay was repeatedly asked about her experience at the moment of the beep, she would
recount most if not all of her actual conversation with him rather than her actual inner
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experience . She initially stated that at the moment of the beep she was remembering the
conversation mostly by visualizing him. However, when questioned for the details of this
experience, she did not or could not give any details of this visualized handyman,
referring instead to how he actually looks (i.e., he has grey hair, is usually wearing blue
jeans, etc.). The interviewers were left being highly skeptical of the existence of the
visualization at the moment of the beep. She also stated that she may have been hearing
him talk. She could not recall exactly what he was saying or if there were specific words
present in her experience. She thinks she may have been aware of the gist of the
conversation at this beep. Finally, Fay stated that it was possible that in “the recesses of
her mind” she was thinking that he was not perfect, that he was better than some, and
thinking of other handymen’s short comings but because she could not seem to describe
what was prominent in her experience, much less what was in the recesses of her mind;
and also because she had so much trouble sticking to her inner experience on this
particular day (as well as others), it is difficult to know how or if at all these aspects were
a part of her experience.
Beep 3.4 – A few days earlier, Fay and her husband had had a conversation about going
to Victorville. Now, Fay was thinking about reasons why she had been against her
husband’s planned trip to Victorville and how she had not wanted to go on the trip. In
this instance again Fay repeatedly described the actual conversation with her husband and
could not focus on a particular moment. Fay stated that at the moment of the beep she
was thinking about various aspects of the conversation, mostly her reasons for not
wanting to go. These reasons included it being too hot, staying in a crowded house, and
the travel distance required, especially when only staying for the weekend. It was very
difficult to discern which of these experiences, if any, were in her awareness at the
moment of the beep. When asked about her inner experience, she repeatedly referred to
the actual facts of the trip rather than her inner experience, suggesting that what she
described as being in her inner experience may not have been in her experience at all at
the moment of the beep. Fay also had substantial difficulty describing how she
experienced these things.
Beep 3.5 – Fay was thinking about Samantha, a woman Fay knows, and Samantha’s
unhappy marriage. While questioned about her inner experience at the moment of the
beep, Fay consistently and repeatedly described the actual situation surrounding the
marriage and apparently could not focus on one particular moment or aspect of her
experience. She described various aspects of Samantha’s actual marriage rather than
Fay’s inner experience. These things included Samantha’s unhappiness, the unhappiness
of Samantha’s and her husband’s relatives, and Samantha’s incorrect pre-conceptions that
her husband had a great deal of money. Because Fay could not seem to distinguish
between her own experience and the facts of Samantha’s marriage, we are highly
skeptical about Fay’s reports about her experience at this beep.
Beep 4.1 – Fay was reading an article in AARP magazine about the state of health
insurance coverage in the United States. When asked “What was in your experience at
the moment of the beep” numerous times and in a variety of ways, Fay often focused on
external realities or inconsistent descriptions of what she was experiencing at or near the
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beep. Initially when asked this question, she described the contents of the article. When
asked again she described Medicare. When she was directed to her inner experience, she
said she was thinking about her own health care coverage, thinking about uncovered
people, thinking about the article, and thinking about someone who cannot afford health
care coverage for his family. The description of her inner experience was very
inconsistent and subjunctified, however, and should be met with skepticism.
Beep 4.2 – Fay was chopping tofu. She had recently had a conversation with Mary, a
woman Fay knows, about Mary’s father and procedures to have elderly people who can
no longer function on their own being declared incompetent. Again, Fay provided
inconsistent, subjunctified descriptions of what was occurring in her experience at or near
the beep, but could not answer detailed questions about her experience in the least. Fay
first stated that she was thinking about procedures for getting elderly people declared
incompetent, but could not answer any detailed questions about this experience (i.e.,
questions of form or what was specifically in her awareness at the moment of the beep).
She then said she was thinking more about Mary’s father, but again could not describe
this experience at all. She then said she was thinking about her own father’s situation in
1992. All were advanced as descriptions of what she was thinking about at the moment
of the beep. The fact that all were distinctly different and were not apprehended as being
simultaneous leads to the conclusion that none (or at least not all) were actually
descriptions of her experience.
Beep 4.3 – Fay was reading an article in Newsweek about John F. Kennedy. The article
debated whether he was a great president or a spoiled rich boy who was not a great
president at all. When asked about her inner experience, Fay instead described the article
itself and events in JFK’s presidency. She sometimes said things that could be
understood to be descriptions of inner experience. For example, at one point she said that
at the moment of the beep she was reading and understanding the article; later she said
she that at the moment of the beep she was debating whether JFK was a great president or
not; later she said that at the moment of the beep she was thinking that maybe the article
was right—JFK was a spoiled rich boy. Largely though, she described the actual article
or actual events in JFK’s presidency when asked about her experience at the moment of
the beep.
Beep 4.4 – Fay was cooking. Fay offered a variety of descriptions of her experience at
this beep: thinking about taking Subway sandwiches to church on Wednesday, thinking
about turning tofu to get the sauce on all sides of the tofu, thinking about having had
Subway sandwiches on the previous Sunday night, thinking about how Subway
sandwiches are healthy and not greasy like Kentucky Fried Chicken or McDonald’s, and
thinking about an incident at Subway on Sunday night when a man was kicked out for
drinking alcohol. She could not zero in on any one of those as being the thought that was
occurring at the moment of the beep, nor did she say that all were occurring
simultaneously. When asked for details of any particular thought, Fay typically shifted to
providing a new thought or unrelated detail. For example, Fay initially said that she was
visualizing the alcohol-drinking incident at Subway. When asked about this
visualization, she described how Subway actually looks. Fay did not appear to be
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describing her experiencing at this beep, but rather the external reality of the Subway
shop.
Beep 4.5 – Fay was playing Scrabble with her husband. She responded in a variety of
ways when asked about her inner experience at this beep. The word “tap” was on the
board and Fay was considering making the word “tape” and “gloved” off of this word.
When asked about her experience, Fay explained game strategy–the importance of rack
management, of “closing the board” when you are ahead, of “opening” it when you are
behind, and of getting bingos. All were advanced as if she were describing her
experience at the moment of the beep, which almost certainly was not the case.
Beep 4.6 – Fay was still playing Scrabble. At the moment of the beep, she was
considering a play to make. She was considering putting a “q” on a double letter score
and getting a double word score so that she could get 40 points for the “q”. She was
checking various locations on the board for where she could put the “q” and recalled that
there were at least two locations. Still, Fay could not answer specific questions regarding
her inner experience at this moment.
Beep 5.1 – Despite the fact that we were present in Fay’s house, in the next room waiting
for her to report that the beeper had sounded, it was difficult to determine what was in her
experience at the moment of the beep because her accounts of her experience varied from
one portion of her account to the next. As best I can understand it, Fay was thinking
about two violation letters that she had signed earlier that morning in her role on a
neighborhood committee. This thinking was described at various times in her account as
being glad that the association chairman of the committee was back, that the assistant
chairman is difficult to deal with, that the assistant chairman has her own agenda, that
one of the letters would mean that the resident had to go to another committee, that one of
the letters would simply be a notice, that one of the violators had a long history of
violation, a file an inch thick, and so on. Fay’s account made it appear, as each one of
those topics was being described, that that topic had been present in her awareness at the
moment of the beep. However, there was no sense of multiplicity or overlap. When
asked whether any of this, for example, the board chairman, was visual, she said “Yes, I
can see him”; but when reminded that the object of this study is not to determine what
she can see but what, if anything, she was seeing at the moment of the beep, she was
unclear.
Beep 5.2 – Fay was playing Scrabble on her computer. She was looking at the screen
and was about to put an “A” and a “K” next to a “Z” that was already down on the board.
At the moment of the beep, Fay was thinking about playing the “A” and the “K” on the
“Z”, was thinking that this was probably her best play and that it would probably
maximize her points. Fay initially said that she was thinking about playing the “K” on
the “Z” and the “A” on the “Z” but later said that she had already made the decision to
play the “K” and the “A” on the “Z”.
K
ZA
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Beep 5.3 – Fay was playing Scrabble on her computer and at the moment of the beep Fay
apparently somehow thinking about the word “slotter.” Fay’s descriptions of this thought
process were inconsistent, so it is impossible to know exactly what was in her awareness
at the moment of the beep, but the general idea was wondering whether or not “slotter”
was a word; that she would play it and find out whether or not the computer would reject
it or not; that she could remember that the word had been played in some past Scrabble
game, but she couldn’t remember the outcome of the protest. These sub-thoughts may
have all been parts of the same thought process that were all present at the moment of the
beep, or they may have been explicit thoughts that were in the vicinity of the beep but not
simultaneous, or they may have been ways of describing her activity, none or which was
actually present in her experience at the moment of the beep. We pressed her on those
issues. For example, we asked twice if there were words in her experience at the moment
of the beep and both times described external reality (i.e., the words on the Scrabble
board and that she didn’t know if “slotter” was a word or not) instead of answering
directly about her experience. Thus Fay’s reports of her experience seemed discursive or
wandering; however, there did seem to be limits on how far that wandering could go. For
example, Fay confidently and believably said that she was not, at the moment of the beep,
thinking of other computer Scrabble systems and their ways of responding to incorrect
words, but may have been thinking about that near the beep. This may be evidence that
Fay has some reliable access to her experience at the moment of the beep. However, the
investigators’ overall impression was that Fay did not, even when interviewed
immediately after the beep, distinguish adequately between what was in experience at the
moment of the beep and what were the characteristics of the situation surrounding her at
the moment of the beep.
Beep 5.4 – Fay was playing Scrabble on her computer. She was thinking about playing
the word “VENOM”. There were two different O’s on the board that she could play this
word through. Both gave her a double word score, but one also put the “V” on a double
letter score. At the moment of the beep, Fay may have been noticing that the “V” could
go on a double letter score, but Fay was not confident or consistent in her reports of her
experience at this beep. Fay at another point stated that the other option (the non-double
letter score option) may have been in her awareness as well. After discussing the beep
for some time, Fay stated that she may have been congratulating herself at the moment of
the beep for finding the play using the double word score. She was inconsistent in her
description of this self-congratulation. This experience was described alternately as a
feeling of happiness, and an awareness that she is good and/or smart. This feeling was
described as a mental process, but Fay could not describe the experience of this process
further. Fay also did not describe this feeling until directly asked about emotion. She
also said at one point that the feeling was more prominent in her awareness than the
noticing of where to play the “V”, but typically described the noticing as prominent. This
may be evidence for undifferentiated experience as she could not consistently state which
experience was prominent at the moment of the beep. Fay was able to rule out some
experiences that were occurring prior to the beep, suggesting some differentiation and an
ability to focus on the moment of the beep.

335

Beep 5.5 – Fay was playing Scrabble at her computer. She was looking at a rack with all
consonants. Fay was again inconsistent in her descriptions regarding her experience at
the moment of the beep. She at one point during the interview that she was wondering
what to do (i.e., whether she should play the rack or exchange her letters), but later said
that she thinking of a series of specific plays she could make. She also stated at one point
that she was thinking that she doesn’t have many prospects with the board and tiles she
had to work with. Fay stated that all of these experiences were in her experience
simultaneously, but the inconsistency of her report and inability to describe these
experiences in detail suggests that this may not have been the case.

Gary’s Samples
Beep 0.1 was a practice beep and was not recorded in the analysis as it was used for
training purposes only. Beeps from day one were also not scored or analyzed as Gary
forgot to bring his notebook to the interview. Beeps from day two were not used as Gary
was uncertain of the procedure and collected some of them two days prior to the
interview. Therefore, only days three through six were used in the final analysis.
Beep 0.1 - Gary was just outside of the DES lab talking with one of the interviewers
about where he and his wife could go while Gary was wearing the beeper. It was a sunny
day and the discussion involved walking a short way across campus. At the moment of
the beep, Gary was concerned about his wife getting sunburned. He was innerly seeing
her, somehow from the front, side, and back at the same time, although this was not fully
investigated. In the inner seeing she was in a green muumuu that she used to wear often.
Gary said that she was wearing a hat in the inner seeing, but only agreed after one of the
interviewer suggested this possibility. This suggests that the hat may not have been in his
awareness at the moment of the beep. It was sunny in the inner seeing without much
background. Gary was also thinking about being interested in being a participant in the
study and hoping that he could help. Gary did not initially describe this experience as
occurring in words, but when it was suggested he said that he was thinking in words
something similar to “I’m interested in being a subject in this study and I hope to be of
some benefit to the study.” Because Gary did not suggest that this experience was in
words until suggested by the interviewers, this report should be taken with high
skepticism. Gary thought that he may have been innerly speaking the words, but that
they weren’t heard. This was not fully investigated, however, as this beep was meant to
demonstrate the process and not frustrate the participant.
(I) – wife sunburned
(IS?) (presence uncertain) – being in study
Beep 1.1 - During this beep it appeared that Gary was arguing with his wife about the
budget. Since neither of them work very much, they have to be careful about their
budget. Gary was not able to report any inner experience at the moment of this beep. It
may be that no inner experience was occurring at this beep, that inner experience was
occurring but Gary could not remember without the aid of his notebook, or Gary did not
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entirely understand the task, as is common on the first day of sampling. Gary admitted
that he did not understand the depth of the task throughout the training exercise.
Beep 1.2 – For this beep Gary stated that he was riding in the car with his wife at one
point and may have been feeling sad because he can no longer. He went on to explain
that he attempts to be a backseat driver when riding with his wife. At one instant it
appeared that while he was riding with his wife he was innerly seeing a street map of the
way home. It was not clear if this was occurring at one of the beeps or not. Gary was
asked to re-create this inner seeing. The re-created inner seeing was of unlabeled streets
represented as black lines on a light background. Only the streets that Gary was traveling
on were in the inner seeing. There was also a square that represented his house.
Although the streets were unlabeled, he understood which street was which.
Beep 2.1 (two days prior to interview) – Gary was cleaning up dog poop in his back
yard. At the moment of the beep, Gary was experiencing pain in his joints. This pain
was present in about 6 of his joints. Gary was not sure which joints had the pain, but he
referenced his shoulders, elbow, knees, and hips. Gary eventually said that his lower
back had the most pain. This pain was a dull ache. Gary was also thinking about the
ramifications of a TIA he had five days prior to the interview. He was thinking “How
serious is this? Will this lead to complications?” These words, or words similar to them,
seemed to be present to Gary at the moment of the beep. There was no voice associated
with the words. They came much faster than if he were speaking them out loud, but still
occurred in sequence.
(SA) – pain
(WT) – ramifications of TIA
Beep 2.2 (two days prior to interview) – Gary’s descriptions of the beep varied
substantially. He was also frequently uncertain about the contents of his awareness at
this moment. Gary was sitting at his desk doing paperwork for his elevator business. At
the moment of the beep, Gary was somehow thinking of a particular business item he was
working on, but was not sure which one. He was somehow trying to be accurate about
his work, but it was not clear whether this accuracy was in his awareness at the moment
of the beep. He was also wondering if his customer would question any potential
problems with the item or if they would not worry about it and have a problem later.
Beep 2.3 – Gary was cleaning his car seats. At the moment of the beep, Gary was
thinking something similar to “Is this really a stroke or TIA or is this going to go away
and not come back or is it going to get worse?” As in beep 2.1, these words occurred
very quickly and were not audible or spoken, but were somehow present to Gary. Gary
was also paying attention to cleaning the car seat, which comprised about an equal part of
his awareness as the thought.
(WT) – stroke
(JD) – cleaning
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Beep 2.4 – At the moment of the beep, Gary was still wondering whether the incident
Saturday was a TIA or a stroke. He did not think that he was thinking about this for the
entire 20 minutes between beeps, but the beep caught him thinking about similar things.
Beep 3.1 – Gary was in his home reading the newspaper. He had just turned to a page
with an article about a pastry chef with an accompanying picture and had just read the
caption to the picture. At the moment of the beep, Gary was wondering if his daughter’s
roommate knew the pastry chef or if she worked with him. This thought was in words,
but had no auditory qualities. Although specific words were present, Gary agreed that
there were many ways that the experience could be described that were equally as
accurate (i.e., has my roommate’s daughter ever worked with or known the pastry chef, I
wonder if my roommate’s daughter has worked with or knows this pastry chef, etc.). The
thought was experienced very quickly (less than a second) and was almost simultaneous
with the beep (Gary could not discern whether it occurred a moment before, a moment
after, or at the exact time of the beep).
WT - daughter’s roommate and pastry chef
Beep 3.2 – Gary was in the kitchen getting ready to make a bowl of cereal. He was
looking at various boxes of cereal. At the moment of the beep, Gary was trying to
determine which type of cereal he was going to eat. This was a mental process that did
not contain words or images.
U – deciding cereal
Beep 3.3 – Gary was getting ready to leave with his wife, but his wife was on the phone
with the medication company. At the moment of the beep, Gary was thinking that they
had to leave right now or they were going to be late. This experience was similar to 3.1
in that words were present but there was no auditory quality to them, the experience
could be described equally well using a variety of words, and it occurred very quickly.
WT – late
Beep 3.4 – Gary was riding in the passenger seat of his car talking to a client on his cell
phone. At the moment of the beep, Gary was talking, but this was not in his awareness as
it was “automatic.” Gary was thinking “when are you going to be ready for our
installation?” The “you” referred to the client he was talking with (Gary asked this exact
question to his client a couple of seconds after the beep). This experience was similar to
that in beeps 3.1 and 3.3 in that there were words present but no auditory qualities and
that it happened very quickly. It was different in that those exact words best describe the
experience. Gary also may have been innerly seeing two workers bending to lift an
indiscernible object (most likely a rail or panel of some sort) that began to form just after
the above experience (Gary is not sure when exactly the beep came in this sequence).
The men were about five to six feet apart and viewed as if Gary was standing about five
feet away from them. There was not much of a background and there were no edges to
the inner seeing. The inner seeing was in black and white. There are two reasons for
skepticism regarding this report however: 1. Gary did not mention the inner seeing until
the possibility of an inner seeing was suggested. 2. Gary often answered questions about
the details of the inner seeing by saying “They would be…” and “It would be…” as if he
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was not describing an actual inner seeing, but an inner seeing like it would have appeared
were he having an inner seeing at that moment.
WT – ready for installation
I? (presence uncertain) – two men lifting
M? (presence of I uncertain)
Beep 3.5 – Gary was in an elevator. At the moment of the beep, he was thinking “Oh
darn, we’re late, I wish we could get started a little earlier.” This experience was similar
to 3.1 and 3.3 (it contained words but there was no auditory quality to the words and it
happened very quickly). The “Oh darn, we’re late” part of the experience contained
those specific words, but the rest of the experience could be described just as accurately
using variations in the wording. Gary may also have been experiencing mild irritation at
the moment of the beep. This was a mental process. It was not clear if this was a
separate experience from the experience above or if it was somehow contained within the
experience above. Gary did not mention this aspect of his experience until the very end
of the description and did so off-handedly, but believed it was present at the moment of
the beep when questioned. This increases skepticism regarding this particular component
of the beep.
WT - late
F? (presence uncertain)– irritation
M? (presence of F uncertain)
Beep 4.1 – Gary was eating breakfast. At the moment of the beep, he was thinking about
his wife Alice’s eye problems, about the seriousness of her eye problems, the possible
consequences of her eye problems, and was worried about their seriousness. This was
experienced as one long sentence that went something like “I wonder how serious Alice’s
eye problems will be and if she will be okay and what the doctor will say and what the
consequences might be…”etc. This sentence occurred faster than external speech and
although it did not have any auditory qualities, it did have characteristics of speech, such
as pauses and inflections at appropriate places. He also reported that it was as if the
words were being spoken but the auditory part of the speech was taken away, but later he
reported that there may have been something visual about this experience, like the words
were moving across his visual field from left to right one at a time, but there was no
actual seeing of the words and it was not like reading. The interviewers were unable to
resolve this seeming inconsistency. It was clear that there were words, and that these
words were sequential, that the sequence was faster than would occur if spoken aloud,
and that there was some inflection and rhythm to the words but how all that was
conveyed was not clear. Gary also may have been experiencing some concern for his
wife’s condition in addition to that expressed in the above experience, but this was not
clear and if it were present it was very slight.
WT (w/ possible visual component) – eye problems
F? (presence uncertain) – concern
Beep 4.2 – Gary was gathering things that he needed to leave his house and was talking
to Alice. At the moment of the beep, Gary was wondering if he had everything that he
needed to leave, if Alice had everything she needed to leave, and was thinking about a

339

doctor to whom he owed money. These thoughts were similar to the experience in 4.1, in
that they were in words, perhaps somewhat like speech but with no auditory component,
and were faster than regular speech, but also perhaps somewhat visual. The experience
was different from 4.1 in that the sentences seemed to interrupt each other, and the entire
rate might have been a bit faster. For example, before Gary could complete thinking “Do
I have everything I need?” another thought, such as, “Does Alice have what she needs?”
would interrupt the first thought. Then a third, also worded, thought would interrupt the
second before it had completed, and so on. The impression was of a jumble of thoughts,
all incomplete.
WT (w/ possible visual component; series of thoughts) – needing things to
leave/doctor
M
Beep 4.3 – This beep was skipped because it came while Gary was writing his response
to beep 4.2
Beep 4.4 – Gary was in the doctor’s office waiting for Alice to be called. Alice was
talking to him about her hospice nursing experience, and although he had a general sense
of what she was saying, he was not paying any or at least much attention to her. At the
moment of the beep, he was thinking a series of worded thoughts: “How serious is her
Alice’s condition?” “What is the doctor going to say?” ”What’s his diagnosis?” The
characteristics of these thinkings were similar to 4.1: worded thoughts, perhaps speechy
but perhaps visual, that followed one another, that were sequential, and that had some of
the rhythm and inflection characteristics of speech. The sentences were shorter than the
one long sentence as in 4.1; the sentences were complete (not jumbled as when they
interrupted each other in 4.2). Gary also may have been experiencing some concern
about the situation the was more than the experience above. The concern at this beep was
greater than in 4.1. It was not physical and it is not entirely clear if it was present or not.
WT (w/ possible visual component; series of thoughts) – diagnosis
F? (presence uncertain)– concern
M? (presence of F uncertain)
Beep 4.5 – Alice had just come out of the doctor’s office back out into the waiting room.
Just prior to the beep she had told him that the doctor said that she will need eye surgery
before the end of the year. At the moment of the beep, Gary felt a cold chill on the
outside of his body as if the temperature in the room had dropped. There was also a
tingling sensation to the chill. The chill and tingling were present from his waist to the
top of his head. This was an emotional reaction to Alice’s news that she would need
surgery. Gary was also thinking a series of worded thoughts: “Oh, my gosh!” ”What’s
going to happen?” ”I hope it turns out okay!” Thank God we have the best doctor.” This
experience was a series of worded thoughts similar to 4.1 and 4.3.
SA - chill
WT (w/ possible visual component; series of thoughts) – surgery-related issues
Beep 4.6 – Gary and Alice were having lunch at a restaurant and Gary was doing a
crossword puzzle. Alice had just asked Gary whom he was going to vote for in the 2008
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election. At the moment of the beep, Gary was thinking “I don’t know yet, I haven’t
made up my mind.” This experience was somewhat simpler than those described above,
so Gary could be more certain of the details. The quotation is the exact or close to exact
words. Gary could also distinguish that he thought a comma between “yet” and “I” rather
than a period because the pause was shorter than it would have been for a period.
However, Gary still could not say whether these words were spoken or seen, even though
he seemed to understand the question, to understand the importance of the distinction,
even to be fascinated by it.
WT (w/ possible visual component) – voting
Beep 5.1 – Gary was eating breakfast and reading the newspaper. He was reading an
article about possibly deleting the motto “In God We Trust” from U.S. currency. At the
moment of the beep, Gary was thinking something very similar to “how are other people
and religions going to react to this newspaper article?” This was experienced in a similar
manner to previous beeps; there were words present, there was no auditory quality to the
experience although the experience did have aspects of speech (such as the question mark
at the end being implicit in the experience), the words were sequential, but a bit faster
than if actually spoken. This aspect of Gary’s experience comprised about half of his
awareness. The other half was the actual article that Gary was reading and
comprehending.
WT – religions and newspaper article
Beep 5.2 – Gary was eating breakfast and just beginning a crossword puzzle. Gary was
thinking of words that could go in the crossword puzzle, specifically in the “1 Across”
and “1 Down” section. At the moment of the beep, Gary was imaginarily seeing words
for both “1 Across” and “1 Down” superimposed on the actual blank crossword puzzle he
was looking at. At the time of the expositional interview, he could not recall what the
words were, but he seemed to indicate that he could have written them down had he
known we wanted that kind of detail. The imaginarily seen words were in capital block
letters as if he had written them. He was not focused on the entire puzzle, just the upper
left corner where “1 Across” and “1 Down” were. Gary’s lack of detail (i.e., which
words he was imagining) suggests that there should be some skepticism regarding the
accuracy of Gary’s report at this beep.
I? (lack of detail) – crossword
Beep 5.3 – Gary was again working on a crossword puzzle. He had completed some of
the puzzle, but was now going back and trying to fill in the blank spaces. At the moment
of the beep, Gary was imagining a word superimposed on the crossword just like in 5.2,
but this time he was in the middle of the puzzle and was only envisioning one word. He
was not sure what the word was or if it was going across or down. Again, Gary’s lack of
detail in describing this beep is grounds for some skepticism.
I? (lack of detail) – crossword
Beep 5.4 – Gary was outside of his house checking the landscaping and sprinkler system.
He was checking for wet dirt where water had come out of the sprinkler, signifying that
the sprinkler was working. The dirt was in fact wet in the appropriate areas. At the
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moment of the beep, Gary felt relieved that the dirt was wet and the sprinkler system
appeared to be working. This relief was experienced as a tingling on the surface of his
upper torso that included his chest and his back. Also, somehow related to the relief,
Gary was thinking that he was glad the sprinkler worked, that the crew seems to have
done their job properly, and that they set up the system properly. This experience was
similar to past experiences in which Gary was thinking in words that had no auditory
quality.
F – relief
WT – glad sprinkler system works
Beep 5.5 – Gary was doing a crossword puzzle. At the moment of the beep, Gary was
again trying to find a word that fit a space in the crossword similar to beep 5.3.
I? (lack of detail) - crossword
Beep 5.6 – Gary was doing a crossword puzzle. At the moment of the beep, Gary’s
experience was very similar to5.3, and 5.5.
I ? (lack of detail)– crossword
Beep 6.1 – Gary was at home eating breakfast. At the moment of the beep, Gary was
having three simultaneous experiences. One of these experiences was wondering if
people he knows are affected by the fires in southern California. This was experienced as
innerly seeing a neighborhood that he knows and has been to in California, and this area
was in flames. He was not sure what specific area he was innerly seeing, but the houses
in the inner seeing were familiar and it was a specific place that he has been. The inner
seeing was fairly clear, in color, and there was motion in the picture (i.e., the flames were
moving). The second experience was that he was feeling bad for the people in the fire.
This was an experience that clearly involved words, but there was no auditory quality to
the words. These words were occurring a bit faster than speech and seemed to move
from left to right somehow. There also may have been some visual quality to the words,
but the exact nature of this visual quality was difficult to discern. (i.e., words present but
not auditory, the words occurring faster than speech, etc.). The third experience was
wondering if the beeper was going to go off while he was thinking about the fire. This
was experienced as words, but with no auditory quality. The words were moving a bit
faster than actual speech, the words may have been moving left to right somehow, and
there may have been a visual quality to the experience, but Gary was not certain of this.
This was also a thought process similar to previous beeps All three of these experiences
were equally present in his awareness.
I – fire
WT (w/ possible visual component) – feeling bad for people
WT(w/ possible visual component) – beeper sounding
M
Beep 6.2 – Gary was in a group meeting. Members of the group were talking about the
World Series of baseball beginning later that day. Gary was thinking something very
close to “Oh, I had forgotten that the World Series started today.” The exact words were
present, but Gary could not quite remember exactly what they were. This experience was
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similar to previous beeps in form. They were sequential and a little faster than speech.
They also seemed to have a visual quality and were moving left to right, but it did not
seem that Gary was actually seeing the words. They also seemed to come automatically
to Gary, rather than being purposefully produced.
WT (w/ possible visual component) – World Series
Beep 6.3 – Gary was still attending the group. The group was talking about coin
collections. At the moment of the beep, Gary was innerly seeing a coin book that he
owns. There was little detail to this inner seeing, which was also out of focus. Gary
could discern that the book was open and almost a white color. He could also see round
disks that represented coins, which were a little darker than the book. There were about
45 coins. He could also see about five empty holes in the book that did not have coins.
These holes were a bit darker than the book and coins. This inner seeing filled his visual
field. Gary was also seeing words scroll across the middle of the inner seeing. The
words were something very similar to “when am I going to get the rest of the quarters
that are being issued this year?” These words were in focus. The words were similar to
the words that scroll at the bottom of some television news channels, but were in the
middle and were moving faster. The verbal part of this experience was similar to
previous beeps (6.1, for example), in that the words did not have an auditory quality,
moved faster than normal speech, and moved from left to right. However, whereas in 6.1
the worded part of Gary’s experience may have been vaguely visual, the worded part of
this experience was clearly visual and the words were clearly seen moving from left to
right.
I – coin book
WT? (form uncertain) – words scrolling
M

Henry’s Samples
Henry had such difficulty describing his momentary inner experience on day one that
the beeps could not be written up in any meaningful way. Also, because Henry’s reports
were very unreliable forms will not be speculated as it is unlikely that his reports
represent his momentary inner experience.
Beep 2.1 – Henry was sitting in the passenger seat of his car (his wife was driving). The
car was coming out of the garage and the door was closing near the moment of the beep.
Near or at the moment of the beep, Henry may have been experiencing something
between anxiety and eagerness in his body that he described as a “drive” or wanting to
move. This involved his entire body and was due to his desire to get to his support group
early. He also may have been experiencing happiness. At first he stated that his
happiness was general (i.e., “I’m always happy.”), but also stated that he was
experiencing happiness somehow (both bodily and mentally, after these possibilities were
suggested by the interviewers) at the moment of the beep.
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Beep 2.2 – Henry and his wife were pulling into the parking lot to attend the support
group. Henry may not have remembered exactly when the beep came for this sample.
He was not certain if the beep came when he was in the parking lot or on the street.
Beep 2.3 – Henry was in his support group discussing the Thanksgiving holiday and what
people did for Thanksgiving last week. This discussion had just begun and Henry may
have been talking. He may have been talking with the group leader about the cold season
in San Francisco or about Thanksgiving. At or near the moment of the beep, Henry may
have been experiencing relaxation, the conversation, and the group leader smiling.
Beep 2.4 – Henry was still in his support group. The group was reading a map of the
United States and discussing where people lived/grew up and where they went for
Thanksgiving. It is unclear exactly what Henry was doing at the moment of the beep (at
first he said he was tracing his finger along Route 15 on the map, but later said his hands
were folded at the moment of the beep). At the moment of the beep, Henry may have
been experiencing a happy mood, but when asked he said that he is generally happy and
did not talk about this experience specifically at the moment of the beep.
Beep 2.5 – Henry was talking to Todd, one of the interviewers, before the interview
began, when the beep sounded through Henry’s earphone. Henry, according to Todd’s
observation, may have been talking about Thanksgiving or what Todd was currently
doing in school. During the subsequent interview, Henry stated that at this moment of
the beep he was saying, “Todd, what are you doing in school?” and that the beep came
between the words “Todd” and “what.” However, although Henry asked Todd about
school, Todd’s recollection is that Henry did not ever ask “Todd, what are you doing in
school?” Henry may have been aware of being in a happy mood at the moment of the
beep, but he again discussed his general happy mood when asked rather than his
experience at the moment of the beep. When Dr. Hurlburt, one of the interviewers
inquired whether this mood was experienced bodily and/or mentally, Henry seemed to
agree that it was bodily and mental, as if following Dr. Hurlburt’s suggestion.
Beep 3.1 – Henry was relaxing in his dining room and was talking to his wife. The two
of them needed to do errands in the near future. At the moment of the beep, Henry may
have been saying “We better get started to go, Kate.” He stated that the beep came just
after he completed the sentence, but changed the exact wording of the sentence in his
report. He also did not appear to have written this statement in his notes. He also may
have been feeling some momentum in his body as he moves to get up out of his chair, but
it was unclear if this was at the moment of the beep as Henry did not mention this until
late in discussing this beep. Henry reported that there was nothing in his experience at
this beep.
Beep 3.2 – Henry was sitting on a couch at a friend’s house. He had just looked at his
watch. At the moment of the beep he was feeling anxious/eager to leave. This was
experienced as a feeling of movement or wanting to move. It was experienced bodily
from the top of his head to his stomach area. There may have also been something
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mental about this experience, but this was difficult to discern. He may have been starting
to get up from the couch at the beep.
Beep 3.3 – Henry was at home eating lunch with his wife and they were discussing going
out later that evening with friends. Initially, Henry reported that he was saying “What
clothing are you going to wear?” out loud to his wife, stating that the beep had come
between “you” and “going.” He later stated that he had specific clothing in mind that he
was going to wear and that at the moment of the beep he was asking for approval from
his wife about what he was going to wear that night. It was difficult to discern whether
this was a change in his report about his experience (from being about his wife’s clothing
to being about his own clothing) or whether the question about his wife’s clothing was
actually a part of his consideration of what he should wear. We tried to differentiate
those aspects without success. He also reported a desire to move that was similar to a
previous beep. We asked to see Henry’s notes for this beep; they simply stated “eating
lunch, getting ready for affair for today.”
Beep 4.1 – Henry was reading a newsletter from a group that he is involved with. He had
just finished reading the last paragraph. Henry initially described many potential
experiences that were occurring at the moment of the beep: thinking about charity work
he has done, thinking about two members of the group that had died recently,
remembering his shock upon one of the member’s deaths occurring very suddenly, and
how he is alive but he could have just as easily died. When it was suggested that he
could be thinking about the dead member in pictures, Henry agreed that he was having an
inner seeing. However, by the end of the interview it seemed that Henry was simply
reading and not having any experience at the moment of the beep, although he may have
been experiencing some of the above experiences somewhere near the moment of the
beep.
Beep 4.2 – Henry first stated that he was eating a carrot and discussing shopping with his
wife. He then stated that he was eating a carrot and reading. At the moment of the beep,
it seemed that Henry was just reading with comprehension.
Beep 4.3 – Henry was talking to his wife. At first, Henry said that was laughing at the
moment of the beep and walking out of the bedroom. He later said that he was saying
“okay dear” to his wife at the beep. It seemed that Henry was not having any inner
experience at this beep.
Beep 4.4 – Henry was glancing through a brochure of Lee’s Liquors. He was looking at
the prices of different gift baskets and comparing them to pictures of what was contained
in the gift basket. At first, Henry stated that his eyes had just focused on a price, $24.99,
and his eyes had not yet moved to the corresponding item, a Bailey’s Irish Crème gift
basket. He later said that at the moment of the beep he was laughing at how expensive
Bailey’s Irish Crème was compared to what prices were like in the 60’s and 70’s for
liquor. Those two descriptions are contradictory, because the one presumes that Henry
knew what the price stood for and the other presumes that he does not know that. When
asked how he was remembering, he explained his real life experience from that time
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period. It seems that Henry was either having no experience at this moment or could not
explain it adequately.
Beep 4.5 – Henry was reading through a magazine and looking for an article that would
be interesting to read. Specifically, he was reading a caption about a Cardinal in Viet
Nam. At the moment of the beep, Henry was apparently simply reading and
comprehending.

Irving’s Samples
Irving’s samples were deemed to be unreliable. A very high level of skepticism
should be used when reviewing his samples. Because they are unreliable, forms are not
included at the end of each of his beep summaries.
Beep 1.1 – Irving was sitting in a chair in his apartment. At the moment of the beep,
Irving may have been wondering what he was going to do this afternoon. At first he
mentioned that he was thinking of the different activities that he might participate in, but
later recanted saying that he was wondering in general what he was going to do.
Furthermore, this was not a decision making process among different activities, but
simply a general wondering. However, it is not entirely clear whether any particular
activities were in his awareness or not at the moment of the beep. There were no symbols
or emotion in this experience. It was reported as simply wondering but substantial
skepticism is warranted for this sample.
Beep 1.2 – Irving had just glanced at the newspaper where he had read an article about
the New York governor’s sex scandal. He was not reading the newspaper at the moment
of the beep. Irving stated that at the moment of the beep he was innerly seeing the
governor making his public announcement that he was involved in the scandal and his
wife was standing next to him. Although Irving believed that the governor was talking in
his experience, he was not hearing any words (i.e., his mouth was moving but there was
no sound being made in Irving’s experience). This seeing was exactly the same as the
announcement he had seen the previous evening on television, although it is not clear if
Irving was seeing a television screen in his experience. Irving was confident in his
description of the inner seeing and described many details. For example, the governor
and his wife were viewed slightly to the side, the governor’s wife was on the governor’s
right, he could see the governor from about the bottom of the neck up, he could see his
wife from about the middle chest up. Irving could not tell what they were wearing,
although the inner seeing was very clear. However, because of the variation in
interviewing for this day and later evidence, this beep should be taken with substantial
skepticism.
Beep 1.3 – This beep occurred seconds after the interview for 1.2 ended. The headphone
had just fallen out of Irving’s ear and he had just put it back in. Although Irving seemed
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uncertain at first, he eventually stated that he was pretty certain that nothing was in his
awareness at the moment of the beep.
Beep 1.4 – Irving was sitting in a chair in his apartment. The previous evening, Irving’s
son and wife had visited him and mentioned that they were having a dinner for him soon
and would invite many people. Irving reported that at the moment of the beep he
wondering who was going to be at his dinner. This wondering appeared to have no
symbols. Also, within this same experience, Irving was somehow thinking of his son. It
is not certain how his son was present in this experience, but Irving was fairly certain that
his son was in this experience. Irving also may have been remembering his son and wife
visiting the previous night, but he was not certain if this was in his experience and if it
was it was much less prevalent than the wondering. Irving was slightly inconsistent
during the interview for this beep, but once the discussion of what was before, after, and
at the beep occurred, Irving became much more consistent. Nevertheless, Irving’s
account was not very believable when considering the lack of rigor of the interview and
evidence from later sampling days.
Beep 1.5 – Irving was reading a newspaper article about a local bridge that recent had
large concrete pieces fall from it. It was not clear what was in Irving’s awareness at this
beep. At first, he said “the first thing that comes to mind is that it’s a catastrophe.” He
then discussed the actual condition of the bridge and the government’s lack of response.
When asked again about the moment of the beep Irving asked what he had said
previously. When the interviewer stated that he said that he may have been thinking that
it was a catastrophe, Irving stated that he was not certain if that is what he was thinking
and was not certain what his experience was at the moment of the beep. Irving was
confident that he was thinking something and had somewhat withdrawn from the actual
process of reading.
Beep 2.1 – Irving was sitting in a chair in his apartment thinking about a story a man told
him at lunch about making an illegal turn in his car. Irving told the interviewer a long
story about this conversation and initially stated that he was thinking about the incident
with the man at the moment of the beep. He later stated that at the moment of the beep
he was trying to stop thinking about the situation, that he was about to “turn it off” in his
mind. Irving thought that he was aware of trying to stop thinking about the situation at
the moment of the beep, but was not certain. Irving was fairly certain that he had to use
effort to end the thought, but was not certain is this was exactly at the moment of the
beep or not. He was also not certain if he was still thinking about the situation with the
man he spoke with at lunch at the moment of the beep and was inconsistent on this point.
Beep 2.2 – When asked about the moment of the beep, Irving said that he was thinking
about a vacation he took with his wife and children many years ago. He then proceeded
to tell a very long story about the actual vacation. When asked again what exactly was in
his awareness at the moment of the beep he said “more or less the first part of the trip.”
When asked if he was thinking about a specific aspect of the first part of the trip at the
moment of the beep he stated that he may have been thinking about the part of the trip
when his son went across a particular state line (the interviewer is not sure which one,
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although Irving knew which one it was). Irving stated that this was very close to the
beep, but was not sure if it was exactly at the beep. He then said that he was thinking
more about the excitement of his children during the trip at the moment of the beep. He
stated that the excitement part of his experience and the state line part were close to one
another and occurred close to the beep. Irving was fairly certain that he was not
experiencing any symbols at the moment of the beep. Throughout this beep, Irving
appeared to rely heavily on external reality. It was difficult to determine to what extent
Irving was discussing the actual trip and to what extent he was discussing his inner
experience.
Beep 2.3 – Irving was sitting in a chair in his apartment. At or around the beep, Irving
was thinking about a woman who used to run the food service in his assisted living
program. He then told a detailed story about the poor quality of food and a meeting he
had with the woman. When Irving was asked how he was thinking about the woman at
the moment of the beep, he stated that he did not understand how she could “go on like
that taking advantage of us.” He then stated that, at the moment of the beep, he was
thinking about the woman but was not certain exactly how he was thinking about her or
the form of his experience at this beep.
Beep 2.4 – Irving was sitting in a chair in his apartment. Irving stated that he was
thinking about his father when he had typhoid fever in the early 1920’s at the moment of
the beep. He then told a detailed story about his family. At one point, Irving was
repetitive, telling the interviewer twice within 3 minutes that he did not want to be a
farmer because it would have been hard for his wife (this is Irving’s first incidence of
repetitiveness so far). It was not clear exactly how he was thinking about his father at the
moment of the beep, but it seems that he was thinking about his father somehow at the
moment of the beep. Irving at one point stated that he was thinking about his mother as
well, but later stated that this occurred after the beep.
Beep 3.1 – Irving did not respond to this beep.
Beep 3.2 - Irving stated that at the moment of the beep he was thinking about seeing
Barack Obama’s minister on television the night before. Irving then went on to discuss
the minister himself, what he was wearing, the effect it will have on Obama in the
election, his concern about ending the war in Iraq, among other issues. When Irving was
repeatedly asked what he was experiencing at the moment of the beep, he was very
inconsistent, but always mentioned something in relation to the Obama’s minister or an
issue surrounding him. Eventually, Irving stated that he was uncertain exactly what he
was experiencing at the moment of the beep but that it had something to do with the
minister.
Beep 3.3 - Irving stated that at the moment of the beep he was thinking about a trip he
took with his father in 1933 and then explained various details of the trip. The
interviewer attempted to make a distinction between what Irving was experiencing at the
moment of the beep and the reality of the trip. Irving again was not certain exactly what
he was experiencing at the moment of the beep, but that it had something to do with
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getting ready to go on the trip. He was again unable to describe the form of his
experience.
Beep 4.1 – Irving had recently read a newspaper article about a mother who discovered
that her son had shot himself. Irving began the interview by discussing the incident itself
and how it reflected on young adults these days. When re-directed to his inner
experience at the moment of the beep Irving stated that he was innerly seeing the mother
coming out of the house, although he could only say this when form options were
suggested, including an inner seeing. He had some difficulty describing the details of the
inner seeing when asked about the details in general. When asked specific questions
(such as what angle, length of hair, what she was wearing, etc.) he was able to respond.
He stated that he was seeing her from the side, that her hair was not long, that she was
Caucasian, and that she may have been wearing a dress but was not entirely certain.
Irving stated that the inner seeing was a little unclear and, although it was in color, the
colors were muted. Irving also may have been shocked by the incident at the moment of
the beep, but could not describe this experience further. Irving’s difficulty describing
form, tendency to describe reality when asked questions about his inner experience, and
lack of ability to answer some specific questions related to this beep are all grounds for
skepticism. It appears likely that Irving was somehow thinking of the situation that he
read about in the newspaper article, but the specifics of this experience are questionable.
Beep 4.2 – At the moment of the beep, Irving was recalling a scene from his childhood.
He was innerly seeing himself at school trying to gain the attention of a teacher who was
talking to another teacher. In the inner seeing Irving was reaching toward the teacher’s
dress (or possibly a sweater), but she was ignoring him and continued talking to the other
teacher. He could not see the other teacher in the inner seeing, but knew that she was
there. He also could not hear the discussion in his experience. The inner seeing was
fairly clear and in color. Irving appeared to be confusing the actual event with the inner
seeing at time, causing reason for skepticism for this experience. For example, when
asked about the teacher’s clothing in the inner seeing he stated that she was “wearing
pretty nice clothing because this was in town.” When asked about what he was wearing
in his experience he stated that “in all probability, I was wearing knickers” but was
clearly referring to the actual situation (that he was probably wearing knickers because
that is what he usually wore in that situation at that time period). He later stated that he
did not think that he could see them in the inner seeing. It is very difficult to discern to
what extent Irving was having this experience at the moment of the beep due to his
alternation between descriptions of reality and inner experience. It is likely that he was
experiencing the general content that he described at the moment of the beep, but the
details are very uncertain. Irving also may have been experiencing wanting attention, as
if he were re-living the actual experience. He could not describe this wanting of
attention. When asked about the form of the experience of attention Irving either simply
repeated the content of the experience or referred to the actual event.
Beep 4.3 – Irving again began this interview describing the actual experience he had as a
child skating with his friends and building a fire on the ice. When directed to his inner
experience at the moment of the beep he stated that he was innerly seeing his friends
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starting the fire on the ice and himself standing nearby. Irving was given no prompts for
form prior to describing this experience. There were about three boys in the inner seeing,
but he was not certain. The fire was lit. There was color to the fire. Irving was not
certain if the rest of the inner seeing was in black and white or if it simply had little color
outside of the fire. The boys were mostly facing him in the inner seeing but he could not
make out the details of their faces as the inner seeing was unclear. He could describe
some details, such as everyone in the inner seeing were wearing skates, the other boys
were fixing the fire, and he was standing upright nearby.
Beep 4.4 – Irving reported not attempting to think of anything in particular prior to this
beep. At the moment of the beep Irving was reportedly thinking about a meeting that he
had earlier in the day. The meeting was for residents of his assisted living program.
Irving was innerly seeing a man (Steve) next to him asking a question about a model
cottage in an adjacent facility. Steve was on the right side of the inner seeing while the
man running the meeting was on the left side but in the distance. This was the same
perspective that Irving had in reality. There were other people in the inner seeing that
were attending the meeting but Irving could not describe any details about these people or
how many there were. The inner seeing itself was fairly clear and it was either in black
and white or had very little color. Irving may have also been hearing Steve talking in his
experience. He was talking very loudly, but was difficult to understand (both in real life
and in his experience). Irving was not certain of the exact words Steve was saying.
Beep 5.1 – Irving was remembering an incident that occurred with a friend (James) who
recently died. Irving described James and the incident at length before he was re-oriented
to the moment of the beep. This incident involved Irving visiting James in the hospital
while James was asleep. Irving said is name a few times and James woke up and said
“Irving” in a loud voice. Irving reported that at the moment of the beep he was innerly
seeing James in the hospital bed. Irving stated that the inner seeing was clear with little
color, although Ed’s face was quite red, as it was in reality. At or very near the moment
of the beep Irving was experiencing James’ opening his eyes and saying “Irving.” Irving
also may have been experiencing amazement at the moment of the beep, but could not
describe the form of the amazement. When asked repeatedly, Irving either referred to the
actual experience or repeated the content of the experience (i.e., “I was just amazed.”).
Irving seemed to again be intertwining reality with his experience at the moment of the
beep, but it is difficult to discern to what extent this was taking place.
Beep 5.2 – Irving was just given the MMSE. Irving had just said “I appreciate that I’m
as good as I am” referring to his cognitive ability. The beep sounded slightly after he
finished this sentence. Irving did not respond to the beep but rather kept having a
conversation with the interviewer with small periods of silence in between talking (a few
seconds). The beep continued to sound during the conversation and Irving did not
respond. Eventually, Irving recognized the “chirp” of the beeper while he was talking
about 4 minutes after the beeper initially sounded.
Beep 5.3 – Again, Irving did not respond to the beep while he was talking. When the
beep sounded, Irving simply continued to talk with no pause in his talking. Eventually
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Irving reported hearing the chirp sound. The interviewer did not hear the beep this time
so it is uncertain how long it took for Irving to recognize the chirp. This seemed to be the
same thing that happened during beep 5.2. However, the interviewer cannot determine
how long the beeper was going off.
Beep 5.4 – Irving was telling a story about a sexton he knew when he was younger who
liked to tell stories. This time, Irving immediately recognized the beep even though it
sounded while he was talking. At the moment of the beep, Irving was reportedly innerly
seeing the sexton standing outside of a church door on the steps. Irving stated that the
inner seeing was clear and the sexton was only a few feet away from the perspective of
the inner seeing and Irving could see most of his body. He was wearing trousers, but
Irving could not describe them. Irving may have also seen himself in the inner seeing,
but only reported this when specifically asked. Irving may have been standing a little to
the left of the inner seeing while the sexton was talking. Irving could not hear what the
sexton was saying in his experience. Irving frequently intertwined reality with his inner
experience during this interview. For example, when directed toward his inner
experience Irving seemed to describe it, then continue to discuss reality. Irving also said
that the inner seeing was in the summer, but later said that this was an external fact and
not necessarily part of his experience at the moment of the beep.
Beep 5.5 – This beep occurred immediately after the end of the interview for 5.4. Irving
had just said “I can see him standing and talking.” There was a pause in the conversation
when the beep sounded and Irving heard it and responded to it. Irving was just getting
ready to tell the interviewer more about the sexton, but it was not clear if this was in
Irving’s experience or not. Irving was not sure what, if anything, was in his awareness at
this beep.
Beep 5.6 – For this beep, Irving simply sat in his chair, not engaging in conversation with
the interviewer. Apparently, Irving had fallen asleep when the beep went off. After
about 35 minutes (the beeper was set for a maximum of 30 minutes), the interviewer
asked him if it went off. Irving woke up and said he did not hear it. The interviewer
listened and the beeper was in “chirp” mode.
Beep 6.1 – Irving began this interview by discussing his son and his wife in general and
how they own a house in Ocean City, New Jersey and how his family is currently in
Ocean City, New Jersey. When questioned specifically about the moment of the beep,
Irving stated that he was wondering what his son was doing today (the day of the
interview). Specifically, he was wondering if he was running on the boardwalk or if he
was repairing something. When questioned further, Irving stated that he was wondering
at the beep if he was running, but later said that this came a little bit after the beep. Near
the end of the interview, Irving stated that this experience came a little before the beep.
Irving also stated that at the moment of the beep he was innerly seeing his son repairing
something. This inner seeing was unclear and difficult to describe, although his son
seems to have been holding a hammer (Irving later added a saw to the inner seeing).
Finally, Irving stated that he was not sure which of the above was exactly at the moment
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of the beep, saying that he did not think that he did very good with this beep and that
what occurred at the beep “slips my mind.”
Beep 6.2 – Irving was sitting in his chair. After approximately 35 minutes, the
interviewer asked Irving if the beep sounded (it was set for a maximum of 30 minutes).
Irving said it had not. Irving was then asked if he was hearing little beeps (i.e., chirps)
and he said no. The interviewer listened to the beeper and it was in chirp mode, signaling
that Irving had missed the beep. Irving did not appear to be asleep during this beep, but
was not watched closely.

June’s Samples
June could not meaningfully engage in DES. Please see the chapter on June for more
information.

Karen’s Samples
Karen’s difficulty with the DES procedure was substantial enough to make individual
beep summaries largely useless. Please see her individual chapter for more information.

Lilly’s Samples
Lilly could not give meaningful responses to her beeps. For more information, please
see the chapter on Lilly.
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APPENDIX B

SELECTED TRANSCRIPTS
Transcripts of excerpts from interviews with 5 participants are given below.
Comments regarding the transcripts are in italics.

Fay
This transcript is taken from the final day of sampling with Fay. During this day, the
interviewers waited in a bedroom at Fay’s house while she wore the beeper so that she
could be interviewed immediately after the beep. Even though this was the last day, this
beep (5.3) is representative of Fay’s interviews in that she is inconsistent and often
discusses external reality rather than inner experience.
Fay began the interview by stating that at the moment of the beep she was playing
computer Scrabble and thinking about whether “slotter” was a word or not.
Russ (interviewer): …are you, uh, right at the moment trying to figure out whether it’s a
word?
Fay: Yeah, I was trying to think of whether it was a word…(inaudible)…or can I just play
it? If it’s not then the computer will challenge it and take it away. You can’t override
that. I’ve seen systems where I think you could but it seems like the current one you
can’t.
R: And s…and so right at the moment are you both thinking “I wonder it’s a word” and
thinking “I’ll play it and find out”?
F: Yeah, that’s what I was thinking.
R: Both of those things?
F: Right.
R: And, and, and does that seem like two separate thoughts or does that seem like two
aspects of the same thought?
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F: Well, it’s two aspects of the same thought.
R: And are there any words involved with that, with that thinking?
F: Well, I was going to add it onto another word that was already on the board
(inaudible).
Fay then briefly describes the actual playing of the word rather than her inner
experience.
R: But, but I guess what I’m tryin’ to figure out is, are you are saying to yourself, self,
something like that, quote “I wonder whether that’s a word” unquote, or…
F: Yeah, I wasn’t quite sure whether it was a word or not. I think I may have played it or,
or it coming up in the past and whether it was good, I can’t recall.
Again, Fay’s response does not address the question of inner experience at all. It
appeared that when asked about words being present in her inner experience, she took it
to be a question about the actual word she was playing in Scrabble.
R: And is that memory somehow present to you right at the moment of the beep?
F: Yeah, I was thinking about it, I was thinking I could play it but the system might reject
it.
Fay is referring to the reality of the situation, not to the question of her experiencing
memory at the moment of the beep.
R: And are, is there any…I’m, I’m gathering this is sort of a thought process, sort of
thinking about I should play it and whether it’s a word, I’ll try it and see.
F: Yeah.
R: Is there a, anything else going on, like emotions or, mad at the system, or?
F: Well, I was kind of trying to remember whether, you know, it had been played in the
past, I think it has, but whether it was good or not, I wasn’t quite sure.
Fay then discussed how much she has been playing Scrabble recently and about local
Scrabble events. R then asked how this remembering presented itself to her, but Fay
simply returned to saying that she was trying to remember whether it was good or not. R
then asked if she was trying to remember a specific time that it was played, and Fay said
no, that she was trying to remember in general.
R then attempted to summarize:
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R: So it seems like you’re looking at the game on the screen.
F: Yeah.
R: And then there’s a thought process which is going on which is about, “Well, I wonder
whether slotter is a word, I, I know I’ve seen it played, I can’t remember whether it’s,
whether it was good or not, I’ll just go ahead and play it, the computer will kick me out,
some, some, some systems will allow you to challenge it, some systems won’t. All that
stuff seems like it’s somehow going on right at the moment of the beep, is that right?
F: Well, I wasn’t thinking so much about systems that would allow you to override
(inaudible).
R: So that was not part of the moment of the beep?
F: No, I would say it was not, but I was thinking the system might challenge it, the
system challenges (inaudible).
R: And, and that, and all of that stuff is somehow present in your thoughts?
F: Yes, I was thinking there was a distinct possibility it might get challenged off the
board.
R: But I’m, but I’m gathering that there aren’t, there aren’t any words that convey that.
For example, you’re not saying to yourself “Well that’s a distinct possibility” end quote,
and yet you somehow know that it’s a distinct possibility.
F: Well, I knew it was a possibility that might not hold up.
This is representative of Fay’s seeming inability to describe the form of her experiences.
R: Okay.
F: And I could go to my Scrabble dictionary and look it up before I played it to see
whether it was going to hold up. If you’re playing an actual game, you know, with live
opponents they’re not going to let you do that. With a computer, you can refer to the
dictionary before you play it.
This is indicative of Fay’s very frequent tendency to discuss reality throughout
interviews.
R: Okay. And, and so, so all these, all these things, is slotter a word, I think I’ll play it,
I’d like it over-ridden, I’m pretty sure, uh, pretty sure I’ve seen it before…do those things
seem in anyway separate or does that all seem like part of the same thought process.
F: I think it was all part of the same thought process.
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R: Okay.
F: I might play it and it might hold, and it might just go away, wipe it off the board.
Todd: And can you say if all of these things, that’s part of the same process, are they all
occurring all at once right at that moment or is it over a period of two, three seconds or?
F: It’s pretty much simultaneous. I’m thinking it may not work, but I’ll give it a shot.
At this point the interview ended for this beep.
This beep is fairly representative of Fay’s samples, though there was much more
consistency in this sample than in some others. Common characteristics of her
interviews that are featured here are:
1. Seemingly undifferentiated experience, or no experience at all, evidenced by a
lack of form and multiple simultaneous awareness that could not be teased apart.
2. The inability to discuss the form of experience. This may be due to the
presence of undifferentiated experience or a lack of inner experience.
3. The tendency to discuss reality when attempting to discuss inner experience.
This could also be symptomatic of undifferentiated experience or no experience at all.
It is not certain if Fay’s difficulties with the interviewing process were due to
undifferentiated experience, no experience at all, or some other factor either related to or
unrelated to experience itself. However, given Fay’s lack of cognitive impairment, it
appears that these are the two most likely explanations.

Henry
This is a transcription from the beginning of beep 4.1 with Henry that is meant to
represent his inconsistency and general difficulty with DES even on the fourth and final
day of sampling. For this day, the interviewers waited outside while Henry wore the
beeper. When the beeper sounded, Henry notified the interviewers and the interviewers
immediately interviewed him.
For this sample, Henry had just finished reading the last paragraph of a letter from the
Knights of Columbus at the moment of the beep. Henry had just been asked what was in
his experience at the moment of the beep:
Henry: Interesting. It was, it was the final part of his, his letter to the, to the (group
members) of what uh, Christmas would be coming to and the (inaudible word) that we
have as Roman Catholics and what, you know, what we should do, and things of that
nature.
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R: Okay. And was all that stuff still in your mind…
H: Oh yeah.
R: In, in what way?
H: In what way? Because you remember certain things that happen during the course of
the year. Like, uh, we lost a few brothers through death. They were very young. A few
brothers who were quite sick.
R: And…
H: And, uh, there was a season of, uh, the first 6 months of the, of the (group) year when
we, uh, were progressing very vigorously in the (inaudible) issues, charity work.
R: And were those things, the brothers that had died, and the charity work, were those
things in your experience right at the moment of this beep…
H: Yes.
R: …or is that just like background?
H: Oh, background, back…because they past on prior, prior. But the, uh, the charity
work, of course, is always, is continuous…
R: Right.
H: is continuous, but the deaths of course were sudden. That’s what happened.
The above is an example of common difficulties that Henry had throughout sampling.
First, he was inconsistent with his answer, first saying that all of what he described was
in his experience, then quickly changing to stating that it was background when given the
option. Second, Henry discussed external fact (i.e., that charity work is on going but the
deaths were sudden) rather than inner experience.
R then explained that in reality the charity work is ongoing, but that does not necessarily
mean that it is in awareness at the moment of the beep. Henry stated that he was indeed
thinking about the charity work as well as the death of the members of the group.
R: And how did that stuff come to you right at the moment of the beep?
H: Well, as I said, I was at the end of the para…, uh, of the, uh, letter, and, uh, as I was
reading this, it was just like an impact, uh, just to bring back everything that we read, that
I read, as in the last statement, it says “I hope you and your families have a wonderful and
joyous Christmas.” So it brings back everything of what has, has gone on in the first six
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months. Charity work, yes. We worked a lot. I worked as much as I could, with my
condition. And the unfortunate deaths of two, two of the brothers.
R: Okay. And so that, the charity work part.
H: Okay.
R: Did you, like, see a picture of the charity work, or just remember the…
H: No, just, just the memorization of what we do, because my wife and I are quite, uh,
active in charity work. We work with women’s resources, battered women. I work with,
uh, stuff with the (organization) that we do.
R: And, and so, that’s uh, that’s a lot of stuff there.
H: I, yes, it’s, yeah, it’s very broad.
Henry still appears to be talking about reality rather than his inner experience, evidenced
by his generalities, his providing of context, and his statement “it’s very broad.”
R: And so right at the moment of the beep, what of that was in, was in your awareness?
H: The death of my, of the two brother knights.
This is an example of Henry’s high level of inconsistency. A few seconds ago, he had
been stating that, at the moment of the beep, charity was in his awareness. Now, when
asked again, he does not refer to the charity work, but rather to the deaths that he
mentioned previously.
R: And, okay, in what, in what way was that in your awareness?
H: The shock. The shock of the youngest one who died.
This is the first time that Henry mentions experiencing shock.
Henry goes on to explain the circumstances surrounding the man’s death, such as how
long he was in the hospital and how he died.
R: What of that death was in your awareness right at the moment of the beep? So you
could be, you could have been feeling about it, you could have been seeing him…
H: I felt, okay.
R: …being sick, or you could have been…
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H: I felt about it because I, I’m a former cancer patient twice. And here’s a young man
who passed away and I’m still kickin’ and I guess it’s not my time to die. That’s, that
was my theory, my philosophy.
R: And was that philosophy in your awareness right at the moment of the beep?
H: Oh yes. Yep.
Henry sounds extremely confident, but this is the first time he has mentioned any type of
philosophy at all, and that philsosophy is presented in an explication of context, not of
experience.
R: In words? Not in words? In pictures? (inaudible question)
H: In pictures, in pictures.
R: In what way? What kind of pictures?
H: In what way? I could see the young man, who was, uh, was, in his coffin and I’m here,
uh, you know, paying him the respect.
Again, this report is inconsistent with his previous reports and is representative of many
of Henry’s reports.
At this point, Henry stated that all or parts of the above came just after the beep as he
was taking stock of what he was experiencing at the beep. At the moment of the beep,
Henry stated that he was not having any experience and was just reading. Nevertheless,
this exchange is representative of many of Henry’s reports, and demonstrates the
substantial inconsistencies of his reports and his propensity for discussing external
reality rather than inner experience. It also demonstrates that Henry apparently did not
understand what was meant by “the moment of the beep” even on the fourth day of
sampling.

Irving
Portions of beep 5.1 are transcribed below. This interview represents one of Irving’s
most believable reports. However, question still remains to what extent it is an actual
report of his inner experience at the moment of the beep versus how Irving experienced
the situation in reality.
Irving was sitting in his chair in his living room when the beep sounded. Irving began
the interview by saying that at the moment of the beep he was remembering an incident
with his friend (James) whose funeral had been earlier in the day. Irving explained that
about 2 years ago James had been in a car accident and had had to be moved to a full359

care facility across the street from Irving’s residence. Irving continued to talk about
James in general. The interviewer then directed Irving to the moment of the beep:
Todd: So what is in your awareness right when the beep goes off?
Irving: Right when it went off…
T: Yeah, right when it went off.
I: …I was visiting him for the first time after that accident in full-care, which was then
still off, across the road. (A short, inaudible sentence) And I hadn’t seen him for so long
and he was in care and I made an effort to go over and see him to see whether he could
converse, or…and right when it went off is when I was asking him in a low voice, he
was, his eyes were closed, and I said “James” a couple times and all at once he opened
his eyes and saw who I was and recognized who he, wa..who I was and said “Irving,” just
like that. Whatever all his dangers were, I don’t know. He’d been hospitalized most of
the time since and he was, at this time, I was seeing him here at full-care.
The above is an example of one of Irving’s most believable and focused responses to
questioning. Usually, when Irving was asked in general about his experience at the
moment of the beep he discussed external reality at length and would not remain focused
on the moment of the beep. The fact that Irving referred to the beep in his response (i.e.,
“…and right when it went off.”) showed a focus on the beep that was virtually never
there during interviewing. Still, it appears that Irving may very well be describing what
actually occurred in the past rather than his experience at the moment of the beep. In an
attempt to discern if Irving was talking about inner experience or the actual event, the
interviewer asked Irving if he thought that his experience/memory of the event at the
moment of the beep was the same as it occurred in reality in the past. Irving said that it
was, although it may be difficult to make this distinction as his memory of the event itself
may not be accurate. Nevertheless, Irving’s reports of his inner experience at the
moment of the beep almost always seemed to reflect a memory of an actual event, making
it difficult to determine if he was talking about inner experience at the moment of the
beep that just happened to reflect reality or if he was talking about reality and picking a
time where the beep occurred. The interviewer then tried to determine the exact point
that the beep occurred in Irving’s description. Irving stated that he was not sure, but he
thought that it came right when James was saying “Irving.” He later stated that he
thought the beep occurred when James was opening his eyes, but again reverted to his
statement that James was saying “Irving” at the moment of the beep. Still, this reflected
a level of specificity and consistency in answering that he typically did not display,
although it does not necessarily suggest that Irving is actually describing his inner
experience at the moment of the beep. The interviewer then asked if Irving was innerly
seeing James at the moment of the beep:
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T: And are you visualizing him in your mind when the beep went off?
I: Yes.
T: And what are you seeing? Can you describe that to me, right when the beep went off?
I: I was standing looking at him. And I said several times his name. And, and then the,
the beep went off when he, as he said “Irving,” I was aston…astonished at that.
Irving is not answering the question at this point. He is not describing what he may be
innerly seeing at the moment of the beep, but either how the actual situation unfolded or
his memory of the situation.
T: So he’s laying in, in bed, is that right?
I: Yes. He was laying in bed on his back…
T: And you’re standing…So in your mind are you just seeing him or are you seeing him
and yourself?
I: I’m seeing him more than myself.
T: Is it like you’re seeing him from the perspective that you actually saw him, do you
know what I mean?
I: Yes.
T: Is it a clear picture?
I: Very clear.
T: Very clear. In color, not in color?
I: What’d you say?
T: Is it in color?
I: Not anymore than his, his complexion was quite red. It wasn’t normal.
Here, Irving is describing reality rather than his inner experience. He was asked if his
inner seeing was in color, but instead described the actual complexion of his friend.
T: Mmm kay. But the actual image that you’re seeing, it’s not in black and white?
I: No.
T: It’s in color, there’s just not a lot of color in the picture, is that right?
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I: Yes, yes. He was in the hospital for so long that…
Irving’s response here gives two reasons for skepticism. First, it was somewhat of a
leading question, and Irving seemed to be led. Irving did not say that there was an
absence of color in the inner seeing, but when the interviewer suggested this Irving went
along with the suggestion. Second, after answering the question, Irving returns to
describing the actual situation rather than his experience or the supposed inner seeing.
T: Yeah.
I: …his color wasn’t natural.
T: He was red.
I: Yes.
The interviewer then returned to Irving’s prior statement that he was astonished:
T: And you mentioned that you were astonished, I guess that he woke up and said your
name.
I: Yes.
T: And that’s how it happened when you actually saw him, you felt astonished, right?
I: Yes.
T: And are you feeling astonished at, when the beep goes off?
I: Yes, I was surprised.
T: Like just now, when the beep went off?
I: Yes.
It seems that Irving may be describing reality here rather than inner experience,although
he seemed quite confident. Perhaps the biggest reason for skepticism is Irving’s response
“Yes, I was surprised.” This response seems to suggest that Irving may have not been
astonished at the moment of the beep as he did not say he was astonished, he said he was
surprised. Furthermore, Irving answered in the past tense to a question that was in the
present tense, suggesting that he may have been referring to the actual incident rather
than his experience at the moment of the beep. If Irving would have answered “Yes, I
am astonished” there may be less reason for skepticism. Also, it seems somewhat strange
that Irving would be feeling astonished while remembering an event he had already
experienced, although this is certainly possible, especially if he is immersed in mentally
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re-living the event. However, the biggest reasons for being skeptical of Irving’s
amazement come when discussing the form of this experience:
T: Is it possible to say how you were experiencing the surprised or astonishment when
the beep went off? So for example, for some people that might be a physical thing that
they feel. For some it’s just a mental…
I: I wasn’t expecting it…
T: Okay.
I: …a response like that. I didn’t know whether he’d wake up and just go back to sleep
or not, but I was surprised at his response.
Irving’s response here seems to indicate the reason that he was astonished when the
event actually occurred and does not at all answer the question about inner experience
that was being asked.
T: And is that a physical surprise, like you’re taking a, like a deep breath or something, or
is it more of a mental surprise, if that makes any sense? It’s a tough question, I know.
I: Well, I, I, I guess it was more shock at the response he gave and not expecting it. We
did, we did not have much of a conversation at all because he did not respond. But when
he opened his eyes he knew who I was.
Again, this is a reason for his actual surprise, not the way it was experienced at the
moment of the beep. This may illustrate Irving’s inability to discuss any kind of
unsymbolized form, a problem present throughout sampling, although the interviewer
may not have made the distinction clear enough for Irving. It is also an example of
Irving’s tendency to discuss reality rather than inner experience.
T: Mmm kay. Anything else at the moment of this beep that you were experiencing?
I: No, not, it wasn’t so much because I did not stay ‘cause we couldn’t converse and he
was going back to sleep.
T: Okay, but in your experience just 10 minutes ago when the beep went off, were you
experiencing anything else?
I: No, I don’t think so.
Again, in this exchange Irving is discussing reality when asked about his experience.
This was common throughout sampling and brings rise to substantial skepticism
regarding all of Irving’s reports as this was arguably his seemingly most reliable report.
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June
This transcription begins in the beginning of the interview for beep 3.2. June was
initially asked about her experience at the moment of the beep about 15 to 30 seconds
before the transcription begins. She is talking about her granddaughter being in Mexico.
One important thing to notice is how fluent, or “normal” June’s conversation is, yet she
is not able to discuss inner experience or the moment of the beep in any meaningful way
whatsoever.
June: Her boyfriend, uh, father, oh, I don’t know, has some kind of connection with the
government, you know, in Mexico. And so the mother and father and (Stacy) and her
boyfriend were going down there for about ten days. He had, you know, some business
to do, so the... she was looking forward to that. And I was just thinking about her down
in Mexico, what she…
Here, June is discussing reality rather than inner experience, a very common occurrence
throughout this transcription and nearly all other interviews with June.
Todd: And so, right…
J: ...what her reaction will be when she returns.
T: Okay. And so, right when that beep went off, right at the moment it first went off,
what were you experiencing or thinking of, or…
J: Well, actually that’s what I was thinking about the whole time…
June is not discussing the moment of the beep, but is rather discussing what she thinks
about in general, i.e., “…thinking about the whole time.” This is also a common
occurrence throughout this and other interviews.
J: …because I just had... just had that on my mind about (Stacy) going to Mexico with
her, uh, future in-laws, and, uh, and her friend, and, uh..., I don’t know that’s about, well,
what I was concentrating on...
This language suggests that June is about to talk about inner experience.
T: Mmm kay.
J: ...and what she…
T: And so was that before…
J: ...was going to experience, you know, in Mexico, ‘cause she’s never been down in that
area…
June returns to discussing reality rather than inner experience.
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J: …and uh, you know, how the people, you know, the majority of them live and so forth.
‘Course they’re going to be getting into the, you know, into the cities…
T: Mmm, hmm.
J: ...and uh, (inaudible) they’ll be staying with.
T: And so you were kind of, you were thinking about all that stuff before the beep? And
at the beep?
J: Yeah, yeah, yeah.
June is emphatic in her affirmative responses to the interviewer’s question, as she is at
many points in the interview. It seems as if June is not understanding the specificity of
the question, and is rather interpreting it as “Were you thinking about all that stuff at
all?”
J: That’s what I was sort of concentrating on. I don’t know. That’s just what came to my
mind ‘cause I had been thinking about her all morning…
Again, June is discussing generalizations, not the moment of the beep.
J: …all I guess and, and uh, ‘cause they were leaving this morning sometime…
Here, June returns to a discussion of reality
J: …and, uh, I’ll just be anxious for her to return, and, and hear her experiences down
there.
T: Mmm kay. So…we were... right before the beeper went off we were talking kind of
back and forth, right? And we were saying… we were talking about her being at (Ohio
State) and (Andrew’s) son being at (Columbus).
J: No, no.
T: No?
J: Irving doesn’t have a son at (Columbus). I have a daugh…a granddaughter at
(Columbus).
T: Okay. There was something with somebody he knows at (Columbus) I thought we
were talking about.
J: They live in (Columbus).
T: Right.
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J: They live in (Columbus).
T: Right, but they don’t go to school there necessarily.
J: Oh no. No, no. His…his son…
T: Right.
J: …who was the pilot…
T: Right.
J: …yeah, they live in (Columbus).
T: So we were talking about that…
J: Yes.
T: …and your granddaughter going to (Ohio State) and she’s going to finish in a year.
J: Yeah.
T: And then I said something about, well, some of us never get out, and then you said that
she would and she might be getting married after college.
J: Yeah, I have…
T: And then the beep went off, I think right after you said that.
J: Yeah, yes.
T: And so at that point, you were thinking about her in Mexico? Right when that beep
went off?
J: Yes.
T: And is there anything in particular you were thinking about her in Mexico?
J: No, I was just thinking, what, you know, how she’s going to, um, oh well, what’s the
word I want to use? You know, when she gets there, how those people live down there.
June did not say what she was thinking at the moment of the beep, and now adds a new
external content component to the story, that she was thinking about how the people live
in Mexico, which she had not mentioned before. Although it appears in this case that
June may be attempting to describe her experience.
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T: Uh, huh.
J: You know, the majority of them. Have you been to Mexico?
T: Umm, for about an hour, once.
J: Oh, well, you know, it’s, un… unless you, you know, you get, I mean there are some
lovely areas, don’t misunderstand me.
T: Uh huh. But there’s rough areas too.
J: But generally speaking, it’s, it’s sort of rough living.
T: Yeah.
J: And uh, and of course a lot of them have come into United States, you know, to get
jobs and so forth.
It is as if the conversation is just continuing naturally with no regard for questions about
inner experience or the moment of the beep.
T: Right. And so when the beep went off were you thinking about, you know, when she
gets there and how the people live…
J: Yes.
She again gives an affirmative answer to a question about her experience at the moment
of the beep, but there is reason to be skeptical about it because she adds a new
component in her next response below.
T: …down there.
J: Well, I’m just anxious. I was just thinking I’m anxious to speak to her when she
returns…
This may be true, but it was not mentioned before. Therefore, it seems to have no
connection to her inner experience at the moment of the beep.
J: …you know, and get her, uh, feelings about the, about that area. And uh, I’m sure that
they’ll have a good time.
June returns to discussing reality.
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J: And I, if, I don’t really know, I forget where, what, where they were staying, you
know, where they had her, her, sss… uh, boyfriend’s, fff…uh, father had reservations
somewhere where they were staying, you know, in a nice motel…
T: Mmm, hmm. Right.
J: …or hotel. And uh…
T: And so were you kind of thinking about all of these things…
J: Yes! Yes, I mean, my mind…
June again responds emphatically and affirmatively.
T: Right…
J: …was…
T: …so…
J: …I could just feel it going like this (put hand beside head and makes circular motion
as if her thoughts were “spinning”), you, I was thinking about…
T: …right.
J: …Mexico, ‘cause I’ve been there.
T: Right.
J: And, um, I’m just anxious to speak to her, you know…
T: Right.
J: …and get her, um, feelings about Mexico.
T: Right. So her going, thinking about her going to Mexico, what she’ll be experiencing,
how the people live down there…
J: Yes, yes.
T: …and that you’re anxious to speak to her now. Were you thinking that all right when
the beep goes off?
J: Yes.
T: All of that?
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J: Yes.
It is possible that June could be thinking about various aspects of her granddauther’s
trip to Mexico, but her inconsistency, inability to answer specific questions, tendency to
discuss reality than inner experience, and her constantly adding new content to her
experience make it fairly clear that this was not the case. Instead, June’s answers reflect
a lack of comprehension and/or disregard for any questions related to momentary inner
experience .
T: Right at that moment?
J: Well really, that’s all I had on my mind…
June returns to discussing generalization.
J: …because I started to, I thought about it this morning and that just came to me about
(Stacy) going down there.
T: Mmm, hmm.
J: And um, I’m just anxious to get her reaction to that country because I know she’s never
been down there, and um, I think it’s, uh, quite an experience for them.
T: Okay.
J: To see how the other half lives.
T: Right, it is interesting, yeah.
J: Yes, it is. And uh…
June gives another strong, affirmative answer.
T: So those things, you were kind of thinking about a lot of these things not only before
the beep went off, but all of it right when the beep went off?
J: Yes. Yes, yes, you know, I just sort of…
June gives another strong affirmative answer. Typically, this level of certainty is
evidence that someone is accurately describing their inner experience. However, it is
clear at this point that June’s certainty represents something else entirely, most likely a
lack of comprehension of the specificity and/or meaning of the question. It could also
represent a mechanism designed to hide the fact that she does not know what she was
experiencing at the moment of the beep, that she has no experience at the moment of the
beep, or that it is simply easier to answer in a strong, affirmative manner.
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T: Right.
J: …you know…
T: And, and are you seeing pictures of Mexico or your granddaughter…
J: (Drawn out and emphatic) Yeesss. Yes.
T: …in your, in your head…
J: Yes. Yes.
T: …innerly seeing…
J: Absolutely. Absolutely. Yes. Yes.
June’s affirmative responses are very quick, as if she is either so certain about her
momentary inner experience that it takes no consideration to respond in such a manner,
or that she is not fully comprehending the specificity and/or depth of the question.
T: And can you say what exactly you’re seeing right when the beep went off or is that too
difficult?
J: (Squints eyes and puts hands to brow as if thinking hard or having a head ache)
Suddenly, when a more specific question that requires more than a “yes” or “no”
answer is presented, June has substantial difficulty.
J: Well….um, I think I was just thinking about talking to her when she returns. I think
that was on my mind, you know, sitting down and having a long chat with her, uh, when
she returns to tell me about her experiences.
T: Okay.
J: Of course I know they’ll be swimming and that sort of thing too, you know…
June returns to discussing external things rather than her inner experience.
T: Sure.
J: …but they’re going to be, um, doing some traveling down there, and, and just to
observe how those people, some of them live…very crudely. Oh, of course, then there
are some beautiful homes too, you know, when you get into the cities but…it’s
certainly…
T: And so were…
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J: It certainly isn’t United States.
T: Mmm, hmm. And so were you thinking in words “Gosh, I really want to talk to her
when she gets home” or seeing pictures or either of those…
J: Oh yes, oh yes, that’s what I’m, you know, that’s what I’m looking forward to, because
I’m, she has a ca…, you know, always has a camera with her, and uh, so I’m anxious to
see her pictures, and, and they’re (inaudible) her experiences down there.
June seems to have misinterpreted the question. She apparently understood it as a
question about actual photographs rather than inner experience, totally disregarding the
first part of the question about worded experience.
T: Okay.
J: But I’m sure that they’ll be doing, you know, a lot of sight seeing and…taking
advantage of all the, uh, opportunities that are, that pop up…
T: Right. Mmm kay.
J: …‘cause I think it’s a place she’d probably never return to. And she was taking time
off from her job. You know, this is the one (that works with children).
T: Right.
J: And, um, so I don’t think she’ll probably ever return there.
T: Okay. (pause) Just checking my time. (pause) Okay. So I don’t think I have any more
questions necessarily.
J: (gets picture of gran daughter) This, this is the one that I’m talking about…
T: Right.
J: … right there.
T: Okay.
J: Yeah, the oldest one.
T: Right. Mmm kay. (pause) So one distinction that’s really hard to make that I want to
try and make as much as possible, and you’re doing a good, a very good job by the way,
is exactly kind of what’s right when that beep goes off and what’s before the beep goes
off.
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The interviewer notices that the beep is sounding
T: Is it going off again?
J: Mmm, hmm. It’s on now.
June did not independently respond to the beep. Although her hearing is fine, she did not
notify the interviewer or otherwise perform the required task when the beep sounded. In
fairness, the interviewer did not give June very much time to respond on her own,
approximately one to three seconds.
T: Did it just start?
J: Yeah, it just started.
The next beep was then discussed, with very similar results. Therefore, it will not be
transcribed. Hopefully, the following things are apparent from the above transcript:
1. June’s conversational skills are relatively normal.
2. June is not close to answering questions about momentary inner experience
evidenced by:
a. June’s inability to answer anything beyond a yes/no question regarding
momentary inner experience.
b. June’s inconsistent answers, typically in the form of adding content as
the discussion continued.
c. June’s consistent discussion of reality rather than inner experience.
d. June’s consistent referral to general experience rather than specific
experience.

Karen
The following is an excerpt from sample 3.2 with Karen. This sample is perhaps the
closest that Karen seemed to get to the moment of the beep. For this day, Karen was
interviewed instantly after the beep.
At the moment of the beep, Karen was reading a book. Apparently, at the moment of the
beep, she was reading about a scene in the book that was taking place at a wedding in
Jerusalem. Karen was just asked what she was aware of at the moment of the beep:
Karen: Well, I’m thinking about some people that are getting married in…(points to
book)
Todd: Okay.
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K: …in Jeru, in Jerusalem. They’re Jewish people so that they have big, big weddings,
you know? And when, uh, a father finds a, a husband or a young man for his daughter
he’s very happy because it’s something that’s unusual to find a…
T: Mmm, hmm.
K: …a good husband, you know? In the meantime I was thinking about my daughter
that, my other daughter that got married. She had a great big wedding.
This seems to signify that she was either thinking about the wedding from the book, her
daughter’s wedding, both, or neither at the moment of the beep.
T: And so right when that beep went off, or like the last kind of split second before it
went off, can you say what was in, what you were thinking of right…
K: The wedding.
T: Okay. And you’re thinking about the wedding, people getting married in Jerusalem
K: Mmm, hmm.
Karen signifies she is thinking about the wedding from the book, although the interviewer
led her in that direction. The possibility that she was also thinking about her daughter’s
wedding has not been excluded however.
T: Okay. And is that, is that related to the book that you are reading?
K: Mmm, hmm.
T: Mmm kay. And so, could you tell me kind of how you are thinking about people
getting married? Are you thinking about it kind of in words, for example, “well these
people are getting married” or are you kind of imagining a wedding in you mind, or?
K: Well, I was thinking about my daughter’s wedding ‘cause she had a big wedding with
over 300 people in the wedding and, uh, in a very ritzy…ri…ritzy hotel you know?
Karen switches back to saying that she was thinking about her daughter’s wedding. It is
difficult to say whether she was actually thinking about the wedding in Jerusalem or
actually wanted to report that she was thinking about that wedding because the
interviewer led her in that direction. What this switch does represent is that either a.
Karen is truly inconsistent about her reports or b. Karen is easily led. Either way, either
of these possibilities are grounds for substantial skepticism. Furthermore, Karen
continues to talk about content when asked about form, a common occurrence throughout
sampling.
T: Okay. And so are you reading about people in Jerusalem getting married?
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K: Mmm hmm.
T: Okay. And so you’re thinking about a wedding?
K: Yep.
T: Okay. And are you thinking of…are you think about the Jerusalem people getting
married…
K: Yeah.
T: …or are you thinking about your daughter getting married?
K: No, I…I’m thinking about these people here… (motions toward book)
T: Right at that, right at that moment? (snaps fingers to signify beep)
K: Yeah.
Here Karen goes back to stating that she is not thinking about her daughter’s wedding at
the moment of the beep, but is rather thinking about the wedding from the book even
though she had just stated that she was thinking about her daughter’s wedding at the
moment of the beep. This is the first time that she has excluded one of the weddings from
her experience (her daughter’s wedding).
T: Okay. So it’s possible you could be reading that but thinking about your daughter’s
wedding.
K: Yeah, uh huh.
T: Or it’s possible you’re reading that and thinking kind of about the wedding in the
book.
K: Yeah.
T: Can you say which one of those you were thinking about? Or are you not sure?
K: A little bit of both.
This is the first time that Karen has said that she was thinking about both weddings.
T: A little bit of both? Okay. And are you thinking about, are they kind of separate, so
you’re thinking about one and you’re also thinking about the other…
K: Yeah.
T: …or are you thinking about, like, one wedding and it kind of has aspects of both?
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K: Well…
T: Or is that too hard to answer?
K: It, it’s hard to answer. Because, see, this girl here had a very simple wedding, and
not...
T: In the book?
K: Yeah.
T: Okay.
K: And then my daughter had an, an enormous wedding…
T: Mmm kay.
K: … so…and my daughter got married in the same church as we got married.
T: Okay.
K: So that’s something else that I was thinking about.
Here, Karen has added another potential aspect to her experience that she did not
mention before (thinking about the fact that her daughter got married in the same church
as she and her husband). However, it should be noted that Karen may not have been
saying that she was thinking about that at the moment of the beep, but may have been
saying that she was thinking about it after the beep, or during the conversation, etc.
T: And so are these again, are these things that you’re thinking about kind of near the
beep and around it?
K: Mmm hmm.
T: So what are you thinking about right at it? Just a split second where you kind of
free…if you, if you could freeze what you were thinking or what you were aware of,
what would that look like, or what would, what would that be? Or can you, I mean maybe
you can’t say, right at that moment?
K: Not really.
T: You can’t say?
K: No.
T: Right at the moment?
K: No.
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T: But you kind of know, you kind of know what you were thinking about kind of around
and near that moment?
K: Yes, uh huh.
This was again a leading question on the interviewer’s part as Karen never stated that
she knew what she was thinking about around the moment of the beep. Nevertheless,
either it is true or Karen is easily led.
T: Okay. And so do you…are you th…do you…maybe…and if you’re not sure that’s fine
and I want you to tell me you’re not sure, but are you thinking about weddings at the
moment of the beep?
K: Yeah.
T: Okay. And you’re thinking…can you say whether you’re thinking about the wedding
in Jerusalem or your daughter’s wedding right at the moment, or not sure?
K: Not sure.
T: Okay. But you were thinking about them both kind of around the beep?
This is another leading question that Karen affirms.
K: Yes.
To this point, the interviewer has suggested options while Karen simply responds yes or
no. This is a cause for increased skepticism as she has not offered this information on
her own.
The interviewer now turns to questions about form:
T: Okay. And is there an imagining at some point? Is there, for example, you’re kind of
having a pi…you’re remembering your daughter’s wedding and you kind of have a
picture in your head? Or there’s a picture of your head, or in your…(laughs)….a picture
of your head …(laughs)…a picture in your head of the wedding in the book? Do you
think that there’s any pictures in your head at any time, at the beep or around the beep, or
no, not necessarily?
K: Well, the, the wedding there was so, oh, what would you call it…so simple…
T: Mmm hmm.
K: …compared to what my daughter had, you know? That wedding there was, was
simple yet, for the Jewish people, it was something special.
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Karen discusses reality rather than her inner experience.
T: Okay. And are you comparing, so are you, you’re comparing the two weddings?
K: Mmm hmm. (Nods).
There is reason for substantial skepticism with this response because a. the interviewer
suggested it and b. Karen has not directly stated that she was comparing the two
weddings to this point.
T: Right, can, can you say if you were doing that right when that beep went off or was it
near when the beep went off?
K: Near when the beep went off.
T: But you’re not sure if it was exactly there or kind of around it?
K: Yes sir.
T: Okay. Good. And is there a way to say how you were comparing them? So for
example, people might have kind of a tense feeling about comparing two weddings, or a
happy feeling, or maybe they’re kind of having a picture of both in their minds, or maybe
they’re thinking in words about “well, this wedding was really big, but this one was
really small.” Can you say how you were kind of com…how you were comparing it? If
there were pictures or words or neither or not sure?
K: Well, this wedding was such, such, such a nothing, you know? And the, the other, my
daughter’s wedding was such a big wedding that it, it’s hard to compare both of them.
T: Okay. But you were kind of comparing them at the beep or around the beep?
K: Yeah.
At this point, Karen was asked if there was anything else in her experience at or near the
moment of the beep, and she said no.
Although this was one of Karen’s better (perhaps her best) sample, it is still apparent
that Karen cannot narrow her experience to the moment of the beep. Furthermore, her
reports of inner experience cause reason for a very high level of skepticism. This is due
to their inconsistencies, the fact that Karen does not offer much information but rather
follows with what is suggested, that Karen typically answered in the affirmative to
leading questions, and her tendency to talk about real life compared to the moment of the
beep.
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